G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 274778, December 3, 2025,
♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Marquez, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Villanueva, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Rosario, [J]
♦ Separate and Dissenting Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

AQUILINO PIMENTEL III; ERNESTO OFRACIO; JANICE LIRZA MELGAR; MARIA CIELO MAGNO; MA. DOMINGA CECILIA B. PADILLA; DANTE B. GATMAYTAN; IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ; SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA; PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION FOUNDATION, INC.; AND PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS,

ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION); DANIEL EDRALIN, SECRETARY GENERAL, NATIONAL VNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-NAGKAISA); RENATO MAGTUBO, CHAIRPERSON, PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA (PM-NAGKAISA); JULIUS CAINGLET, CHURCH-LABOR CONFERENCE, GRACE A. ESTRADA, PRESIDENT, PINAY CAREWORKERS TRANSNATIONAL (PIN@Y); ALFREDO MARANAN, FFW NATIONAL TREASURER; JUN RAMIREZ MENDOZA, UNION PRESIDENT, VISHAY EMPLOYEES PHILIPPINES UNION-FFW AND NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, FFW; JUDY ANN CHAN MIRANDA, CHAIRPERSON, NAGKAISA WOMEN COMMITTEE, GENERAL SECRETARY, PM-NAGKAISA; VILMA G. REYES, UNION PRESIDENT, DELA SALLE MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES INSTITUTE EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER, FFW; RENE L. CAPITO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (AFW); ELIJA R. SAN FERNANDO, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL); RENE DE MESA TADLE, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (COTESCUP); EMERITO C. GONZALES, UNION PRESIDENT UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU); DENNIES GUTIERREZ, UNION PRESIDENT, INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (ILEU-FFW); ROLANDO LIBROJO, CONVENOR, KILUSANG ARTIKULO 13 (A.13); AND ATTY. DANILO C. ISIDERIO, FFW LEGAL CENTER, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

BAYAN MUNA CHAIRMAN NERI COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA VICE CHAIRMAN TEODORO A. CASIÑO, BAYAN MUNA EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, AND FORMER BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND R. GAITE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
*EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

1SAMBAYAN COALITION; MEMBERS OF U.P. LAW CLASS 1975 NAMELY: JOSE P.O. ALILING IV, AUGUSTO H. BACULIO, EDGARDO R. BALBIN, MOISES B. BOQUIA, ANTONIO T. CARPIO, MANUEL C. CASES, JR., RICHARD J. GORDON, OSCAR L. KARAAN, BENJAMIN L. KALAW, LUCAS C. LICREIO, TOMAS N. PRADO, ELIZER A. ODULIO, OSCAR M. ORBOS, AURORA A. SANTIAGO, EMILY SIBULO-HAYUDINI, CONRAD D. SORIANO, AND JOSE B. TOMIMBANG; FORMER OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES; SENIOR FOR SENIORS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MS. CAROL BLANCO BENAVIDES; KIDNEY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. VICENTE GREGORIO; AND ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER, FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMANNUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

I concur with the disposition in the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier, ordering the respondents to return to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) the PHP 60 billion as a specific item in the 2026 General Appropriations Act (GAA), and enjoining the Department of Finance (DOF) to be permanently prohibited from implementing the transfer of the remaining PHP 29.9 billion fund balance of the Philhealth.

I write this opinion, however, to raise my reservation against the declaration of Special Provision No. 1(d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 as both unconstitutional in their entirety. It is my humble view that given the factual milieu and legal implications of the present case, the resolution of this Court should be limited to the transfer of funds involving Philhealth, which can be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution.

To recall, the ponencia struck down as unconstitutional Special Provision No. 1(d) for being a rider or an inappropriate provision to the 2024 GAA for its amendatory effect on the Universal Health Care Act (UHCA), Section 11, and the Sin Tax Laws, and for being violative of Article VI, Section 29(3) of the Constitution. It was also declared as DOF Circular No. 003-2024 as unconstitutional since it implements Special Provision No. 1(d).

To begin with, it is a settled principle that in view of the inherent and stated powers and prerogative of the legislative department, as well as the policy of faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, laws are accorded the presumption of constitutionality. To successfully overcome this presumption, the challenger has the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality.1 Indeed, failing in this regard, the law must be upheld and sustained.

Contrary to the ruling of the ponencia, I opine that the present petition fell short of the requirement necessary to overturn the presumption of constitutionality which the questioned provisions enjoy.

SEC. 25(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

This Court has defined a rider as a "provision which is alien to or not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it is incorporated."2 With respect to the appropriations bill, the reason for prohibiting riders, similar to the rationale of the single subject title rule, is to "prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, to avoid surprise or fraud upon the legislature, and to fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered."3

Since an appropriations bill naturally covers a broad range of subject matter and includes more details compared to an ordinary bill, the requirement is only that "all the provisions in a general appropriations bill are either appropriation items or non-appropriation items which relate specifically to appropriation items." Consequently, "provisions or clauses that do not directly appropriate funds are deemed appurtenant in a general appropriations bill when they specify certain conditions and restrictions in the manner by which the funds to which they relate have to be spent."4

As settled by jurisprudence, the test of germaneness requires that the provisions in the appropriations bill be: (1) particular; (2) unambiguous; and (3) appropriate.5 Hence:

A provision or clause is particular it is relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation in the bill and does not refer generally to the entire appropriations bill. It is unambiguous when its application or operation is apparent on the face of the bill. It is an appropriate provision or clause when its subject matter does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation.6

It is my view that Special Provision No. 1(d) satisfies all the requirements of germaneness and is thus not a rider to the 2024 GAA. As pointed out by the ponencia, the provision is particular and ambiguous. It is particular since it relates to a distinct item of appropriation in the 2024 GAA, particularly the unprogrammed appropriations, which list down the purposes for which the appropriated funds may be utilized. Also, the provision is unambiguous since its application, i.e., the utilization of unprogrammed funds with its corresponding sources, is explicitly stated, and no external reference to sources outside the law is necessary.

On the other hand, it must be reiterated that the ultimate test for the "appropriateness" of a provision is whether its subject matter is properly embraced in the relevant law. If the subject matter is more fitting to be treated and contained in a separate law, then the provision is inappropriate. On this note, I agree with the ponencia that since the amendment or repeal of an existing law should be done in a separate legislation,7 provisions in the general appropriations law of this nature are also deemed inappropriate provisions.

I am not inclined to agree, however, that using these standards, Special Provision No. 1(d) is deemed inappropriate.

First, Special Provision No. 1(d) only refers to another source of funds to be used for unprogrammed appropriations, which is a matter properly dealt with in the general appropriations law. The provision of unprogrammed appropriations and its corresponding sources in the general appropriations law has been traditionally practiced and upheld as valid, as it is intended to only "cover unexpected, excess, or windfall" revenue that may only be used to fund specified public purposes upon compliance with the conditions for its release."8

Too, Special Provision 1(d) did not amend or repeal the UHCA or the Sin Tax Laws. There are two kinds of repeal recognized in our jurisdiction:

A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed. An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.9 (Citations omitted)

As worded, the 2024 GAA did not expressly repeal or amend the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws in view of the absence of a repealing or amendatory clause to that effect. Implied repeal, on the other hand, "proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect."10 On this score, implied repeal typically involves two conflicting provisions or two incompatible laws, thus:

The first is where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, I he latter act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. The second category of repeal is only possible if the revised statute was intended to cover the whole subject matter and as a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute.11 (Citations omitted)

In the present case, the ponencia found that the first form of implied repeal applies, particularly, that Special Provision 1(d) impliedly repealed Section 11 of the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws.

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that the ponencia had accurately and adequately characterized the reserve funds of Philhealth as provided under the UHCA. I fully concur with the extensive discussion by the ponente that, by express mandate of the UHCA, Philhealth funds should be administered strictly in accordance with its provisions.(awÞhi( As correctly enunciated by the ponencia, Section 11 of the UHCA commands how the Philhealth funds shall be utilized and in what order. It mandates the Philhealth to "first, determine its actuarially-estimated ceiling equivalent to two years" projected program expenditures; second, set aside at least a portion of its net income as "reserve funds," which shall not exceed the actuarially-estimated ceiling; third, invest the unused or unutilized portion of its "reserve funds" to earn an average annual income until the total "reserve funds," which includes the interest income from investments, exceed the ceiling; and, fourth, once the accumulated "reserve funds" exceeds the ceiling, the excess actual "reserve funds" shall be used to increase the benefits under the NHIP and to decrease the amount of members" contributions."12 In other words, the UHCA itself restricts the reserve funds of Philhealth, which must be used solely for the purposes and exclusively managed in the manner stated in the law. Thus, Philhealth could not transmit its reserve funds, or even a portion thereof, for a different purpose without crying afoul of the express provision of the UHCA. Notably, the UHCA itself emphasizes this limitation and prescribes that "no portion of the reserve fund or income thereof shall accrue to the general fund of the National Government or to any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations."13

It is, however, precisely on this score that I cannot share the conclusion that Special Provision No. 1(d) impliedly amended the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws.

"A fundamental rule in statutory construction is that a special law cannot be repealed or modified by a subsequently enacted general law in the absence of any express provision in the new law to that effect."14 Thus, it has been held that "a special law must be interpreted to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion."15

The UHCA is a highly specialized law. It is a landmark legislation, passed after decades of lobbying and unyielding demands of the public. One of its distinctive features is Section 11, which evidently has for its purpose strengthening the financial capacity of Philhealth, to the end of ensuring is viability and sustainability in fulfilling its mandate of providing quality services and benefits. I dare say it is one of the most important pieces of legislation that we have today, which undertakes, in the ultimate, universal healthcare for each and every Filipino, a promise that is admittedly still far from realization.

Given the importance and significance of the UFICA, it is my humble view that its provisions, particularly Section 11, should be read as constituting an exception to Special Provision No. 1(d). After all, implied repeals are not favored.16 There is even a presumption against implied repeal.17 The reason is because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. For a law to be deemed repealed, manifest intention by the legislature must be clearly shown. In fact, the lack of an express repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, in the absence of showing of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.18

It is only reasonable to presume that Congress approved and passed Special Provision No. 1(d) with the knowledge and understanding of all laws, including the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws. Indeed, it was not clearly shown that Congress manifestly intended to repeal Section 11 of the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws to the end of allowing Philhealth's reserve funds be diverted to purposes other than what it was designed for.

Since Section 11 of the UHCA constitutes an exception to Special Provision No. 1(d), the DOF could not have legally ordered Philhealth to transmit to the National Treasury a portion of its reserve funds. In ordering the transfer of Philhealth's reserve funds, therefore, the DOF gravely abused its discretion since the application of Special Provision No. 1(d) and its implementing rule, DOF Circular No. 003-2024, to Philhealth violated the UHCA and as the ponencia correctly declared, the Constitution with respect to the people's right to health. The rule is that "there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."19

Verily, this conservative approach reinforces the principle of deference which the Court accords to a co-equal branch of the government, in this case, the legislature. We have said that:

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch—the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.20 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)

It should also be stressed that refraining, from declaring; the unconstitutionality of Special Provision No. 1(d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 allows room for their application to other Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations, the specific charters and circumstances of which were not brought before us in the present petitions. According to the DOF, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation also remitted PFIP 107.23 billion to the National Treasury pursuant to Special Provision No. 1(d).21 this leaves a void as to the full effects of Special Provision No. 1(d) before the declaration of its unconstitutionality.

To this point, since the arguments of petitioners revolved mainly around the application of Special Provision No. 1(d) to Philhealth and the validity of the transfer of its reserve funds to the National Treasury particularly in relation to the UHCA. our approach should be pursuant to an as-applied challenge and our resolution be limited to actual facts proved before the Court. We have previously recognized that:

In an as-applied challenge, the question before the Court is the constitutionality of a statute's application to a particular set of proven facts as applied to the actual parties. It is one "under which the plaintiff argues that a statute, even though generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiffs particular circumstances." Put in another way, the plaintiff argues that "a statute cannot be applied to [him or] her because its application would violate [his or] her personal constitutional rights." Thus, an as-applied challenge is strictly predicated on proven facts particular to an individual and his or her relation to the statute in question. If the facts so warrant, "case severability" may occur, where the Court "severs" or separates the unconstitutional applications of the statute from the constitutional applications of the same statute, but the statute itself may not be completely struck down. That said, it is conceivable that a case which starts put" as an as-applied change may eventually result in the total invalidation of the statute if, in the process, the Court is satisfied that it could never have any constitutional application.22 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

All told, I agree that the transfer of Philhealth's reserve funds to the National Treasury pursuant to the DOF's order must be annulled and set aside, but for the reasons stated in this opinion. I respectfully proffer that the Court can still dispose of the main issue and grant the ultimate relief prayed for by petitioners without necessarily invalidating and declaring Special Provision No. 1(d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 as unconstitutional.

Relatedly, while the transfer of Philhealth's reserve funds to the National Treasury is void, this does not translate to a finding that the Secretary of Finance or the public respondents may be held liable for technical malversation and/or plunder.

Indeed, the argument that the Secretary of Finance is criminally liable for the transfer of Philhealth funds23 fails on procedural and substantive grounds.

Procedurally, petitioners came before this Court through the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. As the ponencia succinctly declared, the present petitions are not the proper procedural vehicles for the initiation of a criminal action, much less the finding of a verdict for one. The function of a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, to note, is "to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government[.]"24 It is very limited in its scope, and does not in any way empower the courts to adjudicate criminal liability or innocence in the same proceeding, no matter how serious the allegations are. Any imputation of criminal liability must be made through the proper criminal proceedings, where the rights of the accused are adequately observed and protected.

Even assuming that the issue on criminal liability may be raised in the present petitions, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the acts of the Secretary of Finance constitute plunder and/or technical malversation.

Plunder is committed by any public officer who, by themselves or in connivance with members of their family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least PHP 50,000,000.00.25 In other words, the gravamen of plunder is the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer, by themselves, or in connivance with others. Here, it was not disputed that the Philhealth funds were transferred to the Bureau of Treasury. There was no allegation, much less proof, that the funds were personally amassed or acquired by the Secretary of Finance or any of the public respondents.

On the other hand, technical malversation requires the concurrence of three elements: "(a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) that [they apply] public funds or property under [their] administration to some public use; and (c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance."26 In the present case, the second element is conspicuously absent. The Philhealth funds were not under the administration of the Department of Finance or any of the public respondents.

As it is, I find that the actions of the Secretary of Finance and the public respondents were made, only in compliance with the mandatory language Special Provision No. 1(d). They acted with institutional good faith and due diligence, relying on formal clearances from several government agencies, including the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, the Commission on Audit, and the Governance Commission for GOCCs. For faithfully observing the mandates of Congress as expressed in the GAA of 2024, at a time where there was no obstacle to do so, the Secretary of Finance and public respondents should not be held criminally liable.