SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 241946. July 29, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELEVER JAEN Y MORANTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
"It is better to risk saving a guilty person than to condemn an innocent one. "
- Francois-Marie Arouet1
I respectfully disagree with the ponencia's finding that the accused appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (Jaen) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The conviction of Jaen is almost entirely premised on the statements made by the so-called "sole eyewitness" to the crime, SPO3 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (SPO3 Cayot) and the purported "circumstantial evidence" presented by the prosecution. However, reliance on these is clearly misplaced.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.2 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if the following circumstances are present:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.— Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.3
However, it is apparent in this case that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution fails to produce Jaen's conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In Aoas v. People,4 the Court pronounced:
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.5
Contrary to the ponencia's view, the exact opposite is established in this case since the circumstances, whether taken in whole or in part, do not definitely point to Jaen as the perpetrator of the crime.6 In fact, the circumstantial evidence here does not exclude the possibility that SPO3 Cayot had committed the offense.
Moreover, it can even be said that the Court cannot rely on circumstantial evidence in this case. As admitted by the ponencia, "[i]n the absence of such direct evidence, the guilt of an accused may nevertheless be proven through circumstantial evidence if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime."7 In interpreting this in the converse, circumstantial evidence may only be resorted to in the absence of direct evidence.
However, it is clear in the case at bar that there is direct evidence that the prosecution used to prove the guilt of the accused – SPO3 Cayot's testimony as an eyewitness to the crime. Nonetheless, the problem is that SPO3 Cayot is not a reliable or credible witness given the concrete reasons presented below. Again, it is clear that resort to circumstantial evidence is done only in the absence of direct evidence, not simply because the direct evidence available is unreliable or incredible.
Even assuming that the Court considers the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, the following reasons show that the guilt of Jaen was not proven beyond reasonable doubt:
First, it was SPO3 Cayot's gun that was the alleged weapon of the crime. And the evidence on this point shows that the gun was kept inside a belt bag and hidden underneath the driver's seat.8 The ponencia surmises that it is plausible that Jaen was able to take possession of the gun since he and Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (victim) went ahead to the car to start the engine.9 The ponencia further states that it is believable that the victim could not have seen Jaen take possession of the gun since the former was seated at the front passenger seat.10 However, since the gun was placed underneath the driver's seat, it would be more logical to conclude that said gun would be nearer the front area of the car than the back. Thus, even if the victim was seated in front, he would have still surely noticed the former reaching for the gun underneath the driver's seat from behind given the fact that they were in a small enclosed space where even the slightest movements would be noticeable.
In addition, there are a number of inconsistencies in SPO3 Cayot's testimony which seriously puts in doubt his version of what transpired, as well as his credibility.
COURT:
[Q :] You were looking for that gun, were you able to see it?
A : No, your Honor I wasn't able to see it.
x x x x
[Q :] Pero hindi mo tingnan doon sailalim ng upuan mo?
A: No, your Honor because when I asked Shongo [Jaen] where was my gun he told me that Gem took it.
ACP Formaran:
[Q :] Did you see the victim holding any gun?
A: No, ma'am, but because Shongo [Jaen] told me that Gem took my gun, I was of the impression that Gem committed suicide.
x x x x
Q : Let me clarify, Mr. Witness, I asked you earlier if you saw the victim holding the gun?
A: No, ma'am.
COURT:
[Q :] Where is the gun now[,]if you know?
A : It's in the custody of the PNP, your Honor.
x x x x
[Q :] How was it turned over to the PNP?
A : I don't know your Honor.
x x x x
[Q :] Doon sa loob ng kotse mo hindi mona nakita?
A: No, ma'am, but what I know is it was recovered at the back of my car.
x x x x
Atty. Cabe:
x x x x
Q : While asking the accused what happened and you answered the victim took the gun where was your focus, was it in front or you were looking at the accused? (sic)
A : To the victim, sir.
Q: To the victim, you were not looking at the accused. Was the car still moving or stop? (sic)
A : Stop, sir.
Q : Already stop, so while looking at the victim, did you find the whereabouts of the gun inside the car or did you see it?
A : Hindi ko na po ltinanap.
Q : You did not even look at the accused whether he was holding a gun or not?
A : No, sir because I was already panicking.
Q : Even when you already went out from the car you still did not see where the gun was?
A : Yes, sir. 11
As a police officer, one of his first instincts should have been to look for the gun that was used to shoot the victim. It thus strains credulity that he would rely on the alleged statement of Jaen that it was the victim who was holding the gun and then later on say that he did not actually see the victim holding the gun – when, in fact, he was beside the victim inside the car and, at the time he asked Jaen regarding the gun, the car was no longer moving.12
Second, the victim was shot six (6) times inside the car. SPO3 Cayot claims that he only heard three (3) gunshots near his ear13 and realized what had happened only after the last shot had already been fired. This claim is unbelievable since the incident happened in a small enclosed space where even the slightest sounds could be heard. Thus, without a doubt, the sound of six (6) gunshots would be deafening to the ears.
The ponencia posits that the reason why SPO3 Cayot did not immediately pull over at the first shot may be explained by the make and model of the firearm in question, i.e., a Beretta 9mm pistol, which has the capability to fire burst consecutive shots without prior need to cock the gun.14 The ponencia states that it is reasonable to deduce that the gunshots were fired in rapid succession, thereby giving SPO3 Cayot the smallest of a window of time to immediately react thereto.15
However, I note that a Beretta 9mm pistol is a double action, semi-automatic pistol.16 Unlike a fully automatic pistol that has the capability to discharge the entire magazine load with a single pull of a trigger and thus its shots are continuous until the triggering device is disengaged,17 a semi-automatic pistol fires a single bullet each time the trigger is pulled – there is thus a pause in between each shot. Hence, it is highly improbable that SPO3 Cayot did not have any time to immediately react at the first instance since the shots were fired, not in rapid succession, but rather one after another.18
In addition, to my mind, if the shot was made by Jaen, then SPO3 Cayot would have immediately stopped the car upon hearing the initial gunshot. And yet, SPO3 Cayot's first reaction, after the 6th shot, was to ask Jaen where his gun was, and then drive to the house of the victim. The testimony of SPO3 Cayot that he did not see what transpired in the car because the car was moving is simply incredible. To be sure, SPO3 Cayot's version of the events borders on the absurd because, as he himself admitted, he was driving only at more or less 40 kilometers per hour:19
[Atty. Cabe:]
x x x x
Q: When you heard a gunshot inside the car, did you see who fired the gun?
A: No, Sir.
COURT:
[Q :] Sigurado ka? Nandyan lang sa likod mo eh, maski sa salamin hindi mo nakita yan? Tapas ang nakita mo smoke lang? Eh ang liit-liit ng loob ng kotse eh.
A : Moving kasi your Honor ang sasakyan.
x x x x
[Q :] Lilingon ka lang at saka andyan ang salamin eh kasi may tungkulin tayo sa katotohanan eh.
A: Yes, your Honor.20
That is not all.
His initial story to the family that the victim had committed suicide is totally bizarre since they were only three (3) people inside the car. Meaning, if he did not do the deed, as claimed by him, then it could only have been Jaen who shot the victim. That he nevertheless told the family that the victim had committed suicide defies rational explanation, and has never been explained.
Third, the exclamation of Jaen "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" in the presence of the family of the victim, is equivocal. To my mind, this is not necessarily an admission of his guilt. Rather, it could have been the precursor to him telling the family that it was SPO3 Cayot who had shot the victim. This view is supported by the admitted fact that as he was beginning to say what truly happened, SPO3 Cayot immediately slapped him in the face and stopped him from further talking.21
The ponencia presumes that the act of SPO3 Cayot slapping Jaen every time the latter tried to speak may be construed as the former's initial attempt to protect Jaen by covering up the incident and making it appear that the victim committed suicide in the car.22 However, it is beyond cavil that such presumption is unfounded. As I see it, SPO3 Cayot slapped Jaen to protect no one else but himself and to conceal the crime that he committed. It was only when he realized that there was a possibility that his misdeed could be discovered that he pinned the blame on Jaen. The alleged admission of Jaen testified by SPO3 Cayot that Jaen allegedly made in isolation at the hospital that he had shot the victim is self-serving.23 Indeed, prior to this supposed admission, Jaen was trying to say something in front of everyone had he not been stopped by SPO3 Cayot. Thus, that Jaen suddenly made his admission in isolation simply cannot be believed.
Needless to say, it is evident that the story of what happened that wretched night is based wholly on the testimony of SPO3 Cayot, who, at this point, has been established to be of questionable credibility and who could have been the malefactor himself. Hence, it is highly erroneous for the ponencia to rely and make presumptions based on SPO3 Cayot's narration.
Fourth, the evidence presented by the prosecution shows indubitably that it had been tampered with:
(1) The paraffin test conducted on both Jaen and SPO3 Cayot yielded negative results for the presence of gunpowder nitrates.24 This is rather bizarre.
(2) PO2 Albert Pedrano, the fingerprint examiner, testified that he had no means to determine the fingerprint that was found on the gun because he could not find any fingerprint data in their database of Jaen as the former had no previous criminal record.25 However, they could have easily verified the fingerprints found on the gun since Jaen was in custody and they could have simply just gotten his fingerprints and compared them to the ones on the gun. However, they did not do so. This again is bewildering.
(3) The forensic chemist Michael Angelo Tudlong (FC Tudlong), who conducted a bullet trajectory examination to determine the specific location where the shots were fired, concluded that: (1) the front passenger door and the windshield were intentionally detached prior to his investigation, (2) there were bullet marks on the dashboard, glove compartment and front passenger door of the vehicle, (3) since the windshield was already gone, he could no longer accurately determine the specific location where the shooter fired the bullets that hit the dashboard and glove compartment, and (4) as regards the third bullet that hit the front passenger door of the vehicle, he concluded that the shooter was inside the vehicle when he fired the said bullet. On cross-examination, he further added:
Atty. Cabe
Q But could it be possible that the shooter was also in front?
A Yes, also possible.26
Reasonable doubt as to where the real assailant was seated is further confirmed by FC Tudlong's answer in his re-cross examination:
COURT:
[Q] What are the probabilities, I mean the degree of probability that he was in the rear passenger seat?
A Based on the location, Your Honor, the possibility was around 80-90%.
x x x x
Q 80-90% that was at the rear?
A Yes, ma'am.
x x x x
Q So, the remaining 10-20%[,] he was in the front seat?
A Yes, Your Honor.27
Based on the testimony of FC Tudlong, it is established that someone had tampered with and manipulated the crime scene. That someone could not have been Jaen since he was brought into custody immediately after his alleged confession in the hospital.
To repeat, FC Tudlong testified that the front passenger door and the windshield were intentionally detached, and had these parts of the car not been detached, he would have been able to accurately determine where the assailant was seated during the incident. It could thus be inferred that the person who detached the front passenger door and windshield has sufficient knowledge and experience to know that removal of said parts would essentially affect the results of the investigation.1âшphi1
Even more telling is the fact that, as admitted by the expert witness, there was a 10-20% chance that the assailant could have been seated in front. That the six (6) entry wounds are at the occipital or posterior region is not conclusive that the shooter was at the back. The victim could have been looking outside the window with his head turned away from SPO3 Cayot when the shots were fired. This would also explain why the victim did not immediately see that a gun was pointed at him. Thus, the entry wounds at the occipital region does not discount the possibility that the assailant may have been seated in the driver's seat.
The guilt of Jaen was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt in order to justify a verdict of guilt. It is true that the law does not require absolute certainty but only moral certainty. However, if there is a 10-20% doubt, as in this case, in the real identity of the assailant, then there cannot be "proof beyond reasonable doubt." To be sure, the concept of moral certainty is subjective. But, in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.28 Indeed, the conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.29
In United States v. Reyes,30 the defendant was acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt:
There was no direct proof adduced against the accused. The evidence was wholly circumstantial. It is true that the commission of crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence. In such cases, however, the circumstances must be just as convincing as when the proof is direct and positive. The circumstances must be such as to lead the mind of the judge irresistibly to but one conclusion, namely, the guilt of the person charged. So long as the acts of the accused and the circumstances can be explained upon any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt, he must be acquitted. If the judge, after hearing the proof: is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty, he must dismiss him.
A reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. A reasonable doubt has been variously defined. It is most difficult to define. It has been said that a reasonable doubt was the doubt of a reasonable man under all the circumstances of the case. This statement is too general and includes too much. Neither does the rule that the judge (or jury) must be convinced to an absolute certainty. This construction would preclude a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean, upon the other hand, proof beyond all "possible or imaginary" doubt. It means simply such proof, to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.31
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution can be explained upon any other hypothesis inconsistent with Jaen's guilt. The ponencia is riddled with presumptions about what had really transpired that night based only on the narration of SPO3 Cayot, which again, is incredible, to say the least. Supposedly, this fortifies the fact that there remains in the mind of an unprejudiced person enough doubt to hold Jaen guilty. The conviction of an accused should not be based on presumptions and inferences. Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.32
Lastly, the ponencia states that since the trial court judge in this case gave full credence to the testimony of SPO3 Cayot, and this was affirmed by the CA, the Court should likewise offer full faith to the same.33 However, it is crucial to remember that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort-it is the last beacon of hope for those who have been wrongly deprived of their liberty. This impetus for the Court to actively seek to right wrongs that have been committed by the lower courts is manifest in this case, especially, as here, where the presumption of innocence has not been successfully overturned by the prosecution.
In sum, I respectfully disagree with the ponencia that the guilt of Jaen was proven beyond reasonable doubt. If even an iota of doubt about the guilt of an accused is compelling enough to warrant an acquittal, then, with more reason, when uncertainty abounds.
Given the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the instant appeal, and accordingly ACQUIT Jaen.
Footnotes
1 See Voltaire, "Quotable Quote," accessed at < https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/75903-it-is-better-to-risk-saving-a-guilty-person-than >.
2 Lozano v. People, 638 Phil. 582, 594 (2010).
3 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
4 571 Phil. 18 (2008).
5 Id. at 25; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
6 Ponencia, p. 7.
7 Id. at 6; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
8 TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot), p. 12.
9 Ponencia, p. 8.
10 Id.
11 TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot), pp. 13-23; emphasis supplied.
12 Id. at 21-23.
13 Id. at 11.
14 Ponencia, p. 8.
15 Id.
16 Id.; see Beretta, Pistols, accessed at < http://beretta.com/en/pistols/ >.
17 Section 3.28, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10591 otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT," May 29, 2013.
18 Ponencia, p. 8.
19 TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot), p. 21.
20 Id. at 19-20; emphasis supplied.
21 Rollo, p. 4.
22 Ponencia, p. 9.
23 Rollo, p. 4.
24 TSN, November 20, 2013 (P/Chief Insp. Yellah M. Apostol), p. 9.
25 TSN, April 8, 2014 (PO2 Albert Pedrano), pp. 15-16.
26 TSN, April 29, 2014 (FC Tudlong), p. 17; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
27 Id. at 19-20.
28 People v. Pagaura, 334 Phil. 683, 690 (1997).
29 Daayata v. People, 807 Phil. 102, 118 (2017), citing People v. Ganhuso, 320 Phil. 324, 335 (1995).
30 3 Phil. 3 (1903).
31 Id. at 5-6; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
32 People v. Maraorao, 688 Phil. 458, 467 (2012).
33 Ponencia, p. 10.
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