G.R. No. 246787 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

I fully concur in the ponencia circulated by the esteemed Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario. I write to share my perspective on the issue of adjudging civil liability in a criminal action despite the acquittal of the accused.

The essential facts of the case are as follows: petitioner spouses Enrique Llonillo and Marites Llonillo (spouses Llonillo) entered into a sangla-tira venture with private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo (Caspillo), under which Caspillo would lend spouses Llonillo a sum of money in exchange for entitlement, for a certain period of time, to the rents of one of the apartment units owned by spouses Llonillo. Consequently, the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby spouses Llonillo acknowledged receipt of the amount of PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo, to be paid on or before March 20, 2010. Trouble ensued, however, when Caspillo failed to collect the promised monthly rentals. After investigation, Caspillo discovered that spouses Llonillo entered into similar sangla-tira schemes involving the same apartment unit with other parties. It also turned out that the apartment units involved in the sangla-tira schemes were mortgaged to different banks. Thus, spouses Llonillo were charged with committing the crime of Estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code.1

On the issue of jurisdiction, the ponencia holds that the Metropolitan Trial Court had the authority to hear, try, and decide the case, despite the lack of proof that the assistant city prosecutor responsible for filing the Information was authorized by the chief city prosecutor of Makati City. This is in accordance with the doctrine in Gomez v. People2 that the lack of prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor constitutes a mere formal defect which may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to raise such ground during arraignment or before entering a plea.3

On the merits, the ponencia acquits spouses Llonillo of the crime of Other Deceits. It found the element of "false or fraudulent act or pretense executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud" missing because it was clear that spouses Llonillo did not suppress the fact that the apartment units were mortgaged when they entered into the agreement with Caspillo. Moreover, the fact that spouses Llonillo entered into other sangla-tira schemes involving the same apartment unit, after they had already entered into the agreement with Caspillo, cannot be considered as being "made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud." Thus, there can be no misrepresentation to speak of at the time of the execution of the MOA.4

Finally, the ponencia holds that spouses Llonillo should be adjudged civilly liable to Caspillo for their loan in the amount of PHP 300,000.00 (unpaid loan), despite their acquittal. The ponencia invokes the case of Padilla v. Court of Appeals5 wherein the Court held that civil liability can be adjudged in the same criminal case where a judgment of acquittal is pronounced, presuming that the surviving civil liability is sourced from an obligation other than the criminal charge. The ponencia holds that civil liability from sources other than the delict may be adjudged in the same criminal action if the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability. In this case, spouses Llonillo's liability for the unpaid loan related to the acts complained of in the criminal action was properly raised during trial, and was admitted by spouses Llonillo themselves.6

I agree with the esteemed ponente that the defect regarding the prosecutor's lack of authority does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. As held by the Court in Gomez, the authority of the prosecuting officer in filing the Information has nothing to do with the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties in a case.7 Indeed, it affects neither the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused, nor the validity of the arrest or the voluntariness of the appearance of the accused in court.8 The lack of authority on the part of the handling prosecutor is a mere procedural defect which may be waived by the accused and which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings.9 As jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law, it cannot be accorded to or taken away from an otherwise competent court for purely procedural reasons.10

As emphasized in Gomez, the authority of the handling prosecutor, specifically as it does not appear on the face of the Information, would not affect the trial court's power to hear and decide a case.11 It is noteworthy that in Rule 117, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court, which requires a handling prosecutor to obtain a prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information with the courts, may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to raise such ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. Such deficiency, if there be any, is merely formal and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.12

I likewise agree that spouses Llonillo should be acquitted as there was no fraud committed in connection with the mortgage of the apartment units.

Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.14

Indeed, in the crime of estafa through the means of deceit, the deceit must have been committed prior to or simultaneously with the fraudulent act because such is the only way that said deceit could become the efficient cause or primary consideration which could have induced the offended party to part with their money or property.15

In this case, as properly held in the ponencia, at the time the parties entered into the subject contract, spouses Llonillo have not yet exerted any fraud prior to or simultaneously with the said execution of the contract. Notably, the additional sangla-tira schemes were not entered into until after the perfection of the agreement with Caspillo. The sangla-tira schemes only came about after the perfection of the agreement. Thus, there was no fraud committed prior to or simultaneously with the signing of the MOA.

Finding of civil liability arising from a separate but related act in the same criminal case

Finally, I agree that the Court can justly hold spouses Llonillo civilly liable for the unpaid loan, without the need of instituting a separate civil proceeding.

I. The nature of the civil liability which can be adjudged in a criminal proceeding where the accused is acquitted

Admittedly, the liability of spouses Llonillo for the unpaid loan arises from the loan agreement between the parties, and not from the alleged criminal act of estafa complained of. Thus, it is necessary to address the question of whether the court may justly award damages for civil liability in a criminal proceeding when the civil liability is not predicated on the criminal act.

It is my position that the moment the accused is acquitted, there can be no more occasion to award civil liability ex delicto, or those arising from the crime. However, it is possible that civil liability can be awarded in the same criminal proceeding if it is based on a different source of obligation other than the crime itself, such as a contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict.

As discussed by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa and Justice Rodil V. Zalameda in their concurring opinions, the correct rule is expressed in the case of De Leon, Jr. v. Roqson Industrial Sales, Inc.16 The said case holds that acquittal precludes the finding of civil liability ex delicto.17 Thus, "if no crime is found to have been committed . . . civil liability ex delicto is not obtained, and any surviving civil liability to be proven by mere preponderance of evidence must be grounded on another source of the civil obligation to pay."18

Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides that obligations can arise from five different sources, namely: (1) law; (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) quasi-delicts. In relation to obligations arising from the fourth source in the enumeration (acts or omissions punished by law), Article 1161 further provides that "[c]ivil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws."19 In turn, Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This civil liability arising from acts or omissions punished by law, and which is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, is referred to as civil liability ex delicto or civil liability arising from the criminal offense.

On the other hand, Article 29 of the Civil Code contains the rule on civil liability when the accused is acquitted in a criminal case, viz.:

Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been [proven] beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Stated differently, in case of a criminal conviction, the basis of civil liability is the criminal liability itself. This is predicated on the rule provided for in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable, which in turn rests on the premise that a crime has both the criminal as well as the civil aspect. On the other hand, in the event of an acquittal, there is no criminal liability to speak of, as well as no civil obligation arising from acts or omissions punished by law or delicts. With criminal absolution, Article 29 contemplates an "act or omission" from which liability may arise based on the other sources of obligations which are independent of the delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability [ex delicto] founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.21 (Emphasis supplied)

To my mind, there can be no greater support to the proposition that acquittal precludes the finding of civil liability ex delicto than the basic principle of presumption of innocence. The accused in a criminal case is innocent of the crime charged until and unless their guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. If the accused is innocent, there can be no basis to adjudge them responsible for civil liability arising from the criminal offense.

In Padilla, and as reiterated in later cases, the Court described three situations wherein civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal. That is, civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (2) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.22 It is submitted that, in all of these situations, it should be presumed that the surviving civil liability is sourced from an obligation other than the criminal charge.

To stress, such an interpretation should apply even in the situation where the accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt. In fact, the Court's judgment in cases where the accused was acquitted on this ground, but still held civilly liable, can be easily reconciled with this interpretation. The following cases support this legal truism:

In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,23 the petitioner was charged with estafa after she used checks, which were later dishonored, to pay for the purchase of grocery items. Said petitioner was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, but was adjudged civilly liable for the unpaid value of the checks.24 In this case, it can be argued that the petitioner's liability for the unpaid value of the checks was based on contract.

In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,25 the petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt of the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, the Court held petitioner civilly liable, on account of the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent."26 In said case, it would appear that the implication is that petitioner was civilly liable for his negligent act, i.e., for the commission of an act which qualified as a quasi-delict.

In Lumantas v. Spouses Calapiz, Jr.,27 the petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries after the operation he performed left a patient with a damaged urethra. The petitioner was acquitted based on insufficiency of evidence, but the Court held that "[t]he failure of the [p]rosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable."28 Again, it can be argued that the petitioner's civil liability for negligence was based on the law on quasi-delicts.

Finally, in Horca v. People,29 the petitioner was charged with theft when she failed to deliver airline tickets after accepting payment for the same. While she was acquitted on reasonable doubt, the Court held her civilly liable for the return of the amount paid to her.30 It can be argued that the obligation to return the amount in said case was based on contract and the law on sales.

It bears emphasis that there is a difference between the "act or omission complained of" and the "legal source of the obligation." A single act or omission can give rise to civil liability premised on a legal provision, a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation, a tort, and/or the commission of a criminal offense. The civil liability which can be adjudged in criminal proceedings must be related to the same act or omission complained of in the criminal charge, but it need not be legally sourced from the commission of the criminal offense.

To reiterate, when the accused is acquitted, there can be no more basis to impose civil liability ex delicto. The civil liability of the accused must be based on a different source of obligation. Consequently, the Court can either allow the imposition of civil liability based on other sources of obligation, or else accept that, whenever the accused is acquitted, civil liability can only be litigated in a separate civil case. As will be discussed further, the latter option would result in needlessly extending litigation and causing serious inconvenience to both the parties and the courts to fix a liability which, in many cases, has already been sufficiently determined in the earlier criminal proceeding. In contrast, allowing the imposition of civil liability in the same criminal proceeding would promote a more expeditious resolution of disputes.

Thus, it is submitted that, when the civil liability of the accused arising from a source of obligation other than the crime, such as a law, contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, has already been established by a preponderance of evidence, it can be imposed in the same criminal proceeding.

The adjudgment in a criminal proceeding of civil liability not arising from the crime raises a concern over the due process rights of the parties involved. Nevertheless, it is submitted that civil liability can be adjudged in a criminal case, regardless of the legal source of the obligation, while still complying with the requirements of due process.

Jurisprudence holds that the requirements of procedural due process in judicial proceedings are: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.31

Fundamentally, the essence of procedural due process lies in the opportunity to be heard. Thus, in Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,32 the Court explained:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. . . . "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also [through] pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Court held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals:34

In the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [W]e ruled that the essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of defense. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of opportunity to be heard. Hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when [they] had been afforded the opportunity to present [their] side. In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, [W]e ruled that lack of opportunity to be heard not necessarily absence of prior notice constitutes a violation of due process. As long as a party is given the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings, such as a motion for reconsideration, and defend [their] interest in due course, [they] would have no reason to complain for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of procedural due process.35 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Verily, it is submitted that compliance with procedural due process is more a question of fact than a matter of characterizing the legal source of the obligation. That is, due process is complied with where the circumstances show that the parties in a criminal proceeding were given a real opportunity to be heard as to the existence or nonexistence of civil liability related to the same act or omission resulting in the criminal charge. This is true regardless of the nature or source of the civil liability involved.

In this case, spouses Llonillo were accorded due process with regard to their liability for the unpaid loan.(awÞhi( The unpaid loan is closely connected with the estafa charge and with the facts and issues discussed during trial. Spouses Llonillo's liability for the unpaid loan was sufficiently raised and threshed out in the proceedings before the trial court. In fact, the amount of the loan was awarded as actual damages in the trial court's Decision, from which spouses Llonillo appealed.36 Spouses Llonillo were undoubtedly informed of the issue as to their liability for the loan and had every opportunity to be heard on the matter.

To my mind, the Court should hold spouses Llonillo civilly liable for the unpaid loan in this criminal case because their liability for the said loan, which arises from a contractual obligation, has already been clearly established by a preponderance of evidence.

While the loan agreement between the parties is technically a separate act from their sangla-tira agreement, I believe that these two acts are intimately connected, hence, the civil liability arising from a contract, particularly, from the loan agreement, may be adjudged in the same case. Notably, it was the unpaid loan which constituted the element of "damage" in the charge of estafa.37

To emphasize, the factual circumstances surrounding the unpaid loan arising from the contract were fully threshed out in the course of the estafa proceedings before the trial court. The fact of the loan was included as a detail in the Information.38 The MOA which contained the agreement of the parties with respect to the unpaid loan was presumably submitted into evidence. Necessarily, the question as to the existence or nonexistence of the unpaid loan was an integral part of the case. The parties, including spouses Llonillo, were given an opportunity to controvert the loan agreement and their nonpayment thereof, which constitutes their civil liability arising from the contract, in the same criminal case for estafa.

More importantly, spouses Llonillo themselves admitted to the loan in the course of trial.39 The settled rule is that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in a case removes the admitted fact from the field of controversy.40 The admission is considered conclusive and binding evidence as to the party who made the same.41

Thus, the evidence necessary to allow the Court to rule upon the civil liability of spouses Llonillo arising from the contract for the unpaid loan has been presented in the proceedings of the criminal case. Despite their acquittal, the said contractual civil liability was established by preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the evidence is clear that spouses Llonillo are liable for the amount of the unpaid loan.

Should the Court require Caspillo to institute a separate civil case in order to enforce the liability of spouses Llonillo for the unpaid loan, the result would be nothing but a redundancy in the presentation of evidence. That is, the parties would be forced to litigate anew, in proceedings that would likely last for years, in order to submit the same evidence and establish the same facts which have already been admitted and/or established in the instant case. Such a situation would not be fair to either of the parties involved here.

To stress, the question of whether the Court should require the institution of separate civil proceedings is a matter of procedure. Thus, the Court should keep in mind the objective of procedural rules to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases."42 In connection with this objective, the Court has previously said that a situation resulting in the multiplicity of suits is "a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice."43

Conformably, it is opined that, in criminal proceedings resulting in acquittal, the civil liability of the accused, arising from a different source of obligation, which is related to the same act or omission resulting in the criminal charge, can still be adjudged in the same case, for as long as the obligation of the accused to fulfill the said civil liability is established during trial by a preponderance of evidence. To require a separate civil action in such cases would be unnecessarily costly and time-consuming for both the parties and the courts, and would only serve to delay the full and final resolution of the dispute between the parties. On the other hand, the championed approach simplifies proceedings, avoids the multiplicity of suits, saves unnecessary expenses, and promotes the full, just, and speedy resolution of disputes between parties.

Thus, in criminal proceedings where the accused is acquitted, courts can still render judgment on the civil liability of the accused related to the same act or omission resulting in the criminal charge when the said liability has been established by a preponderance of evidence. This is true regardless of the legal source of the civil obligation, provided that the requirements of due process are complied with.

These conditions are present in the instant case. Because the unpaid loan is closely connected to the estafa charge against spouses Llonillo and to the act which gave rise to the charge of estafa, the circumstances surrounding the unpaid loan were fully threshed out in the course of the proceedings before the trial court. The evidence, which necessarily allowed the Court to rule upon the liability of spouses Llonillo for the unpaid loan, has been presented and considered. Moreover, spouses Llonillo themselves clearly admitted the loan. Finally, they had every opportunity during trial and on appeal to be heard on the matter of their liability for the unpaid loan.

In fine, in criminal proceedings where the accused is acquitted, but the civil liability of the accused for the same act or omission which gave rise to the criminal charge is nevertheless established by a preponderance of evidence, the courts should still rule on the civil liability of the accused, even if it arises from a different source of obligation. It must be emphasized that proceedings should be simplified, unnecessary expenses avoided, and the full, just, and speedy resolution of disputes promoted. For as long as there is no conflict with substantive law and the requirements of due process are complied with, then there must be a decision on the civil liability of the accused.

ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR in the ponencia's ruling to GRANT the Petition, and ACQUIT petitioner spouses Enrique Llonillo and Marites Llonillo of the crime of Other Deceits under the first paragraph of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, but adjudge them liable to pay private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo the full loaned amount of PHP 300,000.00, with interest.