G.R. No. 242957 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 242957, February 8, 2023,
♦ Decision, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.

I concur with the ponencia of the Chief Justice. Respondent Yuan Wenle was being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, it was error for the trial court to grant respondent Wenle's Petition for Habeas Corpus as it had become moot and academic.

Furthermore, I agree with the Court's laying down of guidelines for the issuance of administrative warrants, all of which must be strictly complied with. Indeed, there are instances where administrative agencies, in order to complete or execute a law, must temporarily and provisionally detain persons.

However, with respect to the seventh guideline requiring that the person temporarily detained must be formally charged, I submit that a formal charge is not enough for the administrative warrant to be valid. In my view, apart from the formal charge, the administrative agency must immediately inform the courts, via an application for a judicial warrant, of the detention of the person. This should result in the issuance of a judicial warrant within the same reasonable time a formal charge must be brought.

The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."1 It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.2 Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."3

The viability of a petition for habeas corpus to question one's detention and impending deportation has been upheld by this Court,4 the reason being that a writ of habeas corpus is "thorough and complete"5 and "affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind and under all circumstances."6 In the words of this Court in De Bisschop v. Galang:7

"[T]he use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens' confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice[.]" This is because habeas corpus, aside from being thorough and complete, affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances. It reaches the facts affecting jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct method, and at once releases the applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized.8 (Citations omitted)

However, it is equally settled that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.9 The restraint, which has become legal,10 renders the remedy of habeas corpus moot and academic.11 The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to pursue the orderly course of the proceedings.12 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The term "court" in Rule 102, Section 4 includes quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Bureau of Immigration.13 Hence, in deportation cases, habeas corpus may no longer be availed of when a deportation charge has already been filed against the alien. The proper remedy of the alien is to pursue the ordinary course of the deportation proceedings under the rules of procedure of the Bureau of Immigration.

In Rodriguez v. Bonifacio,14 agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the Department of Labor and Employment and the Bureau of Immigration, raided night clubs in Ermita, Manila on May 7, 1999. Apprehended were 20 female Chinese nationals, including one Ma Jing, who worked as guest relations officers but had no alien employment permits or alien employment registration certificates. They were subsequently confined at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig.

Ten days later, or on May 17, 1999, Ma Jing filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that she was illegally deprived of her liberty. In particular, she alleged that as of the date of the filing of the petition, "no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her or any judicial writ or order for her commitment has [been issued]."15

It turns out, however, that on May 13, 1999, four days before Ma Jing filed her petition, a Charge Sheet has been filed against her and the other Chinese nationals apprehended with her for violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The Bureau of Immigration, in its Return of the Writ, thus argued that Ma Jing was being lawfully detained, and her petition for habeas corpus was moot and academic.16

The trial court granted the petition and ordered the release of Ma Jing from detention due to her illegal warrantless arrest. However, the Bureau of Immigration refused to release her as it had already issued a summary deportation order against her. This caused Ma Jing to file a "Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt" against then Commissioner of Immigration Rufus B. Rodriguez, among others, for defying the order of the trial court.17

The trial court judge, Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio, granted Ma Jing's motion and declared Commissioner Rodriguez guilty of indirect contempt. This caused Commissioner Rodriguez to administratively charge Judge Bonifacio with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

After investigation, this Court suspended Judge Bonifacio from the service for three months without pay. According to this Court, Judge Bonifacio had no authority to order the release of Ma Jing under a writ of habeas corpus because she was being legally detained under a valid process. Notably, said the Court, "[e]ven granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest."18

In Miranda v. Deportation Board,20 petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board for having entered the country through fraud. They allegedly misrepresented themselves to be children of Filipinos when, in truth, they were Chinese nationals.

Maintaining that they were Filipino citizens, petitioners filed a motion to quash, which the Deportation Board denied. The latter then set the deportation case for hearing.

With their motion to quash denied, petitioners subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus before this Court to challenge the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board. They insisted that the Deportation Board only has jurisdiction when the deportation case involves those who are "admittedly aliens," not those who have alleged their Filipino citizenship.21

Despite their argument, petitioners' petition for habeas corpus was denied by this Court, which held that "'the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the [Deportation Board] of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make 'a showing that the claim is not frivolous[,]' and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens."'22 In other words, petitioners had to go through the orderly course of the proceedings before the Deportation Board, where they had to prove that they are actually Filipino citizens.

Applying Rodriguez and Miranda in the present case, respondent Wenle's Petition for Habeas Corpus should have been denied by the trial court for being moot and academic. It is undisputed that on July 17, 2018, respondent Wenle was charged before the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, the body with jurisdiction over deportation cases.23 Nine days later, or on July 26, 2018, a Summary Deportation Order was subsequently issued against respondent Wenle, and only then was he arrested pursuant to the deportation order.

Instead of a petition for habeas corpus, respondent Wenle's proper remedy was to pursue the orderly course of the deportation proceedings. Under Rule 10, Sections 7 and 8 of the Bureau of Immigration Omnibus Rules of Procedure of 2015, respondent Wenle should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order. In case of denial of the motion, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice or Office of the President would still be available.

The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard,24 which was undisputedly given to respondent Wenle.

All told, the Petition for Habeas Corpus was moot and academic, respondent Wenle having been detained by virtue of a legal process. The trial court, therefore, should have denied the Petition.

The ponencia discusses "administrative warrants," which are warrants akin to search warrants or warrants of arrest, but are issued by "adjudicative authorities other than regular courts."25 It then lays down guidelines for the issuance of these administrative warrants, which must be strictly followed to render these warrants valid.

I agree with the necessity of issuing administrative warrants in certain instances. Indeed, the Executive, in order to effectively enforce and administer the laws,26 must be empowered to temporarily and provisionally detain persons and affect liberties. This is obvious in deportation proceedings, where the president27 or the Bureau of Immigration,28 in order to complete or execute our immigration policies, is given the power to issue arrest warrants for purposes of carrying out a final order of deportation.29 It is impossible to deport an undesirable alien without first gaining custody of the alien's person.

The examples given by Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier in her Concurring Opinion are likewise enlightening. Under Section 2830 of Republic Act No. 7610 and Section 2231 of Republic Act No. 11188, the Department of Social Welfare and Development may immediately take protective custody of children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse, or children involved in armed conflict. This is to expeditiously remove them from the unsafe environment they are living in. Also, under Section 20732 of the National Building Code, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises to determine compliance with the requirements of the Code, and the terms and conditions of the building permit issued. As Justice Lazaro-Javier pointed out, these powers are in the nature of administrative warrants, allowable for the effective execution and implementation of our laws.

Be that as it may, it is my view that these powers should be subject to due process requirements and, more specifically, a judicial evaluation of the cause, nature, and duration of the detention. This is the balance between Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution on executive power, and Article III, Section 233 on the issuance of warrants of arrest being, essentially, a judicial function.

For this reason, I submit that the seventh guideline in the ponencia requiring a formal charge be amended accordingly. Apart from the formal charge, the administrative body must immediately inform the courts, via an application for a judicial warrant, of the detention of the person. The application should be filed before the trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place where the person is detained. This should result in the issuance of a judicial warrant within a reasonable time in order for the administrative warrant to be valid.

7. The person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time if no such period is provided by law. Upon the filing of the formal charge, the administrative body shall inform the courts, via a sworn complaint of the detention of the person. The complaint shall be filed before the trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place where the person is detained, after which, a judicial warrant should be issued. The filing of the sworn complaint and the issuance of the judicial warrant shall be made within the same reasonable period for filing the formal charge. In all stages of the proceedings, the person detained shall not be denied access to a competent counsel of his or her own choice.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The October 22, 2018 Resolution of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Manila in R-MNL-18-10197-SP must be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by respondent Yuan Wenle must be DENIED for being moot and academic.