G.R. No. 246787 - Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

While I join the Banc in pronouncing that Spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo (spouses Llonillo), must be acquitted of the crime of Estafa under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits), I express my reservation on the conclusion reached by the ponente that the civil liability of said spouses arising from their unpaid loan may be awarded in the same criminal action.

The record evinces that spouses Llonillo entered into a sangla-tira venture with the private complainant, Pedro Joel V. Caspillo (Caspillo), involving one of the units in the two (2) buildings they own located at 236 Aguho Street, Barangay Comembo, Makati City. Per this arrangement, spouses Llonillo admittedly received PHP 300,000.00 loan from Caspillo. In turn, as consideration thereof, Caspillo would be entitled to the monthly rental of UNIT H in the amount of PHP 10,000.00 during the duration of the agreement. At the end of the period agreed upon, the full amount of PHP 300,000.00 is to be returned, as well.

Eventually, however, Caspillo failed to collect monthly rentals from the occupants thereof. According to Caspillo, he discovered after investigation that spouses Llonillo similarly entered into another sangla-tira scheme with other individuals over Unit H. Moreover, upon verification with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, he learned that the realties involved in the sangla-tira scheme were mortgaged to different banks contrary to the representation of spouses Llonillo during the negotiation. In view of the purported misrepresentations, Caspillo filed a complaint of estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

During the trial, while Spouses Llonillo did not dispute that they received PHP 300,000.00 in the contentious transaction which was negotiated by their agent, they denied that they made representations that the subject property was free from liens and encumbrances.

In due course, the MeTC found spouses Llonillo guilty of the charge and imposed upon them the penalties of imprisonment and fine as well as the amount of PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages. This disposition was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and subsequently, by the Court of Appeals (CA). Thence, spouses Llonillo commenced the instant Appeal asseverating that they must be exculpated.

As adumbrated above, I fully concur with the acquittal of Spouses Llonillo as there exists no misrepresentation. For one, Caspillo himself admitted during his testimony that he already knew that the contentious properties were already mortgaged to the banks at the time of the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). For another, Unit H was not covered by any sangla-tira to any person except the private complainant at the time they entered the MOA. The subsequent sangla-tira arrangement by spouses Llonillo with other persons could hardly have deceived Caspillo precisely because, at that point in time, he had already executed a MOA with said spouses.

In sooth, the prosecution failed to establish all the elements for an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318, viz.:

The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in (Articles 315, 316, and 317); (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.1

Simply put, spouses Llonillo did not perpetrate any fraud or misrepresentation that could have deluded Caspillo to enter into such agreement and part with his money. Consequently, spouses Llonillo should be exonerated as there is absolutely no factual basis for the criminal liability.

It bears accentuating that while spouses Llonillo are hereby acquitted of Estafa (Other Deceits), the ponencia adjudged them liable for the PHP 300,000.00 loan covered by the MOA.

Quite palpably, the case at bench brings to the fore once again the issue of whether or not the accused, if not found criminally responsible for a felony, may be held civilly liable in the same criminal proceeding. On this score, primal is the rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.2 The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. Whence, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.3 This finds a procedural hook in Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states that what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto.4

Perforce, given that there is no factual basis for spouses Llonillo's criminal liability, their corresponding civil liability ex delicto is extinguished. The civil liability based on their contract with Caspillo should be litigated in a separate proceeding.

To my mind, an adjudication, in the same criminal proceeding, on the civil liability arising from a source other than the act or omission constituting the criminal offense charged would run roughshod over Our current legal and procedural landscapes.(awÞhi( To be sure, I join Our esteemed colleagues in their advocacy for judicial economy, speedy disposition of cases, and inexpensive trials. Still and all, if only to protect the accused's right to due process, I humbly maintain that the civil liability arising from a different source must be threshed out in a separate case until the rules of criminal procedure shall have been revised and the proposed manner of disposition in such instances, properly codified.

I would like to put forth an illustration to aid Us in visualizing the process if the civil liability arising from a different source would have been tried and awarded in the same criminal action, where the accused was acquitted:

It sticks out like a sore thumb that the proposal to allow an award of civil liability based on a different source, in the same criminal proceeding, places the accused in a dire situation, where, instead of the prosecution having the burden of proof, he or she will be required to cover all bases not only to be absolved from criminal liability, but also to free himself or herself of any civil obligation, which may or may not arise from the act or omission subject of the criminal action. This results not only in an unwarranted shift of the burden of proof, but also in an irrefutable hodgepodge of causes of action, which violates the very core of the constitutional right to due process. An accused's right to due process should not be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy.

There lies a compelling reason why the crafters of our laws, as well as Our predecessors in the Court, placed a clear demarcation on the source of civil obligation vis-à-vis the institution of a criminal action. In the foregoing illustration, if we were to apply the proposal to litigate or 'pass upon' the related issues all at once for reasons of judicial economy, at which point do we require the sitting judge to make a determination that he or she must also rule on the civil obligation arising from a different source? At which point, if any, does the accused become aware or notified that he or she must also present contrary evidence thereon – before or after the presentation of defense evidence, or after the judge has so determined that he or she is only civilly liable based on another source? In retrospect, why should we fault spouses Llonillo for not substantiating their claim of payment, when that fact barely constitutes any of the elements of Other Deceits, for which they were being prosecuted?

To stress, while petitioners admit their civil liability, they nevertheless raised the defense of payment, which, at the risk of being repetitive, they are not required to prove at that point considering the nature of the case.

This brings to light another crucial and glaring issue: as the accused will be presumably allowed to present evidence to counter his or her civil liability based on another source, is this not tantamount to allowing a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint in criminal cases, which is categorically proscribed by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure? Will this situation not be tantamount to railroading justice dispensation to the damage and prejudice of the accused-obligor?

Along this grain, it bears emphasis that the prosecution of civil liabilities, nay, the institution of civil actions, mainly, is a private matter. It is not for the Court to champion any side's cause or to insist that they pursue their claims before the court.

The foregoing disquisitions notwithstanding, I submit that there are indeed instances when the award of civil liability may be made in the same criminal proceeding despite acquittal, viz.:

Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these instances, while the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation.5

The rationale behind this rule was explicated by the Code Commission in connection with Article 296 of the Civil Code—

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party . . . . It is just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?7

Certainly, in cases of acquittal based on reasonable doubt, the court may justly award civil liability in the same criminal proceeding. This is but just because the accused, in such cases, is accorded due process since its determination is based on the same charge for which he or she is indicted for and given the opportunity to be heard.

However, it is an entirely different question when there is no crime from which the basis for civil liability ex delicto may arise and civil liability is established on grounds other than the act or omission complained of, as in this case. As heretofore stated, in light of the rule on due process, the same must be ventilated in a separate civil action.

Upon this point, it need not be overemphasized that while Article 29 was enacted to avoid multiplicity of actions and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it was not intended to tread on the right to due process of the accused. Appositely, even the case of Padilla v. CA8 illuminates, thusly:

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. Indeed, a separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced.9

In synthesis, no civil liability based on the MOA should be awarded in this case. To iterate, spouses Llonillo were indicted and tried for a criminal offense. Perforce, to hold them liable for a civil liability arising not from the crime itself sans proceeding for that purpose violates their constitutional right to due process. Basic is the rule that in criminal cases, an important component of due process is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against him or her. A proper apprisal of the accusations would give the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined.10

Indubitably, all the issues pertaining to the contractual agreement of the parties, the purported breach thereof, and the existence of a civil liability ex contractu, if any, vis-à-vis the petitioners' claim of payments,11 must be fully threshed out and addressed in a separate action intended for that sole purpose to give both parties their respective days in court.

Once more, I signify my full support to the laudable objectives of Our esteemed colleagues to avoid multiplicity of suits and foster speedy disposition of cases. All the same, in order to avoid further confusion to the various stakeholders, and more especially, to safeguard the right of the accused to due process, I maintain that the case be resolved in favor of the spouses Llonillo's acquittal without prejudice to the filing of a separate action for the recovery of civil liability ex contractu.