G.R. No. 246787 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

The Spanish Penal Law has substantial influence on Philippine Penal Laws1 considering that the Código Penal was not superseded until the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was adopted in 1930. Under the Spanish Penal Law, a convicted felon should also be adjudged civilly liable as a part of, or in addition to, his or her criminal liability. Articles 111 and 112 of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal) provide that civil remedy is instituted with the penal action unless it has been waived by the party injured or has been expressly reserved for civil proceedings for the future.2 Relative thereto, the Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate the fusion in the criminal prosecution of "the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged."3 This is rooted in Article 100 of the RPC which provides, "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Further, it is doctrinal that an act or omission may constitute both a cause of action in a civil case, as well as an element of, or a criminal offense of itself.

Under Section 1 of the present Rule III, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34[,] and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct[,] and independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.5

To clarify, however, the injured party has to choose the remedy of which to enforce a claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars double recovery. This is consistent with the Court's ruling in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:6

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code[] and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.7 (Emphasis and citation omitted)

Considering that claims which are not for liability ex delicto are not fused or deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal action, there is even no need to reserve the right to prosecute them separately. However, while the civil and criminal liabilities may co-exist, the existence of one is not dependent on the existence of the other. To remember, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.8 Concomitantly, where civil liability is adjudged in the judgment in the fused action, this civil liability may include restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.9

The above discussion is the very reason why the Rules of Court requires a judgment of acquittal to affirmatively state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."10 An express finding or declaration that the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt will indubitably support the continuing vitality of the civil action for damages ex delicto despite the judgment of acquittal. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court explained the two kinds of acquittal and their effects on the civil liability of the accused:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.12 (Citations omitted)

If an accused is acquitted on the ground that he or she is not the author of the act or omission complained of, then he or she is absolved as well of civil liability ex delicto. However, the confusion lies when the accused is acquitted by reason of failure of the prosecution to prove his or her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In such a situation, the accused is acquitted of the crime charged but may still be held civilly liable. This is the dilemma that the Court is confronted with in the present case.

Case law with respect to filing of separate civil actions when the accused is acquitted

In People v. Pantig,13 the Court affirmed the acquittal of Pantig but ruled that his civil liability is based on a contract and did not arise from the criminal act and, hence, may not be enforced in the criminal case.

Likewise, in People v. Singson,14 where the Court found that the evidence against Singson was not sufficient to establish his guilt, the Court acquitted Singson but without prejudice to the pursuit of any civil liability that may be established against her in a separate civil case.

Further, in Dy v. People (Dy),15 the Court ruled that whenever the elements of estafa are not established and the delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case precisely because it springs from the criminal act.

Dy instructs that where the civil liability arises from an entirely different source of obligation, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case and consequently must be filed separately. This is consistent with the fact that whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of a crime do not exist, it effectively says that there is no crime. Necessarily, there can likewise be no act or omission that could give rise to civil liability arising from an act or omission that has been declared inexistent. Therefore, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.

In Spouses Tayamen v. People,16 the Court categorically stated that the award of civil liability ex contractu cannot be made in a criminal case where the elements of the crime were not duly proven.

Recently, the Court in Wong v. Wong,17 citing Dy, ruled that when there is no civil liability ex delicto but only civil liability ex contractu, the civil liability must be litigated in a separate proceeding.

However, in Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases against Sapiera, but ruled that such dismissal will not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration by the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. The Court adjudged Sapiera's civil liability in the same criminal case.

Likewise, in Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba,19 the Court ruled that Rimando's acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil liability and held Rimando liable to Spouses Aldaba for the amount of PHP 500,000.00 also in the same case.

The Court has thus been inconsistent with respect to the filing of a separate civil action in case the accused is acquitted based on insufficiency of evidence when the elements of the crime are not properly established. It is therefore an opportune time for the Court to adopt a consistent and uniform rule as to when civil liability not arising from the crime may be adjudged in the same criminal proceeding or ought to be litigated in a separate civil action.

I agree with Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo's (Chief Justice Gesmundo) position that when the accused is acquitted regardless of the reason, i.e., he or she did not commit the offense or proof is insufficient, then there is no crime to speak of. Hence, there can be no civil liability ex delicto. From the name itself, civil liability ex delicto is civil liability arising from the delict, a crime. Thus, when an accused is acquitted there is no crime to speak of and, therefore, there can be no civil liability adjudged in that instance, whatever be the reason. It is worth pointing out here that a lot of the confusion stems from the distinction between the types of acquittal.

Likewise, I agree with Chief Justice Gesmundo that in instances when an accused is acquitted, civil liability may be awarded based on other sources as provided for under Article 1157 of the Civil Code when the facts and evidence on record already so warrant. However, I think the standard required for allowing it by Chief Justice Gesmundo, as "intimately related to the criminal liability," needs to be further refined and fleshed out. Indeed, the question of whether civil liability may be awarded in the same proceeding is a question of fact that will, as a matter of procedural due process, depend on whether the civil liability of the accused was raised during trial and whether the adverse party was heard on this point. This is consistent with the Court En Banc's ruling in Padilla v. Court of Appeals20 (Padilla):

Similar to the present case, in Padilla, the civil liability of the petitioner therein was based on a different source of obligation other than civil liability ex delicto.

In Guasch v. Dela Cruz,23 the Court pointed out that when the facts to be proven in a civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted, a separate civil action is no longer required to be filed considering that due process has already been accorded to the accused and the evidence to make a determination of the accused's civil liability is already at the disposal of the court. Further, in Dayap v. Sendiong,24 the Court held as follows:

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.25

From the foregoing, therefore, I humbly opine that (1) if the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper because there is no delict from which any civil obligation ex delicto may be sourced and (2) if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the civil liability is based on a different source of obligation, which was properly raised and ventilated during trial and not based on civil liability ex delicto, the civil liability should be adjudicated in the same action and there is no need for a separate civil proceeding without prejudice to the rights of third parties not impleaded in the action.

As elucidated in Gayos v. Gayos,26 it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. Thus, I respectfully suggest in order to have a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of civil claims arising from sources other than civil liability ex delicto, if the court already has the necessary tools to make a determination of the civil liability arising from sources other than civil liability ex delicto and the affected parties have been given their day in court, then there is no reason to require another litigation to be commenced, which will not only add to docket congestion, but will also further burden our already burdened courts, including this Court.

Considering the foregoing, I concur in the findings of the ponencia of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario that the Court may grant the award to private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo (Caspillo) of the civil liability arising from another source of obligation in the same criminal action. By preponderance of evidence, this civil liability was proven when petitioners Spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo failed to pay Caspillo the loan amounting to PHP 300,000 based on a contract, i.e., their duly executed Memorandum of Agreement.

Ultimately, I vote to GRANT the Petition, ACQUIT the petitioners for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and ORDER petitioners to pay private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo the principal amount of PHP 300,000.00 plus legal interest of 12% per annum from April 10, 2013 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision. The total amount due shall likewise earn interest of 6% per annum from the finality of the Decision until full payment.