G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 274778, December 3, 2025,
♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Marquez, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Villanueva, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Rosario, [J]
♦ Separate and Dissenting Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

AQUILINO PIMENTEL III; ERNESTO OFRACIO; JANICE LIRZA MELGAR; MARIA CIELO MAGNO; MA. DOMINGA CECILIA B. PADILLA; DANTE B. GATMAYTAN; IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ; SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA; PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION FOUNDATION, INC.; AND PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS,

ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION); DANIEL EDRALIN, SECRETARY GENERAL, NATIONAL VNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-NAGKAISA); RENATO MAGTUBO, CHAIRPERSON, PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA (PM-NAGKAISA); JULIUS CAINGLET, CHURCH-LABOR CONFERENCE, GRACE A. ESTRADA, PRESIDENT, PINAY CAREWORKERS TRANSNATIONAL (PIN@Y); ALFREDO MARANAN, FFW NATIONAL TREASURER; JUN RAMIREZ MENDOZA, UNION PRESIDENT, VISHAY EMPLOYEES PHILIPPINES UNION-FFW AND NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, FFW; JUDY ANN CHAN MIRANDA, CHAIRPERSON, NAGKAISA WOMEN COMMITTEE, GENERAL SECRETARY, PM-NAGKAISA; VILMA G. REYES, UNION PRESIDENT, DELA SALLE MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES INSTITUTE EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER, FFW; RENE L. CAPITO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (AFW); ELIJA R. SAN FERNANDO, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL); RENE DE MESA TADLE, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (COTESCUP); EMERITO C. GONZALES, UNION PRESIDENT UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU); DENNIES GUTIERREZ, UNION PRESIDENT, INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (ILEU-FFW); ROLANDO LIBROJO, CONVENOR, KILUSANG ARTIKULO 13 (A.13); AND ATTY. DANILO C. ISIDERIO, FFW LEGAL CENTER, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

BAYAN MUNA CHAIRMAN NERI COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA VICE CHAIRMAN TEODORO A. CASIÑO, BAYAN MUNA EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, AND FORMER BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND R. GAITE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
*EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

1SAMBAYAN COALITION; MEMBERS OF U.P. LAW CLASS 1975 NAMELY: JOSE P.O. ALILING IV, AUGUSTO H. BACULIO, EDGARDO R. BALBIN, MOISES B. BOQUIA, ANTONIO T. CARPIO, MANUEL C. CASES, JR., RICHARD J. GORDON, OSCAR L. KARAAN, BENJAMIN L. KALAW, LUCAS C. LICREIO, TOMAS N. PRADO, ELIZER A. ODULIO, OSCAR M. ORBOS, AURORA A. SANTIAGO, EMILY SIBULO-HAYUDINI, CONRAD D. SORIANO, AND JOSE B. TOMIMBANG; FORMER OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES; SENIOR FOR SENIORS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MS. CAROL BLANCO BENAVIDES; KIDNEY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. VICENTE GREGORIO; AND ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER, FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMANNUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

I concur in the ponencia which comprehensively discusses the basis for partly granting the petitions. I share the sentiments of my esteemed colleagues that the right to health of every Filipino is of paramount importance.

I write this opinion to briefly discuss Article VI, Section 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution that provides:

I agree with the ponencia that President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. did not gravely abuse his discretion in certifying House Bill No. 8980 as urgent.

The point of contention of petitioners Bayan Muna Chairman Neri Colmenares et al. is that there was no public calamity or emergency that necessitated the certification of House Bill No. 8980 as urgent. To resolve this, it is imperative to determine what constitutes an emergency.

Section 3(r) of Republic Act No. 101212 entitled the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, defines an emergency as an "unforeseen or sudden occurrence, especially danger, demanding immediate action." And in the context of Article VI, Section 233 of the 1987 Constitution, the Court stated that emergency, as a generic term, "connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal."4 But with respect to Article VI, Section 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution, law and jurisprudence do not provide a specific definition of emergency.

Nonetheless, the Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,5 addressed the argument that a "growing budget deficit" does not qualify as an emergency:

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art.(awÞhi( VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.6

And in ruling on the motions for reconsideration in the same case, the Court stated as follows:

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.7

The Court respected the assessment of the Senate that the passage of the bill was indeed urgent and found that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

In Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,8 the Court reiterated its ruling in Tolentino in finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion in upholding the immediate enactment of Republic Act No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes."

The Court similarly upheld the certification of then President Rodrigo R. Duterte that the immediate enactment of Republic Act No. 11479 or the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 was necessary in Calleja v. Executive Secretary.9 The Court explained:

Therefore, the President's exercise of the power to issue such certification is one that should be accorded with due deference. As such, the Court must refrain from intruding into such matter through the exercise of its judicial power in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, considering that the passage of laws is essentially an affair that falls within the purview of the political branches of government.10

As can be seen, the Court respects the assessment of its co-equal branches as to the necessity of the immediate passage of a law. After all, they are in a better position to make such determination, having access to a wealth of information. I therefore agree with the ponencia that the terms public calamity or emergency should not be restricted to those physical in nature or to fortuitous events. It is my humble view that a restrictive interpretation of Article VI, Section 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution may unduly stifle. the President and the Congress in serving the people.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Court is a mere rubber stamp of its co-equal branches. It shall not hesitate to perform its sworn duty to call them out when they act with grave abuse of discretion. However, this is not the case here.

The certification of House Bill No. 8980 as urgent does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The decision to ensure that the government is able to sufficiently respond to the current needs of our nation hardly qualifies as arbitrary, capricious, or a despotic exercise of judgment. Hence, there is no reason to declare the act in question unconstitutional.