G.R. No. 201631

G.R. No. 201631, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Marvic M.V.F Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

ANGELINA DAYRIT, REPRESENTED BY JULIE E. DAYRIT, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS, ROGELIO I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M. NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN, CANDELARIA MEJORADA, LILIA O. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL, VERONICO MAESTRE, AND MARIO TAGAYLO, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on certiorari (Petition) stems from a complaint for forcible entry (Complaint) filed by petitioner Angelina Dayrit against herein named respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. It assails the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121 which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The ponencia resolves to deny the Petition based on the finding that the present case for forcible entry is an agrarian dispute cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).1

I submit this opinion only to further clarify the interplay between the jurisdiction of the first level courts over summary actions for ejectment as conferred by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19802 (Batas Pambansa Blg. [BP] 129), and the jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian disputes, vested by Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,3 as amended by RA 9700.4

As emphasized by the ponencia, jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try and decide a case before it. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.5 Hence, as a starting point, reference to the statutes governing jurisdiction over summary actions for ejectment on the one hand, and agrarian disputes on the other, is proper.

Subsequently, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was passed in 1988. RA 6657 vested DAR with primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction involving the implementation of agrarian reform, subject to certain exceptions, thus:

In sum, Section 50 vests the DAR with original jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. "Agrarian dispute" is defined under the same statute as follows:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.6 (Emphasis supplied)

As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Section 50 was later amended by RA 9700 which was passed in 2009. As its title implies, RA 9700 was passed to strengthen the State's comprehensive agrarian reform program.7

Among the amendments implemented through RA 9700 are those which relate to the afore-quoted Section 50 of RA 6657.

Foremost, Section 18 of RA 9700 amended the last paragraph of Section 50 of RA 6657 by carving out an exception to the immediately executory nature of DAR decisions, thus:

More relevantly, RA 9700 also added a new provision, identified as Section 50-A of RA 6657. The provision reads:

Section 50-A reinforces the primary jurisdiction of DAR "to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and its "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" by creating a mandatory referral mechanism for cases which, on their face, present agrarian reform issues.

Thus, under Section 50-A, referral to the DAR shall be mandatory when: (i) there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. Notably, the conditions that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism mirror the elements of an agrarian dispute as reflected in its statutory definition under RA 6657, that is, any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Through this mechanism, DAR is given the opportunity to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the case so referred precisely to avert situations where cases involving agrarian disputes are resolved by the first level courts, resulting in null and void decisions rendered without jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the preliminary determination of the DAR that a case is not an agrarian dispute does not preclude the courts from later dismissing the case in question for lack of jurisdiction if it later becomes apparent during trial that the case is, in fact, agrarian in nature which must be resolved by the DAR at the first instance. Conversely, a preliminary determination by the DAR that the case is an agrarian dispute does not preclude it from referring the case back to the regular courts if its preliminary determination is later negated by the matters that come to fore during its own proceedings. To stress, jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. Thus, if further proceedings reveal that the nature of the case differs from how it had been initially characterized, it becomes incumbent upon the adjudicative body concerned to dismiss the case, as any decision rendered without jurisdiction shall be null and void.

Hence, lest there be any confusion, it should be clarified that the mandatory referral mechanism does not limit the jurisdiction of the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous. To be sure, a contrary interpretation would effectively defeat the jurisdiction vested by law upon the adjudicative body concerned.

After the passage of RA 6657 and the subsequent amendments set forth in RA 9700, confusion ensued as to whether subject matter jurisdiction over actions for ejectment involving agricultural lands placed under the CARP remained with the first level courts. This confusion appears to stem from an erroneous interpretation of the Court's ruling in David v. Cordova9 (David) and the seemingly contrary ruling in Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon10 (Chailese). While these cases are often viewed to be at odds, a cursory reading of these decisions show that they can, in fact, be reconciled.

In David, the Court was called upon to determine whether the MCTC may take cognizance of an action for forcible entry involving public agricultural land. There, petitioner Leonardo David (Leonardo) filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Nelson and Danny Cordova (collectively, the Cordovas). The complaint alleged that Leonardo is co-owner of a certain parcel of land denominated as Lot 774. Sometime in 1997, Leonardo purportedly discovered that the Cordovas had forcibly entered Lot 774 and had begun constructing improvements thereon. Subsequently, Leonardo demanded that the Cordovas vacate and cease construction to no avail. Thus, Leonardo filed said complaint before the MCTC.

For their part, the Cordovas averred that Leonardo is not a co-owner of Lot 774, as said lot is owned by the government. They added that Lot 774 forms part of the Dinalupihan Landed Estate which had been placed under the administration of the DAR. On this score, the Cordovas argued that the complaint falls under the jurisdiction of the DAR as Lot 774 had been earmarked for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

The MCTC and RTC were one in finding that Leonardo's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, the CA reversed, noting that Lot 774 was subject of a pending "application for purchase" filed by respondent Danny with the DAR. Leonardo thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing the CA's Decision.

The Court ruled in favor of Leonardo and reversed the Decision of the CA. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court held:

Thus, in David, the Court held that the MCTC correctly took cognizance of Leonardo's action for forcible entry. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that in ejectment proceedings involving the issue of physical possession, the need to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder must be considered. These proceedings are purposely summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. More importantly, the Court ruled that Leonardo's action falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC because it neither involved the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor qualified as an agrarian dispute.

On the other hand, in Chailese, Chailese Development Co., Inc. (CDCI) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) concerning 10 parcels of land registered in its name. The complaint was filed against 51 defendants. In its complaint, CDCI alleged that the defendants therein were illegally occupying the disputed lots. Eight of these defendants stood as respondents in Chailese.

Respondents filed their answer claiming that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the DAR. Respondents claimed that they were tenants of the disputed lots. However, without their knowledge and consent, the disputed lots were transferred to CDCI in order to avoid compulsory distribution under RA 6657. After a series of motions, the case was eventually set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, RA 9700 took effect which, as discussed, amended RA 6657.

On the basis of the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A, respondents filed a motion seeking to refer the case to the DAR. However, the RTC denied said motion for lack of merit. The CA reversed on certiorari and directed the referral of the case to DAR for proper disposition. CDCI thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing such referral.

Hence, in light of the absence of evidence to show any tenancy agreement that would establish the relationship of the parties therein, the Court in Chico granted the petition and reinstated the proceedings before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To be sure, Chailese did not overturn David. The Court's ruling in Chailese merely clarified what constitutes an agrarian dispute by breaking down its essential elements.

As clarified in Chailese, a dispute is agrarian in nature and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the DAR, when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. Conversely, when either of these two elements is absent, the dispute is not agrarian in nature and thus remains under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. As explained, these are the very same elements that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A of RA 6657.

A close reading of the circumstances in David and Chailese shows that the pronouncements therein are consistent with each other. In both cases, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the regular courts as the controversies involved therein were not agrarian disputes.

In Chailese, the Court held that the controversy therein was not an agrarian dispute as respondents therein failed to present proof that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Hence the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was absent. Albeit not discussed in detail in the Decision, the controversy in David also did not qualify as an agrarian dispute as the Cordovas similarly failed to show that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. As in Chailese, the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was also absent.

The confusion appears to stem from the emphasis placed by David on the summary nature of ejectment proceedings. To quote:

Taken in isolation, this oft-quoted pronouncement in David appears to suggest that the regular courts retain jurisdiction over all summary cases of ejectment, regardless of whether the case involves an agrarian dispute or otherwise. To my mind, this reading of what David holds fails to take into consideration a significant fact — that the dispute in David was not agrarian in nature as the respondents therein were not shown to be farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Hence, in David, the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case not because it involved a summary action for forcible entry, but because the dispute therein was not agrarian in nature.

As clarified in Chailese, RA 6657 vests the DAR with exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. As explained, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The jurisdiction of the DAR attaches only when these two elements concur.

Hence, the interplay between RA 6657 vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the first level courts over ejectment cases can be laid out as follows — the first level courts have original jurisdiction over all ejectment cases, except those involving agrarian disputes. Pursuant to the specific provisions of RA 6657, said agrarian disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. The same principle applies with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions. The regular courts have jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions, except those involving agrarian disputes which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.

As aptly stressed by the ponencia, the controlling aspect which determines jurisdiction over ejectment cases is the nature of the dispute.14 By explicit provision of Section 50-A of RA 6657, DAR is charged with the duty to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the dispute through the mandatory referral mechanism. However, as earlier emphasized, this preliminary determination does not operate to preclude the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous.

It is significant to note that the concerns expressed by the Court in Pitargue v. Sorilla15 (Pitargue), which had been quoted by the Court extensively in David, were raised in 1952. At such time, the authority of what was known as the Lands Department was limited to the administration, disposition, and alienation of public lands.16 The Court's observations as to the Land Department's lack of authority to "stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace" were, at the time, well founded.17

However, it should be stressed that, at present, the 2021 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provide:

Hence, the DARAB and its adjudicators are granted sufficient power and authority to prevent breaches of peace and order arising from opposing possessory claims in agrarian disputes. In this regard, I submit that the concerns raised in Pitargue are sufficiently addressed as the circumstances on which they were based no longer obtain at present.

To reiterate once more, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is proven to be a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The concurrence of these two elements places the dispute under the jurisdiction of the DAR.

The Complaint presents an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the DAR

Proceeding from the foregoing, it is clear that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the elements of an agrarian dispute unequivocally concur.

As to the first element, the ponencia aptly notes that respondents have consistently alleged that the issues herein stem from an agrarian dispute, inasmuch as they anchor their physical possession on their respective Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).18 Moreover, as emphasized by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations, petitioner herself previously filed before the DARAB a Petition for Cancellation of the CLOAs issued in favor of respondents, as well as a Petition for CARP exemption involving the disputed lands. The CLOAs subject of these DARAB cases are the very same ones assailed by petitioner in the present case. The prior filing of the DARAB cases thus shows that petitioner herself recognizes that the issues involved herein are agrarian in nature.

As to the second element, I submit that the subsistence of the CLOAs in the names of respondents sufficiently serve as evidence of respondents' status as tenants, farmers, or farmworkers. To note, Section 24 of RA 6657 specifies those who are qualified to stand as beneficiaries of the CARP, thus:

In this connection, Section 24 of the same statute provides that the CLOA serves as evidence of ownership of the land awarded in favor of the qualified beneficiary tenant, farmer, or farmworker. The existence of a valid and subsisting CLOA therefore serves as a continuing recognition of the status of respondents as such.

Considering that the two elements of an agrarian dispute concur, I find the dismissal of the Complaint proper. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.