G.R. No. L-29421, January 30, 1971,
♦ Decision,
Reyes J.B.L., [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29421 January 30, 1971
LINO ARTATES and MANUELA POJAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DANIEL URBI, CRISANTO SOLIVEN, assisted by his Guardian 'ad litem,' MARCELA B. SOLIVEN, REMEGIO BUTACAN and NEMESIO OÑATE, in their private capacities and/or as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan, respectively, and BIENVENIDO CACATIAN, as Deputy Register of Deeds of Cagayan, defendants-appellees.
Bienvenido J. Jimenez for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rogelio Re. Ubarde for defendants-appellees Daniel Urbi and Crisanto Soliven.
Alfredo J. Donato for defendant-appellant Nemesio Oñate.
The Provincial Fiscal (Cagayan) for defendants-appellees Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Register of Deeds.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. 116-T), involving the public sale of a homestead to satisfy a civil judgment against the grantee.
The records show that in an action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, the spouses Lino Artates and Manuela Pojas sought annulment of the execution of a homestead1 covered by Patent No. V-12775 issued to them by the proper land authorities on 23 September 1952, and duly registered in their names (OCT No. P-572). The public sale, conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cagayan on 2 June 1962, was made to satisfy a judgment against Lino Artates in the amount of P1,476.35, and awarded to Daniel Urbi by the Justice of the Peace Court of Camilaniugan, Cagayan, in its Civil Case No. 40, for physical injuries inflicted by Artates upon Urbi on 21 October 1955. In the execution sale, the property was sold to the judgment creditor, the only bidder, for P1,476.35. In their complaint, the plaintiffs spouses alleged that the sale of the homestead to satisfy an indebtedness of Lino Artates that accrued on 21 October 1955, violated the provision of the Public Land law exempting said property from execution for any debt contracted within five years from the date of the issuance of the patent; that defendant Urbi, with the intention of defrauding the plaintiffs, executed on 26 June 1961 a deed for the sale of the same parcel of land to defendant Crisanto Soliven, a minor, supposedly for the sum of P2,676.35; that as a result of the aforementioned transactions, defendants Urbi and Soliven entered into the possession of the land and deprived plaintiffs of the owners' share in the rice crops harvested during the agricultural year 1961-1962. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the public sale of the land to defendant Urbi, as well as the deed of sale executed by the latter in favor of defendant Soliven, be declared null and void; that defendants be ordered to deliver to plaintiffs possession of the land; and to pay to plaintiffs compensatory damages at the rate of P1,000.00 per agricultural year until possession is finally restored to them, the sum of P2,000.00 as damages for maliciously casting cloud upon plaintiffs' title on the land, plus attorneys' fees and costs.
The defendants2 filed separate answers disputing the averments of the complaint. On 29 March 1953, the court rendered judgment upholding the regularity and validity of the execution conducted by the defendant Provincial Sheriff, but finding that the sale of the lands by defendant Urbi to the minor Soliven was simulated, intended to place the property beyond the reach of the judgment debtor, and that plaintiffs had offered to redeem the land within the 5-year period allowed by Section 119 of the Public Land law for reacquisition thereof by the grantee. Consequently, the court declared the sale of the land by defendant Daniel Urbi to defendant Crisanto Soliven null and void; and Daniel Urbi was ordered to reconvey the property to the plaintiffs upon the latter's payment (to Urbi) of the sum of P1,476.35 plus the sheriff's fee incident to the sale at public auction, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from 2 June 1961 until said amount shall have been fully paid, and the further sum of P783.45 representing the amount paid by defendant Daniel Urbi to the Philippine National Bank for the release of the real estate mortgage on the land, contracted by Lino Artates, with legal rate of interest thereon from 29 June 1961.
From this decision, the plaintiffs interposed the present appeal assigning several errors allegedly committed by the court below, all hinged on the validity or invalidity of the public sale of the lot involved herein.
Section 118 of the Public Land law (Commonwealth Act 141) provides as follows:
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institution, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations or corporations.
x x x x x x x x x
As thus prescribed by law, for a period of five years from the date of the government grant, lands acquired by free or homestead patent shall not only be incapable of being encumbered or alienated except in favor of the government itself or any of its institutions or of duly constituted banking corporations, but also, they shall not be liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted within the said period,3 whether or not the indebtedness shall mature during or after the prohibited time.4 This provision against the alienation or encumbrance of public lands granted within five years from the issuance of the patent, it has been held, is mandatory;5 a sale made in violation thereof is null and void6 and produces no effect whatsoever. Though it may be a limitation on the right of ownership of the grantee, the salutary purpose of the provision cannot be denied: it is to preserve and keep for the homesteader or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State,7 so that being a property owner, he may become and remain a contented and useful member of our society.8
In the case at bar, the homestead patent covering the land in question (No. V-12775) was issued to appellants on 23 September 1952, and it was sold at public auction to satisfy the civil liability of appellant Lino Artates to Daniel Urbi, adjudged in the 14 March 1956 decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Camalaniugan, Cagayan.lâwphî1.ñèt There can be no doubt that the award of damages to Urbi created for Artates a civil obligation, an indebtedness, that commenced from the date such obligation was decreed on 14 March 1956. Consequently, it is evident that it can not be enforced against, or satisfied out of, the sale of the homestead lot acquired by appellants less than 5 years before the obligation accrued. And this is true even if the sale involved here is not voluntary. For purposes of complying with the law, it is immaterial that the satisfaction of the debt by the encumbrancing or alienation of the land grant made voluntarily, as in the case of an ordinary sale, or involuntarily, such as that effected through levy on the property and consequent sale at public auction. In both instances, the spirit of the law would have been violated.9
Doubts have been expressed as to whether the words "debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period" (of 5 years from and after the grant) would include the civil liability arising from a crime committed by the homesteader. While there is no direct Philippine precedent on this point, there are various reasons why the non-liability of the homestead grant should be extended to extra-contractual obligations. First and foremost, whether it be viewed as an exemption or as a condition attached to the grant to encourage people to settle and cultivate public land, the immunity in question is in consonance with the definite public policy underlying these grants, which is to "preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him" so he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of society, 10 and the exemption should not be given restrictive application. 11 A levy and sale of the homestead on account of extra-contractual liability incurred would uproot the homesteader and his family and turn them into homeless waifs as effectively as a levy for non-payment of a contractual debt. Secondly, the word "debt" in exemption statutes,—
in its wider sense, (it) includes all that is due to a man under any form or obligation or promise, and covers not only obligations arising under contract, but also those imposed by law without contract. 12
Considering the protective policy of the law, it becomes apparent that "debt contracted" was used in it in the sense of "obligation incurred," since Webster gives the verb to "contract" the meaning of "to bring on; incur; acquire." Finally, our public land laws being copied from American legislation, 13 resort to American precedents reveals that, under the weight of authority, exemption from "debts contracted" by a homesteader has been held to include freedom from money liabilities, from torts or crimes committed by him, such as from bigamy (State vs. O'Neil, 7 Ore. 141, 11 Words and Phrases 318) or slander (Conway vs. Sullivan, 44 Ill. 451, 452), breach of contract (Flanagan vs. Forsythe, 50 Pac. 152, 153) or other torts (In Re Radway, 20 Fed. Cas. 154, 162).
The execution sale in this case being null and void, the possession of the land should be returned to the owners, the herein appellants.ℒαwρhi৷ There would even be no need to order appellee Urbi to execute a deed of reconveyance thereof to the owners. It appears that what was issued here to the judgment creditor/purchaser was only the sheriff's provisional certificate, under which he derived no definite title or right until the period for redemption has expired, without a redemption having been made, 14 or issuance of a final deed or certificate of sale. In other words, the purchaser herein has not acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee over the land that would necessitate a deed of reconveyance to revert ownership back to the appellant spouses. As things now stand, title to the property covered by OCT No. P-572 remains with the appellants, but Lino Artates shall continue to be under obligation to satisfy the judgment debt to Daniel Urbi in the sum of P1,476.35, with legal interest thereon accruing from the date the writ of execution was first returned unsatisfied. It appearing also that appellee Daniel Urbi paid to the Philippine National Bank the sum of P783.45 to release the mortgage on the land, appellants should reimburse him of said amount or of whatever amount appellants have actually been benefited by the said payment.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellants are declared entitled to the return and possession of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-572, without prejudice to their continuing obligation to pay the judgment debt, and expenses connected therewith. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Lot No. 151 of the Allacapan Public Land Subdivision, situated in barrio Allig, municipality of Allacapan, province of Cagayan.
2 Defendant Crisanto Soliven, a minor, was represented by Marcela B. Soliven, who was appointed by the court as his guardian ad litem.
3 Francisco vs. Parsons Hardware, 67 Phil. 234.
4 Bautista vs. Marcos, L-17072, 31 October 1961.
5 Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, 29 April 1968, 23 SCRA 348.
6 Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97 Phil. 41; Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 1006; Cadiz vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032; Santander vs. Villanueva, 103 Phil. 1; Felices vs. Iriola, 103 Phil. 125: Del Rosario vs. Abad, L-10881, 30 Sept. 1958; Republic vs. Garcia, 105 Phil. 826; Republic vs. Ruiz, supra.; Baje vs. Court of Appeals, L-18783, 25 May 1964.
7 Manzano vs. Ocampo, L-14778, 28 February 1961, 1 SCRA 691.
8 Cadiz vs. Nicolas, supra.
9 Beach vs. Pacific Commercial Co., 49 Phil. 765; Francisco vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 67 Phil. 234: Gonzalo Puyat & Sons vs. De las Ama, 74 Phil. 3; Cadiz vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032, 1039.
10 Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil. 792; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 406, 409; Cadiz vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1039; Jocson vs. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; Beniga vs. Bugas, L-28918, 29 September 1970.
11 Duling vs. Salaz, 26 Pac. 2d. 1069; 22 Am. Jur. 80, 793, 795.
12 Duling vs. Salaz, 26 Pac. 2d. 1069; 22 Am. Jur. 80.
13 Jocson vs. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375, 379.
14 Section 26, Revised Rule 39; 2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., page 327.
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