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G.R. No. L-29421, January 30, 1971,
♦ Decision, Reyes J.B.L., [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion, Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Barredo, [J]

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29421 January 30, 1971

LINO ARTATES and MANUELA POJAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DANIEL URBI, CRISANTO SOLIVEN, assisted by his Guardian 'ad litem,' MARCELA B. SOLIVEN, REMEGIO BUTACAN and NEMESIO OÑATE, in their private capacities and/or as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan, respectively, and BIENVENIDO CACATIAN, as Deputy Register of Deeds of Cagayan, defendants-appellees.

Bienvenido J. Jimenez for plaintiffs-appellants.

Rogelio Re. Ubarde for defendants-appellees Daniel Urbi and Crisanto Soliven.(awÞhi(

Alfredo J. Donato for defendant-appellant Nemesio Oñate.

The Provincial Fiscal (Cagayan) for defendants-appellees Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Register of Deeds.


Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the opinion of Justice Teehankee, and vote for the affirmance of the appealed judgment in toto. The date of the issuance of the homestead patent to appellants was September 23, 1952. Under Section 118 of the Public Land Law the homestead could not be held liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted during a period of five years thereafter, or up to September 23, 1957. The opinion of the majority holds that since the civil obligation of appellant Artates was adjudged on March 14, 1956, or within the said period, the homestead cannot be held liable for its satisfaction.lâwphî1.ñèt The obvious implication is that if the judgment had been delayed — if for instance it had been rendered on September 24, 1957 — the result would have been otherwise. I do not believe that such a difference should be made to depend upon the more or less fortuitous and irrelevant circumstance of when the judgment decreeing the obligation was rendered. I am for giving the word "contracted," as used in the law, its ordinary meaning, for after all one who contracts with a homestead patentee during the five-year period and accepts an obligation from him does so with full knowledge of the law's exempting provision, which is deemed in effect a part of the agreement. The same, however, is not true of the victim of a tort or a crime, as in the present case, for here his volition does not come into play, the obligation being imposed entirely by law.


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