G.R. No. 246787 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 246787, January 30, 2024,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [C.J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

I concur with the ponencia of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario in its acquittal of Spouses Enrique Llonillo and Marites Llonillo (Sps. Llonillo) of the charge of Other Deceits punished under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)1 due to the prosecution's failure to prove all the elements thereof.

In addition, I likewise concur with the ponencia in finding that Sps. Llonillo are merely civilly liable based on contract, and in ruling that such civil liability may already be adjudged and awarded to private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo (Caspillo) in the present case, without a need for a remand to the lower court.

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR. No. 38855 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) Decision sustaining the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MeTC) conviction of Sps. Llonillo of the charge of Other Deceits.

On December 17, 2012, Sps. Llonillo were charged with Other Deceits in an Information that reads:

On the 30th day of March 2009, in the city of Makati, Philippines, accused(,) conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant Pedro Joel V. Caspillo in the following manner; accused by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representations they made to complainant to the effect that Unit H[,] at No. 236 Aguho St., was free from any encumbrances whatsoever and that by way of interest for loan extended, complainant is entitled to collect the rental directly from the occupants of the said unit, which representation they know for a fact to be false considering that the unit is already encumbered in violation of the Deed of Mortgage they executed and that the rental cannot be collected as the occupant has previously entered into a similar agreement with accused and there appears to be no other reason but only to convince the complainant to part with his [PHP] 300,000.00 and in fact complainant delivered the amount to the accused, to his damage and prejudice.

In March 2009, Sps. Llonillo were looking for individuals who could lend them money for a fixed period. For this purpose, Grace Pangan (Grace), their agent, offered a sangla-tira agreement to Caspillo. The subject properties are apartment units situated in two buildings located at 236 Aguho Street, Barangay Comembo, Makati City. As agreed upon, the consideration is the lender's right to receive the rents of the apartment units as interest for the loan valued at PHP 10,000.00 per month.

Sps. Llonillo assured Caspillo that the subject properties have no prior liens or encumbrances. Thus, on March 30, 2009, Caspillo accepted the offer and lent PHP 300,000.00 to them. On even date, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) over apartment unit H which was unoccupied at that time. Sps. Llonillo likewise acknowledged receipt of the amount of PHP 300,000.00 therein, payable on or before March 20, 2010. However, it did not contain a stipulation regarding Caspillo's right to receive the PHP 10,000.00 monthly rental as interest.

Initially, Caspillo himself occupied the apartment. After 10 days, he vacated the same and leased it to a friend for one month. Thereafter, he established a mini store thereon which turned out to be unprofitable. Hence, Marites Llonillo offered to find a lessee for the apartment so that Caspillo may receive the PHP 10,000.00 monthly rental but to no avail.

Caspillo then discovered that Sps. Llonillo also executed a sangla-tira agreement over apartment unit H with Germalyn Josol (Josol) and Rodrigo Arevalo, Jr. (Arevalo). Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, Caspillo learned that the subject properties offered for the sangla-tira agreement were already mortgaged to different banks contrary to Sps. Llonillo's initial representations.

Marites Llonillo averred that she inherited the land located at 236 Aguho St., Brgy. Comembo, Makati City from her mother. To fund the construction of apartment units thereon, she mortgaged the real estate to different financial institutions and private individuals. To this end, their agent (Grace) proposed a sangla-tira agreement wherein she would look for lenders who would occupy the apartment units and receive the rentals thereof as interest. Thereafter, it was only Grace who met and negotiated with Caspillo.

For his part, Enrique Llonillo contended that he and his wife never misrepresented that the subject properties are free from liens and encumbrances, and that the subject transaction is a mere loan.

The MeTC convicted Sps. Llonillo of Other Deceits in a December 9, 2015 Decision, the fallo of which reads:

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the foregoing ruling in toto. In turn, the CA also affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto. Undeterred, Sps. Llonillo are now before this Court to maintain their innocence.

At this point, I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia's acquittal of Sps. Llonillo of the charge of Other Deceits — the elements of which are as follows:

(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [arts. 315, 316, and 317 of the RPC]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.

As explained in the ponencia, the records are clear that at the time of the execution of the MOA, Caspillo already knew that the subject properties were encumbered. Further, the other sangla-tira agreements over apartment unit H with Arevalo and Josol cannot serve as bases for Sps. Llonillo's conviction since they were executed only in 2011 and 2012, respectively, or after the execution of the MOA with Caspillo in 2009. Verily, Sps. Llonillo did not employ false pretense nor commit a fraudulent act prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the MOA which may have caused damage or prejudice against Caspillo.

As regards the issue on civil liability, I likewise concur with the ponencia in finding that Sps. Llonillo are merely civilly liable based on their MOA with Caspillo, and that such liability may already be awarded by this Court without a need for a remand to the MeTC.

The filing of a separate civil action is not necessary given that the evidence in the estafa case already covered the sangla-tira agreement and the MOA between Sps. Llonillo and Caspillo. Further, it bears stressing that the MeTC duly passed upon Sps. Llonillo's contention that the subject transaction is a mere loan and that they already made purported payments therefor. In fact, the MeTC found the defense of payment to be unsubstantiated. Thus, the fallo of its ruling included an award of actual damages in the amount of PHP 300,000.00 which is equivalent to the loan of Sps. Llonillo from Caspillo. On appeal, the civil liability ex contractu was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.

As a rule, this Court does not try factual matters in a petition for review on certiorari. One of the exceptions thereto is when the judgments of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of facts. Here, while such ground exists for this Court to undertake a factual review in order to rectify the findings of fact of the lower courts as regards the conviction of Sps. Llonillo, I submit that their findings anent Sps. Llonillo's civil liability ex contractu must remain undisturbed in the present Rule 45 petition.

To emphasize, this case is rooted from a MOA which was executed way back in March 2009. At this point, to require Caspillo to institute a separate complaint to claim his hard-earned money from Sps. Llonillo would not be in keeping with the dictates of fairness and justice. As supported by the unanimous findings of the lower courts, I submit that there is already a preponderance of evidence on record to make Sps. Llonillo pay the money they admittedly loaned from Caspillo. Indeed, this disposition would obviate the filing of multiple actions, save the parties from further expenses, and the Court of its time.

Besides, Sps. Llonillo's acquittal is grounded on the presence of reasonable doubt since the alleged fraud was found not to have been committed prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the MOA with Caspillo, and that the other sangla-tira agreements with Arevalo and Josol were executed after the agreement with Caspillo. Undoubtedly, there is no declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise do not exist.

With regard to the Court's divergent rulings involving the determination of civil liability other than ex delicto in criminal cases, I am of the view that We should sustain the series of rulings wherein the Court awarded civil liability, albeit arising from other sources of obligations, in the same criminal proceeding after finding that while the evidence on record failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, there is a preponderance of evidence to support the conclusion that the accused's liability is merely civil in nature.

In Sps. Tayamen v. People2 and Wong v. Wong,3 the Court decreed that there is no civil liability ex delicto but only civil liability ex contractu, hence the RTC properly made no pronouncement as to the civil aspect of the case. These rulings were anchored on Dy v. People4 wherein the Court held that civil liability ex contractu must be claimed in a separate civil action and not be awarded in the same criminal proceeding.

On the other hand, in Eusebio-Calderon v. People5 and Rimando v. Sps. Aldaba,6 the Court awarded civil liability in the same criminal proceeding despite the acquittal of the accused.

At this juncture, it is well to emphasize that all the foregoing cases were rendered by the Court sitting in division. In Padilla v. Court of Appeals,7 a 1984 case decided unanimously by the Court sitting en banc, it was held:

Subsequently, in Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr.,11 another en banc case, the private complainant filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel a judge to include in its judgment of acquittal the civil liability which the accused admitted in court. The fallo of the questioned judgment therein reads:

The Court granted private complainant's petition and ordered the payment of accused's civil liability ex contractu despite acquittal. It explained:

These rulings are supported by the Rules of Court, which provides that the extinction of the criminal action does not result in the extinction of the corresponding civil action. Consistent with this, the Rules require that in judgments of acquittal, the court must state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove such guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.19 Relatedly, Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado even went on to state that in case of acquittal, the criminal court may be compelled by mandamus to determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise exists, as what transpired in Maximo.20

Pertinently, Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

A survey of jurisprudence21 where the Court refused to award civil damages in the same criminal proceeding in case of acquittal reveals that they were all rendered by the Court sitting in division. Such modification of the ruling in Padilla is proscribed by Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the 1987 Constitution.22

To be sure, the present case is an opportunity for this Court, sitting en banc, to properly settle such conflicting rulings. Hence, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I respectfully submit that the doctrine laid down in Padilla23 be sustained.

Plainly, Article 2924 of the Civil Code does not prohibit the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the facts from which it might arise did not exist.(awÞhi(25

Fittingly, it is prudent to discuss this matter in relation to the provisions governing independent civil actions under the Civil Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender — (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the RPC, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 3126 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 3327 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries").28

This is procedurally implemented under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Sec. 3. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Considering the distinct and independent nature of civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.29 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender, subject however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party "cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission" or under both causes.30 Moreover, such independent civil actions31 do not need to be reserved in the corresponding criminal action.32

Evidently, in estafa cases, the offended party has the right to file an independent civil action either under Article 31 of the Civil Code which contemplates an obligation not arising from a crime (i.e. a contract or a legal duty),33 or Article 33 of the Civil Code which contemplates a civil action for damages arising from fraud (i.e., estafa or swindling), among others.34

It bears stressing that such remedies granted to the offended party are permissive in character, subject to the injunction in general that success in financially recovering in one case should prevent a recovery of damages in the other.35

Preceding from the foregoing, I submit that corollary to such rights, and as a complement to the injunction against double recovery, the offended party shall have the duty to inform the criminal court of any pending independent civil action coupled with a complete statement of the present status thereof, and the civil court of any pending criminal action for estafa coupled with a complete statement of the present status thereof.

All told, subject to the injunction against double recovery, the right to file an independent civil action can harmoniously co-exist with the criminal courts' mandatory duty to rule on the accused's civil liability in the same criminal proceeding, as long as a preponderance of evidence exists to support such finding.

In any event, the foregoing propositions do not discount the possibility of a separate civil action where the offended party has not yet recovered damages in an independent civil action, especially in instances where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.36 Thus, in synthesis:

Subject to the injunction against double recovery, the offended party has the right, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, to institute an independent civil action for the recovery of damages based on an obligation not arising from a crime (i.e. a contract or a legal duty) or fraud (i.e. estafa or swindling). Here, the burden of proof is preponderance of evidence.

The independent civil action does not need to be reserved in the corresponding criminal action, but as a complement to the injunction against double recovery, the offended party shall have the duty to inform the criminal court of any pending independent civil action coupled with a complete statement of the present status thereof, and the civil court of any pending criminal action for estafa coupled with a complete statement of the present status thereof.

In the criminal case for estafa — in case of conviction, the trial court must impose the proper penalty pursuant to the RPC and award civil damages.

In case of acquittal, the trial court must state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove such guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, it shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.37 In other words, if a preponderance of evidence exists to support the conclusion that the accused is civilly liable, then there is no legal obstacle for the court to make a declaration to that effect in the same criminal proceeding and order payment pursuant thereto.

I humbly submit that this doctrine is in line with Our constitutional mandate to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases without in any way diminishing, increasing, or modifying substantive rights. Moreover, it will give life and meaning to the oft-repeated adage that "justice delayed is justice denied."

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties, including the State, which have been wronged, must be equally considered. A verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and the offended party, on the other.38