G.R. No. 239215 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022,
♦ Decision, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Dissenting Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Singh, [J]

RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG CITY, AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

I vote to remand the case to the trial court to hear and decide the petition not on the basis of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 92621 but pursuant to the rules set forth in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.2 In this way, protection is afforded to the child while the Court stays true to its mandate of upholding the law based on what its letter and spirit intend.

The crux of the controversy in this case is whether the remedies of protection orders and custody under R.A. 9262 apply when violence is committed by a woman, in this case, a mother, against her own child. Public respondent, in the assailed Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders,3 ruled in the negative, reasoning as follows:

In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent reiterated that R.A. 9262 does not apply to a situation where it was the mother herself who committed violent and abusive acts against her own child. She explained that "children being protected under R.A. 9262 refer to the biological children and other children under the care of the woman/victim."5 As such, a child's mother is not included as one of the offenders under R.A. 9262.6

I agree with the RTC. I find that public respondent's reading of the law — that R.A. 9262 does not cover violence committed by a mother against her own child — is in full accord not only with the plain language of its provisions, but also with the intent and spirit that animate it.

The first basic rule in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Here, R.A. 9262 unequivocally defines the victims of violence or the offended parties the law intends to protect — the woman and her child. Notably, examining R.A. 9262 in detail reveals that the law is not intended to apply to all children victimized by violence or abuse but only to the child or children of the woman subjected to violence or abuse.

Foremost, the title of R.A. 9262 itself qualifies that the child covered by the law is the child of the woman subject to violence or abuse. Thus, the title of R.A. 9262 reads, "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."7 This is reiterated in Section 1 of R.A. 9262, viz.:

SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004[."] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Further, all through-out the text of the law, the term "child" is always associated with the term "woman." As public respondent aptly noted, R.A. 9262 does not consider or treat the "child" independently from the "woman" subjected to violence or abuse.

To be sure, Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262, in defining what violence against women and their children means, states, "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate[.]"8 Further, in defining the term children, Section 3(h) provides, "[a]s used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim [, i.e. the woman,] and other children under her care."9

In addition, Sections 5 and 6 of R.A. 9262, in enumerating prohibited acts and their corresponding penalties, respectively state:

Likewise, Section 8, which pertains to the issuance of protection orders, refers not just to any child — it refers only to the child of the woman victim. It states that the immediate reliefs granted by law (barangay protection order, temporary protection order and permanent protection order) are for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child as specified in Section 5 thereof.

In the same vein, R.A. 9262 explicitly defines the offender or perpetrator of the crime penalized therein. Thus, Section 3(a) provides that "['v]iolence against women and their children['] refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."10

Following the foregoing enumeration, the offender contemplated by R.A. 9262 includes any of the following persons: the woman's husband, the woman's former husband, the woman's sexual or dating partner, the woman's former sexual or dating partner, or the father of the woman's child.

In Garcia v. Judge Drilon,11 (Garcia) the Court clarified that R.A. 9262 does not single out men as offenders. Women may also be held liable for violating R.A. 9262. However, it should be emphasized that the Court also made it clear in Garcia that this applies only in cases when the woman-victim is in a lesbian relationship or where there is a conspiracy between the perpetrator of the violence or abuse against the woman (i.e. the woman's husband, the woman's former husband, the woman's sexual or dating partner, the woman's former sexual or dating partner, or the father of the woman's child) and another person/s, who may include a woman:

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

Proceeding from the foregoing, R.A. 9262 applies only when there is a woman subjected to violence and abuse. Moreover, since R.A. 9262 does not treat the child independently from the abused woman, and given the offenders enumerated and contemplated by R.A. 9262, it becomes quite clear that R.A. 9262 only covers violence or abuse against the woman's child committed by any of the following persons: the woman's husband, the woman's former husband, the woman's sexual or dating partner, the woman's former sexual or dating partner, or the father of the woman's child.

Stated otherwise, it is quite clear that R.A. 9262 does not contemplate a situation wherein no woman is abused or subjected to violence, and instead it is the woman herself who is the offender or the one who inflicts violence against the victim or the offended party. Also, as explained by the Court in Garcia, a woman may be considered as an offender under R.A. 9262 only when the woman is in lesbian relationship or in conspiracy with other persons. To my mind, public respondent is therefore correct in ruling that R.A. 9262 does not apply to the present case. In the first place, there is no woman subjected to violence in the context of an intimate relationship in this case. Moreover, private respondent in this case is not in a lesbian relationship. Neither was conspiracy established between private respondent and the husband or father of the victim.

Another primordial principle in statutory construction is that a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. The legislative intent is the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. Any interpretation that contradicts the legislative intent is unacceptable.13

A perusal of the spirit and intent of R.A. 9262, through its legislative history and congressional deliberations, leads to this same interpretation that the child included under R.A. 9262 pertains only to the child of the abused woman and not to all children subjected to violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 originated from three bills, two of which were drafted by the House of Representatives and the third emanating from the Senate.

House Bill No. (HB) 6054 entitled An Act Defining Domestic Violence, Providing Protection Measures and Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes (DV Bill) pertained to domestic violence in general. It sought to penalize violence committed by and against any member of the family or household whether a minor, adult, or elderly. It covered incidents of spouse battery, wife assault, woman or girl abuse, marital violence, wife cruelty and violence against family member. It appears that the DV Bill intended to penalize all forms of abuse or violence committed against any person in a family setting.

On the other hand, HB 5516 entitled An Act Defining the Crime of Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, and for Other Purposes (AntiA WIR Bill) limited the crime of violence and abuse to women in intimate relationships. Thus, it defined the crime as acts of violence or abuse committed against a woman who is his wife, or former wife, his/her live-in partner, or former live-in partner, or against a woman whom the person has or had a sexual dating relationship.

Records of committee deliberations of the House of Representatives showed that proponents of the DV Bill asserted the need for a comprehensive law on domestic violence. They emphasized that domestic violence is committed against all members of the family and distinction as to sex or a piecemeal approach in addressing the issue is unnecessary.14 On the other hand, sponsors of the Anti-A WIR Bill insisted that statistical data support that majority of the victims of domestic violence are women and even international instruments like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women recognized the proliferation of gender-based violence committed against women. They also explained that unlike the DV Bill, the Anti-A WIR Bill extends the protection of women not only within the framework of the household but even to women in intimate relationships. They further claimed that other members of the family are already protected by current laws: R.A. 7610 is comprehensive enough to address abuses committed against children, while the Revised Penal Code covers violence committed against other members of the household.15

While there was a move to consolidate both house bills, they were separately approved by the House of Representatives during their Third Reading and were both elevated to the Senate.

The counterpart bill of HB 5516 and 6054 in the Senate is Senate Bill No. (SB) 2723 entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Members of the Family, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, and for Other Purposes.

During the plenary deliberations, the issue on SB 2723's coverage was also raised. It was proposed that men be excluded from the coverage of the bill and that protection afforded by the bill be limited to women, who are mostly the victims of gender-based violence. Subsequently, Senator Vicente Sotto III (Senator Sotto) raised that there is also a need to expand the protection afforded to children subjected to violence and abuse. It was then agreed upon in the Senate that SB 2723 would include both women and children, viz.:

Subsequently, when the three bills were reconciled during the bicameral conference committee, the issue on the persons covered by the consolidated bill was once again raised. There was a consensus among the members that men are excluded from the coverage of the consolidated bill. As to children, however, Senator Sotto's proposition to include all children subjected to violence and abuse was effectively modified when the members of the bicameral conference committee agreed to further refine the definition of children covered by the law, viz.:

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, while Representative Bellaflor Angara-Castillo's suggestion to completely remove the word "children" from the title of the consolidated bill was not adopted, it was nevertheless clarified that the proposed consolidated bill does not cover all children victimized by violence or abuse. The child which the consolidated bill intends to protect is the child affected by the abusive relationship the womanvictim is/was into. It is the child of the woman subjected to violence and abuse, whether the child is her biological or adopted child or a child under her care. As such, the title was revised to include the word "their" beside children and the body of the R.A. 9262 consistently made reference to the child as "her child." This is to make clear the intent, as agreed and clarified during the bicameral conference committee, that not all children subjected to violence or abuse are covered by R.A. 9262 but only the child of the abused woman or violated mother or the child under her care. In this light, the present case unfortunately does not fall within the purview of the law.

Worthy of note as well is the fact that R.A. 9262 did not expressly repeal or amend the provisions of R.A. 7610, which, as raised during the congressional deliberations, provides a comprehensive protection to minor children subjected to violence and abuse.

R.A. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, and other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation committed against children. It covers all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to a child's development, including acts against a child committed by the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.18 As such, Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 penalizes all other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation against a child, which includes those committed by parents against their children, as enumerated under Article 5919 of Presidential Decree No. 60320 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Further, R.A. 7610 and its implementing rules and regulations grant the child reliefs against acts of abuse, violence, cruelty and neglect, such as immediate protective custody and transfer of parental authority.21

Indeed, had Congress really intended to repeal or amend R.A. 7610, which specifically defines and penalizes child abuse, including those committed by their parents, and grants reliefs to protect the child victim, then Congress would have explicitly done so. Despite the fact that R.A. 7610 was raised during congressional deliberations, Congress did not include any amendatory provision in R.A. 9262 on the rights of children provided under R.A. 7610. On the contrary, Congress, during the bicameral conference committee, even clarified that R.A. 9262 does not cover all circumstances of child abuse. What R.A. 9262 actually covers are the acts of violence against the woman and her child, whether biological, adopted or under her care, committed by the woman's husband, woman's former husband, woman's dating or sexual partner, woman's former dating or sexual partner or the father of the woman's child. A child abused by her own mother is not included in any of these circumstances.

In ruling that mothers can be prosecuted under R.A. 9262 when they commit violent and abusive acts against their own children, the ponencia posits that R.A. 9262 uses the gender-neutral word "person" as the offender which embraces any person of either sex.22

However, it must be borne in mind that, and as shown from the preceding discussion, legislative intent is ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.23 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.24 The meaning of the law is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole.25

In this regard, the term person under Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 cannot be read separately from the succeeding phrases which the law deliberately used to describe or qualify the offenders therein. It bears emphasis that Section 3(a) describes the term "person" as the woman's husband, former husband, person with whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom she has a common child. Likewise, the use of the term "person" arose from a recognition of the reality that women may enter into intimate relationships not just with men. It does not at all signify that the woman herself may be an offender, as this interpretation runs counter to the very essence of the law, which is the protection of women from violence in the context of intimate relationships.

Furthermore, in defining violence committed against a child, R.A. 9262, from beginning to end, consistently refers to the abused woman's child. This reinforces the interpretation that the offenders with respect to violence committed against the abused woman's child also pertains to the woman's husband, former husband, person with whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship or with whom the woman has a common child, or simply, the child's own father. In fact, nothing in R.A. 9262 explicitly or even impliedly indicate that the woman herself or a mother is considered as an offender; save in the cases explained by the Court in the case of Garcia. Therefore, it is very inaccurate to say that R.A. 9262 does not limit or qualify the offenders when, in fact, the language of the law categorically does.

In stark contrast to R.A. 9262, R.A. 7610 explicitly names and penalizes parents — hence, including mothers — as offenders or perpetrators of the violence committed against their child. As discussed, Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 covers acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation committed by parents against their own child. As well, the declared policy of R.A. 7610, as expressed in Section 2 thereof, is that the State shall intervene on behalf of the child when abuse, exploitation and discrimination against the child are committed by the his or her own parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the child.

Undoubtedly, R.A. 7610 is the law dedicated for the protection of a child, while R.A. 9262 is the law enacted mainly to protect women in abusive relationships. The core of R.A. 7610 is the protection of a child from all forms of abuse, neglect and exploitation, including those committed by their own parents. On the other hand, R.A. 9262's focus is the gender-based violence and abuse committed against women in intimate relationships. This distinction between R.A. 9262 and R.A. 7610 can also reasonably be inferred from the fact that R.A. 9262 was mostly drawn from the provisions of the Anti-A WIR bills instead of the various DV bills introduced in Congress.

During the deliberations of this case, it was raised that the legislative debates reveal that R.A. 9262 was intended to provide a more comprehensive remedy and that Congress opted not to remove the protection of children from the proposed measures. Senator Sotto's statement that mothers also commit violence and abuse against their children, and the discussion between Representative Darlene Antonino-Custodio (Representative AntoninoCustodio) and Representative Imee Marcos (Representative Marcos) on broadening the definition of child supposedly affirm this position.

While Senator Sotto expressed that women, including mothers can be abusers, and thus, all children should be part of R.A. 9262, as discussed, this proposal was effectively modified during the Bicameral Conference Committee, when the members decided to add the word "their" before children, to signify that the child covered by R.A. 9262 is the child of the abused woman and not just any child abused in a family setting. In other words, by adding the word "their" or "her" to modify the words of "children" or "child," what R.A. 9262 simply intends is to extend protection not only to the abused woman, but also to the abused woman's child as he or she is an unfortunate victim of the abusive relationship his or her mother is into.

In this regard, the discussion between Representative AntoninoCustodio and Representative Marcos on broadening the term "child" to include also those under the woman's care should be read together with the unanimous agreement to describe the child covered by R.A. 9262 as the child of the abused woman confronted with such abusive relationship; as well as and the express language of the law on who the offenders or perpetrators of the violence are. To be sure, Representative Marcos, in adopting the suggestions to broadly define the term child, still made reference to their abused mothers:

REP. MARCOS: Therefore, to reiterate, taking into consideration both Representative Sarenas and Representative Custodio's concerns, the Bicam transcript should therefore reflect the intent of this body to broadly interpret the term "children" not only to include the biological children of the abused or violated mothers, but also all children under their care.26 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, based on congressional records, the intent of R.A. 9262, similar to what its language expresses, is to include only the child affected by the abusive relationship his or her mother is into, and not all children subjected to violence or abuse in a family. If R.A. 9262 is to be interpreted to include all abuse committed against a child, including those committed by their own mothers, then R.A. 9262 would also cover abuses committed by grandparents, uncles, aunties, elder brother or sister, or any person living in the family abode — circumstances which are certainly beyond what R.A. 9262 intends. In including mothers as offenders under R.A. 9262, and consequently, all other members of a household, as what the ponencia does, the very policy for the creation of R.A. 9262, which is to protect women against violence in the context of intimate relationships, is effectively diluted. It also results in a conflation of laws and an abject confusion about, and may possibly conflict with, the coverage of R.A. 7610. Truly, a statute must be construed, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize it with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.27 The operative word is to harmonize — not to confuse.

Justice Leonen, in his Concurring Opinion, opines that "violence and abuse in the context of intimate relationships is not a gender issue but a power issue."28 From this, he makes the argument that it is, therefore, "entirely possible that women can be perpetrators of violence and abuse in domestic and intimate relationships."29 The ultimate conclusion from these premises is that the victims of women in general, when they commit violence or abuse, can therefore seek the remedies under R.A. 9262.

While I agree with the premises, I do not agree that the premises warrant the conclusion.

I do not dispute that domestic abuse is an issue of power. ln fact, abuse in general is an issue of power. Irrespective of context — whether it be in interstate relations (developed vs. developing countries), the State vs. its citizens, employers vs. its employees, parents vs. their children — the ability to commit acts of abuse is directly linked to power. Power may come from different sources and in different forms: it can be political, economic, or rooted in cultural norms, just to name a few. This is why l agree that even in domestic settings, abuse is an issue of power. Historically though, a lot of societies, including ours, have given males the social duty to earn for the family. It has long been the social expectation for the woman to take care of the family and be a "housewife," while the husband is the one expected to earn. This may indeed have skewed power in domestic relationships in favor of the males, as they would naturally hold economic power as a result of this social expectation. Not to mention, there are other factors as well that contribute to abuse in domestic settings, such as gender socialization, to which most — regardless of gender — are subjected, which perpetuate the notion that females are "the weaker sex."

I therefore accept as correct the premise that domestic abuse is an issue of power. What I cannot concede, however, is that this premise implies the following conclusion: that we can read R.A. 9262 beyond its letter.

If this Court were the floors of Congress, and we were debating on the choice between enacting "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children," on the one hand, and a general "Anti-Domestic Violence" measure, on the other, l would support the latter. After all, abuse, as a function of power, can go both ways regardless of sex.

Unfortunately, we are not in the halls of the legislature. Instead, we are in a court of law. Our function is to apply the law, not discuss or debate its wisdom. And in my view, as I am reading the law in its entirety, R.A. 9262 and its provisions are clear: it only applies in situations where women are subjected to violence in the context of intimate relationships. The reference to children, to repeat, has always been in relation to the woman subjected to violence. It covers situations where the child of an abused woman is himself/herself subjected to abuse as a result of, or in connection with, the abuse against the woman. Abuse against children in other contexts is covered by R.A. 7610.

Justice Leonen also wants the Court to liberally apply R.A. 9262 to the present case, in the same way that the Court did in the cases of Estacio y Salvosa v. Estacio y Santos30 (Estacio) and Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan31 (Go-Tan).

However, as I see it, these cases, in fact, fortify the position that what R.A. 9262 penalizes is the violence committed against the woman and her child in the context of intimate relationships and not all abuse committed against a child, as in the present case.

In Go-Tan, the victim was a woman, who was abused by her husband. The Court ruled that R.A. 9262 also applies to the husband's parents, as it was alleged that the husband, conspired with his parents, "in tormenting [the wife] by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically."32

Similarly, in Estacio, the offender was the husband and the victim were the wife and their three (3) children.(awÞhi( As the trial court found, which the Court affirmed, that the offender-husband/father has committed acts of abuse and violence against his wife and their three (3) children, the issuance of protection orders also in favor of the children was proper. The Court said:

Here, petitioner's intent to intimidate and dominate respondent is readily seen. Back when they still cohabited, petitioner would verbally and physically abuse respondent in front of their children. His threats to kill her were so real that even their children advised her to leave the conjugal home because they feared for her life. When he no longer had contact with her, petitioner resorted to using their children as pawns. He would use this passive-aggressive behavior to assert his perceived dominance over respondent when he could not get what he wanted. All of these can be characterized as psychological violence committed against respondent, which have disrupted respondent's life.

Thus, whether petitioner committed acts of violence directly against his children is beside the point. That the children were exploited so that he could indirectly harass respondent is sufficient basis for their inclusion in the stay-away directive. To begin with, petitioner himself dragged their children in the controversy. With the stay-away directive, petitioner can no longer use their children to inflict violence on respondent.£A⩊phi£33 (Emphasis supplied)

To emphasize, a plain reading of R.A. 9262 leads to only one conclusion: it is meant to protect women who are subjected to violence in the context of intimate relationships. The case before the Court is not about violence and abuse against women in intimate relationship. Resort to R.A. 9262 is therefore erroneous and unwarranted. It is incumbent upon the Court not to unduly expand R.A. 9262's coverage beyond its clear sphere of application. To quote the words of the Court in Garcia, "Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law."34

While the purpose of the ponencia to protect the child in this case is quite understandable, it needlessly confuses the laws that should apply.

As well, while the circumstances of the present case make it fall within the purview of R.A. 7610, there is no showing from the narration of the facts whether there was a Complaint or Information for violation of R.A. 7610 that had been filed against private respondent which may bestow upon the RTC the jurisdiction to issue protective reliefs under said law.

Nevertheless, while R.A. 9262 is not the appropriate law in this case and the RTC may not have the jurisdiction to try and hear the case for violation of R.A. 7610, I find that petitioner and his minor child are not without any remedy.

To recall, in filing the petition with the trial court, petitioner not only prays for the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders against private respondent, but also for the temporary and permanent custody of his minor child. As such, the instant petition can be treated as a Petition for Custody of Minors and heard and decided following A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. Under this rule, apart from determining custody based on the best interest of the minor child, the trial court also has the authority to grant provisional and permanent reliefs for the child's protection.

Section 13 of the said rule provides that after the filing of an answer or the expiration of the period to file the same, the trial court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor to either parent, in this case to petitioner, taking into account all relevant considerations including preference of the minor child, unless the parent chosen is unfit.35 This award of custody to the father in this case will be a total and complete protection against the acts of the mother against the child.

Short of giving full relief by way of a custody grant, the trial court is authorized under Section 17 to issue a Protection Order requiring any person:

Note that paragraph (f) grants the trial court sufficient authority to issue incidental and necessary reliefs to protect a child from any forms of violence and abuse, including those committed by his or her own parent, as in this case. Thus, in pursuit of the best interest of the minor child, the Court may remand the case to the trial court for the purposes of hearing petitioner's prayer for custody of his minor child following the aforementioned rules.

Lest I be misunderstood, I am one with the ponencia in its desire to fulfill the State's duty of shielding children from all forms of abuse and exploitation. However, I cannot join with the ponencia's resort to R.A. 9262 in this case. Indeed, the solemn power and duty of the Court, foremost, is to interpret and apply the law within the boundaries set by its language and intent. It does not include the power to correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein.37 In ruling that mothers can be offenders under R.A. 9262, the ponencia reads into the law something which the language and spirit simply do not provide. This is a breach of the court's solemn duty. This is judicial legislation — one that has the deleterious effect of conflating penal laws, to the detriment of the accused who is entitled to the proscription that all doubts be resolved in their favor.

In fine, all the foregoing considered, I find that public respondent did not err in denying petitioner the reliefs prayed for under R.A. 9262. Considering both the plain language and intent of the law, the circumstances of this case clearly do not fall within the purview of R.A. 9262.

That said, to protect the paramount interest and security of the minor child, and to give private respondent her right to due process, the trial court may be directed to treat the petition as a petition for the custody of a minor and hear and decide the case with dispatch following A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.

WHEREFORE, I vote to PARTLY GRANT the petition but only insofar as remanding the case to the trial court to hear and decide the petition under the rules provided in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.