G.R. No. 246787 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

I concur with the acquittal of petitioners Spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo (Spouses Llonillo) of the charge of Estafa (Other Deceits) due to the prosecution's failure to prove all the elements thereof. However, I express a different view with regard to the issue on determination of civil liability in the same criminal proceeding.

Spouses Llonillo entered into a sangla-tira arrangement with private complainant Pedro Joel V. Caspillo (Caspillo), under which Caspillo would lend Spouses Llonillo a sum of money, and in consideration thereof, Caspillo would be entitled to the rents of one of the apartment units owned by the spouses, as interest. The parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where Spouses Llonillo acknowledged the receipt of the amount of PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo, to be paid on or before March 20, 2010.1 Caspillo, however, failed to collect the promised monthly rentals. Caspillo investigated and discovered that Spouses Llonillo entered into similar sangla-tira arrangements involving the same apartment unit with other parties. It also turned out that the apartment units involved in the sangla-tira arrangements were mortgaged to different banks contrary to the representations of Spouses Llonillo during their negotiations. Due to their misrepresentations, petitioner spouses were charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).2

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) found Spouses Llonillo guilty of the charge. The MeTC held that the prosecution established the fraudulent representation of Spouses Llonillo since the latter entered into a sangla-tira arrangements with other individuals, despite their arrangement with Caspillo. The MeTC found that there was suppression of a material fact, which the Spouses Llonillo were bound in good faith to disclose, when they rented out the apartment units.3

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. The RTC held that the elements of deceit and damage are present as Spouses Llonillo did not disclose to Caspillo the previous mortgages to other persons and banks.4

The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise affirmed the conviction of Spouses Llonillo. The CA found that petitioner spouses' fraudulent representation was established when they made it appear that Caspillo could collect the rentals of the apartment unit as interest for the loan they obtained from him, which representation they knew to be false as they mortgaged the unit to different banks and entered into a sangla-tira arrangement over the same unit with other people.5

The ponencia acquits the Spouses Llonillo of the crime of Estafa through Other Deceits because the prosecution failed to prove that there was a false pretense and that such false pretense was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. According to the ponencia, there is no suppression of a material fact since Caspillo was aware that the apartment unit was mortgaged to financial institutions at the time he entered into the sangla-tira arrangement.6 The other sangla-tira arrangements could also not be the basis for Spouses Llonillo's conviction as they were entered into after the execution of the MOA with Caspillo.7 However, the ponencia ordered Spouses Llonillo to pay Caspillo the loan amount of PHP 300,000.00.8

I concur with the acquittal of petitioner spouses of the charge of Estafa (Other Deceits) due to the prosecution's failure to prove all its elements.

For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (i) the accused makes a false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the RPC; (ii) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (iii) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.9

As correctly found by the ponencia, at the time of the execution of the MOA, Caspillo already knew that the subject properties were mortgaged to financial institutions since he admitted that he had seen the copies of the certificates of title covering the apartment unit during negotiations. Further, the other sangla-tira agreements over the apartment unit with other people cannot serve as basis for Spouses Llonillo's conviction since they were entered into after the execution of the MOA with Caspillo. Thus, Spouses Llonillo did not employ false pretense nor commit a fraudulent act prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the MOA, which may have caused damage or prejudice against Caspillo. Accordingly, Spouses Llonillo should be acquitted of the charge of Estafa through Other Deceits.

However, I do not agree with the ponencia's ruling that civil liability can be adjudged against Spouses Llonillo in the same criminal case.

It is a fundamental principle that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.10 This is borne of the recognition that a person found guilty of committing a crime has caused injury to two parties—first, the state, hence the criminal liability, and second, the private complainant, hence the civil liability.

If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not automatically prevent a judgment as to the civil aspect of the case.11 Rule 111, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically states that:

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court explained the two kinds of acquittal and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. . . . The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.13

The ponencia holds that the civil liability arising from sources other than the delict may be adjudged in the same criminal action where the judgment of acquittal was pronounced. However, this position is incongruent with our rules of procedure. The rules of procedure established by this Court are clear that the civil action deemed instituted when a criminal case is filed is limited only to the enforcement of civil liability ex delicto:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.14

Accordingly, a criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine accused's civil liability arising from a source of obligation other than delict. The court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal aspect and the civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime.15

The Court reiterated in Dy v. People16 that the civil liability which attaches to a criminal action pertains only to the recovery of civil liability ex delicto, and not to civil liability arising from a different source of obligation, as in the case of a contract where the civil liability is ex contractu. Thus, the civil liability that arises from a different source of obligation must be filed separately:

Thus, Dy v. People instructs that whenever the elements of Estafa are not established, and the delivery of any personal property is pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the Estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, or that which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Rather, it is civil liability ex contractu, which arises from an entirely different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case and, consequently, must be filed separately.18

It is also worthy to note that the corpus delicti of Estafa is fraud. Fraud is an essential element of Estafa, and its presence is necessary to prove the commission of the crime. If there is no evidence of fraud or deceit, there is no crime committed. Estafa necessitates a showing that the accused intentionally deceived another party, leading to wrongful gain or damage.

Here, petitioner spouses were acquitted because of the absence of the element of false pretense or fraud. Petitioner spouses did not commit any false pretense or fraud that could have deceived Caspillo into executing the MOA and parting with his money. The acquittal of petitioner spouses is not merely based on reasonable doubt; there is absolutely no factual basis for criminal liability. Since petitioner spouses' civil liability arises from a contract, which is not related to the allegation of fraud, it must be threshed out in a separate case. Petitioner spouses' civil liability arising from the contract should be pursued through a separate civil proceeding, where the terms of the contract and obligations of the parties can be properly examined and determined.

Further, this Court elucidated that the fusion of criminal and civil actions can deprive an accused of their right to a meaningful hearing, violating the accused's right to due process:

It is important to recognize that the rules of procedure in criminal and civil cases are distinct and separate. In a criminal case, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, which must demonstrate the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a high standard of proof that requires moral certainty, leaving no reasonable doubt in the mind of the court. As such, the defense's primary focus is on disproving the elements of the crime as stated in the information, and raising defenses that are applicable to the situation. The information serves as a formal written accusation that outlines the specific charges against the accused and provides them with notice of the allegations they are facing. Thus, the accused in a criminal case prepares their defense based on the crime stated in the information.

Conversely, in a civil case, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, who must prove their case by a preponderance of evidence. This is a lower standard of proof compared to proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. The defendant's defense in a civil case often revolves around attacking the legal and factual basis of the plaintiff's complaint, seeking to demonstrate the absence of liability. Additionally, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss to prove the absence of a basis to collect the civil liability.

The procedural disparities between criminal and civil cases underscore the necessity of maintaining separate proceedings for adjudicating each type of liability. Thus, any civil liability arising from a source other than a criminal act must be pursued in a separate civil action. To do otherwise would violate the fundamental right to due process guaranteed to the accused.

While it may be argued that adjudicating civil liability arising from a source other than delict in the same criminal case promotes efficiency and expediency, it is important to prioritize the rights of the accused and ensure a fair proceeding. Pursuing civil claims arising from a source other than delict in a separate action allows for a more thorough examination of the evidence and legal arguments, leading to a more just resolution.

Additionally, integrating civil claims arising from a different source other than delict into the criminal proceedings could allow litigants to misuse the court as a leverage to forcibly collect their civil claims against the defendants. To maintain fairness and efficiency, it is crucial to keep the civil and criminal cases separate and ensure each is resolved on its own merits.

While there have been instances20 where this Court allowed recovery of civil liability in the same criminal case even if the source of the liability was not the crime itself, it is important to note that in such cases, civil damages were awarded since the facts sustaining them were proven by preponderant evidence.

In this case, the civil liability of petitioners Sps. Enrique Llonillo and Maritess Llonillo was based on a different source of obligation other than civil liability ex delicto. They admitted that they borrowed money from Caspillo, but they averred that they already made certain payments to Caspillo. Since there is an allegation of payments, the civil liability of petitioners must be threshed out in a separate case considering the insufficiency of evidence to hold them liable. As regards the subsequent execution of another sangla-tira agreement and its effect on petitioner's contract with Caspillo, the same was not adequately ventilated in the proceedings. Therefore, a separate civil action regarding this matter is necessary.