G.R. No. 253426, November 29, 2022,
♦ Decision,
Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Singh, [J]
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 253426. November 29, 2022 ]
ANA MARIA C. MANGUERRA, PETITIONER, VS. MA. PATRICIA CONCEPCION E. MANGUERRA-ABERASTURI, JOSE MARIANO E. MANGUERRA, CHRISTINE MARTINA E. MANGUERRA, MAMERTO LUIS E. MANGUERRA, JUAN PAOLO E. MANGUERRA, AND GREGORIO CONSTANTINO E. MANGUERRA, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRENCE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
I concur.
Antecedents
On January 27, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of decedent Concepcion A. Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra (decedent) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP Proc. No. M-5599, where she prayed for the allowance of the decedent's will and for her appointment as executor of the estate.
By Order dated April 15, 2003, the Regional Trial Court allowed the decedent's will, ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner, but invalidated the disinheritance provision contained in the will. She thus filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a motion, praying for the distribution of the properties of the estate to the named devisees and legatees in the will.
By Resolution (Partial Distribution Order) dated October 21, 2013, the Regional Trial Court directed the partial distribution of the decedent's estate. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Partial Distribution Order, which was denied. Aggrieved, they filed their Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal both dated April 2, 2014, challenging the Partial Distribution Order.
By Order dated June 2, 2014, the Regional Trial Court approved the record on appeal and directed the submission of the records to the Court of Appeals. Notably, while the appeal was pending, petitioner filed a Motion for Final Distribution of Remainder of the Estate, which was not opposed by the respondents despite ample opportunity to do so. By Resolution dated September 17, 2014, the Regional Trial Court granted petitioner's Motion (Final Distribution Order).
On September 30, 2014, respondents filed a Motion to Inhibit, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court. After the re-raffle of the case, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 10, 2014, which was denied under Order dated September 7, 2015. They received the order denying their motion on September 22, 2015. Thereafter, on October 21, 2015 or 29 days after their receipt of the order of the Regional Trial Court, they filed their Notice of Appeal with attached Record on Appeal, challenging the Final Distribution Order.
By Order dated April 5, 2017, the Regional Trial Court disapproved respondents' record on appeal for having been filed out of time. It ordained that since the case had already been finally disposed of, the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal which should have been filed within 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was granted under Decision dated June 17, 2019. It ordered the Regional Trial Court to approve the notice of appeal and record of appeal and explained that in special proceedings, the proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order is by notice of appeal and record on appeal in accordance with Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Since Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prescribes a period of 30 days within which to file a record on appeal, the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved respondents' timely-filed notice of appeal and record on appeal.
By Order dated July 8, 2019, the Regional Trial Court approved respondents' notice of appeal and record on appeal. Hence, this petition.
I. Section 2(a) and Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
An appeal is a statutory or reglementary right. It is availed of only by following strictly what the statute or the regulation states as to the mode and timing of taking it. The relevant provisions in the Rules of Court are clear as regards the mode and timing of an appeal in special proceedings:
Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 2(a):
Section 2. Modes of Appeal. – (a) Ordinary Appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 3:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
What Section 2(a) states is a straightforward and categorical directive that a record on appeal is not required "except in special proceedings... " without qualification. With the same straightforward and categorical mandate, an appellant in a special proceeding case has 30 days from the designated timeline to file both the notice appeal and the record on appeal.
Indeed, the purpose of a record of appeal is to mimic the case records so the latter does not have to be brought to the Court of Appeals and proceedings at the Regional Trial Court could continue. But this is not stated in the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court itself.
The conclusion that the appeal does not call for a record on appeal when the case has been already finally disposed of is a legal conclusion that may or may not be correct all the time. For often, the situations that should inevitably lead to this legal conclusion are not intuitive. It involves a judgment call for which a party in error should not be penalized.
If upheld, we put imprimatur on a rule fraught with prejudicial ambiguity that imposes the burden upon a party to determine for herself or himself whether a record on appeal should be filed and whether the appeal period is 30 days or 15 days. This rule would only foment needless litigation on procedural matters to the detriment of enabling substantive resolutions. This we cannot allow.
II. Relevant jurisprudence
In any case, there is authority to the effect that the mode of appeal and thus the time for taking the appeal is the same in cases where multiple appeals could or did in fact happen. We find this language in Republic v. Nishina, thus:
The appellate court's reliance on Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr. in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is misplaced. In Zayco which was a petition for letters of administration of a deceased person's estate, the decedent's children appealed the trial court's order appointing the grandson of the decedent as administrator of the estate. Their notice of appeal and record on appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that the appealed order is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. But even if the appeal were proper, it was belatedly filed. On certiorari by the decedent's children, the appellate court sustained the trial court. On petition for review, this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that "[a]n order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate," hence, the order is "final" and "appealable." The Court also held that the appeal was filed on time.
In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the proceedings before the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate – matters covered by Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals could, and did in that case, call for them. (Emphasis supplied)
III. Application
Here, since the appeal was from a case under special proceedings – the probate of the decedent's last will and testament – wherein multiple appeals could happen, respondents correctly relied upon the express and clear provisions of Section 2(a) and Section 3 of Rule 41.
At any rate, there was still a pending issue before the Regional Trial Court as regards the Partial Distribution Order as it remained the subject of an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Verily, the proceedings before the trial court had not yet come to an end when the order appealed from was issued. Hence, the Regional Trial Court had no basis to fault respondents in appealing from the assailed order through a record on appeal and within 30 days from their receipt of the same.
All told, the notice of appeal and record on appeal were timely filed.
THUS, I vote to deny the present petition and affirm the Decision dated June 17, 2019 and the Resolution dated September 8, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151780.
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