G.R. No. 260374 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 260374 / 260426, June 28, 2022,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAROLINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS, SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M. IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CARWYN CANDILA, AND JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

I concur with the Decision of the Court penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, dismissing the Consolidated Petitions. However, I write this Concurring Opinion to emphasize two points on which, I opine, the resolution of these cases turns.

Contrary to the position of respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (respondent), the Constitution mandates this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Consolidated Petitions.

Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides for a mode of review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Particularly, through this remedy, the Court is provided the means to discharge its duty to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Unlike in the American jurisdiction where the power of judicial review is not found within the text of the American Constitution but was established only as a doctrine in the seminal case of Marbury vs. Madison (Marbury),1 the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction is vested by no less than the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

In Angara vs. Electoral Commission,2 the Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel expounded on how this Court, in the exercise of its power to determine the proper application of the law, checks the other branches and instrumentalities of government:

In G.R. No. 230674, the petitioners invoke the Court's power of judicial review alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the following issuances:

(1) Resolution dated 17 February 2022 of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 21-156 (DC);

(2) Resolution dated 10 May 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 21-156 (DC);

According to the petitioners in G.R. No. 230674, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent despite what the petitioners characterized as false representations contained therein.

In G.R. No. 260426, the petitioners likewise invoke the Court's power of judicial review, and assail the following issuances on the ground of grave abuse of discretion:

(1) Resolution dated 10 February 2022 of the COMELEC Former First Division in SPA No. 21-212 (DC); and

The petitioners in G.R. No. 260426 argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling, among others, that respondent is not perpetually disqualified from running for public office.

As the Court is vested by no less than the Constitution with the exclusive authority and corresponding duty to review judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC, this Court must rule upon the challenge squarely, as it did in the exhaustive ponencia of Associate Justice Zalameda.

The final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals can no longer be modified

The Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 has long attained finality. Hence, the same can no longer be altered.

It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.3 The primary consequence of this principle known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is that the judgment may no longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court.4

The tenet is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.5 It has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.6 As held in Antone v. People:7

In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,8 this Court further explained the rationale behind the doctrine of immutability of judgments and held that it is a fundamental principle in our justice system:

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments admits of several exceptions, namely, (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.9

The Court has also relaxed the application of the doctrine to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.10

Petitioners Ilagan et al. assert that the case falls under the third exception: the Decision of the CA is void because "it completely ignored the mandatory directive of Section 286 of P.D. No. 1994, which mandated that if the offender is a public officer, he shall suffer the maximum penalty imposed and in addition, he shall be perpetually disqualified from running for public office."11

In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court explained the nature and effects of a void judgment:

While it is true that the rule on the immutability and finality of judgments finds no application in cases where the final and executory judgment is void, this Court has consistently held that a mere erroneous judgment is not a void judgment.13 An erroneous judgment is one though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to law.14 A wrong judgment is not a void judgment, provided the court which renders it had jurisdiction to try the case.15

Here, petitioners Ilagan et al. question the Decision of the CA mainly on the basis of the supposed erroneous non-imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. Hence, even assuming arguendo that the penalty imposed by the CA was wrong, such error does not make the Decision void as an exception to the principle of immutability of judgments, considering that the appellate court indisputably had jurisdiction over the case. It has been held that "even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final."16

I am not unaware that the Court, in a line of cases, has corrected the penalties imposed notwithstanding the finality of the judgments of conviction.17 The Court ratiocinated that "a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess."18 However, unlike the supposed omission complained of in this case, the said cases concerned penalties in excess of what were prescribed by law which warranted the Court's relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice. I therefore submit that the rulings in those cases find no application in these cases and thus the general rule on immutability of judgment stands. Lest it be forgotten, the doctrine of immutability of final judgments is the very guarantee of stability and reliability in our adversarial system of dispute resolution.

In concurring with the ponencia of Associate Justice Zalameda, and the equally erudite Opinions of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, I cannot but emphasize the requirement of impartiality which is expected of every member of the Bench. The principle is enshrined in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19

The annotation provided by the Philippine Judicial Academy, the American Bar Association – Rule of Law Initiative and the University of the Philippines Law Center – Institute of Judicial Administration underscores the importance of impartiality in the administration of justice:

The significance of impartiality is so fundamental that even the mere appearance of partiality is a ground for administrative liability. The ruling of the Court in Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio,21 as reiterated in Sison-Barias v. Judge Rubia,22 is instructive:

It is a fitting reminder to quote here the words of Associate Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor in his Concurring Opinion in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice:24

These Consolidated Petitions are a tangle of a multitude of factors, beliefs, persuasions, even hopes and aspirations. It finds our nation at a crossroads in our shared history. It is not only the parties who are anticipating the resolution of these Petitions. After all, what is at stake is the highest office of the land, and with it, the lives of the Filipino people for the next six years and even beyond.1a⍵⍴h!1

It is during these times that the impartiality of the Court should all the more be manifest. It is when there are far too many discordant voices that a magistrate must be the exemplar of objectivity in his or her appreciation of the facts and application of the law, blind and deaf to all but the clarion call to uphold the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426.