G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 274778, December 3, 2025,
♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Marquez, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion Opinion, Villanueva, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Rosario, [J]
♦ Separate and Dissenting Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

AQUILINO PIMENTEL III; ERNESTO OFRACIO; JANICE LIRZA MELGAR; MARIA CIELO MAGNO; MA. DOMINGA CECILIA B. PADILLA; DANTE B. GATMAYTAN; IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ; SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA; PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION FOUNDATION, INC.; AND PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS,

ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION); DANIEL EDRALIN, SECRETARY GENERAL, NATIONAL VNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-NAGKAISA); RENATO MAGTUBO, CHAIRPERSON, PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA (PM-NAGKAISA); JULIUS CAINGLET, CHURCH-LABOR CONFERENCE, GRACE A. ESTRADA, PRESIDENT, PINAY CAREWORKERS TRANSNATIONAL (PIN@Y); ALFREDO MARANAN, FFW NATIONAL TREASURER; JUN RAMIREZ MENDOZA, UNION PRESIDENT, VISHAY EMPLOYEES PHILIPPINES UNION-FFW AND NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, FFW; JUDY ANN CHAN MIRANDA, CHAIRPERSON, NAGKAISA WOMEN COMMITTEE, GENERAL SECRETARY, PM-NAGKAISA; VILMA G. REYES, UNION PRESIDENT, DELA SALLE MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES INSTITUTE EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER, FFW; RENE L. CAPITO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (AFW); ELIJA R. SAN FERNANDO, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL); RENE DE MESA TADLE, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (COTESCUP); EMERITO C. GONZALES, UNION PRESIDENT UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU); DENNIES GUTIERREZ, UNION PRESIDENT, INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (ILEU-FFW); ROLANDO LIBROJO, CONVENOR, KILUSANG ARTIKULO 13 (A.13); AND ATTY. DANILO C. ISIDERIO, FFW LEGAL CENTER, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

BAYAN MUNA CHAIRMAN NERI COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA VICE CHAIRMAN TEODORO A. CASIÑO, BAYAN MUNA EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, AND FORMER BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND R. GAITE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
*EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

1SAMBAYAN COALITION; MEMBERS OF U.P. LAW CLASS 1975 NAMELY: JOSE P.O. ALILING IV, AUGUSTO H. BACULIO, EDGARDO R. BALBIN, MOISES B. BOQUIA, ANTONIO T. CARPIO, MANUEL C. CASES, JR., RICHARD J. GORDON, OSCAR L. KARAAN, BENJAMIN L. KALAW, LUCAS C. LICREIO, TOMAS N. PRADO, ELIZER A. ODULIO, OSCAR M. ORBOS, AURORA A. SANTIAGO, EMILY SIBULO-HAYUDINI, CONRAD D. SORIANO, AND JOSE B. TOMIMBANG; FORMER OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES; SENIOR FOR SENIORS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MS. CAROL BLANCO BENAVIDES; KIDNEY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. VICENTE GREGORIO; AND ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER, FERDINAND MARTIN ROMUALDEZ; THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH ESCUDERO; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY RALPH RECTO; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS BERSAMIN; AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, EMANNUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

I concur with the ponencia's reasoning and result, as indeed, all the salient points have been discussed thoroughly and decidedly. I only offer for the record my humble opinion on the matter of the purported criminal liability of Secretary of Finance Ralph G. Recto (Secretary Recto) for technical malversation and/or plunder.

Petitioners Aquilino Pimentel III et al. (Pimentel et al.) would have the Court pass on Secretary Recto's alleged culpability for technical malversation or plunder for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing an injunctive writ.1 However, as was discussed in the ponencia, the references to purported criminal liability to challenge the acts of Secretary Recto are improper in this proceeding. In these petitions for certiorari, the only issue to be adjudicated is the constitutionality of Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII of the 2024 General Appropriations Act (GAA) and Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 003-2024, and whether they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As such, the ponencia rightfully declares that the Court cannot even suggest that such type of liability exists even only as a basis for nullifying the assailed issuances.

Nonetheless, based on the records of this case, it appears that Secretary Recto was only fulfilling his legal duty in issuing DOF Circular No. 003-2024.

In the 1987 Constitution, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.2 While the 1987 Constitution does not define what is meant by "executive power," Article VII thereof identifies certain powers to be exercised by the President, including but not limited to, the power to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.3 In Marcos v. Manglapus,4 the Court expounded that the 1987 Constitution maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." It is not limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution but includes whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial.

The Court has explicated that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments.5 From this arose the doctrine of qualified political agency, which postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.6 Fittingly, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" provides that there shall be, under the Executive Branch, as many Departments "as are necessary for the functional distribution of the work of the President."7

Particularly relevant to this case, the Department of Finance's mandate includes:

As Secretary of Finance, Secretary Recto has the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the above mandate of the DOF and for the discharge of its powers and functions.9

Pursuant to the above mandate, Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII of the 2024 GAA expressly directed the DOF to "issue the guidelines to implement this provision." In compliance therewith, Secretary Recto issued DOF Circular No. 003-2024 to realize the collection of Unprogrammed Appropriation sourced from the "[f]und balance of the Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) from any remainder resulting from the review and reduction of their reserve funds to reasonable levels taking into account the disbursement from prior years."

On this point, it bears to emphasize that Secretary Recto, as the head of the DOF, has no discretion as to whether he will comply with said legislative directive. As DOF Secretary, Secretary Recto is duty-bound to faithfully execute all laws pertaining to the DOF's mandate.10 As the alter ego of the President, he must implement and execute all laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of the DOF and any other functions provided by law.11

Surely, Secretary Recto had no obligation to first verify the validity of the laws, nor even to question their wisdom, prior to faithfully executing them. Generally, all laws are presumed to be constitutional.12 In Peralta v. Commission on Elections,13 the Court stated, thus:

An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.14

Nonetheless, in good faith, Secretary Recto exercised due diligence by first consulting with the Governance Commission of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GCG), the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), and the Commission on Audit (COA).15 It was only after securing the favorable legal opinions of the GCG, the OGCC, and the COA that Secretary Recto issued DOF Circular No. 003-2024.

One need not be hard-pressed to see how all three agencies would confirm the validity of issuing the implementing guidelines for the transfer of the fund balance of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) to the National Treasury. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague,16 the Court declared that Congress's participation in the national budgeting process is the formulation of the appropriations act, whereas the implementation or execution of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably the function of the Executive Branch. It is the Congress that determines the specific purposes for which public funds will be used.

To stress, in issuing DOF Circular No. 003-2024, Secretary Recto was only implementing the appropriations law. He did not determine or decide the purpose for which public funds were appropriated. Instead, Secretary Recto merely directed public funds for the exact purpose for which Congress intended them under the 2024 GAA. He simply enforced Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII of the 2024 General Appropriations Act by applying the "fund balance" to the Unprogrammed Appropriations as the Congress determined.

Lastly, that the Court now declares Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII of the 2024 GAA and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 as void does not negate Secretary Recto's good faith, nor does it automatically create a basis for his liability. A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his or her official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.17

In this case, it was certainly reasonable for Secretary Recto to rely on and enforce Special Provision 1(d) as it had yet to be invalidated by the Court at that time.

I would like to close with the Court's pronouncement in Hagedorn v. COA,18 viz.:

It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so ... until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.19