Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 241946. July 29, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELEVER JAEN Y MORANTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated January 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07970, which affirmed the Decision3 dated May 14, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) finding accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (Jaen) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information4 charging Jaen of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accusatory portion of which states:
That, on or about the 13th day of July, 2013 in San Juan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with intent to kill with the use of a gun – Beretta Pistol 9mm with Serial No.[ ]G42306Z, [later marked "FCC-I"], did, then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously shoot the head of one Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gun shot wounds on his head that caused his instantaneous death, the said killing having been attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery which qualify (sic) the killing to murder.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The prosecution alleged that on July 13, 2013, SPO3 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (Cayot) together with his distant relative, Jaen, also known as "Shongo," attended a ceremony at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan. Afterwards, Cayot's officemate, victim Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (Manzo), approached Cayot to ask if he could give him a ride home, to which Cayot obliged. Upon reaching Manzo's home in San Juan City at around 4:30 in the afternoon, Manzo invited the two to have some drinks since they had not seen each other for a long time. The two agreed and had a drinking session, and they were later joined by Sgt. Rey Banzon (Banzon) and his nephew.
After some time, Manzo invited all of them to go to a resto-bar owned by Banzon in Mandaluyong City, to which they all agreed. They then drove to the resto-bar, with Manzo and Jaen riding with Cayot. Before they all disembarked, Cayot placed his handgun inside his belt bag, and thereafter, tucked it beneath the driver's seat of his car. At around 11:20 in the evening, after having dinner and drinks, they prepared to leave. Cayot asked Jaen to go ahead and start the engine of the car together with Manzo; Cayot joined them a few minutes later. On their way home, Cayot drove the car while Manzo sat in the front passenger seat and Jaen in the back seat. When they were near Manzo's house, Cayot was startled by the sound of a series of gunshots near his ear and the smoke inside the car. He stopped the car and then saw blood dripping from Manzo's head. Cayot asked Jaen what happened and where his gun was, to which the latter responded that Manzo took it. Cayot panicked and cried, believing that Manzo committed suicide.
They then drove straight to Manzo's house and brought him inside, wherein Cayot informed the family of Manzo's alleged suicide. While they were talking, Manzo's niece observed that Jaen was fidgety. Jaen then interrupted them and repeatedly exclaimed, "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" In response, Cayot slapped him to make him stop. After Cayot finished informing the family of what had happened, Jaen excused himself to urinate several times. They observed that he repeatedly rubbed his hands against the concrete wall; he also urinated at the pocket garden in the basement and wiped his hands on the grass and leaves. Thereafter, the family brought Manzo to the hospital. Thereat, Jaen took Cayot aside and confessed to him that he was the one who shot Manzo. Consequently, Cayot arrested him.6
The autopsy revealed that Manzo sustained six (6) gunshot wounds, the entry point of which were all at the posterior/occipital region, or at the back of the head.7 According to the medico-legal examiner, based on the distant gunshot wounds, the assailant would have been approximately two (2) feet away, and possibly seated at the back. During investigation, Cayot's service gun was found at the back of the car, together with five (5) cartridge cases and two (2) deformed jackets. An examination revealed that the bullets were fired from the same gun. Cayot, Jaen, and the cadaver of Manzo were all subjected to a paraffin test which yielded negative results.8 The forensic chemist who conducted the bullet trajectory examination also noted that there were bullet marks in the glove compartment, on the dashboard, and on the door of the front passenger's side; moreover, the windshield was detached.9 Based on his examination, he explained that the possible location of the assailant was inside the car, particularly the rear passenger seat.10
Although Jaen pleaded not guilty to the charge,11 he did not present any evidence in his favor.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision12 dated May 14, 2015, the RTC found Jaen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with its concomitant accessory penalties under Article 41 of the RPC. He was likewise ordered to indemnify Manzo's heirs in the amount of P75,000.00 for the latter's wrongful death, and P50,000.00 in moral damages. The period of his preventive imprisonment was likewise credited to him.13
Despite the absence of an eyewitness account, the RTC found that the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly identified Jaen as the gun wielder. Treachery was likewise established by the evidence adduced which indicated that the attack was sudden, with the assailant coming from behind the victim, thereby rendering the latter defenseless. Thus, it held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements constituting the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC.14
Aggrieved, Jaen appealed15 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated January 22, 2018, the CA affirmed Jaen's conviction for the crime of Murder, with the following modifications: (a) increasing the award of moral damages to P75,000.00; (b) further awarding to Manzo's heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00; and (c) imposing on all monetary damages legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) from finality of the ruling until fully paid.17
The CA concurred with the RTC's findings that the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented was enough to identify Jaen as the gun wielder. As to the argument that treachery was not proven, the CA agreed with the RTC that the evidence presented, including the number of gunshots and the location of the wounds, were enough to show that the attack was sudden which rendered the victim defenseless.18
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Jaen is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,19 to wit:
Article 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,-shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
x x x x
Based on the foregoing, the following elements must be established to prosecute the crime of Murder: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.20
In this case, all of the foregoing elements are present. It is undisputed that Manzo was killed through treacherous means, which killing did not constitute parricide or infanticide. Meanwhile, anent the second element, the Court holds that – contrary to the opinions of Associate Justices Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa) and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (Justice Reyes) – the circumstantial evidence in this case clearly prove that the accused, Jaen, killed the victim.
To expound on this latter point, it must be highlighted that Manzo was shot and killed while seated at the front passenger seat of a moving vehicle being driven by prosecution witness Cayot, with Jaen at the backseat thereof. As suicide had already been ruled out,21 basic reason and logic dictate that the shooter is either Cayot or Jaen.
Relying on circumstantial evidence, the RTC found Jaen as the guilty party. Notably, the RTC's findings were fully affirmed by the CA. It is well settled that absent any showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error; the factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are binding on the Court,22 as in this case. However, to be sure, and in light of the dissenting opinions of Justices Caguioa and Reyes, a further discussion on circumstantial evidence is apropos.
It is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions as a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes, by their nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses.23 In the absence of such direct evidence, the guilt of an accused may nevertheless be proven through circumstantial evidence if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.24
Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.25 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence as case law has consistently recognized that it may even surpass the latter in weight and probative force.26
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. On this note, the Court, in Almojuela v. People,27 reiterated the basic guidelines that judges must observe when faced with merely circumstantial evidence in deciding criminal cases, to wit:
(a) Circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with caution;
(b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
(c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of the guilt of the accused; and
(d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused so as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced form scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. They are like puzzle pieces which when put together reveal a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is t he author of the crime.28 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test and not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.29 In this wise, the Court has held that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is like a 'tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven.' Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture."30
As identified by the RTC, and as affirmed by the CA, all of the following circumstances point to the fact that Jaen was clearly responsible for Manzo's murder:
1. [Cayot, Jaen, and the victim, Manzo,] were together that fateful night in a drinking session;
2. After the said drinking session, they left together in a car. [Cayot] drove, the victim was seated at the front passenger seat, ·and [Jaen] sat at the back;
3. While driving and nearing the house of the victim, [Cayot] heard near his ear a series of gunshots and saw smoke inside the car which caused him to immediately pull over;
4. While parked, [Cayot] asked [Jaen] what happened and where his gun was, to which [the latter] replied that the victim took hold of his gun;
5. Simultaneously, [Cayot] saw blood dripping from the victim's head and panicked;
6. [Cayot and Jaen] brought the victim to the latter's house and informed the family that the victim committed suicide;
7. At that time, [Jaen] was fidgety. He suddenly interrupted and repeatedly exclaimed, "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo";
8. When they brought the victim to the hospital, [Jaen] admitted that he was the one who shot the victim;
9. The victim's death was caused by gunshot wounds;
10. The victim's gunshot wounds were all located at the [posterior occipital region] of his head; and
11. The investigation disclosed that the shots were fired inside the vehicle and the assailant was positioned at the back seat and which was two (2) feet away from the victim.31
In addition to these circumstances, and in refutation of the points raised by Justices Caguioa and Reyes, the following circumstances further fortify the finding that Jaen was Manzo's killer, viz.:
First,32 Jaen had knowledge and access to Cayot's handgun. This may be explained through the latter's testimony narrating that: (i) Jaen was inside the car when Cayot placed his handgun inside the bag, and thereafter, tucked said bag under the driver's seat;33 (ii) Jaen and Manzo went to the car ahead of Cayot in order to start the engine;34 and (iii) Jaen sat at the backseat, directly behind the driver's seat.35 Thus, it is completely plausible that at the time Jaen was already positioned at the back of the driver's seat and before Cayot entered the car, Jaen may have already taken the bag containing the handgun which was tucked underneath the driver's seat, thus, giving him access thereto. Moreover, it is believable that neither Manzo nor Cayot discovered that Jaen already had the handgun, since Manzo was at the front passenger seat, and thus, could not see Jaen's actions at the back, while there was no showing that Cayot checked the whereabouts of his gun before driving his car.
Second,36 the make and model of the firearm in question, i.e., a Beretta 9mm pistol, is a double action, semi-automatic pistol,37 and has the capability to fire burst consecutive shots without prior need to cock the gun. This corroborates Cayot's testimony where he stated that:
[ACP Formaran]: Prior to the gun shots, did you hear anything from [Jaen] and [Manzo]?
[Cayot]: I didn't hear anything, ma'am.
Q: Be specific Mr. Witness, how many gun shots did you hear?
A: About three (3) burst gun shots, ma'am, it's near my ear.38 (Emphases supplied)
Thus, it is reasonable to deduce that the gunshots were fired in rapid succession, thereby giving Cayot the smallest of a window of time to immediately react thereto.
Third,39 the testimonies and reports of the forensic officer conducting the bullet trajectory examination, and the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy, cohesively place the assailant at the back seat of the car. While the forensic officer noted that it could be possible that the shooter was at the front, he also mentioned that it was improbable. Particularly, when probed by the trial court as to the likelihood that the shooter was behind the victim, the expert stated that "the possibility was around 80 to 90%" that the shooter was in the rear passenger seat.40 Moreover, when taken together with the autopsy findings and testimony of the medico-legal forensic officer, this small possibility is obviated completely. Through said testimony; it was established that: (a) there were six (6) entry wounds at the occipital/posterior region (lower back near the nape) of the victim's head, with corresponding exit wounds;41 and (b) the bullet wounds were "distant wounds," which were approximately two (2) feet away.42 Taking into consideration the foregoing – and keeping in mind that there were only two (2) other people aside from the victim inside the moving vehicle, namely Cayot who was in the driver's seat, and Jaen who was in the backseat directly behind Cayot – it is highly improbable that a person seated on the driver's seat, i.e., Cayot, would angle the gun in such a way as to shoot Manzo at the latter's nape area, while still driving a moving vehicle. More importantly, assuming arguendo that a person seated at the driver's seat is flexible enough to be able to do so, the entry wounds would not be classified as "distant wounds" by the medico-legal officer as it would be difficult for the shooter to create a distance of two (2) feet between the gun and the entry wounds. Moreover, if the entry wounds were not to be classified as "distant" but as "near contact" or "intermediate," they would have the presence of stippling or "powder tattooing" on the skin surrounding the entry wounds, which is due to unburned powder grains exiting from the gun causing pinpoint abrasions on the skin surrounding said entry wounds,43 which was not the case here. As the foregoing virtually eliminates Cayot as the shooter – coupled with the finding that Manzo's death was conclusively ruled out as a suicide – the only discernible conclusion is that Jaen was the one who shot and killed Manzo inside the moving vehicle.
On this note, the Court observes that Cayot's act of slapping Jaen every time the latter exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" may be construed as the former's initial attempt to cover up the incident in order to make it appear that Manzo committed suicide inside his car. After all, Cayot and Jaen are relatives, albeit distant, and it is only human nature that a person would be partial to a relative and would attempt to cover up the latter's criminal misdeeds should there be a chance to do so. It is thus highly probable that it was only when Cayot had realized that he could no longer contain the truth that he made a turn-around and arrested Jaen, lest he be branded a co-conspirator to the crime.44
All told, when all the circumstances and pieces of evidence are taken together and not nitpicked individually, they paint the complete picture that Jaen was indeed the one responsible for Manzo's death, to the exclusion of all others. Besides, the Court has always given the highest respect to the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, "considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses."45 Since the trial court judge in this case gave full credence to the testimony of Cayot, which was affirmed by the CA, this Court should likewise offer full faith to the same.
Furthermore, it is well to note that Jaen did not offer any defense during trial or any explanation or contrary evidence to dispute the circumstances established by the prosecution's evidence. This is likewise suspect as "[a]n innocent person will normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence."46
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused if his guilt is not proven beyond a whisper of a doubt. However, the entire point of allowing circumstantial evidence to result in conviction is precisely to avoid setting felons free for mere want of direct evidence.47 As the Court noted in People v. Whisenhunt,48 "[c]ircumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection."49 This is particularly true in this case. Manzo was shot and there were only two (2) other people in the car with him. Undeniably, one of them must be the killer. To absolve Jaen in this case would be to set a murderer on the streets on the faintest of doubts which have already been contradicted by the totality of the circumstantial evidence. After all, "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."50
In view of the foregoing, the Court affirms the conclusion of the courts a quo that Jaen is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, persons found guilty of Murder shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the courts a quo correctly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.51
Finally, and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,52 the Court deems it proper to adjust the monetary awards due to Manzo's heirs as follows: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages. Further, the aforesaid monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07970 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its concomitant accessory penalties under Article 41 of the same Code. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo the following amounts: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion.
Footnotes
1 See Notice of Appeal dated February 5, 2018; rollo, pp. 12-13.
2 Id. at 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Marie Christine Azcarraga Jacob, concurring.
3 Records, pp. 164-169. Penned by Judge Myrna V. Lim-Verano.
4 Dated July 16, 2013. Id. at 1-2.
5 Id. at 1.
6 See rollo , pp. 3-4.
7 See Medico-Legal Report No. A13-530 dated July 17, 2013; records, p. 149 and its dorsal portion.
8 See Initial Laboratory Report with Chemical Report No. C-288-13 dated July 14, 2013 (id. at 12) for the paraffin test done on Cayot and Jaen and Chemical Re port No. C-291-13 dated July 15, 2013 (id. at 150) for the paraffin test done on Manzo's cadaver.
9 See Physical Identification Report No. PI-016-2013E-BT dated July 15, 2013; id. at 137.
10 See rollo, pp. 4-5.
11 See Order dated July 26, 2013; records, p. 23.
12 Id. at 164-169.
13 Id. at 169.
14 See id. 168-169.
15 See Notice of Appeal dated May 14, 2015 (CA rollo, p. 29) and Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated November 22, 2016 (id. at 55-72).
16 Rollo, pp. 2-11.
17 Id. at 10-11.
18 See id. at 6-10.
19 Entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (December 13, 1993).
20 People v. Las Piñas, 739 Phil. 502, 524 (2014); citations omitted.
21 The forensic officer subjected Manzo's cadaver to a paraffin test and found no trace of nitrates on it (see Chemistry Report No. C-291-13 dated July 15, 2013 [records, p. 150 and TSN, March 12, 2014, pp. 7-14).
22 See People v. Quigod, 633 Phil. 408, 420 (2010).
23 People v. Pentecostes, G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017, 844 SCRA 610, 619, citing People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 417-419 (2003).
24 See Almojuela v. People, 734 Phil. 636, 646 (2014), citing People v. de Quijano, G.R. No. 102045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73-74.
25 Id.; citation omitted.
26 See People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 26 (2004); citations omitted.
27 Supra note 24.
28 Id. at 646-647; citing People v. Galvez, 548 Phil. 436, 460 (2007).
29 See Planteras, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018; citations omitted.
30 Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017, 828 SCRA 525, 538-539, citing People v. Ragon, 346 Phil. 772, 785 (1997).
31 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
32 In response to Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa's point that the gun used was a firearm issued to Cayot, and nothing on record shows he gave Jaen access to the same. (See Dissenting Opinions of Justice Reyes, pp. 5-6 and Justice Caguioa, p. 2.)
33 See TSN, November 5, 2013, pp. 24-25.
34 See id. at 10.
35 See id. at 11.
36 In response to Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa's point that it was unbelievable that Cayot only pulled over after the last shot was fired because a normal person would put the vehicle to an immediate halt after the first shot. (See Dissenting Opinions of Justice Reyes, p. 6 and Justice Caguioa, p. 4.)
37 See < http://www.beretta.com /en/pistols/> (visited August 9, 20 19).
38 TSN dated November 5, 2013, p. 11.
39 In response to Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa's point that the bullet trajectory report and the testimony of the expert witness show that it was also possible that the shooter could be positioned at the front. (See Dissenting Opinions of Justice Reyes, p. 5 and Justice Caguioa, p. 7.)
40 See TSN dated April 29, 2014, pp. 19-20.
41 See TSN dated December 17, 2013, pp. 9 and 11.
42 See id. at 9-10.
43 See < https://www.pathologyoutlines.com/topic/forensicsgunshotwounds.html > (visited August 9, 2019).
44 In response to Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa's point that it was strange that Cayot tried to interrupt Jaen when he exclaimed that "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko nasa inyo!" to Manzo's family. (See Dissenting Opinions of Justice Reyes, p. 6 and Justice Caguioa, p. 5.)
45 People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 596 (2016); citations omitted.
46 Almojuela v. People, supra note 24, at 649.
47 See People v. Casitas, supra note 23, at 418.
48 420 Phil. 677 (2001).
49 Id. at 696.
50 See Section 2, Rule 133 of the REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE.
51 See Article 63 (2) of the RPC.
52 See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
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