G.R. No. 246787 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38855 which affirmed the trial court's verdict of conviction against Spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo (Spouses Llonillo) for Other Deceits under the first paragraph of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.1

To recall, Spouses Llonillo were charged with Other Deceits before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), for Makati City. According to the prosecution, they approached complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo (Caspillo) and offered him a sangla-tira venture involving several units in the two buildings they owned (subject units). In this venture, Spouses Llonillo were looking for individuals who could lend them money for a fixed period. As consideration, the lender would be entitled to the rent of the subject units as interest for the loan in the amount of PHP 10,000.00 per month. At the end of the stipulated period, the loan would be paid in full.

Assured by Spouses Llonillo that the subject units had no prior liens or encumbrances, Caspillo accepted the offer and gave PHP 300,000.00 to them. Simultaneously, the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby Spouses Llonillo acknowledged receipt of PHP 300,000.00. It appeared, however, that the agreement on the payment of the PHP 10,000.00 monthly interest was not included in the MOA. Eventually, Caspillo failed to collect the monthly rentals from the occupants (lessees) of subject unit H. After investigating, he found out that Spouses Llonillo similarly entered into another sangla-tira venture with Germalyn Josol (Josol) and Rodrigo Arevalo (Arevalo) over subject unit H. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, he further learned that the realties involved in the sangla-tira scheme were mortgaged to different banks, contrary to the representations made by Spouses Llonillo during their negotiations.2

The MeTC found Spouses Llonillo guilty as charged and sentenced them to six months imprisonment and imposed a fine of PHP 300,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. Consecutively, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction.3

Spouses Llonillo now assail the issuances of the Court of Appeals and pray anew for their acquittal.4 The issues are -

Indeed, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Spouses Llonillo's case despite the purportedly defective and void Information. In Gomez v. People,5 the Court pronounced that absence of the handling prosecutor's authority on the face of the Information has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide the case. It is sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint, as the case may be, that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 and is adopted under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the absence of the authority of the Chief City Prosecutor of Makati City on the face of the Information charging petitioners with Other Deceits did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.

I agree that Spouses Llonillo must be acquitted. For one to be liable for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, it is required that the prosecution prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles of the Revised Penal Code; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the complainant to part with their property.6 Here, there was no suppression of any material fact so as to constitute false representation on the part of Spouses Llonillo.

A thorough review of the case records led the Court to discover Caspillo's admission that he was informed that the subject units were already mortgaged to banks prior to entering into the agreement with Spouses Llonillo. Consequently, as correctly ruled by the ponencia, the sangla-tira venture of Spouses Llonillo was not "made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud," and no misrepresentation was committed. As such, the prosecution failed to prove all the essential elements of the crime charged. Spouses Llonillo must accordingly be acquitted.

As for their civil liability, the same may and ought to be adjudged in the same criminal case notwithstanding the verdict of acquittal. Not only is this explicitly sanctioned by existing law and jurisprudence, it is also the more practical and expedient recourse for party-litigants. Consider:

First. Article 29 of the New Civil Code expressly allows the private complainant in a criminal proceeding to recover civil liability arising from sources of obligation other than ex-delicto in case the accused was acquitted on the ground that his or her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the wording of Article 29 of the Civil Code is clearly permissive, i.e., "a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." As such, it is not mandatory for civil liability other than ex-delicto to be recovered via a separate action. That is clearly not the import of the law. Conversely, civil liability arising from other sources of obligation may be awarded in the same criminal action where the accused was acquitted.

Second. This interpretation is duly supported by numerous cases, some of which were likewise cited and comprehensively discussed by other learned Members of the Court, including the esteemed Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo and the Good Ponente himself. For the sake of brevity, I will thus no longer cite the same one by one. Just to give one example, however, I respectfully direct attention to Padilla v. Court of Appeals.7

In Padilla, the Court, sitting En Banc, exhaustively discussed how a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. Indeed, the Civil Code does not expressly mandate that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages, viz.:

I humbly opine that the Court's pronouncement in Padilla is the applicable ruling and thus must govern. To reiterate, Padilla clearly instructs that, as a general rule, civil liability except civil liability ex delicto, may be awarded in the criminal proceeding where the accused was acquitted. The exception, i.e., a separate civil action therefor must be filed, when: (1) additional facts have to be established; (2) more evidence must be adduced; or (3) the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. None of the foregoing exceptions are, however, applicable in this case.

Lastly. I believe that it is more prudent and reasonable to allow the determination of the civil liability of Spouses Llonillo in the same criminal case despite their acquittal.

Ruling on the accused's civil liability arising from other sources of obligation in the same criminal case does not necessarily violate the accused's right to due process. For the accused's civil liability arising from whichever source, e.g., ex delicto or ex contractu, originates from the same act or omission subject of the criminal case. More often than not, therefore, the reality is the facts, evidence, and arguments or defenses of the parties in the criminal case and any separate civil action are closely intertwined, if not identical. Further, all available defenses of the accused are usually fully ventilated in the criminal case since the consequence thereof, involving as it does the accused's very life and liberty, is greater. The instances where separate litigation is necessary are thus sparse and rare.

Here, in fact, a judicious consideration of the defenses adduced by Spouses Llonillo reveals that the same are also their defenses against their alleged breach of the MOA. Particularly, they riposted that they were not privy to the MOA and not bound by the obligations therein since they never met Caspillo or negotiated with him. For it was actually their agent, Grace Pangan, who prepared the same and conducted the said negotiations.8 Too, I humbly submit that a ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties vis-à-vis the MOA may be issued from the totality of the facts proved during trial. Nothing thus bars the Court from rendering a pronouncement on the civil liability ex contractu of Spouses Llonillo.

Indeed, it is more in accord with expediency and practicality to do so. We keep in mind that the Court must promulgate rules that provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.9 Requiring the private complainant to once again institute a complaint and litigate their case anew is nothing short of unnecessary and redundant. It would require them to submit same evidence and once again undergo the rigorous process of the trial, with the end goal of having to establish the same facts already established in the criminal case. This is undeniably an unfair scenario for the opposing parties and the court. Worse, this will unnecessarily drain the resources and time of the parties and clog the court dockets.

ALL TOLD, I vote to ACQUIT Spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo of the crime of Other Deceits under the first paragraph of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code and order them to pay the civil liability arising from the breach of the MOA, if any.