G.R. No. L-29421, January 30, 1971,
♦ Decision,
Reyes J.B.L., [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29421 January 30, 1971
LINO ARTATES and MANUELA POJAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DANIEL URBI, CRISANTO SOLIVEN, assisted by his Guardian 'ad litem,' MARCELA B. SOLIVEN, REMEGIO BUTACAN and NEMESIO OÑATE, in their private capacities and/or as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan, respectively, and BIENVENIDO CACATIAN, as Deputy Register of Deeds of Cagayan, defendants-appellees.
Bienvenido J. Jimenez for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rogelio Re. Ubarde for defendants-appellees Daniel Urbi and Crisanto Soliven.(awÞhi(
Alfredo J. Donato for defendant-appellant Nemesio Oñate.
The Provincial Fiscal (Cagayan) for defendants-appellees Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Register of Deeds.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to concur in the ruling in this decision that the provision of Section 118 of the Public Land Law which says that "lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not ... become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant" contemplates inclusively "the civil liability arising from a crime committed by the homesteader" within said period. Indeed, I do not feel it is necessary to go deep into the Webster's dictionary meaning of the verb "to contract" or to look for state court decisions in America, which could be isolated and based on statutes not similarly phrased and oriented as Ours, to resolve the legal issue before Us, it being sufficient, towards that end, to consider only the basic principles that underlie the disposition of public lands under our own laws on the matter.
I understand that the ultimate reason behind the exceptions contained in the cited provision of the Public Land Law is to insure the accomplishment of the double purpose of a homestead grant, which is to encourage the development of arable lands and enhance their productivity in the interest of the national economy and, at the same time, provide qualified citizens with a piece of land which they and their families may call their own, on which they can live and which they can work and thereby become useful members of society. Accordingly, the homesteader is safeguarded against his own weaknesses imprudence and improvidence by making it impossible for him to directly or indirectly, by his voluntary act, dispose of or lose the land in favor of others. So also do the exceptions make it impossible for him to allow himself to be utilized as dummy of opportunists. If this understanding of mine is correct, it should follow necessarily that for these purposes to be achieved, a homesteader must be, during the exempt period, in physical condition to work the land granted to him. I cannot help wondering how a person who has been convicted of a crime, the penalty for which is most likely to include a period of incarceration can work on and develop his homestead in the manner conceived in the law. That such a contingency may not be true in all instances, for there may be punishment of crimes with imprisonment of insignificantly short duration or even fines only, does not affect the general principle involved. I consider it implicit in all land grants by the State that the grantees bind themselves to be loyal and useful members of society, at least, during the period of development thereof that the law contemplates, namely, the first five years from the grant. Surely, one who commits an offense against the State and his fellow-citizens or other inhabitants in this country is far from being a useful member of society. To be sure, his act of committing an offense is voluntary, but this is not the voluntary act of imprudence and improvidence against which the law guards the homesteader even against himself. Crime is an assault upon the sovereign people and the social order, even if not always directly against the national security, and it is my considered view that, in principle, one who is guilty thereof forfeits whatever rights he might have acquired by virtue of the State's generosity, particularly, when, as in this case, it is a grant of a special privilege under specified circumstances and not generally and commonly enjoyed by all citizens/inhabitants of the country.
For these reasons, I vote to affirm the judgment of the court a quo which, after all, recognizes the appellants' right to redeem the land in question under Section 119 of the Public Land Law, which is the most they should expect from the State, as thus, their right to the land is reinstated without practically depriving the innocent victims of the crime herein involved of their remedy for the private injury they have suffered. In other words, under the trial court's decision, all the ends of justice and equity are subserved, whereas it is difficult to say the same of the decision of this Court.
REYES, J.B.L., J., concu.r
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