G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233

G.R. No. 274778, December 3, 2025,
♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Marquez, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Villanueva, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Rosario, [J]
♦ Separate and Dissenting Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

AQUILINO PIMENTEL III; ERNESTO OFRACIO; JANICE LIRZA MELGAR; MARIA CIELO MAGNO; MA. DOMINGA CECILIA B. PADILLA; DANTE B. GATMAYTAN; IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ; SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA; PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION FOUNDATION, INC.; AND PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS,

ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION); DANIEL EDRALIN, SECRETARY GENERAL, NATIONAL VNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-NAGKAISA); RENATO MAGTUBO, CHAIRPERSON, PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA (PM-NAGKAISA); JULIUS CAINGLET, CHURCH-LABOR CONFERENCE, GRACE A. ESTRADA, PRESIDENT, PINAY CAREWORKERS TRANSNATIONAL (PIN@Y); ALFREDO MARANAN, FFW NATIONAL TREASURER; JUN RAMIREZ MENDOZA, UNION PRESIDENT, VISHAY EMPLOYEES PHILIPPINES UNION-FFW AND NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, FFW; JUDY ANN CHAN MIRANDA, CHAIRPERSON, NAGKAISA WOMEN COMMITTEE, GENERAL SECRETARY, PM-NAGKAISA; VILMA G. REYES, UNION PRESIDENT, DELA SALLE MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES INSTITUTE EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER, FFW; RENE L. CAPITO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (AFW); ELIJA R. SAN FERNANDO, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL); RENE DE MESA TADLE, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (COTESCUP); EMERITO C. GONZALES, UNION PRESIDENT UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU); DENNIES GUTIERREZ, UNION PRESIDENT, INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (ILEU-FFW); ROLANDO LIBROJO, CONVENOR, KILUSANG ARTIKULO 13 (A.13); AND ATTY. DANILO C. ISIDERIO, FFW LEGAL CENTER, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

BAYAN MUNA CHAIRMAN NERI COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA VICE CHAIRMAN TEODORO A. CASIÑO, BAYAN MUNA EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, AND FORMER BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND R. GAITE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
*EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

1SAMBAYAN COALITION; MEMBERS OF U.P. LAW CLASS 1975 NAMELY: JOSE P.O. ALILING IV, AUGUSTO H. BACULIO, EDGARDO R. BALBIN, MOISES B. BOQUIA, ANTONIO T. CARPIO, MANUEL C. CASES, JR., RICHARD J. GORDON, OSCAR L. KARAAN, BENJAMIN L. KALAW, LUCAS C. LICREIO, TOMAS N. PRADO, ELIZER A. ODULIO, OSCAR M. ORBOS, AURORA A. SANTIAGO, EMILY SIBULO-HAYUDINI, CONRAD D. SORIANO, AND JOSE B. TOMIMBANG; FORMER OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES; SENIOR FOR SENIORS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MS. CAROL BLANCO BENAVIDES; KIDNEY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. VICENTE GREGORIO; AND ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER, FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMANNUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

I commend our highly esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier, on another incisive and erudite ponencia. I fully concur with the ponencia's ruling that respondents should be ordered to return the PHP 60 billion taken from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), as already mandated by President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., and that the Department of Finance (DOF) should be prohibited from implementing the transfer of PHP 29.9 billion "fund balance" from PhilHealth.

However, I, like Associate Justices Jhosep Y. Lopez, Japar B. Dimaampao, and Raul B. Villanueva, have serious reservations regarding the wholesale invalidation of Special Provision No. 1(d) of the 2024 General Appropriations Act (GAA) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024. I will no longer reiterate the arguments which Associate Justices Lopez, Dimaampao, and Villanueva already exhaustively discussed in their well-reasoned separate opinions; rather, I write only to express a few additional points.

As a rule, any analysis of the validity of a law must prescind from the presumption that said law is constitutional. Thus, in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,1 the Court emphasized that "every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative."2

Consistent with the presumption of constitutionality, "in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred."3

In this regard, analysis of the constitutionality of Special Provision No. 1(d) must begin from the presumption that this provision is constitutional. Moreover, if Special Provision No. 1(d) appears to be in conflict with the Constitution in any way, but the Court can adopt a construction that harmonizes this law with the requirements of the Constitution, the Court is duty-bound to so harmonize Special Provision No. 1(d) and the Constitution.

With these fundamental principles in mind, the instant controversy presents the Court with a crossroads: it can nullify Special Provision No. 1(d) of the 2024 GAA and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 in their entirety, or it can exercise judicial restraint, harmonize Special Provision No. 1(d) and the Constitution, and rule only on the facts before it, i.e., the transfer of PhilHealth's reserve funds to the National Treasury. For the reasons explained below, I believe the latter option is more in accordance with the Constitution, established limits on the Court's power of judicial review, and the principle of separation of powers.

Second, I respectfully disagree with the ponencia's ruling that Special Provision No. 1(d) is not germane to the purpose of the 2024 GAA and is thus a prohibited rider.

As stated in the ponencia, all provisions in a GAA must be germane to the purpose of the law, i.e., they must be particular, unambiguous, and appropriate.4

The ponencia recognizes that the first requisite of germaneness is fulfilled by Special Provision No. 1(d). According to the ponencia, Special Provision No. 1(d) is particular as "it relates to a particular appropriation in the 2024 GAA, i.e., the unprogrammed appropriations, which do not have definite funding sources, save for foreign assisted projects funded by foreign loans[.]"5

However, the ponencia finds that the other two requisites of germaneness are absent, as Special Provision No. 1(d) is: (a) ambiguous; and (b) inappropriate, because it impliedly repeals Section 11 of the United Healthcare Act (UHCA). I respectfully disagree on both counts.

In Atitiw v. Zamora,6 as cited in the ponencia, the Court explained that a provision in a GAA "is unambiguous when its application or operation is apparent on the face of the bill and it does not necessitate reference to details or sources outside the appropriations bill."7

Applying this principle, the ponencia argues that Special Provision No. 1(d) is ambiguous because it does not define" fund balance" and "reasonable levels," and instead requires the DOF to issue guidelines to implement this provision.8 According to the ponencia, this directive constitutes an undue delegation of legislative authority to the DOF.

To the contrary, however, I respectfully posit that the lack of a statutory definition of "fund balance" and "reasonable levels" does not render Special Provision No. 1(d) ambiguous, and that Special Provision No. 1(d) is a valid delegation of legislative authority to the DOF.

At the outset, "courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers."9 This judicial policy is consistent with the principle of separation of powers, as well as the reality that delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies "has become necessary because of 'the growing complexity of the modern society.' These agencies are considered specialists, which 'can deal with the problems [in their respective fields] with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.'"10

Mindful that the Court must exercise caution in determining the existence of an undue delegation of legislative authority, I submit that Special Provision No. 1(d) is not an undue delegation of legislative authority.

In ABAKADA GURO Party List (formerly AASJS) v. Hon. Purisima,11 the Court explained the standards for determining whether a delegation of legislative power is valid:

Two tests determine the validity of delegation or legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.12 (Emphasis supplied)

With respect to the requirement of completeness, the Court has explained that "[a]ll the terms and provisions of the law must leave nothing to the delegate except to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law should be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced."13

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule-making authority by an administrative agency are necessarily broad and highly abstract.

A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has found the following, despite being broad principles, to be sufficient standards to constitute a valid delegation of legislative power: "the standardization and regulation of medical education," "safe transit upon the roads." "public welfare," "interest of law and order," "public interest," "public convenience and welfare," and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency."14 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To further illustrate, general standards such as "'as far as practicable,' 'decline of crude oil prices in the world market,' and 'stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar'"15 are not "unclear nor inconcrete in meaning, but are in fact determinable by the simple expedient of referring to their dictionary meanings."16

In cases involving the delegation of rate-fixing power, "the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just."17

In addition, a standard imposed by the legislature does not have to be expressly stated; in fact, impIied standards have been deemed sufficient to guide the legislature's delegate. As the Court has held, these standards "do not have to be spelled out specifically, and could be implied from the purpose of the act considered as a whole."18

In Belgica v. Ochoa,19 the Court was tasked, among other issues, to determine whether the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, an appropriations law, was an undue delegation of legislative authority.20 The Court held that this phrase was an undue delegation of legislative authority as it did not provide a sufficient standard to guide the delegate:

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details or the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. There are [two] fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries or the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits or the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

... Thus, while Section 8 of [Presidential Decree No.] 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless he stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.21 (Emphasis supplied)

In my view, there is a sea of difference between an impermissibly vague standard such as "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" and the standards provided in Special Provision No. 1(d).

As explained by the ponente, Special Provision No. 1(d) "provides the sources of funds including the conditions for the utilization of the allocated funds therefor i.e., among others, that there be a fund balance from a [government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)]."22 Consequently, Special Provision No. 1(d) is complete. It does not clothe the DOF with any discretion to decide on the sources of funds or the conditions for the utilization of funds, as these matters were already determined by Congress when it passed the 2024 GAA.

Special Provision No. 1(d) also provides the DOF, as the legislature's delegate, sufficient standards to carry out the delegated task. Under this provision, the DOF is not given unfettered authority to designate any and all funds of GOCCs as "fund balance"; instead, "fund balance" is to be determined based on "any remainder resulting from the review and reduction of their reserve funds to a reasonable level."23 The determination of the "reasonable level" is also subject to a legislative standard under Special Provision No. 1(d), i.e., it must "tak[e] into account disbursement from private years."

The ponencia also distinguishes Special Provision No. 1(d) from Special Provision No. 1(a) to (c), which do not require supplementary issuances from the DOF.

In this regard, I respectfully draw the ponente's attention to other portions of the Special Provisions which refer to supplementary issuances by other government agencies, as follows:

Indeed, references to the need for guidelines issued by other government agencies are replete throughout the 2024 GAA. To illustrate, a few examples are listed below:

If a reference to guidelines or rules issued or to be issued by other government agencies is sufficient to render a provision of a GAA ambiguous, it would appear that numerous provisions of the 2024 GAA are ambiguous and therefore fail the test of germaneness. Surely this was not the result intended by the Court when it handed down its ruling in Atitiw. Such a ruling would "tie the hands of Congress in providing budgetary policies in the appropriations bill,"36 precisely the outcome the Court in Atitiw wished to avoid.

For the above reasons, I disagree that the directive to the DOF to issue guidelines to implement the Special Provisions of the 2024 GAA renders Special Provision No. 1(d) ambiguous and therefore a prohibited rider under the Constitution. Special Provision No. 1(d) does not unduly delegate legislative power, and the resulting DOF Circular No. 003-2024 is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Special Provision No. 1(d) does not impliedly repeal Section 11 of the UHCA, and is therefore not inappropriate

The third requisite for germaneness is that the provision must be appropriate. Citing Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,37 the ponencia explains that the following provisions are not appropriate in a GAA: (1) provisions that do not relate specifically to some particular appropriation; (2) even if they relate to some particular appropriation, they nonetheless violate the Constitution; or (3) provisions that intend to amend or repeal, or have the effect of amending or repealing, existing laws.38 According to the ponencia, Special Provision No. 1(d) impliedly repealed Section 11 of the UHCA and is thus an inappropriate rider.

I respectfully disagree. Associate Justices Lopez, Dimaampao, and Villanueva already explained why Special Provision No. 1(d) did not impliedly repeal Section 11 of the UHCA and Sin Tax Laws. I wish only to add a few points on this subject for the consideration of the banc.

In Mecano v. Commission on Audit,39 the Court distinguished between two types of implied repeal:

I respectfully submit that neither mode of implied repeal is present in this case.

As to the first mode of implied repeal: even assuming that Special Provision No. 1(d) and Section 11 of the UHCA govern the same subject matter (i.e., that PhilHealth's reserve funds and fund balance are one and the same), these statutory provisions are not irreconcilable. It is a basic rule that "general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable—lex specialis derogat generali."41

As pointed out by Associate Justices Lopez and Dimaampao, the lex specialis with regard to PhilHealth's reserve funds is PhilHealth's mandatory duties with respect to these funds under Section 11 of the UHCA. The broad language of Special Provision No. 1(d), which specially identifies neither PhilHealth nor its reserve funds but rather speaks generally of GOCCs and their fund balances, is general legislation that must give way to the particular requirements of Section 11 of the UHCA.

As regards the second mode of implied repeal, it can hardly be disputed that Special Provision No. 1(d) does not cover the whole subject of Section 11 of the UHCA. As explained by the ponencia, Special Provision No. 1(d) "provides the sources of funds [for unprogrammed appropriations,] including the conditions for the utilization of the allocated funds therefore[.]"42 On the other hand, Section 11 of the UHCA: (1) identifies the "reserve funds" of PhilHealth; (2) sets forth its ceiling, usage, and investment parameters; (3) establishes a prohibition against the transfer of this "reserve funds"; and (4) requires the creation of the "reserve funds" for specific purposes.43

Assuming, again, that "fund balance" and "reserve funds" under Special Provision No. 1(d) and Section 11 of the UHCA are one and the same, Section 11 of the UHCA contains numerous details on the use and safekeeping of these funds, details which are beyond the scope of Special Provision No. 1(d). Accordingly, Special Provision No. 1(d) does not cover the whole subject of Section 11 of the UHCA.

In addition, implied repeal requires a finding that Congress intended to repeal the previous law:

[S]tatutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for the earlier act.44

I do not believe that such intent can be inferred from the general language of Special Provision No.(awÞhi( 1(d). Moreover, since provisions that intend to amend or repeal, or have the effect of amending or repealing, existing laws, are not appropriate in a GAA, to infer such intent on the part of Congress would be to presume that Congress intended to craft ineffective legislation. Such an inference is contrary to the Court's duty to interpret existing laws such that they can be made effective.

It is an established principle that "construction of a statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of the act and will carry out the intention of Congress."45 Moreover, "statutes are to be read in a manner that would 'breathe life into it, rather than defeat it, and ... all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.'"46 These principles are not simply tools to simplify statutory construction or meaningless motherhood statements; these principles are borne out of the Court's respect for the legislature as a co-equal branch of government. Thus, they should not be carelessly set aside and disregarded.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully submit that Special Provision 1(d) is not a rider, as it is particular, unambiguous, and appropriate. I further submit that Special Provision No. 1(d) did not unduly delegate legislative authority to the DOF. While the DOF erred in ordering the transfer of PhilHealth's reserve funds to the National Treasury, this error was one of implementation, not legislation.

Third, the Court must exercise judicial restraint and rule only on the facts before it.

In his Concurring Opinion in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,47 Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen succinctly explained the notion of judicial restraint:

When interpretations of a constitutional provision are equally valid but lead to contrary results, this Court should exercise judicial restraint and allow the political forces to shed light on a choice. This Court steps in only when it discerns clear fallacies in the application of certain norms or their interpretation. Judicial restraint requires that this Court does not involve itself into matters in which only those who join in democratic political deliberation should participate. As magistrates of the highest court, we should distinguish our role from that of an ordinary citizen who can vote.

Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from speculating on the facts of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead. Likewise, this Court should avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none of the parties can fully argue simply because they have not established the facts or are not interested in the issues raised by the hypothetical situations. In a way, courts are mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial skepticism. What we think may be happening may not at all be the case. Therefore, this Court should always await the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.48 (Emphasis supplied)

As discussed by Associate Justice Lopez in his Separate Concurring Opinion, the substance of the petitioners' arguments-against the validity of Special Provision No. 1(d) and the assailed DOF Circular focus on the effect of these issuances on PhilHealth, not on their invalidity in all instances. Associate Justices Lopez and Dimaampao also note that at least one other GOCC has remitted funds to the National Treasury pursuant to Special Provision No. 1(d), and the question of whether this transfer is void is not before this Court. To my mind, the Court should exercise restraint and base its ruling only on the facts before it, lest its Decision in this case trigger a ripple of unforeseen consequences that unduly hamper the operations of government.

For similar reasons, the argument of the petitioners that the transfer of funds from PhilHealth to the National Treasury constitutes malversation or technical malversation and plunder for which the DOF Secretary should be held criminally liable is misplaced since it involves issues of criminal liability beyond the scope of the instant proceedings.49 I fully agree with the ponencia and wish only to emphasize that this Court is not the proper forum to allege and try criminal charges in the first instance, regardless of the nature of the proceedings. There is no procedural vehicle by which an aggrieved party may bring criminal charges before this Court without first resorting to the trial courts. Moreover, without determination of probable cause, arraignment, trial, and all the other procedural measures designed to ensure that persons accused of criminal wrongdoing are afforded due process, any ruling on the merits of petitioners' allegations of criminal conduct would violate the rights of the DOF Secretary.

All told, the Court's power of judicial review empowers the Court to correct grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive and Legislative. It is not carte blanche for the Court to interfere with the workings of government through judicial legislation, nor is it authority for the Court to flout the fundamental principle of separation of powers and dismiss the wisdom and expertise of its co-equal branches of government. For these reasons, I respectfully submit that the Court should (a) limit its declaration of invalidity to the transfer of PHP 60 billion of PhilHealth's reserve funds to the National Treasury, and (b) refrain from invalidating Special Provision No. 1(d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 in their entirety.