G.R. No. L-29421, January 30, 1971,
♦ Decision,
Reyes J.B.L., [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29421 January 30, 1971
LINO ARTATES and MANUELA POJAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DANIEL URBI, CRISANTO SOLIVEN, assisted by his Guardian 'ad litem,' MARCELA B. SOLIVEN, REMEGIO BUTACAN and NEMESIO OÑATE, in their private capacities and/or as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan, respectively, and BIENVENIDO CACATIAN, as Deputy Register of Deeds of Cagayan, defendants-appellees.
Bienvenido J. Jimenez for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rogelio Re. Ubarde for defendants-appellees Daniel Urbi and Crisanto Soliven.(awÞhi(
Alfredo J. Donato for defendant-appellant Nemesio Oñate.
The Provincial Fiscal (Cagayan) for defendants-appellees Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Register of Deeds.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote for the affirmance in toto of the judgment appealed from. Hence, I concur in that portion of the decision decreeing that appellants should reimburse appellee Urbi for the sums that Urbi had paid to the Philippine National Bank to release the mortgage previously executed by appellants on the subject homestead land, but I dissent from the principal decree thereof that "title to the property .... remains with the appellants, but (appellant) Lino Artates shall continue to be under obligation to satisfy the judgment debt to Daniel Urbi in the sum of P1,476.35, with legal interest thereon accruing from the date the writ of execution was first returned unsatisfied."
The issue at bar is whether the execution sale conducted in 1962 by the sheriff of Artates' homestead lot acquired in 1952 to satisfy a 1956 judgment against Artates in favor of Urbi (for physical injuries inflicted by Artates upon Urbi in 1955), at which public sale the homestead lot was sold to Urbi as the only bidder for the amount of his judgment credit in the sum of P1,476.35 should be held null and void, as the majority would now hold, by virtue of the prohibitory provisions of Section 118 of the Public Land Law. The key provision cited is that providing that such homesteads "shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period ..".
Under the cited provision, all sales and alienations of the homestead property made by the homesteader within the 5-year prohibition are null and void. Similarly, the homestead is held not liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted by the homesteader within the said period, even though it be contracted that the indebtedness shall mature after the prohibited period. The law's purpose is clear and salutary: to preserve and keep for the homesteader the land given to him gratuitously by the State and to protect him from his own weakness and improvidence.
But in the case at bar, the judgment debt of the homesteader in favor of Ubi * was not contracted but duly adjudicated by a competent court in a lawful judgment for injuries inflicted by Artates upon Urbi in 1955, which, gauging the same from the substantial amount of P1,476.35 awarded, must have been quite serious. The happenstance that Artates' assault on Urbi and the judgment award occurred within the prohibitory period should not be construed beyond the law's text and intent to favor the wrongdoer Artates as against his victim Urbi.
We would have the anomalous situation thereby where, while recognizing that Artates has a just and continuing obligation to pay Urbi the judgment debt, the debt would in effect be nullified. The judgment debt was awarded since 1956 and would by now have prescribed, but the majority decision would nullify the levy and public sale of the land to satisfy Urbi's judgment credit conducted in 1966 long after the expiration of the statutory five-year prohibitory period. The majority decision bars Urbi forever from looking to Artates homestead property for the satisfaction of his judgment credit. Artates' evasion of his judgment debt to Urbi is thereby made certain. Any later creditor of Artates, real or simulated, from one day after the expiration on 23 September 1957 of the said five-year prohibitory period is given sole and exclusive preference to look to the said property for satisfaction as against Urbi beyond whose reach it is placed, contrary to the priority and preference that Urbi would lawfully be entitled to as a bona fide judgment creditor.
Finally, pursuant to Artates' offer to redeem the property from Urbi within the 5-year redemption period allowed by section 119 of the Public Land Law, the lower court in its appealed judgment so ordered such redemption and reconveyance.ℒαwρhi৷ This strikes me as an eminently fair and just judgment which should be upheld. Artates, the homesteader, is thus assured of keeping and preserving his homestead in accordance ** with the spirit of the law and the lawful judgment credit of Urbi against him is at the same time duly satisfied.
Castro and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Editor's Note: Should be read "Urbi." .
** Editor's Note: Should be read "accordance."
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