G.R. No. 260374 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 260374 / 260426, June 28, 2022,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAROLINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS, SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M. IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CARWYN CANDILA, AND JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

What makes these cases apparently difficult are their political repercussions and the threat of unthinking judgments by passionate partisans from either side.

Put in another way: what are at issue in this case are narrow legal questions, not political ones.

What is at issue in this case is not whether the Justices of this court politically support a candidate. The personal background, the leadership potentials or even the platform, or lack thereof, of any candidate for the highest political office are not at issue. How we vote in this case does not necessarily reveal how we voted during the last elections nor reveal our continuing positions regarding various platforms of government.

Thus, in the resolution of the narrow legal questions, any Justice should be careful not to privilege our political choices. Rather, we should adopt the longer view: to examine the applicable text of the provisions of the Constitution and the law; to review the existing construction of their meaning as well as their genealogy; and to be conscious of our interpretative methodology and ensure that our premises proceed not from the political results that we want, but from the values and principles congealed in the legal provisions and applicable not only for the parties involved in this case but also durable enough for the future.

How we vote in this case will reveal our commitment to the rule of law, regardless of its personal political consequences for us.

In general, the qualifications for any person to vie for President of the Republic of the Philippines is limited to those enumerated in Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution. These qualifications are admittedly very sparse, but intentionally so. Its intent is to be inclusive, as well as to put as much of the characteristics, background, and platform of a candidate to the electorate. It will, in the future, allow a socialist, a union leader, an activist that had already been convicted of illegal possession of firearms during martial law, or even a former government employee who may have been wrongly convicted by a final judgment of failure to file an income tax return—even when taxes were withheld from his or her monthly compensation—to run for President.

In my view, these qualifications cannot be amended by statute. Neither can additional qualifications be included through interpretation by the Court. The Constitution can only be modified through the process of amendment and revision outlined in its own Article XVII.

In general, the Certificate of Candidacy is the document that would allow the Commission on Elections to evaluate: (a) the qualifications and disqualifications of a candidate; and (b) determine whether his or her name should be included in the ballot. It is submitted to the Commission on Elections and is not required to be published. It is not the sole and exclusive document that will be used by the electorate to evaluate and judge the candidate.

In view of its limited purpose, the Omnibus Election Code requires that any cancellation be founded not only on material misrepresentations, but that the representations be proven to be intentionally false.

Resolving the question does not mean that the candidate misrepresents his or her credentials to the electorate—this will be the subject of public discussions and forums after the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy. The question is whether a candidate has intentionally misled the Commission on Elections with a false representation which is material enough to affect whether or not his or her name should be included in the ballot.

Private respondent's final conviction did not include perpetual disqualification from any elected public office. That conviction is already beyond the review of this Court. It became final upon the withdrawal of the appeal to this Court. Neither is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification automatically and implicitly imposed in crimes that are not prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

The non-filing of an Income Tax Return—an individual's self-report of his or her taxable income—is not, in all cases, similar to tax evasion. Certainly, the law now provides for a process of compromising the failure to file income tax returns on time. Definitely, a failure to file an income tax return by a government employee whose compensation is already subject to withholding taxes is generally not tax evasion.

Thus, there are certain instances when the conviction for failing to file income tax returns is not considered as a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Moral turpitude in the context of that provision implies an act that displays a level of depravity that goes into the one's character to be able to discern right from wrong. Not all acts that are punished by law involves a showing of moral turpitude.

Our legal order does not require one to be a saint before a person can consider running for public office. Candidates may have made mistakes in the past. They may make mistakes in filing Certificates of Candidacy. But the intent of the relevant law is to have the electorate, rather than for courts, judge the strengths and faults of a candidate for themselves, through a narrow reading of the law divorced from its spirit, to determine who will be included in the ballot.

Certainly, in my view, we cannot add to the minimum constitutional qualifications to run for President through the indirect route of assessing Certificates of Candidacies.

This Court has the duty and power of judicial review under the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.1

The 1987 Constitution has expanded the scope of this judicial review from its traditional purview. Courts are no longer only bound to "settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." They are also "empowered to determine if any government branch or instrumentality has acted beyond the scope of its powers, such that there is grave abuse of discretion."2 Judicial review gives authority to the courts to invalidate acts of legislative, executive, and constitutional bodies if shown contrary to the Constitution.3

Grave abuse of discretion refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction[.]"4

[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.6

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court corrects acts made without or in excess of jurisdiction by any tribunal, board, or officer in the exercise of its governmental function:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial junctions has acted without or in excess [of] its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.7

(a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as where it uses wrong considerations and grossly misreads the evidence at arriving at its conclusion; (b) where a tribunal's assessment is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used[;]" "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable[;]" and (d) where the tribunal uses wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue.8

There is grave abuse of discretion when a "constitutional body makes patently gross errors in making factual inferences[,] such that critical pieces of evidence presented by a party not traversed or even stipulated by the other parties are ignored."9

Under Rule 6410 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by this Court on the ground that the Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In its Comment,11 public respondent Commission on Elections posits that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Petitions. It claims that as the elections have been concluded, this Court has already been stripped of its power to resolve the issues raised.12 They add that the overwhelming number of votes in favor of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.) has rendered the Petitions moot.13

Under the Constitution, this Court En Banc, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, is also the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President[.]"14

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is an independent constitutional body. However, it is not separate and distinct from this Court. When this Court convenes as the tribunal, it exercises judicial power albeit wearing a different hat.15

This Court En Banc sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the power to rule on election contests. A "contest" refers to a postelection scenario.16

Moreover, this Court has held that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal only has jurisdiction over the declared president and vice president of the elections, and not candidates. Thus, it cannot resolve cases filed before it that question the qualifications of candidates for presidency or vice presidency.17

Moreover, the nature of election issues raised before the Commission on Elections are different from those that can be raised before the electoral tribunals. The 2016 cases of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections18 and David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal19 demonstrate this distinction.

In Poe-Llamanzares, petitions under Rule 64 were filed assailing the decision of the Commission on Elections that cancelled the certificate of candidacy for presidency filed by Senator Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Poe-Llamanzares). The Commission on Elections found that the senator committed false material representation regarding her citizenship and residency.

In its ruling, this Court clarified that the Commission on Elections can only rule whether the certificate of candidacy should be cancelled on the ground that there is false material representation. It cannot rule on the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

Poe-Llamanzares stressed that the Constitution withholds from the Commission on Elections the power to decide inquiries into qualifications of the candidates, such as age, residency, and citizenship. Questions on candidates' qualification are within the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals.

This Court further created the distinction between "disqualification proceedings" and "declaration of ineligibility."

Disqualification is based on Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Elections Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code. It bars a person from "becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate from public office." On the other hand, ineligibility pertains to the "lack of qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office[.]" It is the procedural vehicle to "remove the incumbent from office."20

Poe-Llamanzares elucidated that there is no legal proceeding to determine the eligibility of a candidate before election. This is because the determination of a candidate's eligibility, such as their citizenship or residency, takes a long time and may extend beyond the start of the term of office. Moreover, the rationale behind the prohibition against preproclamation cases in elections for president, vice president, and members of Congress is to preserve the prerogatives of the electoral tribunals.

Thus, in Poe-Llamanzares, this Court held that the electoral tribunal had no jurisdiction over the controversy. While the case touched upon the requirements of citizenship and residency, it mainly involved a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on false material representation.

This is in contrast with the subsequent case of David, where the citizenship and residency of Poe-Llamanzares were likewise assailed. However, David is distinct from Poe-Llamanzares as it was filed after Senator Poe-Llamanzares already took office as a senator. As a post-election case, the petition was correctly filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal as it assailed the actual eligibility of Poe-Llamanzares as a senator, not the validity of her certificate of candidacy.

In this case, the two Petitions are correctly filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They question the various Resolutions21 of the Commission on Elections, which denied the petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy and the petition for disqualification against Marcos, Jr. The petitions assailing the certificate of candidacy of Marcos, Jr. were filed before the elections were conducted, making them a preelection contest.

The Petitions mainly assail the certificate of candidacy of Marcos, Jr. on the ground that he committed false material representation. While it involves his qualifications, the Petitions are anchored on the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. It is a preelection contest filed before the Commission on Elections and reviewable by this Court. Thus, this Court may review the Petitions notwithstanding the fact that the elections have been concluded.

To be enabled to run for any elective public office, a person must satisfy both substantive and procedural requirements under our electoral laws. A candidate's eligibility or ineligibility is defined by the Constitution and statutes, such as the Omnibus Election Code.22 These provide the minimum qualifications for a person to present a candidacy to run for a public office.

Substantive requirements pertain to the possession of qualifications and none of the disqualifications for a public office.23 On the other hand, the procedural requirements pertain to the compliance with the electoral process for a particular national or local election, as outlined by the Omnibus Election Code and Commission on Elections.24

The substantive qualifications for presidency are found in Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution.25 These qualifications are reiterated in Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code.26 Meanwhile, the disqualifications are found in Sections 1227 and 6828 of the Omnibus Election Code.

It is not enough that a person actually possesses the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position sought. They must likewise dutifully and honestly declare details relating to these in their certificate of candidacy. A person must file their certificate of candidacy in the form and within the period prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code and by the Commission on Elections.29 It is through a certificate of candidacy that a candidate certifies under oath their eligibility, i.e., their qualifications to the office sought.30

The lack of any qualification for a public office, or the commission of any act constituting a ground for disqualification, including any material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy as regards their qualifications, may prevent a person from running, or if elected, from serving a public office. In other words, when an ineligible person is elected as a public officer, their right to hold office may be challenged in at least two ways:31

Pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

In turn, Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the contents of a certificate of candidacy:

Meanwhile, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the grounds for which a candidate may be disqualified:

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,33 this Court pointed out that a Section 78 petition and a Section 68 petition are two distinct remedies:

A grant of a Section 78 petition involves a finding that: (a) a person lacks a qualification; and (b) that they made a false material representation.35

To deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, there must be a showing that the representations of the candidates are both false and material.36

To be material, the representation must pertain to the qualification for the office sought by the candidate:

The representation must not only be material, but also be false.38 To be false, it must be established that the candidate "intentionally tried to mislead the electorate regarding [their] qualifications."39 It must evince a "deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible[,]" and "made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office."40

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,41 this Court emphasized that the attempt to mislead must be deliberate:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would be candidate's qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if [they run] and [are] elected, [they] cannot serve; in both cases, [they] can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.42

The false material representation committed by a candidate cannot merely be an innocuous mistake. It must be both false and material considering that the consequences imposed on a guilty candidate are grave. The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy prevents the candidate from running, or if elected, from serving their term of office.43 It deprives a person of a basic and substantive political right to be voted for public office.44

Indeed, in David and Poe-Llamanzares, this Court had the occasion to elaborate on whether a foundling is a natural-born Filipino citizen in relation to a declaration of citizenship in a candidate's certificate of candidacy. These two cases arose from Section 78 petitions involving Senator Poe-Llamanzares's certificate of candidacy to run for public office.

David held that the Senate Electoral Tribunal did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that Senator Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen and qualified to hold a seat as senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

This Court clarified that a reading of "the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise."45 Any other conclusion would equate to a permanent discrimination against foundlings, which violates the equal protection clause and runs contrary to our commitment to comply with our international treaty obligations.

In Poe-Llamanzares, I voted to set aside resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections as Senator Poe-Llamanzares made no false material representation in her certificate of candidacy for presidency.46 I expressed that a candidate should not be expected to be thoroughly familiar with the precise interpretation of a legal concept related to their eligibility to run for public office, which in that case pertained to the concept of foundlings vis-àvis the citizenship requirement; and to correctly apply such a concept.

Absent any doctrine on the matter, the assertion made by Senator Poe-Llamanzares in her certificate of candidacy did not constitute a false material representation of fact, but a mere misinterpretation of law. Moreover, as I have pointed out, the Commission on Elections could not, based on new doctrines not known to Senator Poe-Llamanzares, declare that her certificate of candidacy is infected with false material representation.

In this relation, I emphasized the need to establish that a material representation is false to successfully challenge a certificate of candidacy through a Section 78 petition:

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code requires a candidate to state under oath that "[they are] eligible for said office." In the event a candidate certifies under oath that they are eligible to run for public office notwithstanding a final judgment expressly disqualifying them from running, that is the time that the candidate is making a false material representation.48

Here, there is no false material representation on private respondent Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.'s part when he did not indicate in his certificate of candidacy that he was convicted of a crime carrying a penalty of perpetual disqualification and a crime involving moral turpitude.

While the representation is material as it refers to a qualification to run for presidency, there is nothing false in his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners posit that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public service attaches to respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction and is deemed incorporated in the dispositive portion. They refer to Section 286 of Presidential Decree No. 1994 that amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment included that a public officer or employee convicted of a crime penalized under the National Internal Revenue Code would be disqualified from holding any public office:

As pointed out by Commission on Elections, Presidential Decree No. 1994 took effect only on January 1, 1986, which introduced the penalty of perpetual disqualification for convictions under the National Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code is the applicable law for the taxable years of 1982, 1983, and 1984, which does not include the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification.

While the provision is effective during the taxable year of 1985, respondent Marcos, Jr. was no longer a public officer when he was required to file his tax return. Thus, the accessory penalty under Presidential Decree No. 1994 does not attach to his conviction.

Moreover, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision, which became final and executory, is crucial in this point. To recall, the Court of Appeals' Decision modified the Regional Trial Court's ruling, acquitting respondent Marcos, Jr. of his violation for nonpayment of deficiency taxes but affirming his conviction for failing to file income tax returns for taxable years 1982 to 1985. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals removed the penalty of imprisonment and retained the payment of fine. Thus:

Evidently, the dispositive portion of the final and binding judgment does not impose a penalty of imprisonment or perpetual disqualification from public service. This is the directive part of the Decision and the order that should be followed in the execution.51 Ultimately, it is the dispositive portion that binds respondent Marcos, Jr.52

Thus, the order of execution can never go beyond the terms and consequences clearly expressed in the dispositive portion. Otherwise, adding other penalties not stated in the Decision transgresses upon the Court of Appeals' judicial discretion to impose penalties and incredibly prejudices respondent Marcos, Jr.

The Court of Appeals has the judicial discretion to impose a penalty of imprisonment, including perpetual disqualification. Here, the Court of Appeals, within the discretion bound by law, decided to delete the imprisonment and retain the imposition of fine.

Further, it bears emphasis that the Court of Appeals' Decision has been rendered final. It is beyond appeal and alteration. In Kumar v. People,53 this Court held:

Thus, the ruling can no longer be disturbed, even if the questions raised are meant to correct errors of fact or law.

Moreover, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for the failure to file his income tax return does not disqualify him to run as a candidate.

Apart from identifying the qualifications of candidates for public office, the Omnibus Election Code likewise enumerates the circumstances that will render a person disqualified. Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

None of these disqualifications are present in respondent Marcos, Jr.'s case. He was not found to be insane or incompetent by competent authority, and he was not sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, and rebellion. Moreover, the affirmation of his conviction before the Court of Appeals did not carry a penalty .of imprisonment.

Petitioners, however, assert that the failure to file an income tax return in violation of Section 45 of the National Internal Revenue Code is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude refers to "everything. . . done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."56 In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,57 this Court defined moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a [person] owes [their fellow], or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty. . ., or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."58

The definition of moral turpitude and the identification of crimes involving moral turpitude is loose.59 Generally, the standard surrounding moral turpitude depends on what the society accepts as rules of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.60 Determining what constitutes moral turpitude requires a social consensus of what acts are deemed reprehensible based on a society's standards.

However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude.61 It is ultimately a question of fact, and it depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation.62 For this reason, this Court must determine what crimes involve moral turpitude.63

The question of whether a failure to file an income tax return is a crime involving moral turpitude has been settled by this Court in Republic v. Marcos II.64 In that case, this Court ruled that the failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude because "the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual."65 Thus, the mere failure to file an income tax return is a distinct and separate violation from (1) filing a false return and (2) filing a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax.66

A false return may or may not be intentional. It simply involves a deviation from the truth regardless of the person's intent. Meanwhile, a fraudulent return "implies intentional or deceitful entry with intent to evade the taxes due."67

On the other hand, a mere omission or negligence in the filing of a tax return does not signify malicious intent. There is no apparent willfulness to evade payment of tax. The failure to file a tax return is not viewed as entirely irremissible. In fact, the penalty for failure to file an internal tax return can be compromised under Section 255 of the National Internal Revenue Code:

Here, as pointed out in the ponencia, our tax laws are being developed in a way that decriminalizes failing to file an income tax return. This is fair and reasonable considering that many Filipinos miss or fail to file their income tax returns due to the complicated tax system, the lack of incentives to file, especially from individuals and businesses in the informal economy, or simply due to negligence.69

While these acts should not be enabled, there should be a broader understanding in characterizing this crime. The mere failure to file an income tax return does not demonstrate moral perversity or intent to defraud or evade payment of tax. Thus, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified from running as a presidential candidate despite his failure to file his income tax return.

Nevertheless, Filipinos who miss or fail to file their tax returns should face the consequences of the law. Our government relies heavily on the collection of taxes and compliance with our tax laws is a duty of every citizen. The president themselves must dutifully ensure that these laws are faithfully executed. This includes the rightful filing of returns and payment of taxes.

The Constitution merely sets out the minimum qualifications for the president. In doing so, it allows the electorate to decide for themselves the standard they deem fit for the position. This may include a person's character, integrity, educational background, political leaning, public service track record, expertise, work ethic, or even records of criminal conviction. These standards can demonstrate and predict how a candidate will carry out their duties once elected to office. During the campaign period, the qualifications of a candidate are threshed out by the public with the hope that it provides guidance to the electorate in making an informed decision.

Thus, the electorate heavily relies on the information it receives and the kind of political discussions it participates in.

As part of its duty, the Commission on Elections is bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the election[.]"70

The Omnibus Election Code states that petitions to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such as the Buenafe Petition, "shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election."71 On the other hand, final decisions of petitions for disqualification, including the Ilagan Petition, "shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought."72

Nevertheless, the Commission on Elections, in clear derogation of the above provisions, released its Resolutions on both petitions on May 10, 2022, a day after the 2022 elections.

The Commission on Elections cannot claim that it was given insufficient time to study the Petitions.

On January 20, 2022, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration73 of the Commission on Elections Second Division's January 17, 2022 Resolution74 that denied the Buenafe Petition for lack of merit.75 Moreover, in its February 10, 2022 Resolution,76 the Commission on Elections Former First Division dismissed the Ilagan Petition, and motions for reconsideration were also filed soon after.77 The Commission on Elections spent almost four and three months, respectively, to decide on the motions for reconsideration, releasing their Resolutions only after the electorate cast votes.

This unmitigated delay cannot be countenanced, especially as the petitions involved no less than a candidate for the highest government position in our country. Such delay in the resolution of the qualifications and the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Marcos, Jr. has materially affected not just the results of the elections but also the smooth transition of the incoming administration. It negatively impacted not just the parties involved, but the electorate as well.

The pendency of the case was an effective sword of Damocles hanging over respondent Marcos, Jr. Petitioners were forced to cast their votes, wondering if their efforts were for naught. The looming issues on respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications and certificate of candidacy caused confusion and uncertainty in the electorate's minds, one that clearly weighed into their choice of candidate.

The Commission on Elections should have expended all efforts to prioritize the resolution of these cases prior to the conduct of elections. The constitutional commission should be spearheading the Philippine election's organization and efficiency and should not be the cause of any setback, as it has been charged with the significant duty of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of the elections.78

Already, even before the text of all the opinions in this case were published and even before they have read a single word in our unanimous reading of the legal provisions, partisans were so ready to brand the sitting Justices as traitors, motivated by greed and power, beholden to the President who appointed them almost ten years ago, and everything else other than being capable of legal judgment. All of which of course have no justification. All of which of course are false.

All of which of course reveal the kind of uncritical thinking that provides the fertile ground of disinformation and violence that will subvert our democracy.

The potential for any totalitarian or authoritarian government to succeed is directly proportional to the ability of the cultural environment of its society to dehumanize its component individuals, identities, groups, or communities.

It was Hannah Arendt who said, in her six-page letter to the scholar. Gerard Shoelem, clarifying again her concept of the banality of evil, which she first wrote in her book "Eichmann in Jerusalem":79

All of us are a potential part of that fungus, of that infection that can spread evil.

We do so when we reduce our enemies to their worst, when we caricaturize them as incapable of any humanity. We do so when we reduce the world into an "us-versus-they," with nothing in between. We do so when we maintain ourselves only in the company of our epistemic bubbles.

As citizens deserving of a better democracy, we have the responsibility to know that to speak and to express is a right, but it is a responsibility to speak well—to speak the truth, clearly, without drowning others, and with the openness to engage in real conversations.

Elections foster partisanship and division. Democracy, however, requires that we are open to listen; to be able to judge; and to distinguish our disagreement from our capacity to reduce those with whom we disagree as persons incapable of any kind of humanity.

Otherwise, we enable that system that oppresses. We facilitate that society that is incapable of recognizing the human rights of our opponents. When we participate in demonizing another, we are as responsible for atrocities to be committed against other human beings.

The constitutional guarantee of a democratic society, with the sovereign assurance that political leaders are chosen through elections, is certainly not an inevitable guarantee of the quality of that democracy.

An authentic and truly meaningful democracy can only be assured by the humanity and collective efforts of our people.

Any dysfunction in our democracy, any belief in the power of disinformation magnified by unmoderated and unregulated social media, any concerns about the weakening institutions such as media and education that traditionally informs a more critical citizenry, are better addressed by the strategic, collective, and sober action of our people.

On the other hand, winners of elections should acknowledge that the mandate they are given in an unequal society, with many who are poor, with the growing fear of health, climate, and economic crises, are mainly expressions of hope for a leadership that inspires the best solutions from all our people. That leadership should be tolerant, respectful of dissent, and always protective of the intrinsic dignity as well as the rights of every human being.

That leadership should lead through the power of their example: that they follow the law and pay the right taxes.

We have one life. Through elections, perhaps with reasons that only the universe will know, some are given one more chance to do what is right.