G.R. No. 201631 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 201631, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Marvic M.V.F Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

ANGELINA DAYRIT, REPRESENTED BY JULIE E. DAYRIT, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS, ROGELIO I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M. NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN, CANDELARIA MEJORADA, LILIA O. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL, VERONICO MAESTRE, AND MARIO TAGAYLO, RESPONDENTS.

I agree with the ponencia that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint against respondents for forcible entry, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute. This is in accordance with Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon1 and the amendment introduced in 2009 by Republic Act No. 97002 (RA 9700) to Republic Act No. 66573 (RA 6657). Chailese pertinently ordained:

By virtue of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) was designated to assume the powers and functions of the DAR with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, and matters relating to the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.

The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19 of RA 9700 to Section 50. The provision reads:

In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by RA 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of RA 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, RA 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of RA 6657. More, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.

Thence, having settled that Section 19 of RA 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:

In this case, the presence of the first requisite is satisfied by the allegations made by the respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim.

The allegations in petitioner's complaint make a case for recovery of possession, over which the regular courts have jurisdiction. In response thereto, however, the respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim, assailing the jurisdiction of the regular court to rule on the matter on the ground that it is agrarian in nature, which thus complies with the first requisite, viz.:

An agricultural tenancy relation, on the other hand, is established by the concurrence of the following elements enunciated by the Court in Chico v. CA,4 viz.:

Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion and as opposed to the first requisite, mere allegation would not suffice to establish the existence of the second requirement. Proof must be adduced by the person making the allegation as to his or her status as a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

The use of the word "an" prior to "allegation" indicate that the latter qualifies only the immediately subsequent statement, i.e., that the case is agrarian in nature. Otherwise stated, an allegation would suffice only insofar as the characterization of the nature of the action.

Had it been the intention that compliance with the second element would likewise be sufficient by a mere allegation from one of the parties that he or she is a farmer, farm worker, or tenant, the legislature should have used the plural form when referring to "allegation" as the concurrence of both requisites is mandatory for the automatic referral clause to operate.

Further instructive is this Court's ruling in the previously cited case of Chico. Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of its jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship must be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are alleged.5 Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.

Here, respondents consistently maintained that the case is agrarian in nature. This consistent argument is well documented in the ponencia itself. Hence, the first requisite is complied with. It is also clear that respondents are tenants-farmers of petitioner.

Their action to sneak into the landholdings and petitioner's court case involved incidents arising from their landlord-tenant relationship.6 This too is amply documented in the ponencia. Thus, the second requisite is present.

Indeed, there would have been no dispute between the parties and no present cases before us (before the Court resolved to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631) had it not been for their agrarian relationship and agrarian contest at the DAR through the DARAB.

Under the 2009 amendment to RA 6657, it is the DAR through the DARAB that has subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's ejectment case.

It may be true that respondents had been issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). Ordinarily, they would have already acquired vested rights of absolute ownership over the landholdings and would have already ceased to be mere tenants.7 But the CLOAs did not attain finality. Petitioner initiated and in fact won a petition for annulment of these CLOAs at the PARAD level. She also applied for exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage at DAR. This application has been granted. Just like the CLOAs, nonetheless, the annulment of the CLOAs and the exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage have not become final and executory. All these incidents mean that the agrarian relationship and agrarian dispute have not been terminated. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.8

Insofar as the case is concerned, neither the first nor the second level courts had then the benefit of Section 50-A of RA 6657 as amended – they did not have then the mandate to refer the dispute to the DAR for certification as an agrarian or non-agrarian dispute. In any event, our doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or by the courts.9 As we have consistently held: "Laws can only be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that prescribes it."10

THUS, I vote to DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 201631 and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121. I also vote to reverse and set aside the April 17, 2007 Decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 2000-09-16, as well as the December 10, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 2007-116 affirming the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court's (MCTC) Decision.