G.R. No. 260374 - Seprate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 260374 / 260426, June 28, 2022,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAROLINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS, SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M. IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CARWYN CANDILA, AND JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

This Court may exercise jurisdiction to resolve the instant petitions. The proclamation of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.) as the president-elect of the Republic of the Philippines in the recently concluded 2022 National and Local Elections does not serve to put an end to the jurisdiction of this Court on judicial matters, and the commencement of the Court's jurisdiction acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). With the same function as the other electoral tribunals, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), the PET serves as the body that decides on issues of election, return and qualifications of the specific government position which pertains to their mandate. Thus, whatever conditions that must be met in order to vest jurisdiction on the other electoral tribunals would necessarily be applicable to the PET before it could exercise jurisdiction. On this matter, the pronouncement of this Court, which extensively discussed the jurisdiction of the HRET, in Reyes v. COMELEC,1 finds application, thus:

Verily, Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides the jurisdiction of the PET, which is essentially the same as that of the HRET and SET, as follows:

Notably, a president-elect, despite his proclamation, does not become the President of the Republic of the Philippines until he begins his term of office. This term of office begins at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election.4 It is only at this instance when the duly elected President assumes office, after being proclaimed and after taking his oath of office.

Thus, as long as the petition remains with this Court before June 30, 2022, this Court retains jurisdiction to resolve the instant petitions.

To recapitulate, the petition for certiorari filed by Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, Fides M. Lim, Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Roland C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano (Buenafe, et al.) arose from a petition to cancel or deny due course the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.) under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), while the petition for certiorari filed by Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan, Saturnino Cunanan Ocampo, Maria Carolina Pagaduan Araullo, Trinidad Gerilla Repuno, Joanna Kintanar Cariño, Elisa Tita Perez Lubi, Liza Largoza Maza, Danilo Mallari Dela Fuente, Carmencita Mendoza Florentino, Doroteo Cubacub Abaya, Jr., Erlinda Nable Senturias, Sr., Arabella Cammagay Balingao, Sr., Cherry M. Ibardolaza, CSSJB, Sr., Susan Santos Esmile, SFIC, Homar Rubert Roca Distajo, Polynne Espineda Dira, James Carwyn Candila, and Jonas Angelo Lopena Abadilla (Ilagan, et al.) arose from a petition for disqualification of Marcos, Jr. under Section 12 of the OEC.5

As mentioned in the ponencia, both of these petitions referred to the same set of criminal cases for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended (1977 NIRC) involving Marcos, Jr.6 Ultimately, Marcos, Jr. was acquitted by the Court of Appeals (CA) for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982-1985, but convicted him for failure to file income tax return for the same period. He was then sentenced to pay a fine for these violations. This decision eventually became final and executory.7

Noticeably, both the petitions filed by Buenafe, et al. and Ilagan, et al. were anchored on the same factual basis, albeit being sought to be applied on different provisions of the OEC. Nonetheless, as extensively discussed in the ponencia, a petition to deny due course is different from a petition for disqualification. To further highlight the differences between these two remedies, Fermin v. Comelec8 is instructive, viz.:

The differences in the effect of these two remedies, as well as the ground by which these petitions have to be examined, necessitates a clear delineation between these two. The importance of the distinction was illustrated in the case of Munder v. COMELEC10 when this Court examined a petition for disqualification as a petition to deny due course because of the ground relied upon by the petitioner therein, thus:

As such, it is important to examine the ground relied upon in a petition for cancellation of COC and a petition for disqualification. It has been held that the proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner.12

As mentioned, a petition for cancellation of COC must revolve around a material representation on the eligibility of a candidate, as set forth in the Constitution and laws. If the ground relied upon does not pertain to a material representation of any of the eligibility requirements of a candidate such as a nickname, the petition would have to be denied. This was aptly discussed by this Court in Villafuerte v. COMELEC13 as follows:

With respect to the presidency, the eligibility requirements therefor are set forth under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Under this provision, the basic eligibility requirements that a presidential candidate must satisfy pertains to: (1) citizenship, (2) status as a voter, (3) ability to read and write, (4) age, and (5) residency. It is when any of these requirements are materially misrepresented in a COC when a COC may be denied due course.

In addition to Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution, other grounds pertaining to eligibility of a presidential candidate, which may be raised in a petition to deny due course or cancel COC are: (1) the provisions on term limitation, and (2) perpetual disqualification. These two additional grounds serve as a bar to a person who intends to run for public office and thereby affects eligibility of a candidate, as it limits the persons who can run for public office. Moreover, in the same manner as the basic eligibility requirements under Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution could readily be ascertained at the time of the filing of the COC, these grounds could likewise be determined by the candidate him/herself.

The term limitation for those running for president is provided in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Indeed, in the case of Albania v. COMELEC,15 this Court upheld the COMELEC's ruling that a violation of the three term-limit rule for a mayoralty candidate is a ground for a petition for cancellation of COC, and not a petition for disqualification, viz.:

Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office. The word "eligible" in Section 74 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. And We had held that a violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, x x x.16

The illustrative cases on term limitations were enumerated in Aratea v. COMELEC17 as follows:

With respect to perpetual disqualification as a ground for cancellation of COC, Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC19 expounded on the following:

Reiterating the foregoing, Dimapilis v. COMELEC21 applied perpetual disqualification as a ground for cancellation of a COC, when said accessory penalty is imposed in an administrative case, to wit:

While the other grounds in a petition for cancellation of COC may very well be differentiated from the grounds for a petition for disqualification, perpetual disqualification, as a ground for the cancellation of COC, presents a conundrum in this delineation. This is because perpetual disqualification is imposed based on the act committed by a person, whether it be a crime or an administrative infraction.

Verily, under Section 12 of the OEC, there are certain crimes, the conviction of which, would be a ground for disqualification of a candidate. The provision reads:

With this, there may be a situation where a person who has been sentenced to final judgment of a crime, which carries the penalty of perpetual disqualification, and which crime likewise involves moral turpitude, may be disqualified or his/her COC be cancelled. Indeed, this Court has already recognized that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications.23 In cases of such overlap, "the petitioner should not be constrained in [his/her] choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies."24 Such is the present case, with the petition filed by Buenafe, et al. as a petition for cancellation of COC of Marcos, Jr. and with the petition filed by Ilagan, et al. as a petition for disqualification.

While the arguments of the two petitions overlap, specifically pointing out the conviction of Marcos, Jr. for failure to file his income tax return, the basis of the analysis on these two petitions should be delineated.

With respect to the petition filed by Buenafe, et al., being a petition for cancellation of COC, the same should be analyzed as to whether the conviction of Marcos, Jr. carried perpetual disqualification. On the other hand, the petition filed by Ilagan, et al., being a petition for disqualification, should be analyzed based on the issue of whether the conviction of Marcos, Jr. involved moral turpitude.

Examining the petition filed by Buenafe, et al., the same was correctly denied by the COMELEC for failure to prove that the conviction of Marcos, Jr. by the CA for failure to file income tax return carried perpetual disqualification.

The accompanying effects of perpetual disqualification are very well defined under the RPC as follows:

The effect of perpetual disqualification on the deprivation of the public office to which it relates serves as a bar to one who is seeking for public office. It may be imposed as a principal or an accessory penalty. Under the RPC, perpetual disqualification is automatically imposed as an accessory to certain principal penalties, as follows:

Similarly, under the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS), perpetual disqualification is automatically imposed as an accessory to the principal penalty of dismissal, as follows:

Noticeably, both the RPC and the RACCS specify the principal penalty to which the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification attaches. Verily, being an accessory penalty, it is important to determine the principal penalty to which it attaches in order to guide the proper authority as to the inherent penalties that accompanies the principal penalty.

In the instant case, the petition filed by Buenafe, et al. relies on Section 286 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, which was introduced as an amendment thereto by Presidential Decree No. 1994. The provision reads:

A reading of paragraph (c), Section 286 would show that it contained a general statement as to the imposition of perpetual disqualification, without however specifying the principal penalty to which it attaches to. This run against the nature of an accessory penalty, which is a penalty that is inherent to, and made dependent on the existence of a principal penalty. Further, this goes against due process considerations as it would appear that a mere conviction of any crime penalized by the NIRC, when committed by a public officer, would automatically carry perpetual disqualification. It bears noting that the provisions of the NIRC carry different penalties that correspond to the act that is being penalized. In the same way that the RPC and the RACCS imposes perpetual disqualification to penalties that are grave and correctional, the NIRC must necessarily adapt to the same principle. It cannot simply be imposed as an accessory penalty against any violation without specifying the principal penalty to which it attaches to.

Should the penalty of perpetual disqualification be treated as a principal penalty and not as an accessory penalty, then with more reason should the petition of Buenafe, et al. be denied. As a principal penalty, it should be explicitly stated in the CA decision that convicted Marcos, Jr. for non-filing of his income tax return. In the absence of an express imposition, it cannot be said that Marcos, Jr. was perpetually disqualified from public office.

Withal, petitioners Buenafe, et al. failed to point out any provision of law imposing an accessory penalty to the penalty of fine as imposed by the CA. This CA decision, which has already become final and executory, did not carry in its dispositive portion, any wordings of perpetual disqualification. Thus, Marcos, Jr. did not commit material misrepresentation when he stated in his COC that he is eligible to run as president of the Republic of the Philippines.

With respect to the petition filed by Ilagan, et al., the same must be examined on the basis of moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general."25 Zari v. Flores26 is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude, namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.27

While the concept of moral turpitude has been viewed as a flexible concept that cuts across crimes for which morality may be invoked, it is my view that the most important consideration in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude is the responsibility imposed upon the actor and whether his/her actions that led to the commission of a wrong resulted into a clear and grave loss to another individual.

In this case, the crime to which Marcos, Jr. has been adjudged guilty of pe1iains to non-filing of his income tax return during his term as the ViceGovernor and as Governor of Ilocos Norte in the years 1982-1985. While the CA Decision convicting him of the crime could no longer be modified, determining whether said crime involves moral turpitude would necessitate a review of the provisions of the NIRC which served as a basis for his conviction.

Here, the developments in the NIRC would show that the responsibility to file a return falls on the withholding agent and not the taxpayer. Further, being an elected official at the time, Marcos, Jr. was a government employee. The provisions on these are as follows:

Significantly, a perusal of the developments in the provisions of our tax code would reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt a government employee, much less those who are receiving purely compensation income from filing their income tax return. This is because of the withholding system of taxes that has already been in effect for those working in the government. Verily, there is no responsibility on the part of the government employees to file an income tax return when the appropriate amount of withholding tax has already been deducted from their salary.

As in the case of Marcos, Jr. being the then Vice-Governor and Governor of Ilocos Norte, his payroll falls under the payroll for government employees. Thus, his taxes would have to be withheld by the appropriate office before receiving his salary. As the legislative intent shows that it is the officer that has already withheld the taxes who should file the income tax return, the taxpayer, as in the case of Marcos, Jr., would have no such responsibility. Consequently, his inaction on the matter, and for not having shown to have caused a clear and grave loss to another individual, would not involve moral turpitude.1a⍵⍴h!1

With the ground relied upon by the petition of Ilagan, et al. for the disqualification of Marcos, Jr. not having been proven, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition.

Withal, the votes given to a winning candidate, especially when pertaining to the highest office of the land, could not simply be disregarded. The Philippines, as a republican and democratic State, relies on the voters' exercise of their right to choose the leaders whom they want them to represent. The pending petitions could not simply be left hanging until the presidentelect takes his oath and assume office, as this would already take away the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, I commend the efforts exerted by my colleague, Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda for his prompt action on the petitions, as reflected in his well-written ponencia.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petitions filed by Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, Fides M. Lim, Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Roland C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano in G.R. No. 260374 and Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan, Saturnino Cunanan Ocampo, Maria Carolina Pagaduan Araullo, Trinidad Gerilla Repuno, Joanna Kintanar Cariño, Elisa Tita Perez Lubi, Liza Largoza Maza, Danilo Mallari Dela Fuente, Carmencita Mendoza Florentino, Doroteo Cubacub Abaya, Jr., Erlinda Nable Senturias, Sr., Arabella Cammagay Balingao, Sr., Cherry M. Ibardolaza, CSSJB, Sr., Susan Santos Esmile, SFIC, Homar Rubert Roca Distajo, Polynne Espineda Dira, James Carwyn Candila, and Jonas Angelo Lopena Abadilla in G.R. No. 260426.