G.R. No. 260374

G.R. No. 260374 / 260426, June 28, 2022,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAROLINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS, SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M. IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CARWYN CANDILA, AND JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

The words of Alexander Hamilton, in his speech before the New York Ratifying Convention on 21 June 1788, may have been spoken in another country and in another century, but the same sentiments still ring true for us today.

Even as we acknowledge that elections are the cornerstone of democracy, we also recognize that an overwhelming mandate, as reflected in the votes cast for one candidate cannot, by itself, be the sole basis, nor is it the most compelling reason, to declare one fit for public office.

In every election, citizens put the fate of the nation on their shoulders and carry the burden of establishing a functioning government. The outcome of an election, in turn, endows the elected officials with authority to lead.

The 31,629,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes cast, do, however, lend more gravity to the Court's exercise of its constitutional power to settle the present controversy. And in situations such as this case, where there is opposition or doubt on the fitness of a candidate to run for the highest political office in the land, it is the Court's duty to step in and be the final arbiter on the matter. The Court must tread with deliberate care in its resolution: any misstep may unravel the very expression of the people's will. Consequently, it is in the interest of our democracy that any doubts on the outcome of the elections be dispelled with a proper and definitive ruling.

Thus, it is not enough for the candidate to obtain the highest number of votes, said candidate must hold the requisite qualifications and abide by the required standards set by law to file for candidacy. In the same vein, to undo an election, there must be compelling and unequivocal evidence of the candidate's disqualification or failure to meet the requirements for filing a certificate of candidacy.

Upon a careful and deliberate study of the issues raised, the Court resolves to dismiss the consolidated petitions. Respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (respondent Marcos, Jr.) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to run for president. Furthermore, his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) contains no false material representation and is, therefore, valid.

G.R. No. 260374 is a Petition for Certiorari2 with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) (Buenafe Petition). Petitioners Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, Fides M. Lim, Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Ronald C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano (petitioners Buenafe, et al.) seek to annul and set aside the Resolution3 dated 17 January 2022 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and the Resolution4 dated 10 May 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 21-156 (DC) entitled, Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, et al. v. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.

G.R. No. 260426 is a Petition for Certiorari5 with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ilagan Petition). Filed by petitioners Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan, Saturnino Cunanan Ocampo, Maria Carolina Pagaduan Araullo, Trinidad Gerlita Repuno, Joanna Kintanar Carifio, Elisa Tita Perez Lubi, Liza Largoza Maza, Danilo Mallari dela Fuente, Carmencita Mendoza Florentino, Doroteo Cubacub Abaya, Jr., Erlinda Nable Santurias, Sr. Arabella Cammagay Balingao, Sr. Cherry M. Ibardaloza, CSSJB, Sr. Susan Santos Esmile, SFIC, Bomar Rubert Roca Distajo, Polynne Espineda Dira, James Carwyn Candila, and Jonas Angelo Lopena Abadilla (petitioners Ilagan, et al.), the petition assails the Resolution6 dated 10 February 2022 of the COMELEC Former First Division and Resolution7 dated 10 May 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 21-212 (DC).

On 2 November 2021, petitioners Buenafe, et al. filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the COC of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 881, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).8 Petitioners Buenafe, et al. identified themselves as Filipinos of legal age, registered voters, and officers of various non-government organizations and civic groups.9 They claim that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representations under oath when he filed his COC for President in the 2022 National Elections with the COMELEC.10

Subsequently, on 20 November 2021, petitioners Ilagan, et al. filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12, Article I of the OEC.11 Petitioners Ilagan, et al. identified themselves as Filipinos of legal age who are martial law victims and rights advocates.12

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. and Ilagan, et al. referred to the same set of criminal cases for the violation of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended (1977 NIRC), involving respondent Marcos, Jr.13

On 27 June 1990, the Special Tax Audit Team (audit team) created by then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jose U. Ong (Commissioner Ong) commenced an investigation of the internal revenue tax and estate tax liabilities of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, as well as his alleged "associates and cronies."14 The audit sought to determine whether the taxpayer: (1) earned income; (2) filed the required income tax; and (3) made the corresponding tax payment.15 The audit team submitted its findings to Commissioner Ong, which prompted him to file a letter complaint dated 25 July 1991 with the Secretary of Justice.16

In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, and Q-92-29217, respondent Marcos, Jr. was charged with violation of the 1977 NIRC for failure to file his income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985.17 In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214, and Q-91-24390, respondent Marcos, Jr. was charged with violation of the 1977 NIRC for failure to pay income taxes due, exclusive of surcharges and interests, in the amounts of ₱107.80 for 1982, ₱3,911.00 for 1983, ₱1,828.48 for 1984, and ₱2,656.95 for 1985.18

Respondent Marcos, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment.19 The eight cases were tried jointly.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC) declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. was elected Vice-Governor, and later Governor, of the province of Ilocos Norte from 03 November 1982 up to 31 March 1986.20 On 27 July 1995, after trial, the RTC ruled in this manner:

Respondent Marcos, Jr. proceeded to appeal the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals (CA). In a petition docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, he questioned the RTC's finding that the failure of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to comply with existing laws,22 which required prior notice to him, did not derogate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.23

In a Decision dated 31 October 1997 (CA Decision),24 the CA agreed with respondent Marcos, Jr. that there was insufficient notice from the BIR. It further declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. should not have been held to answer for the criminal charges filed against him for non-payment of deficiency income tax liabilities.25 On the other hand, even as the stipulation on deficiency income taxes between the BIR and respondent Marcos, Jr. should still be satisfied since his acquittal does not amount to extinction of the civil liability, the surcharges should not be imposed because these presuppose notice and demand.26 Ultimately, respondent Marcos, Jr. was not able to prove that the charges for non-filing of the required income tax returns were incorrect.27

Respondent Marcos, Jr. intended to appeal the CA Decision before this Court. However, he later filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw his Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review.29 We granted his motion to withdraw in a Resolution dated 08 August 2001.30 Our Entry of Judgment was made on 31 August 2001.31 The CA made an Entry of Judgment on 10 November 1997.32

On 02 December 2021, the RTC released a certification stating that there is no record on file of respondent Marcos, Jr.'s compliance of payment or satisfaction of its Decision dated 27 July 1995 or that of the CA's Decision dated 31 October 1997.33 Neither was there any entry in the criminal docket of the RTC Decision dated 27 July 1995 as affirmed and modified by the CA.34

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. also cited this Court's ruling in Ferdinand R. Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals.35 In that case, We affirmed the Decision dated 29 November 1994 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, which stated that the deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessments, amounting to P23,292,607,638.00, are already final and unappealable. Further, We held that the levy of real properties is a tax remedy permitted by law.

In SPA No. 21-156 (DC), petitioners Buenafe, et al. argued before the COMELEC that respondent Marcos, Jr. committed false material representation when he stated in his COC that he is eligible to run for President.36 They maintained that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s prior conviction carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to vote, and to participate in any election.37

The COMELEC Second Division issued Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference dated 11 November 2021 and directed respondent Marcos, Jr. to file a verified Answer within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt.38 He filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer on 16 November 2021, which the COMELEC Second Division granted on 18 November 2021.39 The Answer was filed on 19 November 2021 and included a prayer for Face-to-Face Oral Arguments.40 On the same date, petitioners Buenafe, et al. moved to reconsider the Order dated 18 November 2021 and insisted that the period to file an Answer was nonextendible.41 Citing its authority to suspend the reglementary periods in the interest of justice, the COMELEC Second Division denied petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s motion for reconsideration.42

Prior to the preliminary conference scheduled on 26 November 2021, petitioners Buenafe, et al. filed the following: (1) Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum on 19 November 2021; (2) Compliance Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Parte Urgent Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum on 23 November 2021; (3) Summary of Documents, also on 23 November 2021; and (4) Bill of Exceptions on 24 November 2021.43

Both petitioners Buenafe, et al. and respondent Marcos, Jr. appeared through counsel during the preliminary conference on 26 November 2021.44 Neither party offered any stipulation of facts.45 In his Memorandum dated 17 December 2021, respondent Marcos, Jr. objected to petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s marking of exhibits.46

In its Order dated 13 December 2021,47 the COMELEC Second Division denied the following: (1) petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Urgent Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum; and (2) respondent Marcos, Jr.'s Prayer for Face-toFace Oral Arguments.

Both parties submitted their Memoranda on 20 December 2021.48 In its Resolution dated 17 January 2022,49 the COMELEC Second Division denied the petition for lack of merit. It considered the issue of whether respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC should be denied due course or canceled under Section 78 of the OEC on the ground that it contains false material representations.50 It went on to discuss the merits of the case even as it declared that the petition should be summarily dismissed for invoking grounds of disqualification in a petition for cancellation and/or denial of due course of a COC.51

The COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s material representations are not false, i.e., that he is eligible for the position of President and that he is not perpetually disqualified from public office.52 It underscored that the CA Decision did not mete out the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.53 It also found, as a matter of judicial notice, that respondent Marcos, Jr. ceased to be a public officer when he and his family were forced to leave the Philippines on 25 February 1986.54 The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office under Section 286 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1994, which amended Section 286(c) of the 1977 NIRC, thus cannot apply to respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was already a private individual when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return.55 The COMELEC Second Division also concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr. had no intention to deceive the electorate about his qualifications for public office.56

The COMELEC Second Division reiterated this Court's declaration in Republic v. Ferdinand Marcos II and Imelda R. Marcos57 that failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude.58 Moreover, failure to file income tax returns is not tax evasion.59

Commissioner (now a Member of this Court) Antonio T. Kho, Jr. filed a Separate Opinion60 where he agreed with most of the points of the Resolution. However, he opined that, unlike its usage in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty of perpetual disqualification in the 1977 NIRC is a principal penalty, which must be expressly specified in the judgment of conviction. Thus, he concluded that there is no legal justification to deny due course to or cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC because his representations are not false.

On 20 January 2022, petitioners Buenafe, et al. filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc.61 Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to file Comment/Opposition with attached Comment/Opposition on 25 January 2022.62

In a Resolution dated 10 May 2022,63 the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and affirmed the Resolution dated 17 January 2022 of the COMELEC Second Division. It held that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration failed to raise new matters or issues that warrant the reversal of the questioned Resolution.

Commissioners Socorro B. Inting (Commissioner Inting) and Marlon S. Casquejo (Commissioner Casquejo) wrote Separate Concurring Opinions. Commissioner Inting emphasized that petitioners Buenafe, et al. deliberately misquoted the applicable law, noting that the penalty of imposing both a fine and imprisonment only became mandatory on 11 December 1998 with the passage of Republic Act No. (RA) 8424, or the 1997 NIRC. Therefore, the CA cannot apply the penalty of imprisonment without violating the constitutional proscription on ex post facto laws.64

On the other hand, Commissioner Casquejo maintained that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the judgment handed down by a court of law on a tax-related case is void. As such, the COMELEC does not have the power to review nor amend decisions of the CA.65

Meanwhile, in the Resolution66 dated 10 February 2022, the COMELEC Former First Division resolved the Petition for Disqualification filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., docketed as SPA No. 21-212 (DC), as well as the two other Petitions for Disqualification, that of Akbayan, et al. in SPA No. 21-232 (DC), and of Abubakar Mangelen (Mangelen) in SPA No. 21-233.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. argued that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office should rightfully be imposed upon respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was a public official when he violated the 1977 NIRC.67 Further assailing the validity of the CA Decision, they insisted that the unlawful deletion of the penalty of imprisonment rendered the judgment void and produced no legal effect.68 They also alleged that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction amounts to moral turpitude.69 Finally, petitioners Ilagan, et al. asserted that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representation when he stated in Item No. 22 of his COC that "he has not been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory."70

The COMELEC Former First Division issued the following on 20 December 2021: (1) Notices and Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference and requested the City Election Officer of 1st District of Pasay City and Election Officer of Batac, Ilocos Norte to serve the Summons to respondent Marcos, Jr.; and (2) Notice and Order to inform the counsel of petitioners Ilagan, et al. to submit the requisite proof of service.71 The following day, Notices and Summons were personally served to respondent Marcos, Jr. at his address in Pasay City.72

The parties marked their documentary exhibits during the preliminary conference on 07 January 2022.73 They were then directed to submit their memoranda within forty-eight (48) hours.74 Petitioners Ilagan, et al. submitted via email their Memoranda on 09 January 2022.75

At the scheduled preliminary conference on 06 January 2022, respondent Marcos; Jr. manifested that he would not be able to personally appear before the COMELEC.76 He stated that he was in mandatory isolation after being in close contact with an individual who tested positive for Covid-19.77 He confirmed this by submitting a medical certificate issued by his attending physician.78

On 11 January 2022, petitioners Ilagan, et al. filed an Opposition with Manifestation and Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Opposition with Manifestation.79 They alleged that the documents submitted by respondent Marcos, Jr. should be stricken off the records because his Memorandum lacked a formal offer of evidence.80 Respondent Marcos, Jr. submitted a Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence on 13 January 2021.81

The COMELEC Former First Division considered the following issues whether respondent Marcos, Jr.: (1) is perpetually disqualified from running for public office; (2) has been sentenced by final judgment to a. penalty of more than eighteen months of imprisonment; (3) has been convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; and (4) is qualified to be elected President of the Philippines.82

In a Resolution dated 10 February 2022,83 the COMELEC Former First Division dismissed all three petitions for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC Former First Division held that the failure to file income tax returns was not originally penalized with perpetual disqualification under the 1977 NIRC.84 It came into force only upon the effectivity of its amending law, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1994, on 01 January 1986.85 Moreover, the penalty of perpetual disqualification was never imposed by the RTC nor by the CA.86 It is a principal penalty, not merely accessory, for violation of the 1977 NIRC.87 Thus, the imposition of that particular penalty should be included in the dispositive portion of the decision.88

Second, respondent Marcos, Jr. was not penalized with imprisonment of more than eighteen months.89 The COMELEC First Division stressed that the CA correctly removed the penalty of imprisonment meted by the RTC and imposed only a fine of ₱2,000.00 for each charge of failure to file an income tax return. It held that such modification is best left to the sound discretion of the CA and is not within the power of the COMELEC to review.90

Third, failure to file an income tax return is not a crime that involves moral turpitude.91 It is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law punishing it.92 There is no fraud involved as it is a mere omission on the part of the taxpayer.93 Failure to file an income tax return is not a form of tax evasion.94 The COMELEC Former First Division found no evidence that respondent Marcos, Jr. voluntarily and intentionally violated the law.95 It noted the BIR certification that stated the compliance by respondent Marcos, Jr. with the CA Decision and the payment of deficiency taxes and fines.96

Fourth, respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be elected as President of the Philippines.97 His sentence to pay fines does not fall under any of the instances when a person may be disqualified to hold public office as provided in Section 12 of the OEC, namely: (1) declared by competent authority insane or incompetent; (2) sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months; or (3) sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.98

Commissioner Casquejo wrote a Separate Concurring Opinion,99 underscoring petitioners' lack of standing to question the CA's judgment. He further averred that the COMELEC will not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a decision that has long been final.100 Commissioner Casquejo also asserted that the amendment introduced by Section 252(c) of the 1997 NIRC shall not be retroactively applied to respondent Marcos, Jr. Finally, nonfiling of income tax returns does not equate to moral turpitude.101

Petitioners Ilagan, et al., along with the two other sets of petitioners, filed their respective motions for reconsideration.102

In its Resolution dated 10 May 2022,103 the COMELEC En Banc denied the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., as well as those filed by Akbayan, et al. and Mangelen. The COMELEC En Banc held that all three motions failed to raise new matters that would warrant a reversal of the COMELEC Former First Division's Resolution.104

Commissioner Casquejo again wrote a Separate Concurring Opinion,105 asserting that respondent Marcos, Jr. met the requirements for a candidate for President. Hence, there was no reason to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr.106 He likewise reminded the public that the COMELEC will not be used to declare as void a judgment that has long attained finality.107

The National Elections proceeded on 09 May 2022, as scheduled. Respondent Marcos, Jr. garnered 31,629,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes cast.108

The Buenafe Petition, which also sought the issuance of a TRO to enjoin Congress from canvassing the votes cast for President and from proclaiming respondent Marcos, Jr. as the duly elected President of the Philippines, was filed on 18 May 2022.109 Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a Manifestation to the Buenafe Petition the next day where he argued that canvassing of both Houses is mandatory.110

This Court required respondent Marcos, Jr. to file his Comment to the Buenafe Petition on 19 May 2022.111 The Comment was filed on 31 May 2022,112 or before the deadline on 03 June 2022.

In the meantime, Congress convened as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) in a joint session on 24 May 2022.113 Respondent Marcos, Jr. was proclaimed as the winning presidential candidate on 25 May 2022.114

The Ilagan Petition was also filed on 18 May 2022.115 However, petitioners Ilagan, et al. were further required by this Court to comply with certain procedural requirements. In an Order dated 30 May 2022, We ordered the following to submit their respective comments: COMELEC; respondent Marcos, Jr.; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the Senate President; and House of Representatives, represented by the Speaker of the House.116 The Court further directed the consolidation of the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions.117

Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed his Comment on the Buenafe Petition on 19 May 2022.118 Subsequently, he manifested that he was adopting said Comment to the Ilagan Petition insofar as the arguments therein are applicable, averring thus:

Meanwhile, petitioners Ilagan, et al. make the following assignment of errors:

The COMELEC, meanwhile, argues for the dismissal of both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions. We identify the grounds it raised as follows:

The Senate filed a Manifestation128 in lieu of Comment. It stated that the Senate and the House of Representatives have duly approved to proclaim respondent Marcos, Jr. as the duly elected President of the Philippines.

The House of Representatives, on the other hand, filed an Opposition Ad Cautelam129 in lieu of Comment. It argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain Congress in its functions as the NBOC for the positions of the President and Vice President. Even assuming arguendo that this Court has the jurisdiction or authority to issue the TRO prayed for in the Buenafe Petition, the acts sought to be enjoined are fait accompli.

The consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The Court holds that respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to run for President, and that his COC is valid.

This Court is well-aware of its singular responsibility. This is not the first time that We are asked to decide whether a candidate for President is qualified after elections have been conducted, votes have been counted, and winners have been proclaimed. There is precedent to declare this case moot had respondent Marcos, Jr. not garnered the highest number of votes.130

In the cases where the qualifications of a presidential candidate were questioned, the issues sought to be determined involved questions on citizenship,131 and both citizenship and residency.132 These issues were definitively decided before the conduct of the elections.

The cases involving the winners of the two highest positions in the Executive branch that were decided after the conduct of the elections did not question the qualifications of the candidates or the validity of their COCs. All of these cases were election protests,133 adjudicated by this Court acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), where the second placers questioned the number of votes of the proclaimed winners and sought to be proclaimed in their stead.

This Court, in all the cases involving controversies over the candidacies or election of the President or Vice-President, has always asserted its jurisdiction to decide the cases brought before it under the authority vested upon it by the Constitution. We take the same stance here and decide on the issues raised in the present Petitions.

We deem it necessary to state at the outset that the qualifications for the candidates for President are not limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Additionally, a candidate for President may also find his or her COC canceled under grounds found in statutes such as the OEC. Specifically, Section 69 of the OEC has laid down the requirements to weed out nuisance candidates for elective positions, including those for President.134 It reads:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

I. A petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC is distinct from a petition for disqualification

We acknowledge that there are distinctions between the remedies sought by the petitioners in these consolidated cases. The present petitions stem from two cases before the COMELEC: (1) SPA Case No. 21-156 (DC), filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al., which sought to deny due course to or cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC; and (2) SPA No. 21-212 (DC), filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., which sought to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr. as a candidate for President.

A petition to deny due course to or cancel COC is governed by Section 78 in relation to Section 74, of the OEC, to wit:

On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed pursuant to Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC.135 The provisions under the OEC state, in relevant part:

A. A petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC shares similarities with a petition for disqualification

Apart from having the same respondent, these consolidated petitions share further similarities. For one, they are both pre-election remedies with a similar objective: to prevent a purportedly ineligible candidate from running for an elective position.136 In addition, they can be filed by any registered voter or any duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties.137

On this score, and based on our examination of the records, there appears to be no real disagreement on the matter of petitioners' standing to file these cases. The records show that the present Petitions were filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al. and Ilagan, et al. in their capacities as citizens, registered voters, martial law victims and rights advocates.138 Although the COMELEC did not appear to have any issues on the matter initially, it now contests petitioners' standing, on the theory that the instant petitions have been rendered moot by respondent Marcos, Jr.'s supervening proclamation.139 The COMELEC maintains that since the issues raised against respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications are essentially election contests, which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PET,140 petitioners, to have standing, must show proof that they were either a registered candidate for the presidency who received the second or third highest number of votes, or a voter who voted in the May 2022 elections.141

We will discuss the questions of mootness and jurisdiction in another part of this Decision. Nevertheless and for purposes of settling the issue of standing, suffice to state that petitioners, as the parties aggrieved by the denial of their respective petitions before the COMELEC, are allowed under the Rules of Court to assail the judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.142 Significantly, respondent Marcos, Jr. never challenged petitioners' standing in any of the pleadings he filed before the COMELEC and this Court.143

B. A petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC and a petition for disqualification are different remedies

Ultimately, however, a petition to deny due course to or to cancel COC and a petition for disqualification are "different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities."144

First, the two remedies are anchored on distinct grounds: whereas an action under Section 78 of the OEC is concerned with the false representation by a candidate as to material information in the COC,145 a petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the elective position said candidate is seeking.146 To prosper, the former requires proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact147 relating to the candidate's requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification necessary to run for elective office;148 the latter, possession of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission.149

Second, they have different prescriptive periods: a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed within five days from the last day of filing of COCs, but not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC sought to be canceled; a petition for disqualification may be filed any day after the last day of the filing of COC, but not later than the date of the proclamation.150

Third, both have markedly distinct effects: a disqualified person is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, while the person whose certificate is canceled or denied due course is not treated as a candidate at all.151 Moreover, a disqualified candidate may still be substituted152 if they had a valid COC in the first place. However, one whose COC was denied due course or canceled cannot be substituted because the law considers him or her to not have been a candidate at all.153

While the grounds for a petition for disqualification are limited to Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC, and, for local elective officials, Section 40 of the LGC, the same grounds may be invoked in a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC if these involve the representations required under Section 78.

The case of Chua v. COMELEC154 (Chua) is instructive on this point. In Chua, a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel COC was filed against Arlene Chua on the date of her proclamation as councilor based on the allegation that she was a dual citizen and a permanent resident of the United States of America (U.S.). Notwithstanding the caption of the petition, the COMELEC considered the same as one for Disqualification since the ground cited falls under Section 40 of the LGC. As such, the COMELEC found that the petition was timely filed pursuant to Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The Court, faced with the issue of whether the petition was for disqualification or to deny due course to or cancel COC, elucidated that the choice of remedy lies with the petitioner, to wit:

As in Chua, Section 12 of the OEC may likewise be invoked as a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC since Section 74 of the OEC requires a person filing a COC to declare that he is eligible for office. Thus, in Ty-Delgado v. HRET155 (Ty-Delgado), We found that therein petitioner committed false material representation in his COC as to his eligibility given that he had been convicted by a final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC.

A case is moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties, such that this Court is left with nothing to resolve. It can no longer grant any relief or enforce any right, and anything it says on the matter will have no practical use or value.156 This is not the scenario We have here.

The issues raised in both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions – whether respondent Marcos, Jr. is guilty of material misrepresentation of his eligibility and whether he suffers any of the grounds for disqualification – are not rendered moot by his receipt of the highest number of votes or by his subsequent proclamation. The petitions raise fundamental questions as to whether respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be a candidate for President. These are actual and justiciable controversies that the Court must resolve in the exercise of its judicial power. We cannot stress enough that the qualification of the candidate is not waived by his or her subsequent election to the office. A candidate may obtain 99% of the votes cast, but if he or she is found to possess any of the grounds for disqualification, our laws prohibit such candidate from occupying public office.

In its Comment, the COMELEC argues that the case was mooted by the completion of the electoral process, where respondent Marcos, Jr. obtained an overwhelming number of votes, and his proclamation as the President-elect.157

However, the cases relied upon by the COMELEC are not on all fours with the present Petitions. In Perez v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,158 We ruled that a provincial fiscal is deemed ipso facto resigned from office upon his filing of a COC for Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, in Morelos v. Dela Rosa,159 We dismissed a petition to annul the election of barrio officials for being moot due to the expiration of their term of office.

The COMELEC's use of Our pronouncement in Quizon v. COMELEC160 (Quizon) should likewise be clarified. To justify overlooking irregularities in the COC, We explained:

We underscore, however, that Our pronouncement in Quizon is limited to technical irregularities in the COC (such as signing and swearing on the same and information required to be stated) and not the eligibility of a candidate.

B. The conditions for the filing of petitions before the Presidential electoral Tribunal have not been met

Respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC argue that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Petitions since exclusive jurisdiction now lies with the PET.162

The last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests, relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate rules for the purpose." This is echoed in Rule 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, or the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which reads:

The 1987 Constitution mandates the creation of Electoral Tribunals for only four offices: President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. It is recognized that Section 4, Article VII, which refers to the President and Vice-President, is similarly worded to Section 17, Article VI, which refers to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. Both provisions describe the respective Electoral Tribunals as being the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective subjects. The rulings on the trigger point for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are thus instructive for identifying when the jurisdiction of the PET should be invoked.

Our ruling in Reyes v. Commission on Elections163 (Reyes) painstakingly described the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the HRET:

Applying the ruling in Reyes to the present petitions, this Court, sitting En Banc, can only take cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed before it; and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office.

These conditions are not present here. The Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are filed under Rule 65 assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc. While respondent Marcos, Jr. has been proclaimed as the Presidential candidate with the highest number of obtained votes, he has yet to take his oath and assume office. As Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez astutely pointed out, the term of office begins at noon on the 30th day of June following the election. Hence, as long as the petitions remain with this Court before 30 June 2022, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve them.165

Based on current records, no petition for an election contest has been filed before the PET. An election protest should be filed within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.166 On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto should be filed within ten days after the proclamation of the winner.167

The petitioner in an election protest is limited to the registered candidate for President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes. On the other hand, a quo warranto case may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned.

An election protest is anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts, while a petition for quo warranto attacks the protestee's ineligibility or specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.168

In any case, the proclamation, oath-taking, and assumption of the President result in removing from the jurisdiction of this Court any pre-proclamation remedy elevated to the Court from the COMELEC.

The peculiar scenario availing here is that the present Petitions are pending before Us after the same were elevated from the COMELEC after the conduct of the elections. The PET, which is this Court sitting en banc, has to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the issues of election, returns, and qualification upon the assumption to office of respondent Marcos, Jr. The question then is: should We dismiss these petitions and wait for the same petitions to be filed before Us sitting as the PET?

To arrive at the answer, We revisit the history of the PET and its relation to the Court as elucidated in Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,169 thus:

The "constitutionalization" of the PET has been described as independent but not separate from the Judiciary. As such, the PET cannot be considered distinct from the Supreme Court, thus:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e. the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.

Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government — Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary — but not separate therefrom.

Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?

If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?

Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna and Regalado E. Maambong is schooled by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:

When the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself. The constitutional provision refers to the same "Supreme Court sitting en banc." However, it should be recognized that the proceedings before the PET require a distinct set of rules of procedure owing to the very specific nature of its functions. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court En Banc as the PET is likened to the characterization of specialized courts in relation to the then Courts of First Instance. They are the same courts having the same jurisdiction, only that specialized courts are intended for practicality. Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution therefore should not be considered as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court over the pending petitions.

III. Respondent Marcos, Jr. possesses all of the qualifications and does not possess any of the grounds for disqualification

Any person intending to run for public office needs to have the qualifications required under the law for the position he or she intends to hold.171 At the same time, he or she must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law and the relevant regulations.172

We reiterate that the qualifications for President and Vice-President are prescribed in Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. These qualifications are also found in Section 63 of the OEC.

There is no question that respondent Marcos, Jr. has all the qualifications of a candidate for President as provided under the Constitution and the OEC. Notably, neither the Buenafe Petition nor the Ilagan Petition alleges that respondent Marcos, Jr. lacks any of these qualifications: natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. instead argue that respondent Marcos, Jr. has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and is thus disqualified from being a candidate and holding any government office under Section 12173 of the OEC.

Notably, Section 68 of the OEC, which provides additional grounds for disqualification, namely, being found to have committed an election offense,174 or being a permanent resident of, or an immigrant in, a foreign country, is not being invoked in the present case. Hence, We limit Our discussion to the alleged disqualification of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12 of the OEC.

The CA found respondent Marcos, Jr. guilty of failing to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-29217.175 Petitioners Ilagan, et al. argue that this amounts to a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, which has the effect of disqualifying respondent Marcos, Jr. from being a candidate and from holding any government office. Failure to file income tax returns may or may not be a crime involving moral turpitude. We explain this below.

Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, nor do they necessarily have to be heinous. Moral turpitude has been often understood to mean acts that are "contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general."176 It does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.177

Associate justice Arturo D. Brion, in his separate concurring opinion in Teves v. COMELEC,178 laid down the historical roots of moral turpitude. He explained:

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the concept of "moral turpitude" can be traced back to the immigration laws of the U.S. It is thus not surprising that in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, this Court has earlier used definitions from U.S. cases as reference.

It may be worth noting that under the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual, the following are considered common crimes involving moral turpitude:

In 1955, the Supreme Court of California, in Call v. State Bar of California181, characterized moral turpitude as one that involves fraud, and must be distinguished from mere neglect or unintended failure, viz:

In the 1990 case of In Re Grimes,183 it was ruled that willful commission of a crime does not automatically mean fraudulent, hence, it does not per se involve moral turpitude. In said case, petitioner attorney pleaded guilty to three (3)-counts of willfully failing to file a tax return. The Supreme Court of California found that petitioner's misconduct did not involve moral turpitude, but it did warrant discipline.

In the Philippines, we can trace the term moral turpitude as far back as 1901 in Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings). This law provided that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequently, moral turpitude found its way in statutes governing disqualifications of notaries public, priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages, registration to military service, exclusion and naturalization of aliens; discharge of the accused to be a state witness, admission to the bar, suspension and removal elective local officials, and disqualification of persons from running for any elective local position.184

We first had occasion to characterize moral turpitude in the 1920 case of In Re Basa.185 This involves an interpretation of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to Bouvier's Law Dictionary for guidance and held:

Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary definition to interpret the concept of moral turpitude.

In subsequent cases, We continued borrowing definitions established in U.S. jurisprudence. In the 1959 case of Tak Ng v. Republic187, We cited U.S. cases defining moral turpitude to pertain to an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man188 or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.189

Twenty years later, in 1979, in Zari v. Flores190, We added that moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, establishes moral turpitude.191 Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as ate not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.192

Meanwhile, in other cases, We examined the existence of moral turpitude based on the fraudulent intent of the offender. The Court in its 1964 decision in Ao Lin v. Republic193 explained:

Then, in 1975, in the case In Re Lanuevo195, We declared that it is for the Supreme Court to determine what crime involves moral turpitude.196 This became the foundation of the jurisprudential doctrine holding that whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.197

Over the years, We adjudged the following as crimes involving moral turpitude:

Indeed, in Zari v. Flores,238 We said that tax evasion is a crime involving moral turpitude. On whether an act or omission constitutes tax evasion, We certainly agree that it depends on the totality of circumstances. As such, it must be clarified that failure to file income tax return does not always amount to tax evasion. Tax evasion connotes fraud through the use of pretenses and forbidden d vices to lessen or defeat taxes.239 The fraud contemplated by law is actual and not constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done or resorted to in order to induce another to give up some legal right. Negligence, whether slight or gross, is not equivalent to the fraud with intent to evade the tax contemplated by law. It must amount to intentional wrong-doing with the sole object of avoiding the tax.240 Furthermore, tax evasion connotes the integration of three factors: (a) the end to be achieved, i.e., the payment of less than that known by the taxpayer to be legally due, or the non-payment of tax when it is shown that a tax is due; (b) an accompanying state of mind, which is described as being "evil," in "bad faith," "willful," or "deliberate and not accidental"; and (c) a course of action or failure of action that is unlawful.241

On the other hand, failure to file income tax return may be committed by neglect, without any fraudulent intent and/or willfulness. In fact, under Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC, the law treats "failure to file any return" differently from "willful neglect to file the return." The former is meted with. a surcharge of 25%, while the latter, 50%.242 The 50% rate is referred to as the fraud penalty.243 Previously, under Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC, a taxpayer may be excused from the 25% surcharge if the taxpayer subsequently files the return despite absence of BIR notice and the earlier failure is due to a reasonable cause. Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC and Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC respectively state:

The foregoing discussion illustrates that omission to file a tax return is not fraudulent per se.

As Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier eloquently declared, taken in its proper context, the failure to file a compensation income tax return is far from being "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general."244

Although petitioners suggest that We reexamine the totality of circumstances surrounding respondent Marcos, Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return, We deem it unnecessary to go through the same exercise because of this Court's Decision involving the same facts. In Republic v. Marcos II,245 We already declared that respondent Marcos Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude, viz:

Significantly, Republic v. Marcos II involved the same Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 and considered the same act of non-filing of income tax returns at issue in the present Petitions. We held in the said case that respondent Marcos Jr. is not disqualified from being an executor of his father s will since the crime of failure to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude. Thus, consistent with our earlier pronouncement, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.

The foregoing militates against the notion that non-filing of income tax return by an individual taxpayer receiving purely compensation income involves moral turpitude, or is against good morals and accepted rule of conduct.246 It is not in itself immoral, and neither does it constitute an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.247 Thus, We sustain the COMELEC's ruling that the omission of respondent Marcos Jr. to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.

As We sustain COMELEC's ruling, We, however, address and state Our disagreement with the argument that the omission to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude because the offense has already been decriminalized by RA 10963, otherwise known as the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law.

At this juncture, We clarify that non-filing of income tax returns has not been decriminalized under the 1997 NIRC and its subsequent amendments. Rather, what our current tax laws introduced are classifications of taxpayers who are not required to file an income tax return and who may file a tax return under the substituted filing system.

This clarification starts with a distinction between taxpayers who are not required to file income tax returns from taxpayers who file tax returns under the substituted filing system. Under Section 51(A)(2) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, a minimum wage earner is exempt from income tax and is not required to file an income tax return. On the other hand, an individual earning purely compensation income from a single employer whose income tax has been correctly withheld by said employer is not required to file an annual income tax return.248 Over the years, the BIR recognized the need to simplify the filing of individual income tax returns. It introduced the substituted filing system in Revenue Regulations (R.R.) No. 3-2002,249 which was further amended by R.R. No. 19-2002.250 Substituted filing took effect in taxable year 2001 and was made mandatory starting the taxable year 2002.

The substituted filing system made it easier for pure compensation earners to file their income tax returns because the relevant information is more accessible to their employers. In substituted filing, the employer's annual return for the employee is considered as the employee's income tax return because they contain identical information. Employers, or other persons who are required to deduct and withhold the tax on compensation, furnish their employees with a Certificate of Income Tax Withheld on Compensation, or BIR Form No. 2316.251 After the issuance of a joint certification by the employer and the employee, the employee who is qualified for substituted filing is no longer required to file an Annual Income Tax Return, or BIR Form No. 1700.252

"Substituted filing" was distinguished from "non-filing" of income tax returns in Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 1-2003. RMC No. 1-2003 further clarified the provisions of R.R. No. 3-2002, as amended by R.R. No. 19-2002.

The substituted filing system did not dispense with the requirement of filing income tax returns for pure compensation earners. Neither did it exempt qualified taxpayers from filing income tax returns as required by Section 51 of the 1997 NIRC.

Prior to the enactment of the TRAIN Law in 2017, an individual whose pure compensation income is derived from sources within the Philippines exceeds ₱60,000.00 is still mandated to file an income tax return.254 Hence, even if an individual taxpayer is qualified to avail of the substituted filing of income tax return, he or she is still not excused from filing an income tax return. The TRAIN Law, in amending the 1997 NIRC, added a new section, 51-A, to incorporate the substituted filing system established by BIR practice into law.255

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao states256 that, in adopting the system of substituted filing under Section 51-A of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by the TRAIN Law, Congress did not decriminalize the non-filing of income tax returns. It merely ordained, for the convenience of individual taxpayers, a practice already established and observed by the BIR. What is clear, however, is that the non-filing of income tax returns by those who have not duly met the requirements and conditions may still be penalized under both the 1997 NIRC and the TRAIN Law.

In any event, as discussed above, the COMELEC concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. And We affirm the COMELEC's conclusion.

B. Conviction for non-filing of income tax returns is not a ground for disqualification

The RTC convicted respondent Marcos, Jr. and meted out the penalty of imprisonment and fine. However, the CA modified this ruling and limited the penalty to the payment of fine.257

In arguing that Section 12 of the OEC should still apply to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr., petitioners Ilagan, et al. asserted before the COMELEC that the CA Decision is void for failing to follow the penalty provided under Section 254 of the 1977 NIRC, which expressly imposes the penalty of both imprisonment and a fine.

Further, petitioners Ilagan, et al. insist that, even if the CA did not err in deleting the penalty of imprisonment in resolving the case against respondent Marcos, Jr., he is still perpetually disqualified on the basis of the unequivocal language of PD 1994, which amended the 1977 NIRC. They argue that a mandatory accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification is imposed by PD 1994 in addition to the penalties provided under the 1977 NIRC.258 For their part, petitioners Buenafe, et al. assert that the consequence of perpetual disqualification applies to all convictions of crimes under the NIRC, regardless of the imposed penalty.259

We agree with the COMELEC, that the introduction of the penalty of both imprisonment and fine in Section 254 only became effective in 1998 when the 1997 NIRC was passed. Consequently, this cannot be retroactively applied to the prejudice of respondent Marcos, Jr., who was convicted for failure to file the required tax returns for the years 1982 to 1985. Well-settled is the rule that penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, unless favorable to the accused.260

Following the doctrine on immutability of judgments,261 the CA Decision has long attained finality and can no longer be modified in any respect. Nevertheless, We deem it necessary to restate and clarify which laws apply to the different violations.

For respondent Marcos, Jr's. failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1984, what should apply instead is Section 73 of the 1977 NIRC, which states:

On the other hand, PD 1994 is the applicable law for respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file his 1985 income tax return. Section 288 of said law imposes the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both:

Clearly the CA had the discretion to impose the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both, upon respondent Marcos, Jr. The CA's Decision imposing only the penalty of a fine is valid: Consequently, respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was sentenced by final judgment to a penalty of more than eighteen months under Section 12 of the OEC.

Similarly, as will be expounded later on, We agree with the COMELEC's finding that respondent Marcos Jr. was not imposed with the penalty of perpetual disqualification from running for public office.262

The said accessory penalty was not originally provided for in the 1977 NIRC, as this was only imposed upon the effectivity of PD 1994 in 01 January 1986.263 Hence, again, respondent Marcos, Jr. may be imposed with the accessory penalty only for his failure to file his income tax return for the year 1985.

However, a perusal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision264 would reveal that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification was not imposed on respondent Marcos, Jr. Evidently, this CA Decision has long attained finality, and can no longer be touched upon by this Court.265 To alter the same would be extremely prejudicial to respondent Marcos, Jr., and would create a precedent contrary to the basic principle that all doubts should be construed against the State and in favor of the accused.266

IV. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to deny due course to or to cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC

Respondent Marcos, Jr. raises the argument that petitioners Buenafe, et al. violated Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, which states:

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. counter that their petition before the COMELEC did not violate the cited provision since it only raised grounds relating to the falsity of the material representation of eligibility in respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC.268 Thus, the COMELEC erred in ruling that their petition was susceptible to summary dismissal for invoking grounds for disqualification.269

For their part, respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC claim that the petition may be summarily dismissed for raising grounds for disqualification, such as respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude and a crime that carries the penalty of imprisonment of more than eighteen (18) months.270

However, these arguments are neither decisive of, nor relevant to, the present controversy. The COMELEC did not dismiss the petition on the ground of violating Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the substantive issues raised and denied the petition for lack of merit.271 The pertinent portion of the COMELEC Second Division's Resolution dated 17 January 2022 reads:

The COMELEC En Banc further noted that "despite the finding that the Petition may be summarily dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements under the law, the Commission (Second Division) relaxed compliance with technical rules and proceeded to discuss the merits of the case."273 Given that, there is no need to belabor the procedural correctness of petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s submissions before the COMELEC. Whether petitioners Buenafe, et al. raised arguments more appropriate for a petition for disqualification274 is now irrelevant to this Court's resolution of the present petitions.

Moreover, the Court has ruled that, even without a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, "the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction."275 Thus, even procedural defects in petitioners Buenafe at al.'s COMELEC petition will not save respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC from scrutiny.

In passing upon the merits of these petitions, We are mindful that the scope of Our review in a petition for certiorari is limited. Pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, petitioners Buenafe, et al. must show that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.276

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."277 Thus, mere abuse of discretion is not enough.278 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."279 Unless it is firmly established that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, We would not interfere with its decision.280 Findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.281

We find no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The COMELEC's ruling is amply supported by law, jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.

As previously mentioned, Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC govern the cancellation of, or denial of due course to, COCs on the ground of false material representation. Under Section 74, a person tiling a COC must state therein that "he is eligible for said office," among other information. On the other hand, Section 78 expressly provides that the denial of due course or cancellation of a COC may be filed exclusively on the ground that the information the candidate provided under Section 74 is false.

Notably, not every false representation warrants the denial of due course to or cancellation of a COC. It must be shown that the false representation pertained to material information and was made with an "intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office."282 Thus, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not, in and of itself, justify the cancellation of his or her COC.283 The requisites of materiality and intent must be present.

A. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s representations that are subject of the Petitions are material

Section 78 does not specify the parameters of a "material representation." Nonetheless, this Court has had numerous occasions in the past to expound on the concept.

In Villafuerte v. COMELEC,284 We held that, for a representation to be material, it must "refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold." Thus, facts pertaining to a candidate's residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification are considered material under Section 78 of the OEC.285

Further, in Salcedo II v. COMELEC,286 the Court explained the rationale behind the requirement of materiality, and concluded that the law should not be interpreted to cover innocuous mistakes:

In this case, petitioners Buenafe, et al. assert that respondent Marcos, Jr. made a false material representation when, in his COC, he certified under oath the statement, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to."287 Respondent Marcos, Jr. also allegedly misrepresented his eligibility when he checked the box "No" in response to the question, "[h]ave you ever been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory?"288 Petitioners Buenafe, et al. claim that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for violation of the NIRC carried with it the penalty of perpetual disqualification, thereby rendering the two statements false.289

The assailed representations pass the test of materiality because they pertain to respondent. Marcos, Jr.'s eligibility to hold elective office. In Dimapilis v. COMELEC290 (Dimapilis), We ruled that perpetual disqualification is a material fact because it directly affects a person's capacity to be elected and to hold public office, thus:

When respondent Marcos, Jr. declared that he has not been convicted of an offense that carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold office, he made a material representation regarding his eligibility to run for and hold elective office. This representation, if proved false, would fall within the ambit of Section 78 of the OEC.

Similarly, respondent Marcos, Jr. made a material representation when he signed and subscribed to his COC, which states that, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to."291 In Aratea v. COMELEC292 (Aratea), the Court emphasized that disqualification to run for office is an ineligibility. Consequently, a statement in the COC that one is eligible, when such is not the case, is a false material representation constituting ground for the application of Section 78 of the OEC:

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:

The Court came to the same conclusion in the cases of Ty-Delgado,293 cited earlier, and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC294 (Jalosjos, Jr.). In these cases, the Court ruled that petitioners therein, who had filed their respective COCs, made false material representations when they declared themselves eligible to hold public office, despite prior convictions that rendered them ineligible.

Dimapilis involved a candidate found guilty by a final judgment of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct. Meanwhile, in Aratea, Jalosjos, Jr. and Ty-Delgado, the candidates seeking to run for public office had criminal convictions under the RPC. None of these cited cases pertains to a conviction under the NIRC, specifically the application of Section 286, as amended by PD 1994.

Nonetheless, We find no reason to depart from these cases' ruling on the effect of perpetual disqualification to hold public office on a person's representation of eligibility in his or her COC. Accordingly, We hold that the assailed representations in this case are material for the purpose of applying Section 78 of the OEC.

Respondent Marcos, Jr. claims that his alleged perpetual disqualification to hold public office does not bear on his eligibility because it does not pertain to any of the requirements under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.295 He argues that these requirements are exclusive.296 Hence, in determining his eligibility to run for President, only the requirements under this constitutional provision must be considered, to the exclusion of any other grounds for disqualification under other laws.297

The Court has ruled that, as used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having "the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office."298 Perpetual disqualification is an ineligibility. Necessarily, therefore, it directly affects one's eligibility to run for office. Equally established is that the enumeration of qualifications in the 1987 Constitution, as reiterated in Section 63 of the OEC, is not exclusive. Other pertinent laws lay down requirements for qualification and eligibility to run for and hold elective office. These considerations are sufficient to meet the requirement of materiality under Section 78 of the OEC.

Having established that the subject representations are material, We now resolve whether they are false, i.e., whether respondent Marcos, Jr. misrepresented himself to be eligible and not disqualified from running as president. Relevant to its resolution is whether respondent Marcos, Jr. was indeed perpetually disqualified from holding public office in light of the CA Decision.

B. In the Philippines, disqualification from public office is a long-established penalty

The concept of disqualification from public office has been present in Philippine laws for more than a century. It figured several times in the various Acts enacted by the First Philippine Commission between 1900 to 1907. Under Act No. 5,299 disloyalty to the U.S. as the supreme authority in the Islands was declared a ground for complete disqualification for holding office in the Philippine civil service.300

Act No. 1126301 empowered the Civil Governor not only to remove any municipal officer from office, but also, in his discretion, declare such official either temporarily or permanently disqualified thereafter from holding office.

Moreover, Act No. 1582, or the Election Law of 1907,302 which governed the country's very first national elections through popular votes,303 provided that "xxx no person who has been convicted of a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for two years or more shall hold any public office, and no person disqualified from holding public office by the sentence of a court xxx shall be eligible to hold public office during the term of his disqualification."304 Prior to this, persons who meet the minimum age, residence and literacy requirements305 can become municipal officers, unless they are ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial, departmental, or governmental funds, contractors for public works of the municipality,306 or someone who habitually smokes, chews, swallows, injects, or otherwise consumes or uses opium in any of its forms.307

In addition, Act No. 1582 provided for a penalty of disqualification from any public office, for a period of five years upon certain officials who shall "aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election."308

Under Section 11 of Act No. 1450;309 which amended Act No. 136,310 the penalty of disqualification from holding office may also be meted by the Governor General upon justices of the peace found "not performing his duties properly" or "unfit for the service." A person may also be disqualified from running from office by reason of the non-payment of taxes, which disqualification can be removed by paying the delinquent taxes after election and before the date fixed by law for assuming office, but not afterwards.311 Persons convicted of offenses connected with administration of the then Bureau of Audits (such as embezzlement or malversation in office) were likewise "ipso facto forever disqualified from holding any public office or employment of any nature whatever within the Philippine Islands."312

Further back in history, disqualification from public office was already recognized as a penalty even before the American occupation. The Penal Code for the Philippine Islands (old Penal Code), which was promulgated in 1884 under the Spanish Constitution,313 state in pertinent part:

It was then considered both an afflictive314 and accessory penalty. As a stand-alone penalty, disqualification from public office can be imposed for a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.315 On the other hand, when imposed as an accessory to other penalties,316 its duration was as provided by law.317

In 1930, the old Penal Code was repealed by Act No. 3815, or the RPC. Although the provisions relating to disqualification from public office were essentially retained, there were still notable changes: first, from six separate Articles under the old Penal Code, the provisions on disqualification were thereafter compressed into two provisions, which now read:

The Court, in Lacuna v. Abes,318 clarified the distinction between the different kinds of disqualification as distilled in these two provisions:

Second, in addition to being classified as an accessory penalty, the penalty of disqualification from public office319 is also specifically imposed by the RPC as a penalty for the commission of the following crimes:

Third, under the old Penal Code, accessory penalties must be explicitly imposed.320 Thus, in People v. Perez,321 this Court held:

In contrast, Article 73 of the RPC categorically provided for a presumption regarding the automatic imposition of accessory penalties, thus:

To be sure, disqualification from public office has also been provided as a principal penalty for the commission of crimes identified and defined under special laws. These include, among others:

Disqualification from public office may also be imposed as a penalty in administrative cases. Section 51 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,327 for example, specifically provides that the grave administrative offense of fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage shall be penalized by dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.

Generally, however, perpetual disqualification from holding public office is among the disabilities considered inherent in, and follows as a consequence of, the penalty of dismissal.328 Such penalties are, in turn, imposed for the commission of acts constituting grave misconduct, that is, misconduct attended by any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established rules:

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. maintain that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. was not disqualified from running for public office for the following reasons: (1) PD 1994 clearly and unequivocally imposed a mandatory penalty of perpetual disqualification as an accessory penalty on top of the penalties provided by the 1977 NIRC;330 (2) respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public official until 1986 and there was no abandonment of office that would justify his failure to file the required income tax returns;331 (3) the CA Decision imposing only the penalty of fine is void as it completely ignored a mandatory directive to impose the maximum penalty prescribed; as well as the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office;332 (4) in any case, since respondent Marcos, Jr. never filed the required income tax returns, he is, to date, considered to be in continued violation of the NIRC.333

As the foregoing issues are interrelated, this Court shall address them jointly.

Section 45334 of the 1977 NIRC required every Filipino citizen having a gross annual income of at least ₱1,800.00, whether residing in the Philippines or abroad, to file an income tax return on or before the fifteenth day of March of each year, covering income of the preceding taxable year. Failure to so file was originally punished, under Section 73, by "a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both."

On 05 November 1985, PD 1994 was issued, introducing substantial amendments to the 1977 NIRC. These amendments included Section 286, to wit:

We agree with petitioners Ilagan, et al. that Section 286 clearly provides for the imposition of disqualification from public office as a penalty upon public officials or employees found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by PD 1994. It is, however, not disputed that the fallo of the CA Decision335 adjudging respondent Marcos, Jr.'s guilt for non-filing of the required income tax return makes absolutely no mention of said penalty. We again quote the dispositive portion for emphasis:

Petitioners Ilagan, et.al. advance the view that the imposition of disqualification from public office as an accessory penalty is mandatory and that, since courts have no power to impose a lower penalty than what is authorized by law, the CA Decision is void as it "completely ignored the mandatory directive of Section 286 of PD 1994."336

However, it must be emphasized that in criminal cases, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State. The interest of the private offended party, if any, is restricted only to the civil liability.337 Thus, in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes,338 We sustained the dismissal of the petition for the annulment of a decision of acquittal on the ground that the same would "necessarily require a review of the criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. xxx [O]nly the State, and not herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the criminal aspect of the case."

The offense of non-filing of income tax returns does not conceivably implicate any private interests, much less those pertaining to petitioners Ilagan, et al. As in malversation of public funds or property, tax evasion, or violations of RA 3019, the government is the offended party that sustained actual and direct injury as a result of the commission of the offense in question and the one entitled to the civil liabilities, if any, of the accused.339 On this score alone, petitioner Ilagan, et al.'s contentions should be rejected.

Even granting ex gratia argumenti standing in petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s favor, the CA Decision has long become final and executory as in fact Entry of Judgment was issued more than twenty (20) years ago, on 31 August 2001.340 It can no longer be modified, even by this Court.

Finally, in Estarija v. People,341 We upheld the erroneous penalty imposed by the RTC upon Estarija for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. The trial court imposed upon Estarija a straight penalty of seven years, without any accessory penalty. The correct penalty under the law, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act, would have been imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as minimum, to nine years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. However, the decision of the RTC had already become final and executory because Estarija mistakenly appealed his conviction with the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan. In resolving the case, We held:

In another case, Tan v. People,343 We set aside the amendatory judgment of the trial court increasing the penalty imposed on petitioner for bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment, on the basis of which petitioner had applied for probation, foreclosing his right to appeal and rendering the previous verdict to lapse into finality. Thus, even if the trial court erred in the penalty imposed, the decision can no longer be amended after it has attained finality.

This is not to say, however, that there was, in fact, error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it saw fit to modify the conclusions reached, and penalties imposed, by the trial court.

In the landmark case of People v. Simon,344 We have already settled the matter of treatment of penalties found in special laws and the RPC:

Here, petitioners Ilagan et al.'s theory that perpetual disqualification was automatically imposed with the mere fact of conviction finds basis from jurisprudence involving disqualifications under the RPC. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction, on the other hand, is for the non-filing of income tax return under the 1977 NIRC. Whereas the RPC contained a system of penalties categorized between principal or accessory penalties,346 as well as an express presumption in regard to the imposition of certain penalties upon the mere fact of conviction,347 the 1977 NIRC did not.

People v. Silvallana,348 the case cited by petitioners Ilagan, et al. to support their argument that the accessory penalty need not be written in the judgment of conviction, clearly states that the presumption on the automatic imposition of accessory penalties applies only to Articles 40,349 41,350 42,351 43,352 44,353 and 45354 of the RPC, in relation to Article 73355 thereof. In that case, We explained:

Further, a more careful reading of Section 286 would also show details that militate against petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s reading of automatic imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. We refer to the following portion of Section 286:

As correctly pointed out by respondent Marcos, Jr.,356 while Section 286(c) specifies that the revocation or cancellation of a certified public accountant's certificate is automatic upon conviction, the same is not true with respect to the imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. If indeed the legislative intent is such that a public officer or employee found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC is automatically perpetually disqualified from holding public office, then the law could have so easily stated. It, however, did not do so.

In dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.357 This Court thus holds that, unless explicitly provided for in the fallo, the penalty of disqualification from public office under Section 286(c) is not deemed automatically imposed on a public officer or employee found to have violated the provisions of the 1977 NIRC. We find this interpretation to be more in keeping with the intention of the legislators, as well as being more favorable to the accused.358

Applying the same principle, petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s claim of a continuing violation on the part of respondent Marcos, Jr. also lacks merit. There is nothing in either the 1977 NIRC or PD 1994 that speaks of the continuing nature of the offense of non-filing of income tax returns. In fact, in case a person fails to make and file a return at the time prescribed by law, the law allows the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make the return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise. Such return shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes, unless the taxpayer can prove the contrary under proper proceedings.359

We reiterate that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.360 Indeed, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused.361 Additionally, We stress that execution must always conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision, because the only portion thereof that may be subject of execution is that which is precisely ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion.362

Further, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.363 To be sure, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable in accordance with the principle of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law and whether it may have been made by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court itself. Any act that violates this principle must be immediately struck down.364

We emphasize that the CA Decision365 has long attained finality. A plain reading of the said decision would reveal that the penalty was limited to the imposition of the payment of fines, and respondent Marcos, Jr. was neither sentenced to imprisonment nor meted the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, this Court cannot add to, nor modify, the penalties imposed therein. Moreover, as discussed above, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file an income tax return is not an offense involving moral turpitude.

At any rate, respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines imposed in the CA Decision.

To prove payment of the deficiency taxes and fines, respondent Marcos, Jr. presented a BIR Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt dated 27 December 2001.366

This notwithstanding, petitioners Ilagan, et al. assert that these are insufficient to prove satisfaction of the deficiency taxes and fines, as an order of payment must first come from the court before payment may be made.367 Further, they argue that nowhere in the BIR Certification does it state that the payments were made in satisfaction of the imposed penalties rendered by the court. To support their submissions, petitioners Ilagan, et al. presented a Certification issued by the RTC stating that there is no record on file of: (1) compliance of payment or satisfaction of its Decision dated 27 July 1995 or the CA Decision dated 31 October 1997; and (2) entry in the criminal docket of the RTC Decision dated 27 July 1995 as affirmed/modified by the CA Decision.368

On the other hand, the COMELEC Former First Division found as sufficient the BIR Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt presented by respondent Marcos, Jr. Specifically as regards the Landbank Official Receipt, the COMELEC Former First Division concluded that the payment was indeed for the deficiency taxes and fees as evidenced by the amounts indicated therein, and the writing of the number "0605."369 It was explained that BIR Form 0605 is a payment form used by taxpayers to pay taxes and fees that do not require a tax return, including deficiency taxes.370 Moreover, the COMELEC Former First Division considered that the breakdown of amounts indicated in the Landbank Official Receipt already includes the payment of fines ordered to be paid by the CA.371 Consequently, it ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines in the total amount of P67,137.27, in compliance with the CA Decision.

It bears stressing that BIR Form 0605 is accomplished every time a taxpayer pays taxes and fees that do not require the use of a tax return such as second installment payment for income tax, deficiency tax, delinquency tax, registration fees, penalties, advance payments, deposits, and installment payments, among others.372 The same has also been considered by the Court as proof of payment of deficiency taxes.373 We likewise reiterate that the best evidence for proving payment is by evidence of receipts showing the same.374 Thus, We agree that respondent Marcos, Jr. has indeed submitted sufficient evidence to prove the payment of the deficiency taxes and fines imposed upon him.

In contrast, the RTC Certification presented by petitioners Ilagan, et al. is insufficient to establish that respondent Marcos, Jr. did not pay the deficiency taxes and fines because it merely establishes that there is no record on file showing compliance with the RTC and the CA Decisions. Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by means other than mere allegations.375 Here, petitioners Ilagan, et al. failed to substantiate their allegations through this mere RTC Certification, especially when weighed against the evidence presented by respondent Marcos, Jr.

On this note, We stress that the 1977 NIRC provides that the failure to file return or to pay tax shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment or both. There is therefore no merit to the allegation that the CA, by limiting the penalty to the payment of fines in its Decision, failed to correctly apply the provisions of the law effective at the time of the offense. The CA imposed a penalty that is within the range of penalties provided by law. Thus, it is erroneous to say that respondent Marcos, Jr. has yet to serve his penalty. Respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines imposed upon him.

Pertinently, it bears noting that respondent Marcos, Jr. was a government employee for the years 1982 to 1985. The COMELEC Former First Division considered the Certification issued by the Local Finance Committee of the Province of Ilocos,376 which stated that taxes were withheld from his compensation received for the years 1982 to 1985. There is basis to conclude that any deficiency taxes due from his compensation should be attributable to the provincial government as the withholding agent, and not to respondent Marcos, Jr.377

In any case, non-payment of fines is not a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC, which contemplates only three instances when a person may be disqualified to hold public office, thus:

Verily, whether or not respondent Marcos, Jr. satisfied the payment of fines and penalties with the lower courts is immaterial since his sentence did not fall within the purview of Section 12 of the OEC.

"In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case: In these, the will of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the laws which control the community, receive their tone and spirit from the public wishes."378

Vox populi, vox Dei – In the 09 May 2022 elections, over half of the electorate chose to stake the fate of the entire nation on respondent Marcos, Jr. Only time can unravel the wisdom behind the overwhelming support given to him. In the meantime, no one can argue that the electoral exercise is an essential part of our democracy.

Equally important to the life of our Republic is the acknowledgement that it is founded upon the rule of law. Thus, even the will of the majority cannot subvert what the law has made obligatory. Candidates are expected to abide by the procedural and substantive requirements for running for public office.

As such, inquiring upon a candidate's qualifications and compliance is not just a right but a responsibility of every citizen. Petitioners Buenafe, et al. and petitioners Ilagan, et al. have exercised such responsibility which, in turn, brought these cases to light. In resolving these Petitions, the Court also made its own determination not only as part of its constitutional duty, but in its role as a pillar of our democracy.

This Decision was never intended to validate the 31,629,783 who expressed their faith on respondent Marcos, Jr. Instead, this Decision aims to confirm the eligibility and qualifications of respondent Marcos, Jr. for the highest position of the land. After much scrutiny, We come to the conclusion that our laws do not support the position taken by petitioners Buenafe, et al., who declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representations as to his eligibility, nor the assertions of petitioners Ilagan, et al., who put doubt on respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications by alleging that he is perpetually disqualified from running from public office and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Indeed, the exercise of this Court's power to decide the present controversy has led to no other conclusion but that respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to run for and be elected to public office. Likewise, his COC, being valid and in accord with the pertinent laws, was rightfully upheld by the COMELEC.