G.R. No. 242957 - Separate Concurring

G.R. No. 242957, February 8, 2023,
♦ Decision, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

In this case, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila (RTC) in a Resolution,1 dated October 22, 2018, granted the Petition2 for Habeas Corpus filed by the respondent Yuan Wenle (Wenle), and declared as null and void the July 26, 2018 Summary Deportation Order3 (SDO) issued by the petitioner Bureau of Immigration's (BI) Board of Commissioners (Board), reasoning that the said Order, in relation to Rule 9 of the Bureau's Omnibus Rules of Procedure4 (Omnibus Rules) was issued without affording due process to Wenle.5

The SDO issued by the Board of the BI against the respondent Wenle was pursuant to a letter6 from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Philippines (Chinese Embassy), seeking assistance from the BI for his arrest in relation to his alleged crimes in the PRC.7 Wenle was subsequently arrested by immigration officers of the BI on August 22, 2018 prior to his departure for Hongkong.8

Consequently, Wenle filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus9 under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, before the RTC, which granted it.10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Board, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari11 to assail the RTC Resolution,12 dated October 22, 2018.

The ponencia nullified the assailed Resolution of the RTC,13 through the lens of its proposed guidelines in determining the validity of an administrative warrant issued by a non-judicial agency:

The aforementioned guidelines, the ponencia adds, must all be strictly complied with, to sustain the validity of an administrative warrant.15

The ponencia found that the assailed RTC Resolution must be nullified, reasoning that Wenle's detention by the BI was lawful and justified, which meant that his recourse through habeas corpus proceedings should be denied.

However, principally, I strongly believe that now is not the time to determine the validity of non-judicial warrants in general because it is not an issue raised by either party. In the ponencia's summary of the contentions of the parties, and the issues culled therefrom,16 nowhere is the question of whether a warrant issued by an officer other than a judge is constitutionally impermissible even posed. The guidelines, therefore, in my view, amount to obiter and an advisory opinion on the matter, the BI's power to issue an arrest warrant pursuant to deportation proceedings not having been directly challenged in this case. Moreover, the power of other agencies to issue such orders or warrants that hew closely to the language of Article III, Section 2 is also not within the frame of issues raised by the parties. The facts do not pertain to any other agency except the BI. Finally, the Petition filed by the BI is a review of the Resolution of the RTC in a habeas corpus proceeding, the only question is the correctness of the said Resolution considering that Rule 102 of the Rules of Court allows the issuance of the remedy in all cases of illegal confinement or detention.17

That being said, I nevertheless see the wisdom in the proposed guidelines.1aшphi1 Thus, while it is my position that the guidelines amount to an advisory opinion on an issue not squarely raised before this Court, I would like to offer my own thoughts regarding administrative warrants issued by non-judicial agencies merely for academic discourse.

The Fundamental Law is categorical: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The Court has repeatedly stressed that the ambit of protection of the due process clause extends even to foreigners in the Philippines.18

Corollarily, even the President's statutorily granted power to deport foreigners is subject to the due process clause.20

This paradigm of affording due process to foreigners in the Philippines governs even considering the settled rule that the entry or stay of foreigners in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace and consequently may be revoked.21 In Secretary of Justice, et al. v. Koruga,22 the Court emphasized that such foreigners "may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto."23

Qua Chee Gan, et al. v. Deportation Board24 (Qua Chee Gan), a case that predates both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, was categorical that the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures is a right extended to all, citizens or foreigners.25 The Court took particular note that the said right, as expressed in Section 1, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, was vastly different from the Jones Law of 1916,26 where such guarantee was expressly reserved as a right of an accused.27 Conformably, the Supreme Court further noted that the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings:

As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al., this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law, wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course, it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.28 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The doubt expressed by the Court in Qua Chee Gan was settled in Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso29 (Salazar), where it ruled that such a power to arrest and deport a foreigner is exceptional in character owing to the constitutional power of the President as the architect of the State's foreign policy:

It should be noted, however, that the issue in Salazar was with respect to the power of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) (or the Secretary of Labor and Employment) to validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.32 Thus, in answering the said issue, the Court carved out as an exception to the constitutional requirement that warrants be determined solely by a judge, the power of the President or the BI to arrest foreigners to effect an order of deportation. This much is evident from Salazar's use of Qua Chee Gan:

The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding — and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.33 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Attention should be given to the fact that the Court in Qua Chee Gan sustained the validity of the arrest of a foreigner if and only if a deportation order has been issued. Moreover, it is well-settled that the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted if the person is detained under process issued by a court,34 which includes quasi-judicial bodies such as the BI.35 Applied in this case, it is clear that Wenle is the subject of the SDO issued by the BI after he was charged on July 17, 2018.36

The burgeoning question now is whether Wenle was afforded due process before the SDO was issued? In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus before the RTC, Wenle alleged that the BI issued the SDO without notice and hearing, contrary to Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.37

The ponencia noted the position of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda that "a foreigner tagged as a fugitive would have no opportunity to be heard prior to and after arrest as an SDO is considered final and executory."38 Moreover, the Omnibus Rules failed to clarify whether a motion for reconsideration is applicable to the SDO.39 This is notwithstanding the position of the BI, represented by the OSG, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari, that respondent may file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 10, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules.40 In fact, Wenle contends that such a remedy was not expressly stated to apply to SDO's. Thus, it directed the BI to amend the Omnibus Rules "to clarify the availability of certain procedural remedies to give full effect on a prospective deportee's due process rights.1aшphi1"41

At first blush, it appears that Wenle was indeed deprived of an opportunity to dispute the Charge Sheet42 and the Mission Order,43 the Omnibus Rules prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.44 With the noted ambiguity of the Omnibus Rules with respect to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, Wenle thus filed his petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus before the RTC.

The undersigned finds that Wenle was most certainly afforded due process before the RTC when he filed his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Precisely, the question that the RTC should have resolved was whether Wenle was illegally detained.

Evidence that Wenle's arrest and deportation is justified is amply supported by the record. His identity as "Yuan Wenle" with revoked Passport No. E75457683,45 as pinpointed by the Chinese Embassy,46 was confirmed by the BI.47 Having been declared an as "undocumented foreigner" whose presence in the country according to the BI "poses a risk to public interest,"48 Wenle's arrest and detention is justified. In his Petition, Wenle failed to rebut the findings of the BI: (1) that he was involved in crimes and was wanted by authorities in the PRC; and (2) that his passport had already been cancelled.

Indeed, as correctly argued by the OSG,49 the Court in Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez50 ruled that:

Thus, "[i]f it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint."51 The RTC Resolution, therefore, was issued without basis and must be reversed, as held by the ponente.

Even though I concur in the ruling, I have serious reservations regarding the promulgation of the proposed guidelines. As previously stated, neither of the parties raised the issue of a non-judicial officer or agency, such as the BI, issuing an arrest warrant.

The ponencia synthesizes the aforementioned by stating that the substantive issue in the case is whether the SDO issued by the BI against Wenle is void for violating due process.53

It is elementary that a court acquires jurisdiction over the issues only after a joinder thereof.54 Generally, jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which are either disputed by the parties or simply under consideration.55 This principle of jurisdiction over the issues traces its origin in the concept that judicial power pertains to the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.56 Hence, the Court "has no authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions and it has no authority to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests."57 Indeed, the Court's decision "should not be any broader than is required by the precise facts" and "[a]nything remotely resembling an advisory opinion or a gratuitous judicial utterance respecting the meaning of the Constitution must altogether be avoided."58

Wenle's case calls for a review of the legal correctness of the RTC Resolution granting his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus. As the ponente already found, Wenle's detention was lawful and justified, supported by the law, jurisprudence and the evidence. Consequently, the RTC's issuance of the writ is erroneous.

While the dilemma of whether a non-judicial officer or agency may issue a warrant to either arrest a person or search a place and seize an object will for now continually hang, it is a dilemma whose categorical and final adjudication is not called for by the facts as presented. I must, therefore, respectfully disagree that it is "necessary to pass upon [the] question on whether the power to issue warrants may also extend to adjudicative authorities other than regular courts."59

Wenle, in particular, did not dispute that the BI may arrest a foreigner under the relevant laws, but only that the SDO was issued in violation of his recognized right to due process. Wenle did not assail the constitutionality of the SDO, in particular, and administrative warrants, in general, under the lens of Section 2, Article III, before the RTC. What concerned him is the SDO's constitutionality as it pertained to his right to due process under Section 1, Article III. Neither did the RTC declare that the SDO was violative of the constitutional requirement that a warrant of arrest be issued only by a judge on the basis of probable cause.

As such, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a warrant because it was issued by an officer other than a judge. The guidelines clearly attempt to address such problem by providing that "[a] violation of any item of these guidelines is a prima facie proof of usurpation of judicial functions, malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or graft and corrupt practices on the part of responsible officers."60

By exercising our constitutionally ordained rule-making power in directing the BI to amend its Omnibus Rules, the Court has already directly addressed the issue raised by Wenle in the earnest hope that a perceived violation of the right to due process in deportation proceedings will no longer add to our considerable dockets.

In any case, Salazar is guidance that, at present, the only exception recognized by the Court is with respect to deportation proceedings, in consonance with its exceptional character involving immigrants and foreigners whose presence in the country may injure societal interests.

Lest I be misunderstood, I, with utmost sincerity, believe that the guidelines are necessary to "prevent an administrative agency or officer from legally performing oppressive acts."61 But the Court is not at liberty to make pronouncements that rest on issues not presented before it. The doctrine of separation of powers also limits the Court's constitutional power to act and adjudicate, and it must yield to Congress the wisdom in determining whether an administrative agency, particularly one endowed with quasi-judicial powers, should also possess the power to issue a warrant of arrest and/or search and seizure.

Judicial power "does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal question and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."62 There must be an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.63

Even with such a position, I would like to humbly share my thoughts regarding the power of administrative agencies to issue warrants of arrest and searches and seizures. To that extent, I join the ponencia in the reasonable construction of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution as being limited only to criminal cases,64 that is, actions the goal of which is to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused, and which construction permissibly sustains the power of an administrative agency to issue an administrative warrant to "address some specialized, exigent or important public need."65

However, I am mindful that we ought to distinguish between administrative orders that restrain liberty and those that authorize the search and seizure of property. Specifically, the issuance of orders that restrain liberty, which are akin to warrants of arrest, are more clearly within the domain of the judiciary and should be subject to judicial warrants, except for cases where warrantless arrests are recognized. Indeed, the detention of persons is a more serious, if not the most serious, and intrusive means of enforcing the law. As to the power of the Executive to arrest persons for purposes of deportation, prevailing jurisprudence already carves out such arrest warrants from the general rule that warrants of arrest can only be issued by judges. In any other case, if an administrative agency finds that there is a necessity to detain a person or restrain his or her liberty, the rule should still be that a judicial warrant should be obtained, unless a warrantless arrest is allowed. In my humble view, there is no necessity to alter these prevailing rules now.

As to the power of administrative agencies to issue orders for the search and seizure of property, these can be characterized as inspection and confiscation orders expressly allowed under specific laws and confirmed in a number of cases decided by this Court. For these types of orders, the guidelines in the ponencia should apply strictly.

The guidelines on validity of administrative warrants can be succinctly divided into three elements: (1) the origin of the power; (2) the grounds for issuance and the standards for determination; and (3) the manner of execution. To be sustained, an administrative warrant must be within the jurisdiction of the administrative agency, which as the guidelines suggest must be pursuant to "well-defined regulatory purposes."66 Thus, a law must be enacted granting such power to the non-judicial agency, particularly, as the ponencia expressly required, the power to "pass upon and make final pronouncements on conflicting rights and obligations of contending parties."67

We must remember that administrative agencies may be broadly classified into two:

The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof." The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.68 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

It is in respect of this quasi-judicial power, or the power to determine the rights and liabilities of parties, from where the authority to issue administrative warrants must spring forth. Absent this element, an administrative warrant is constitutionally proscribed.

Such determination of rights and liabilities is typically the province of the judiciary, evident from our Rules of Court in its definition of civil actions, criminal actions, and special proceedings,69 and the Fundamental Law's definition of judicial power.70 However, the Court has conceded that "[t]he ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts."71 The Court has thus clarified that a "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.72 Stated differently, the administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.73

One example is Republic Act No. 10863, or the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act (CMTA). Principally, the power of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) revolves around the protection and enhancement of government revenue, the institution of fair and transparent customs and tariff management that will efficiently facilitate international trade, prevention and curtailment of any form of customs fraud and illegal acts, and modernization of customs and tariff administration.74 In enhancing government revenue in import and export transactions, the BOC, in turn, is empowered to assess and collect customs revenues from imported goods and other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties accruing under the CMTA.75 To assess and collect customs revenues, the BOC was granted power to effect search, seizure and arrest, with Congress authorizing certain persons to exercise police authority:

The authorized officers are required to coordinate with the Commissioner of the BOC. The CMTA likewise provides that "mission orders shall clearly indicate the specific name carrying out the mission and the tasks to be carried out."77 The CMTA further specifies that such exercise of police authority shall only be within customs premises as defined and identified in Section 303 thereof,78 and only when the vessel, aircraft, cargo, goods, animal or any other movable property when the same is subject to forfeiture79 or when they are subject of a fine80 imposed under the said law.81

Searches and seizures under the CMTA are further detailed under Sections 219, 221, 222, and 223.82 The BOC Commissioner is also empowered to "demand evidence of payment of duties and taxes on imported goods openly for sale or kept in storage," which in case of failure, the BOC Commissioner is authorized to seize the goods and subject them to forfeiture proceedings.83 The District Collector is similarly authorized to "cause the arrest and bring back [a] vessel or aircraft to the most convenient port with the assistance of other concerned agencies," if it departs or attempts to depart before entry shall have been made, not being thereunto compelled by stress of weather, duress of enemies, or other necessity.84

It is well settled that the BOC has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.85 Thus, the Court has held that trial courts "are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings."86

Under the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code), abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission)87 of a nuisance per se, whether public or private, may be done extrajudicially.88 But to pursue such extrajudicial abatement, the Civil Code commands that the district health officer "determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance."89 Further, the Civil Code also provides that:

Thus, the district health officer is given the quasi-judicial power to determine whether abatement should proceed.

The Revised Fire Code of the Philippines of 2008 also authorizes the immediate abatement of fire hazards, in the form of notices or orders to comply against the owner, administrator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition of the building or structure by the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and its Chief.90 Further, any building or structure assessed and declared by the chief, the BFP or his/her duly authorized representative as a firetrap on account of the gravity or palpability of the violation or is causing clear and present imminent fire danger to adjoining establishments and habitations shall be declared a public nuisance, through a notice to be issued to the owner, administrator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition of the building, structure and their premises or facilities.91 If such persons fail to comply within the prescribed periods, the Chief, the BFP or his/her duly authorized representative may cause the structures summary abatement, defined as all corrective measures undertaken to abate hazards which shall include, but not limited to remodeling, repairing, strengthening, reconstructing, removal and demolition, either partial or total, of the building or structure.92

Dangerous buildings, as defined under the National Building Code of the Philippines, may also be abated by the Building Official, who shall order their repair, vacation, or demolition, if possible.93

In all these instances, it cannot be denied that there is a seizure of property, which is enforced and determined by an administrative officer through proceedings that partake of a judicial character, hence, quasi-judicial. This quasi-judicial character is what, at the very outset, lends basis to an administrative warrant.

Disallowing these warrants simply because they are not issued by a judge would be, in my humble view, problematic, leaving government without seasonable and sufficient remedies in these spheres of governance.

Another point that must be considered in determining the validity of an administrative warrant is the ground under which it may issue. The guidelines already deal with the same by requiring that "[t]he danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent and must be greater than the damage or injury to be sustained by the [person] who shall be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property."94 The guidelines likewise emphasize that the resulting deprivation should be temporary or provisional, in line with the objective of suppressing imminent danger, harm, or evil.95 With this in mind, Congress must specify that such danger, harm or evil are present in the cases where it grants quasi-judicial power, and subsequently endows the agency with the power to issue administrative warrants.

The harm, danger or evil referred to are not too difficult to discern. In the case of forfeiture proceedings, taxation of dutiable goods, under the lifeblood theory, is too obvious to require microscopic evaluation. For dangerous buildings and fire hazards, the danger to the public is all too real to ignore. The summary abatement and the seizure of these properties is undoubtedly for public safety.

When the objective has been clearly spelled out in the applicable law, the criteria for the determination of the grounds for the issuance of the administrative warrant should, in the same vein, be particularized. The requirements of the Constitution under Section 2, Article III of a probable cause finding, as also suggested by the guidelines,96 should be extended. Before its issuance, an administrative warrant "must be based on tangible proof of probable cause and must state a specific purpose or infraction allegedly committed with particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the x x x things to be seized."97

In so far as execution, the ponencia is also correct in invalidating an administrative warrant if it pertains to a criminal offense or pursued as a precursor for the filing of criminal charges and any object seized pursuant to such writ shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding.98 In People v. O'Cochlain99 (O'Cochlain) the Court sustained the validity of airport searches as a form of administrative searches provided that "the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale."100 Conformably with the ponencia that the administrative warrant must only seek to prevent an imminent danger, harm, or evil, the Court in O'Cochlain held:

The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft. The search cannot also serve unrelated law enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel through the system. As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement, the screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for evidence of crime. It is improper that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement objectives" such as uncovering contraband unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." In United States v. $124,570 US. Currency, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives from coloring administrative searches. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. Department of Health and Food and Drug Administration101 (Venus) this Court ruled that an administrative search authorized under Republic Act No. 3720 is valid after it found that the administrative search met the requirement for the valid exercise of police power, i.e., the presence of a lawful object and the use of lawful means. The Court in Venus made it clear that searches incident of inspection, supervision and regulation sanctioned by the State in the exercise of its police power, known as administrative searches, do not violate the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Although O'Cochlain and similar cases dealing with administrative searches invariably pertain to "warrantless" searches, the same requirement, that such searches are undertaken with no criminal action already in mind, is equally applicable here.102 The primary duty of administrative agencies to regulate specific spheres of governance by enforcing the law is what sustains the validity of administrative warrants. When the administrative warrant conflates the administrative liability of a person with his or her criminal liability, Section 2, Article III is transgressed, and such warrant must be struck down for being unconstitutional.

Finally, paragraph (7) of the guidelines, which mandates that a person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time if no such period is provided by law, should be clarified. It must be a formal administrative charge because any misinterpretation as to what the charge is, i.e., criminal charges, will confuse the paradigm introduced by paragraph (6).

In summary, I agree in reversing the assailed RTC Resolution. Wenle was not deprived of his right to due process, even if we concede that the Omnibus Rules was ambiguous as to the remedies available to a foreigner, such as Wenle, detained on the basis of the SDO. Wenle was amply afforded an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings in his petition for habeas corpus.

However, I must express my reservation with respect to the proposed guidelines because the facts do not call for adjudication of the validity of the arrest of Wenle, nor of any other agency empowered to issue an administrative warrant of arrest or search and seizure. The Court has no jurisdiction over such an issue because Wenle never disputed the power of the BI to cause his arrest pursuant to the SDO. In our review of the RTC Resolution, we are bound by the arguments of the parties and the issues they generate once joined, and thus the said Resolution's correctness as to its finding that the SDO violated Wenle's right to due process is the only judicial question we should entertain.

To stress, the proposed guidelines provide an elegant solution to the question of the validity of administrative warrants. I support such proposition, if and when the proper case comes before this Court.

The temptation to resolve this dilemma of whether non-judicial officers or agencies may validly issue warrants of arrest and search and seizure is admittedly strong. But we are constitutionally mandated in every case to adjudicate on the basis of facts adduced and the issues pleaded by the parties.

ACCORDINGLY, I respectfully CONCUR and vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioner Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and nullify the assailed Resolution, dated October 22, 2018, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, in Case No. R-MNL-18-10197-SP.

I likewise CONCUR in ordering the Bureau of Immigration to AMEND its Omnibus Rules of Procedure in conformity with the Decision.