G.R. No. 201631

G.R. No. 201631, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Marvic M.V.F Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

ANGELINA DAYRIT, REPRESENTED BY JULIE E. DAYRIT, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS, ROGELIO I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M. NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN, CANDELARIA MEJORADA, LILIA O. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL, VERONICO MAESTRE, AND MARIO TAGAYLO, RESPONDENTS.

Formerly, G.R. No. 201631 was consolidated with G.R. No. 201076.1 The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assail the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02564-MIN (G.R. No. 201076) and CA-G.R. SP No. 03121-MIN (G.R. No. 201631).

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 in G.R. No. 201076, petitioner Angelina Dayrit (Angelina) is contesting the December 20, 2011 Decision3 and February 22, 2012 Resolution4 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 02564-MIN, affirming the January 17, 2008 Resolution5 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 13439.

DARAB Case No. 13439 is an appeal from the December 22, 2004 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for Misamis Oriental, which ordered the cancellation of three Certificates of Land Ownership Award6 (CLOA) in a petition for annulment initiated by Angelina.7 The DARAB ordered8 the archiving of the annulment case until the resolution of the separate application for exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental as filed earlier by Angelina before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

In a Resolution9 dated June 13, 2012, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 201076 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA and for failure to comply with the formal requirements under the Rules of Court. The Resolution became final and executory on August 1, 2012.10

In G.R. No. 201631, petitioner Angelina filed a petition for review on certiorari11 assailing the CA's January 27, 2012 Decision12 and March 28, 2012 Resolution13 in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121, that reversed and set aside the December 10, 2008 Decision14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City.

The RTC Decision affirmed the April 17, 2007 Decision15 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which ruled in favor of Angelina in an action for forcible entry which the latter initiated against respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas,16 Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot,17 Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin,18 Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon, Arsenio Catiil,19 Veronico Maestre, and Mario Tagaylo (collectively, respondents).

In the same Resolution20 dated June 13, 2012, this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 201631 with G.R. No. 201076 to avoid conflicting decisions on related cases. However, in view of the finality of the Resolution in G.R. No. 201076, the Court resolves to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631. Thus, what remains for the resolution of the Court is G.R. No. 201631.

G.R. No. 201631 arose from a complaint for forcible entry filed by Angelina against respondents before the MCTC.

Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.21 The first lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-13388, and the second lot by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-1804.22

In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP.23 Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents.24 Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB (Misamis Oriental Provincial Office).25 She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR.26 The petition for annulment before the DARAB became the subject of G.R. No. 201076 in this Court.

While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila Office, Angelina claimed that on September 17, 2006, respondents surreptitiously entered the property and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.27 This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for forcible entry.

Respondents, in their answer,28 acknowledged that Angelina was the previous owner of the parcels of land.29 However, they alleged that Angelina lost her ownership over 16.6927 hectares of the properties when these were awarded to respondents as CARP beneficiaries.30 It follows that Angelina lost her right of possession.31 Respondents also argued that they remain owners of the parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment of the CLOAs.32 Hence, Angelina cannot claim forcible entry as she already lost her right of possession.33

In its April 17, 2007 Decision,34 the MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. Evidence showed that Angelina was in prior possession of the parcels of land.35 The MCTC held that respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands by entering the property; they should have filed an appropriate action to enforce their ownership pursuant to the CLOAs.36

The MCTC also resolved the question of whether the forcible entry suit is barred by the pending case in the DARAB. The MCTC ruled that the issue in the forcible entry suit pertains only to the possession in fact or physical possession of the property, the resolution of which is for the maintenance of public order; it does not relate to the issue of ownership in relation to agrarian disputes that are cognizable and are already pending before the DARAB.37 Hence, the MCTC is not bound to wait for the resolution of the pending DARAB case.

In its December 10, 2008 Decision,39 the RTC affirmed the MCTC Decision in its entirety. The RTC added that a mere allegation of an agrarian dispute does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction especially because the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,40 as amended, provides that the lower courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.41 The issue of physical possession over agricultural lands is different from the issue of disposition and alienation, which is cognizable by the DAR.42

In its January 27, 2012 Decision,43 the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the CARP.44 In the instant case, petitioner's parcels of land in dispute were included in the CARP.45 Portions were awarded to respondents pursuant to the CLOAs that resulted to the issuance of new titles.46 As beneficiaries, respondents occupied the parcels of land, which was considered by Angelina as unlawful entry, resulting in the filing of the instant case to recover possession.47

The CA therefore found that the issue of possession in this instant case is linked to an agrarian dispute.48 Respondents entered the properties by virtue of the CLOAs issued to them.49 The MCTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, or at least have heard the parties to determine if it has jurisdiction.50 Finally, the CA added that the complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia as the trial court was aware that there was a separate proceeding in the DARAB.51

Angelina moved for reconsideration but was subsequently denied by the CA in its Resolution53 dated March 28, 2012.

Angelina now comes to this Court assailing the CA's disposition of the case. She maintains that while the DAR has the power of administration and disposition of agricultural lands, the courts have jurisdiction on actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.54 The instant case involves the issue of mere possession; it does not involve the adjudication of ownership or an agrarian matter.55

Angelina cites case law that upholds the courts' jurisdiction over possessory matters despite involving agricultural lands, as the issue is independent from the question of disposition or alienation.56 Maintenance of public order, which is the purpose of having summary remedies on actions for forcible entry, cannot be hindered by invoking agrarian dispute.57 Angelina also adds that the DAR, in its June 8, 2011 Decision, has already resolved her application for exemption and ruled that the parcels of land are exempted from coverage.58 Finally, Angelina argues that the DAR proceedings was an administrative prejudicial question that warranted the abeyance of judicial proceedings.59

In their comment,60 respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute under the original and primary jurisdiction of the DARAB.61 The filing of the instant complaint for forcible entry is an offshoot of the enforcement of respondents' rights and obligations under the CLOAs issued to them.62 The case relates to the terms and conditions of the transfer of ownership, which necessarily includes possession, from the landowner to the beneficiaries.63

Angelina filed her Reply64 and reiterated her arguments. She attached a copy of the June 8, 2011 Decision65 and January 19, 2012 Resolution66 of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.

The issue for the resolution of the Court is whether the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry.

The Petition has no merit. The Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action for forcible entry.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try, and decide a case before it.67 A judgment rendered by a body without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked any time.68 It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.69

In contention here is the conflict of jurisdiction between the MCTC and the DARAB. Angelina maintains that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the instant complaint for forcible entry, while respondents maintain that the DARAB has jurisdiction as the action is considered as an agrarian dispute stemming from the enforcement of the CLOAs issued to them.

Clarifying the jurisdiction of
DARAB in relation to
possessory and ejectment
actions involving agricultural lands.

Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,70 as amended, provides for the jurisdiction of first-level courts. Paragraph two of the provision specifically states:

In actions for forcible entry, the party is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.71 The inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.72 Plaintiff's proof of prior physical possession of the usurped property is essential for the action to prosper.73 This is determined by examining the allegations in the complaint.

On the other hand, Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 198874 (CARL), as amended, provides for the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR, to wit:

DAR exercises this adjudicatory power through the DARAB, which is created by Executive Order No. 129-A (series of 1987).75

In 2009, the CARL was amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9700.76 Section 50 of the CARL was amended as follows:

As can be gleaned from these laws, the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, as related to the instant case, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.77 The amended CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the DAR if there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant.

Relevantly, in the case of David v. Cordova78 (David), the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the MCTC over a complaint for forcible entry. The Court found that complainant therein sufficiently alleged in his complaint that he had prior physical possession of the property and that he was unlawfully deprived thereof.79 The Court also discussed that the alleged public character of the land does not deprive the first-level court of jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.80 The appellate court held that the courts lack jurisdiction because the land in question is allegedly a public agricultural land.81 In this wise, the Court held:

From this disquisition, it seems that courts have exclusive jurisdiction on all ejectment cases, including those lands that are "public in character." This is not the case, however. As observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa), the seeming confusion is brought about by this portion of David:

It must be stressed that David did not lay down the rule that all ejectment cases, whether involving an agrarian dispute or not, are cognizable by the first-level courts. As Justice Caguioa has pointed out, the reason why the Court sustained the MCTC's jurisdiction therein is not because the case is summary in nature, but because it does not involve an agrarian dispute.84 David clearly states that the dispute therein is not an agrarian matter. Also, there is indeed an allegation that the land is public in nature - this was even discussed in the ruling. However, the land being public in character is completely separate from the existence of an agrarian dispute. When a dispute involves a public land, it does not necessarily amount to an agrarian dispute; an agrarian dispute is specifically defined in the law.

Thus, David should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land.

Then there is the more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon85 (Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:

RA 9700 reinforced the jurisdiction of DAR as already provided in the original CARL. It made clear the requisites for a case to be considered to be an agrarian dispute. It also mandated the automatic referral upon concurrence of the requisites. In Chailese, the Court retroactively applied RA 9700 to the case and ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the possessory action due to absence of evidence on the existence of a tenancy relation, thus failing to satisfy the second requisite.

Based on the foregoing, David and Chailese can be viewed as guides for the courts in tackling ejectment and possessory actions allegedly involving agrarian disputes. David instructs that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts - those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts. In this relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes to the DAR.

Retroactive application
of RA 9700 and Chailese on
cases before first-level
courts

Chailese further provides for the retroactive application of Section 50-A of RA 9700:

Chailese states that RA 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR already provided in the CARL in requiring the automatic referral of cases to it. Further, this amendment is procedural in nature that can be applied to pending cases before RA 9700's passage. The Court thus applied the amendment in ruling that the complaint, even if filed prior to the amendatory law's passage, is cognizable by the RTC.

While Chailese involves a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed before the RTC, there is no reason to not apply RA 9700 retroactively to cases before the first-level courts, such as complaints for forcible entry. After all, the amendment did not distinguish and it mentions of municipal trial courts: "[I]n cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court xxx"87 To add, the Court has once stated that any doubts as to the jurisdiction of the DAR on the implementation of the CARP should be resolved in its favor, as the law has granted it special authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.88

Preliminarily, as found by the trial courts and the appellate court in the instant case, it is undisputed that the allegations in the complaint herein pertain to forcible entry. However, pursuant to David, it is not automatic that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the forcible entry case. There is a need to determine if the case involves an agrarian dispute.

From this, the Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry. As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, this case meets the two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized in Chailese.89 Thus, the Court finds that the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.

The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that the land in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries.90 The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon matters of allegations of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts.91 The CA also did the same and in fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an agrarian dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents.92 In their comment filed before this Court, respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute.93

As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. In this case, this requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the existence of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.

As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's status as farmer, farmworker, or tenant.94 In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are farmers of the subject lands. Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here recognized the status of respondents as farmers.95 This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as farmers was cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. This is also shown by the cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage, and this forcible entry case. Thus, the second requirement is met.

In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC should have dismissed the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to the amendment that the DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.96 CLOAs were issued to respondents being the beneficiaries of CARP. Recipients of CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded.97 As respondents entered the subject parcel of lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by Angelina as forcible entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.

Nonetheless, the Court is aware that Angelina herself also availed of remedies by moving for the cancellation of the CLOAs and requesting for the exemption of the subject lands from CARP coverage. The Court takes note of the DAR Secretary's June 8, 2011 Decision and January 19, 2012 Resolution of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.98 However, as based from the records, these suits have not yet attained conclusion or finality; thus, the rights of the parties may still change. Still, the Court must resolve the instant case as it still presents a justiciable controversy regarding jurisdiction.

Gesmundo, C. J., Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concur.