SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 241946. July 29, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELEVER JAEN Y MORANTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.1
I dissent based upon this basic precept.1âшphi1
The underlying shooting mishap unfolded in a drunken stupor, involving accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (accused-appellant); his distant relative SPO3 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (Cayot), who owns the service firearm used in the killing and in whose automobile the tragic event transpired; and the latter's co-worker, Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (Manzo), the unfortunate victim who died from bullet wounds in the head. Jaen was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, tried, and convicted both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (CA) based only on the evidence of the prosecution. The judgment of conviction under review is based purely on circumstantial evidence derived from the testimonies of Cayot, as principal witness, and the rest of the prosecution witnesses – all compounded in a resume adopted by the CA, and affirmed by the ponencia, as follows:
1. SPO3 Cayot, Jr., appellant and the victim were together that fateful night in a drinking session;
2. After the said drinking session, they left together in a car, SPO3 Cayot, Jr. drove, the victim was seated at the front passenger seat, and the appellant sat at the back;
3. While driving and nearing the house of the victim, SPO3 Cayot, Jr. heard near his ear a series of gunshots and saw smoke inside the car which caused him to immediately pull over;
4. While parked, SPO3 Cayot, Jr. asked the appellant what happened and where his gun [was] to which appellant replied that the victim took his gun;
5. Simultaneously, SPO3 Cayot, Jr. saw blood dripping from the victim's head and panicked;
6. SPO3 Cayot, Jr. and the appellant brought the victim to his house and informed the family that he committed suicide;
7. At that time, appellant was fidgety. He suddenly interrupted and repeatedly exclaimed "[Aaminin] ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo;"
8. When they brought the victim [to] the hospital, he admitted that he shot the victim;
9. The victim's death was due to the gunshot wounds;
10. The gunshot wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the posterior part of his head;
11. The investigation disclosed that the shots were fired inside the vehicle and the assailant was positioned at the back seat and which was two (2) feet away from the victim.2
I invite attention to the testimonies of Cayot, Mary Rose Garbo (Garbo), and Michael Angelo Tudlong (Tudlong).
At the stand, Cayot, the prosecution's principal witness, gave a narrative of the incident on which much of the above findings were based: In the afternoon of the subject date, he, together with accused appellant, was departing from a ceremony at Camp Bagong Diwa. On their way out, Manzo, his workmate, asked him for a ride home, and he obliged. Upon reaching Manzo's drop-off point at his residence, the three of them decided to have some drinks.3 It appears that accused-appellant and Manzo had not met each other before. Moments later, they were joined by two other police officers, one of whom was a certain Sgt. Rey Banzon (Banzon). Banzon owned a restaurant and bar in Mandaluyong City where the group finally decided to eat supper and have more drinks. There, they all proceeded on board Cayot's car and before alighting, Cayot tucked under the driver's seat a belt-bag containing his service firearm. They had been drinking until 11:20 p.m. when Cayot decided to call it a night. On his cue, accused-appellant, joined by Manzo, had gone to the car ahead of him to start the engine. Not long after, Cayot joined the two and drove the car. Cayot claimed that Manzo was on the passenger seat, whereas accused-appellant was at the back.4 As Cayot was driving, he was startled by gunfire near his ear and by billowing smoke inside the cabin. Panicked and shaken, he asked accused-appellant what happened and where his gun was, and accused-appellant replied that Manzo "took the gun." Cayot, however, did not notice either accused-appellant or the victim in possession of the gun.5 He instantly pulled over, and saw blood dripping from Manzo's head.6
Cayot claimed that he then decided to proceed to Manzo's house because it was already close by. There, he informed the family of Manzo that the latter had committed suicide. The family nevertheless took Manzo to the hospital,7 and it appears that they were accompanied by both Cayot and accused-appellant. Cayot professed that at the emergency bay of the hospital, he performed the arrest on accused-appellant right after the latter took him aside and admitted to him that it was he who shot Manzo.8 The admission was made away from the hearing presence of everyone else at the hospital.9
Garbo, Manzo's niece, supplied material details on what transpired at their residence before Manzo was taken to the hospital. She recounted that at around 11:00 p.m. on that fateful night, the household was startled when Cayot came in yelling, "Nagpakamatay! Nagpakamatay!" She, with her mother and father, came shuffling downstairs and into the garage to see what was going on.10 They found accused-appellant and Cayot, and the latter informed them that Manzo had just committed suicide inside his car. As Cayot was explaining the events, Garbo observed that accused appellant was fidgety. She claimed that in at least two instances, accused appellant had tried to interrupt Cayot by exclaiming, "Aaminin ko lahat! Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" In those instances, however, she stated that Cayot had successfully restrained accused-appellant from speaking by slapping him on the face.11 She likewise recalled that accused-appellant had twice excused himself from the group to urinate not too far from where they were all gathered and, in both instances, he was accompanied by her father. She claims having seen accused-appellant, after relieving himself, wiping and rubbing his hands against the garage wall and the grass on the pocket garden. She remembered that they were able to take Manzo to San Juan Medical Center at 2:00 a.m. the following day.12
Forensic chemist Michael Angelo Tudlong testified on the bullet trajectory examination he performed on the bullet holes borne by the subject automobile, two days after the incident. Arriving at the San Juan City Police Station which had since taken custody of the vehicle, he claimed to have immediately noticed the missing door on the passenger side which, he believed, had been intentionally removed. He also noted the missing passenger windshield which, he was told, had been tucked away inside the vehicle's compartment. He failed to inquire why the same was detached from the door.13
Tudlong explained that bullet trajectory examination is done to determine the possible location of the gun wielder based on existing bullet holes.14 On the subject vehicle, he claimed to have found one such hole on the dashboard and another on the glove compartment. However, because the windshield was no longer attached to the vehicle, he could not possibly determine the exact location or position of the shooter. He noted another bullet entry hole on the front passenger door, indicating that the shooter was definitely inside the vehicle when that shot was fired.15 With respect to the detached windshield, he admitted seeing it, but did not examine it because he assumed that it was the same windshield originally attached to the door.16
On cross-examination, Tudlong reiterated that while he was positive that the shooter was inside the vehicle, he nevertheless could not accurately determine the shooter's exact position based only on the three documented bullet holes; also, that while the shooter could possibly have been positioned at the rear passenger seat judging by the bullet hole on the dashboard, there was also a possibility that the shooter was at the front on account of the bullet hole found on the detached passenger door.17
Indeed, circumstantial evidence may alone be available in proving the elements of the crime,18 but before a conviction can be had upon it, the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion, which roints to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.19
While direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused especially in the absence of an eyewitness,20 evidence of circumstances which tend to connect the accused with the commission of the crime may properly be admitted, even though inconclusive in character.21 The basic distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is that in the former, the witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge as to the main facts to be proved, while in the latter case, proof is given of facts and circumstances from which the court may infer other connected facts which reasonably follow according to common experience.22
Thus, in People v. Sañez,23 this Court declared that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Wai Ming24 and People v. Reyes25 instruct that all the evidence must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. While considerable latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence when the necessity therefor arises either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof,26 still, the imperative in People v. Bato27 is that, where the state's evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.28
Based on the testimonial evidence on record – particularly that pertaining to Cayot, Garbo and Tudlong – I find that the chain of circumstances on which the guilty verdict has been reached is not so unbroken as to now warrant a validation of the verdict below. I harbor serious doubts on the circumstances surrounding the underlying shooting mishap and, hence, hard pressed to find that accused-appellant should be held responsible for the killing.
First, among the physical evidence examined and testified to by expert witnesses, the bullet trajectory examination result authored by Tudlong is most striking. Considering that he admittedly failed to examine the detached windshield of the passenger door, indeed, leaves much to be desired. In all, however, his testimony is clear enough to suggest that he could not establish with absolute certainty the relative position of the gun wielder based only on the bullet holes he found and examined – concluding that by his documented evidence, there could also be a possibility that the gun wielder was positioned at the front.29
Second, it bears to stress that the gun used in the killing is a service firearm officially issued to Cayot as a member of the police force.30 Poring over Cayot's testimony on record, I find no suggestion that he had given accused-appellant access to the said gun at any time before the incident. In fact, he claimed that he had kept it inside a bag and placed it under the driver's seat – away from plain view – before stepping out of the car and into the restaurant-bar where he and his companions decided to eat supper and have more drinks.
Third, the fact that Cayot claimed to have heard three gunshots near his ear and the fact that he, apparently, stopped the car only when the last shot was fired are, to a reasonable mind, unworthy of belief because a normal person in the same situation would have put the car to an almost instantaneous halt at the first shot. Also, a vehicle cabin is a small enclosed space in which any movement within would be visible or, at least, discernible. Hence, Cayot's claim that he did not notice who between accused-appellant and Manzo was in possession of the gun, and his claim that he came to believe Manzo had shot himself in the head multiple times, are equally difficult to surmise.
Fourth, it is hardly strange, considering the gravity of the events that had then just transpired, that accused-appellant was visibly uneasy during the time he and Cayot were reporting to Manzo's family the supposed suicide incident. What I find truly strange, if not beleaguering, is that Cayot, as observed by Garbo, had tried and succeeded at least twice to restrain accused-appellant – by a slap in the face – from interrupting the conversation in an unmistakable attempt to offer Manzo's family crucial infonnation regarding the incident. Accused-appellant's frustrated exclamation "Aaminin ko na. Sasabihin ko sa inyo," is indeed very telling, yet records are bereft of any suggestion that he has – then, or at any point in the proceedings – made an admission to the killing, except at the hospital, but in the absence of any witness as professed by Cayot. Suffice it to say that to my mind, the aforementioned actuation of Cayot has put in doubt his credibility as a prosecution witness.
Fifth, the ponencia attempted to explain the slapping as an attempt on the part of Cayot to prevent accused-appellant from admitting in front of Manzo's family that he himself was the culprit – going as far as surmising that the said actuation of Cayot proceeded from an instinct of a relative to cover up for his own kin. But how come that instinct to protect his kin suddenly waned when he performed the arrest on accused appellant following a supposed admission to the deed, at the hospital and under circumstances where no one could testify on that regard? I pose this rhetorical question as an allusion to resonating doubts not only on accused-appellant's culpability, but also on the credibility of Cayot's testimony.
The invariable rule, pronounced in acquittal judgments rendered in People v. SPO1 Leaño31 and People v. Ragon,32 is that, like a tapestry, the body of circumstantial evidence is made up of strands that create a pattern when interwoven, which may not be plucked out and considered one strand at a time independently of the others. I believe that the rule might avail if the testimonial sources of the component circumstances are to be accorded full credibility. It is not so in this case, where the testimony of the principal prosecution witness, who is involved in the incident and who also happens to be the arresting officer who took accused-appellant to custody following a supposed admission, is the source of doubts that are now weighing down on the finding of guilt below. There is no test to find truth in human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.33
Moreover, Bacerra v. People34 injects as crucial component of the tapestry the material events that transpired prior to the underlying incident.35 It must be recalled that Manzo and accused-appellant were strangers to each other prior to the incident. Yet the prosecution has failed to offer evidence of what may have transpired from the time the two had met at the first instance, to the time they had started drinking at Manzo's place where they were joined by two other police officers, and the time the group, with Cayot, lingered at the restaurant-bar for more drinks – this, to necessarily establish the possible motive of accused-appellant in killing Manzo. While motive of the accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime, it becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial.36
In voting to reverse and set aside the judgment of conviction below, I do not thereby put forth the theory that accused-appellant did not kill the unfortunate victim. As the prosecution evidence has failed to piece evidence seamlessly together in a way that identifies accused-appellant as the assailant and no other, I hereby advocate for an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. An acquittal upon this ground will prosper even though accused-appellant's innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.37 It is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own evidence,38 and all the more where, as in this case, the defense has not offered evidence at the trial.
It is fundamental that in criminal cases, a conviction, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, must be beyond reasonable doubt.39 While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the quantum of proof nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience.40 By constitutional fiat, when moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter ofright.41
I register this dissent as a testimony that the Court, in this case, has failed to hand down a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the Petition, and rightly accord accused-appellant his liberty.
Footnotes
1 People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 608 (1999), citing People v. De Guzman, 272 Phil. 432, 438 (1991).
2 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
3 TSN, November 5, 2013, pp. 4-7.
4 Id. at 7-11.
5 Id. at 11-13, 21, 23.
6 Id. at 11.
7 Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 15, 18.
9 Id. at 17-18.
10 TSN, October 28, 2014, pp. 3-4.
11 Id. at 5-6.
12 Id. at 6-8.
13 TSN, April 29, 2014, pp. 8-9, 14.
14 Id. at 10.
15 Id. at 11.
16 Id. at 13.
17 Id. at 15-20.
18 29 Am Jur 2d, sec. 315, p. 333, citing McGuire v. State, 288 So 2d 271.
19 People v. Wai Ming, 332 Phil. 254, 273 (1996).
20 See People v. Bato, 348 Phil. 246, 256, 262 (1998).
21 29 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 315, p. 332, citing Pittman v. State, 51 Fla 94.
22 Id. at Sec. 313, p. 329, citing McCoy v. United States (CA9 Mont) 169 F2d 776.
23 378 Phil. 573, 584 (1999).
24 Supra note 19.
25 349 Phil. 39 (1998).
26 Supra note 22, at 330, citing Thiede v. Utah Territory 159 US 510.
27 Supra note 20.
28 Id. at 249.
29 See note 17.
30 TSN, November 5, 2013, p. 14.
31 419 Phil. 241 (2001).
32 346 Phil. 772 (1997).
33 People v. SPO1 Leaño, supra note 31, at 260.
34 812 Phil. 25 (2017).
35 Id. at 39.
36 Supra note 33.
37 Id. at 261.
38 People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 682 (2001).
39 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
40 Daayata v. People, 807 Phil. 102, 117-118 (2017).
41 Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 593 (2008).
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