G.R. No. 246787 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

I concur in the acquittal of petitioners Enrique Llonillo and Marites Llonillo (collectively, petitioners-spouses) from the charge of estafa (Other Deceits), penalized under the first paragraph of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

I offer my thoughts, however, as to their civil liability despite their acquittal.

The facts surrounding this case are simple. Petitioners-spouses entered into a "sangla-tira" arrangement with the complainant, Pedro Joel V. Caspillo (Caspillo). Petitioners-spouses do not dispute that they entered into the arrangement with Caspillo, and that as a result of it, they had received PHP 300,000.00 from him. The "sangla-tira" arrangement involved Caspillo lending petitioners-spouses the aforementioned amount of money, and in consideration thereof, Caspillo would be entitled to the rents of an apartment unit—owned by petitioners-spouses—as interest. The value of the rent was PHP 10,000.00 per month, and Caspillo would be entitled to the same for the duration of the period agreed upon. At the end of the said period, the full amount of the loan is due to be paid as well.

Caspillo, however, eventually failed to collect monthly rentals from the occupants of the apartment unit. Upon a supposed investigation, Caspillo "discovered" that petitioners-spouses entered into similar "sangla-tira" arrangements with others. In addition, Caspillo supposedly learned that the apartment unit was mortgaged to different banks allegedly contrary to the representations of petitioners-spouses during their negotiations. Because of said alleged misrepresentations, Caspillo filed the complaint that eventually resulted in the filing of this criminal case in court.

Petitioners-spouses, as previously mentioned, do not dispute receiving PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo, or entering into the "sangla-tira" arrangement with him. In their defense, they only denied that they made representations that their property was free from liens and encumbrances. They also claimed that another person, their agent Grace Pangan (Grace), negotiated with Caspillo on their behalf.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) where this case was originally filed found petitioners-spouses guilty of the charge. Apart from imposing the penalties of imprisonment and fine, the MeTC also ordered petitioners-spouses to pay Caspillo the amount of PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages. The case was then appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. Undeterred, petitioners-spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter likewise affirmed the conviction. Petitioners-spouses thus filed the present petition to once again assert their innocence.

The ponencia acquits petitioners-spouses. The ponencia quotes portions of Caspillo's testimony in court, wherein he basically admitted that he had seen the copies of the certificates of title covering the apartment unit during negotiations. In essence, the ponencia acquits petitioners-spouses because there could be no fraud or misrepresentation amounting to estafa in this case since, contrary to his initial claims, Caspillo knew that the apartment unit was mortgaged to financial institutions at the time he entered into the "sangla-tira" arrangement. The similar "sangla-tira" arrangements could also not be the basis for the conviction as they were entered into after the one with Caspillo had already been perfected.

I agree with the ponencia's pronouncements regarding the criminal liability of petitioners-spouses. Indeed, there could be no estafa in this case as the prosecution clearly failed to establish the crucial element of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. I write this Opinion, however, to expound on the matter of finding civil liability on the part of the petitioners-spouses.

As observed by the ponencia, I agree that courts can still adjudge civil liability in criminal cases that result in an acquittal if the said civil liability arises from other sources of obligation.

Article 29 of the Civil Code allows courts to adjudge civil liability in criminal cases that result in an acquittal even though the remaining civil liability arises from other sources of obligations

Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates the different sources of obligations, namely: (1) law, (2) contracts, (3) quasi-contracts, (4) acts or omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts. All obligations trace their existence from any of these five sources.1

For civil obligations arising from criminal offenses (ex delicto), Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that it shall be "governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages."2 In this connection, Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This is supplemented by Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[i]n crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant."

The implication of both Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 2202 of the Civil Code is that the existence of criminal liability is a necessary prerequisite before civil liability ex delicto may be said to exist. In other words:

if no crime is found to have been committed... civil liability ex delicto is not obtained, and any surviving civil liability to be proven by mere preponderance of evidence must be grounded on another source of the civil obligation to pay, i.e., an underlying source of obligation by virtue of which [the accused], though acquitted of the criminal charge, remains civilly liable therefor.3

In other words, if any civil liability were to survive an acquittal, such liability would have to be anchored on the other sources of obligation, namely law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict.

In this connection, Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hen the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his [or her] guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."4 At first blush, it may appear that a new civil action has to be instituted in order to enforce the civil liability that survived the acquittal based on reasonable doubt. However, as early as 1984, in Padilla v. Court of Appeals5 (Padilla), the Court En Banc already ruled that Article 29 allows courts to adjudge civil liability in the same criminal case where the judgment of acquittal was pronounced. Padilla involved a criminal case for grave coercion against the numerous accused who carried out the order of the mayor to evict the complainants from the market stall which they used to lease. While the several accused were initially convicted by the trial court, they were eventually acquitted by the CA based on reasonable doubt. Thus, the only pending issue when it reached the Court was whether the accused's civil liability was deemed extinguished by their acquittal. The Court held in the negative, and even ruled that there was no need for a separate proceeding to enforce the surviving civil liability. The Court, in Padilla, explained:

To my mind, the Court's reasoning in Padilla remains true even though technically, the civil liability to be adjudged arises from a different source of obligation. Verily, to require the aggrieved party to file another case, go through the rigors of trial, and relitigate his or her case anew just to vindicate his or her rights would be to make justice even less accessible. It will further tilt the scales of justice away from those who have already been aggrieved or victimized through an act that did not merit a criminal punishment, but was nevertheless proven to have happened or existed.

I understand that this position is not in line with our procedural rules. The rules of procedure promulgated by the Court are clear that the civil case deemed instituted when a criminal case is filed is limited only to the enforcement of civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings of the ponencia and the cases it cites like Dy v. People7 (Dy) and Wong v. Wong8 are perfectly understandable. However, the rules of procedure promulgated by the Court are meant to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases."9 Therefore, if faced with a dilemma of upholding the letter of the rules of procedure, on the one hand, vis-à-vis interpreting it in a way that fulfills its purpose, I have no doubt in my mind that it is the latter—the one in accord with the Constitutional design of the rules—that the Court should uphold. This is, of course, limited only to the instances when doing so would not be violative of the accused's due process rights.

This idea of awarding civil liability in the criminal case that resulted in acquittal even though the remaining civil liability is anchored on a different source of obligation is not novel. For instance, in the cases of Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,10 Eusebio-Calderon v. People,11 Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba,12 and De Leon, Jr. v. Roqson Industrial Sales, Inc.,13 the Court adjudged civil liability against an accused acquitted of estafa, and anchored the liability adjudged on the underlying transaction, the amounts of the checks that were dishonored, as well as the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In Tupaz IV v. Court of Appeals14 which involved a criminal case for violation of the Trust Receipts Law, the Court still held the acquitted accused to be civilly liable even as it itself recognized that "his liability arose not from the criminal act of which he was acquitted (ex delito) but from the trust receipt contract (ex contractu) of 30 September 1981."15

In Chiok v. People,16 the Court, speaking through the same ponente as the case of Dy above (i.e., Justice Jardeleza), held that the accused, although acquitted in the criminal case for estafa through misappropriation of property, would still be civilly liable because "the monetary transaction between [the parties] was proven by preponderance of evidence."17 The same conclusion was reached in the similar case of Gamaro v. People.18

Finally, in the relatively recent case of Horca v. People19 (Horca) which involved a contract to purchase airline tickets that did not come into fruition, the Court acquitted the accused from the charge of theft but nevertheless held her civilly liable. The Court, in Horca, explained:

Conformably with the foregoing, the civil aspect of the criminal case can survive an acquittal when it is based on reasonable doubt. In this scenario, even though the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action can still prevail as long as preponderant evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. "This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation."

As applied in this case, there is reason for this Court to believe that Horca should be held civilly liable to the Sisters of Providence. The fact remains that Sister Reynolds and her congregation was prejudiced when they paid for the tickets but did not get reimbursed when the flight was cancelled. This is also supported by Horca's own acts when she acknowledged the need to return the money and when she actually paid Sister Reynolds the amount of [PHP ]90,000.00 to partially cover for the airline tickets. To the Court, this essentially amounts to an admission of her liability to return the said amount. Concomitantly, while this Court acquits petitioner because reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt, We adjudge Horca to be civilly accountable considering that preponderant evidence exists to establish her liability.20 (Emphasis supplied)

All of these cases show situations where the Court deemed it more economical to rule on the civil liability of the accused even though it arises from a different source of obligation (i.e., not ex delicto). If there are no longer any disputed facts as to the underlying transaction and the remaining liability, I respectfully see no reason why the courts should refuse to adjudge civil liability. To quote Padilla anew:

Due process has been accorded the accused.(awÞhi( He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.21 (Emphasis supplied)

All told, while the ponencia is correct that the civil liability remaining in this case is ex contractu, it does not mean that the Court should refuse to adjudge civil liability if there are no longer any pending issues of fact as to the underlying transaction and the amounts to be paid. From the perspective of the Court, there is no impediment for the exercise of its powers, and from the perspective of the parties, their due process rights have been respected. Simply put, I submit that the rule should be the following: if the facts necessary to sustain the accused's civil liability arising from other sources of obligation were established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted and the accused accorded due process with respect to his or her defenses in respect of that source of obligation, then the court concerned, in the interest of judicial economy, can and should adjudge civil liability against said accused.

Applying the foregoing to this case, since petitioners-spouses admitted to receiving PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo and entering into a "sangla-tira" arrangement with him, then the Court can adjudge civil liability in this case despite their acquittal from the estafa charge, especially if the records are complete and the assertions of alleged payments are bare and unsubstantiated.