G.R. No. 253426 - Concurring Opinion




G.R. No. 253426, November 29, 2022, ♦ Decision, Gaerlan, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J] EN BANC [ G.R. No. 253426. November 29, 2022 ] ANA MARIA C. MANGUERRA, PETITIONER, VS. MA. PATRICIA CONCEPCION E. MANGUERRA-ABERASTURI, JOSE MARIANO E. MANGUERRA, CHRISTINE MARTINA E. MANGUERRA, MAMERTO LUIS E. MANGUERRA, JUAN PAOLO E. MANGUERRA, AND GREGORIO CONSTANTINO E. MANGUERRA, RESPONDENTS. CONCURRING OPINION GESMUNDO, C.J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated September 30, 2020 filed by Ana Maria C. Manguerra (petitioner), assailing the Decision dated June 17, 2019 and the Resolution dated September 8, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 151780. The CA reversed and set aside the Orders dated April 5, 2017 and June 16, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 (RTC), in SP. Proc. No. M-5599. The CA essentially held that the notice of appeal and record on appeal were timely filed by Ma. Patricia Concepcion E. Manguerra-Aberasturi, Jose Mariano E. Manguerra, Christine Martina E. Manguerra, Mamerto Luis E. Manguerra, Juan Paolo E. Manguerra, and Gregorio Constantino E. Manguerra (collectively, respondents) within the 30-day reglementary period. This case involves the distribution of the estate of Concepcion A. Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra pursuant to her will, which was subject to probate. After the RTC allowed the decedent's will, it issued Partial Distribution Order regarding the uncontested portions of the estate.1 Respondents filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal against said Partial Distribution Order. After much litigation and while the appeal against the Partial Distribution Order was pending, the RTC issued a Final Distribution Order, which was essentially ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal 29 days after the receipt of notice of the Final Distribution Order.2 However, the RTC denied the notice of appeal for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.3 Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it, among others, disapproved their notice of appeal and record on appeal. Later, the CA ruled in favor of respondents. The CA held that in cases involving multiple appeals, such as the distribution of shares in an estate proceeding, a notice of appeal and record on appeal may be filed within the 30-day period; not the 15-day reglementary period. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court.4 The ponencia denies the petition. It stated that "x x x the current Rules do not specify that a record on appeal is only required when the whole case is not yet fully disposed of. In other words, while it is possible that there would be no need for a record on appeal when the case is fully disposed of, the requirements under the Rules of Court, specifically Section 2(a), Rule 41, still stand. Thus, in special proceedings, and in other cases of multiple and separate appeals, a record on appeal must be filed together with a notice of appeal."5 I respectfully express my concurrence with the conclusions reached by the ponencia. Record on appeal Sec. 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court states that there can be multiple appeals in special proceedings: Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. Accordingly, it is not only the final judgment of the court in a special proceeding, which resolves all the issues therein, that may be appealed to the appellate court. Rather, there can be multiple appeals depending on the issues involved in a special proceeding. In relation thereto, Sec. 2(a) of Rule 41 provides that both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal should be filed against a judgment or final order of the trial court, to wit: Section 2. Modes of appeal. — (a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis supplied) Verily, in special proceedings or in other cases where multiple or separate appeals are required by the Rules of Court, a record on appeal must be filed, together with the notice of appeal, to assail a judgment or final order by the trial court. On the other hand, Sec. 3, Rule 41 provides the period to institute an appeal when a record on appeal is required, viz.: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. (Emphasis supplied) In Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol6 (Spouses Lebin), this Court declared that a judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed by a record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal, instead of only a notice of appeal, is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part capable of being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding other parts of the case. In contrast, a record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as it affords the appellate court full opportunity to review and decide the appealed matter.7 This was reiterated by the Court in Brual v. Contreras8 (Brual), wherein it held that under Sec.1aшphi1 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he/she needs to file not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that would require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party. In said case, the Court held that since therein respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial of their motion for intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within the period prescribed by the Rules. Although in both cases of Spouses Lebin and Brual, the Court dismissed petitioners' appeal for their failure to timely file a record on appeal. Likewise, in Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio,9 it was held that the proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he or she will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party. In this case, the ponente essentially states that respondents properly filed a record on appeal, together with the notice of appeal, and underscored that the case of Republic v. Nishina10 (Nishina) does not squarely apply. Nishina involves a petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname. The Court held therein that the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent's petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry. Notably, the RTC therein, in its October 8, 2007 Order, had already granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos "to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 [bearing] Registry No. 93-06684 and to change it [in its stead] Registry No. 87-04983, particularly the surname of [therein respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE." Accordingly, insofar as the petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname was concerned, no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order; thus, the filing of a record on appeal was no longer necessary. However, while Nishina states that it may be possible that a record of appeal is no longer needed to appeal in special proceedings when no other matter remains to be heard by the trial court, the Court did not categorically state that the reglementary period to appeal in special proceedings is reduced to 15 days when only a notice of appeal is required. Conspicuously, the Court did not go so far as to declare that the reglementary period to file an appeal is shortened from 30 days to 15 days because there was a judgment or final order issued by the court in a special proceeding, which can no longer be subjected to multiple appeals. Accordingly, it cannot be implied that since no record on appeal is required, the 15-day reglementary period for notice of appeal now applies. It bears emphasis that Nishina did not, in any way, amend Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing therein which states that when a record on appeal is no longer mandated in a special proceeding, the reglementary period is shortened to 15 days. In addition, it might prove problematic if the Court allowed different reglementary periods for various appeals in special proceedings. It would create an unnecessary issue between the parties, such as with the present case, on the applicable reglementary period that will govern the filing of an appeal in a special proceeding. One party may claim that the reglementary period to file a notice of appeal and record on appeal is still 30 days because there are remaining matters to be settled by the trial court. Another party may claim that the reglementary period to file an appeal is only 15 days because there are no more pending issues before the trial court. These conflicting claims on the reglementary period within which to file an appeal in a special proceeding can be avoided if the Court simply adheres to its original, rational, and uniform reglementary period of 30 days whenever a judgment or final order in a special proceeding may be subject to multiple appeals. In this manner, the litigants and the courts need not have to second-guess the applicable reglementary period to appeal in special proceedings. The more applicable case here would be Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr.,11 which involves a petition for letters of administration of a deceased person's estate. There, the decedent's children appealed the trial court's order appointing the grandson of the decedent as administrator of the estate. Their notice of appeal and record on appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that the appealed order was interlocutory and thus, was not subject to appeal, and that even if the appeal was proper, it was however belatedly filed. On certiorari by the decedent's children, the appellate court sustained the trial court. On petition for review, this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that "[a]n order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate," hence, the order was "final" and "appealable." The Court also held in Zayco that the appeal was filed on time – within the 30-day reglementary period. The Court emphasized therein that a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the proceedings before the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate – matters covered by Sec. 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals are, and in that case, were called for. Consequently, whenever there is a special proceeding involving multiple appeals, the 30-day reglementary period to appeal shall govern. Further, as properly observed by the ponencia, the Nishina case is not on all fours with the case at bar. For one, Nishina involved a petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname; while the present petition involves the distribution of shares in the estate. These are two very different special proceedings with different and multiple issues to be settled. Advance distribution pending appeal It is also my position that even with the Final Distribution Order, it does not necessarily mean that there are truly no issues left pending before the trial court. To repeat, the present case involves the distribution of shares in the estate. Sec. 2 of Rule 109 states: Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of this rules.12 Accordingly, even if there was a final order of distribution and there was an appeal, there can still be an advance distribution of the estate by the trial court for those portions not affected by the controversy or appeal. In that instance, the records of the case should remain with the trial court for that purpose of advance distribution. Thus, it appears that even if there is a final order of distribution, a record on appeal may still be required to be filed by the appellant as the records of the case should remain in the trial court for the purpose of advance distribution pending appeal. In said situation, the reglementary period would still be 30 days – not 15 days as advanced by the ponente. Notably, the implication of Sec. 2 of Rule 109 was not discussed in Nishina because the petition therein involved the cancellation of birth record and change of surname; and not the distribution of shares in an estate. Even if there is a final order of distribution of shares in an estate and an appeal is filed by the aggrieved party, there remains a pending issue left in the trial court. Thus, it would be more prudent to file a record on appeal with the appellate court within the 30-day reglementary period so that the records would remain with the trial court, for the purpose of resolving the possible issue of advance distribution of the estate, based on its discretion – particularly those portions of the estate not affected by the controversy or appeal. Remedy against the non-distribution of the estate Finally, it must be emphasized that respondents have several remedies to enforce their shares in the estate. In Heirs of Fran v. Salas,13 the Court discussed the remedies of the heirs who wish to assail the non-distribution of their shares in the estate, to wit: The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order.14 (Emphases supplied) Thus, even if the Final Distribution Order becomes final and executory, it is not the end of the road for respondents. They are still afforded a remedy in case of a non-distribution of the shares of the estate against them. WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, pp. 6-7. 2 Id. at 7-8. 3 Id. at 8. 4 Id. at 9-11. 5 Id. at 13. 6 672 Phil. 477 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]. 7 Id. at 489. 8 G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022 [Per J. Hernando, Second Division]. 9 767 Phil. 724, 734 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]. 10 649 Phil. 206 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]. 11 574 Phil. 736 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division]. 12 RULES OF COURT, Rule 109, Sec. 2. 13 285 Phil. 789 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]. 14 Id. at 813-814. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation