G.R. No. 239215 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022,
♦ Decision, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Dissenting Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Singh, [J]

RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG CITY, AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

Violence should not be narrowly and solely viewed as a gender issue in the context of intimate relationships but rather, a power issue.1 Constantly labeling women as "weak" and "victims" affirms a level of heteronormativity. Women who perpetrate violence should not be immune from the force of the law. On the other hand, children who suffer from domestic violence should be protected from their abusers — even from their own mothers.

Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution mandates the "fundamental equality before the law of women and men."2 Consistent with this direction, the State, as a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, is bound to take all appropriate measures "[to] modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the, sexes, or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]"3 In Alanis III v. Court of Appeals:4

In keeping with the Convention, Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the State be active in ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive than the more widelyinvoked equal protection and due process clauses under the Bill of Rights. In Racho v. Tanaka, this Court observed:

This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section I only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."

Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.5 (Citation omitted)

Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, reflects this policy. It is a novel statute which guarantees the dignity of women and children and mandates their protection from violence and threats to personal safety and security.6 It addresses domestic violence in intimate relationships, which is largely due to unequal power relations between men and women.7

In Garcia v. Drilon,8 this Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, emphasizing the prevailing patriarchal society which empowers men at the expense of women. Thus:

Further, Garcia explained how women and their children are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence. This creates a valid classification and substantial distinction between men and women which justified the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262. Thus:

Preventing violence against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, arid therefore need legal intervention.10 (Citation omitted)

Nevertheless, Garcia recognized that violence and abuse may also be perpetrated against men.11 Women, on the other hand, may also be perpetrators of violence.12 The under reported abuse against men is largely due to social and cultural expectations on masculinity which compels men to keep mum on domestic abuse.13

Gender must be viewed primarily as an "inequality of power," not merely as a difference assigned to sexes.14 The social status and role attributed to men and women are repercussions of this inequality:

The differences we attribute to sex are lines inequality draws, not any kind of basis for it. Social and political inequality are ... basically indifferent to sameness and difference. Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact, its outcome presented as its origin, the damage that it pointed to as the justification for doing the damage after the damage has been done, the distinctions that perception is socially organized to notice because inequality gives them consequences for social power. Distinctions of body or mind or behavior are pointed to as cause rather than effect, without realizing that they are so deeply effect rather than cause that pointing to them at all is an effect.15

Republic Act No. 9262 is a law which intends to reject patriarchy. The reductionist thinking that women are always victims reinforces their powerlessness. This only perpetuates and affirms the very biases and prejudices against them.16

The view which perpetually labels women as victims results in a narrow thinking that women are always weak. This does not advance gender equality, but aggravates the belief that men will always dominate women.17 This only affirms heteronormativity:

Thus, violence and abuse in the context of intimate relationships is not a gender issue but a power issue.19 With this understanding, it is entirely possible that women can be perpetrators of violence and abuse in domestic and intimate relationships.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 defines "violence against women and children" as:

[A]ny act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical. sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Violent acts include physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, and economic abuse.20

To address these acts, the law provides three distinct remedies to the victims: a criminal complaint, a civil action for damages, and a civil action for issuance of a protection order.21

A criminal case may be filed against offenders who commit any act of violence against women and their children under Section 5.22 This includes: threatening, attempting, or causing physical harm to the woman or her child; placing them in fear of imminent physical harm; attempting to compel or compelling them to engage in any conduct; restricting their movement; engaging them in sexual activities through force; or causing substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.

Meanwhile, a civil action may also be filed under Section 36 for actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages.

One of the law's innovations is the remedy of protection orders. A protection order is issued to "[prevent] further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 ... and granting other necessary relief' and to "[safeguard] the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independent1y regain control over her life."23 Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9262, the protection order may include any, some, or all of the following reliefs:

Republic Act No. 9262 provides three kinds of protection orders: a barangay protection order, a temporary protection order, and a permanent protection order. The punong barangay, or if they are unavailable, the barangay kagawad, issues barangay protection orders, while trial courts issue temporary and permanent protection orders.

Under Republic Act No. 9262, it 1s not only the victim who can file the petition for a protection order:

Section 9. Who may File Petition for Protection Orders. — A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:

To enable the law to fully protect the victims, it mandates a liberal application in granting petitions for protection orders. This Court affirmed this approach.

In Go-Tan v. Tan,24 petitioner filed a petition for protection order against her husband and her parents-in-law. In arguing against the petition, respondents argued that they were not covered by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 which explicitly states that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship.25

In Go-Tan, this Court allowed the filing of a petition for protection order against the woman's parents-in-law, acknowledging that violence may be committed directly or indirectly through other persons. This is consistent with the policy of the law to promote the safety of violence victims.26 Thus, while parents-in-law are not expressly provided in the definition of offenders, a protection order may be filed against them when shown that they have caused verbal, psychological, and economic abuses against the victim.27 A strict interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 will not advance its policy:

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit — the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.28 (Citation omitted)

The law further extends protection to the victim's children, regardless of their age. In Estacio v. Estacio,29 petitioner-offender questioned the inclusion of their adult children in the protection order. He argued that only children below 18 years old or those incapable of taking care of themselves as defined under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 can be covered by the law.

In upholding the adult children's inclusion in the protection order, this Court found that petitioner-offender indeed committed violence against respondent' through their children. He harassed respondent by sending her degrading and threatening messages through the children. Although the children are no longer minors, descendants as a whole class are covered by the law within the context of protection orders. Moreover, this Court pointed out that the law does not distinguish children based on age as possible beneficiaries of protection orders.30

Even if the wording of the law provides that the term "children" in the law "refer[s] to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves," this Cou1i considered the parties' adult children who may be granted relief under other sections of the law. Particularly, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9262 states that other forms of relief may be issued in favor of the victim and "any designated family or household member."31 This liberal reading of the provisions will give life to the law's policy of protecting the victims.

Clearly, this case compels us to view gender as a relational and power dynamic with a broader understanding of domestic violence. With a liberal reading of the law, a petition can be filed on behalf of the child even against the mother.

This is in keeping with the law's declaration of policy, which does not only guarantee the safety and security of the woman, but also of the child.32 Particularly, it stresses the State's commitment to advance not only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, but also the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The restrictive reading of Republic Act No. 9262 which treats a child as a mere adjunct of their mother defeats the law's policy.7!ᕼdMᗄ7 The law does not require the woman to be the victim to afford protection to the child. The text of the law is plain. As pointed out by the ponencia, Republic Act No. 9262 provides that acts of violence under Section 5 can be committed against the woman or her child.33

Further, under Section 9(a) of the law, one of the persons allowed to file a petition for protection order is the "offended party." This can be read in conjunction with Section 3(a) which defines violence under the law as any act or a series of acts committed "against [a woman's] child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse."

Moreover, Section 9(b) allows parents or guardians of the victim to file the petition for protection order. The wording of the law does not distinguish, which parent is allowed to file. It is not only the mother who can file a petition for her child. The gender-neutral framing of the provision allows space for fathers or even guardians to file a protection order against an abusive mother. The father, as a parent, can file the petition on behalf of his minor daughter.

Here, Randy Michael Knutson (Randy) alleged that his daughter, Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby), was maltreated and threatened to be killed by her mother, respondent Rosalina Sibal Knutson (Rosalina). There were instances when respondent Rosalina pulled Rhuby's hair, slapped her face, and knocked her head. These are acts of physical violence that can be prevented by a protection order.

Further, Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act does not diminish the force and effect of Republic Act No. 9262. As explained by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 does not distinguish between relatives or non-relatives. Verily, Randy could have filed an action under this law. However, child abuse within the context of intimate relationships is still covered by Republic Act No. 9262. The law's distinct feature is its emphasis on violence perpetuated within the bounds of intimate and domestic relationships, which are saturated and often shaped by gender relations as compared to other types of relations.

On the other hand, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa's strict interpretation of the law reduces the protection of the child from the abuses of the mother. It further diminishes the burden of the mother and removes her sense of agency simply because she is a woman. This is not the intent of Republic Act No. 9262. That Rhuby's mother is the respondent does not exclude Rhuby from the protection the law provides. This interpretation does not frustrate the law's intent. It also does not diminish the protection intended for victims of gender-based violence. The fundamental equality before the law of men and women should be invoked when the situation demonstrates political and social oppressions. Otherwise, the benefits of the law should be emphatically applied.