[ A.C. No. 10511. January 04, 2022 ]
MILAGROS MELAD-ONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PLACIDO M. SABBAN, RESPONDENT.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROSARIO, J.:
I have no qualms about the ponencia's finding that respondent is guilty of misconduct. There is substantial evidence to support this conclusion. I also have no problems concurring in the penalty imposed. Taken together, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is commensurate.
However, I would like to note some procedural gaps in the investigation and resolution of this case. For future reference, these issues must be addressed to ensure that due process is diligently observed. Otherwise, we risk being a party to a gross violation of this very right we are sworn to protect.
THE ANTECEDENTS
In a complaint1 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on July 17, 2014, Milagros Melad-Ong (complainant) accused Atty. Placido M. Sabban (Atty. Sabban or respondent) of illegally acquiring a portion of a property subject of litigation, of representing conflicting interests, and of deception.
Complainant alleged that she is the daughter of Jose Melad (Jose), who filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a civil suit against Concepcion Tuyuan (Concepcion) for the reconveyance of a parcel of land left behind by Fe Tuyuan. Jose claimed to be the sole heir of Fe Tuyuan and thus, he is entitled to the whole property.
Atty. Sabban, together with his father, Atty. Benito Sabban (Atty. Benito), filed a complaint-in-intervention on behalf of their clients, the Maguigads, who also claimed to be the true heirs of Fe Tuyuan.
On January 26, 1995, Jose passed away and was substituted by his heirs, which include herein complainant.
In May 1995, Concepcion executed a "Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees," which ceded ten hectares out of the 27 hectares of land originally owned by Fe Tuyuan. The land was supposedly Atty. Benito Sabban's compensation for the legal services he rendered for Fe Tuyuan when she was still alive.
Subsequently, Atty. Benito, for himself and on behalf of his son, herein respondent, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) an application for retention of the ten-hectare portion. Complainant alleged that this was furtively done without the knowledge of the court and the other parties to the civil case.
Sometime in 2006, Atty. Benito died. Respondent resumed appearance in the civil case. Around February 2008, respondent convinced the parties to settle the case. He then drafted a compromise agreement, which the RTC approved on April 1, 2008.
However, complainant lamented that due to the actuations of respondent, they never received the portion assigned to them under the compromise agreement. Further, she claimed that they would not have agreed to settle the case had respondent fully disclosed to them the retention he and his father made in 1995.
Complainant additionally accused respondent of representing conflicting interests, which he committed by lawyering for Concepcion and the Maguigads, his original clients. In particular, when the Maguigads obtained a writ of execution of the judicially approved compromise agreement, respondent moved for reconsideration thereof on behalf of Concepcion.
Accordingly, complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.
We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
On October 12, 2015, respondent filed his answer2 by counsel. While he admitted to filing the complaint-in-intervention of the Maguigads, respondent alleged that it was Atty. Benito who handled the case until the latter's death in 2006. Respondent also averred that the parties freely consented to the compromise agreement. Finally, he contended that the portion assigned to the heirs of Jose is the same portion awarded to them by the DAR when they applied for retention.
The Investigating Commissioner conducted a clarificatory hearing on April 8, 2016. The parties agreed to discuss only one issue in their position papers: whether respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of the property awarded to the heirs of Jose under the compromise agreement.3
The parties filed their position papers. Complainant reiterated her arguments whereas respondent complied with the directive to discuss the sole issue agreed upon.
In a Report and Recommendation4 dated December 12, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. Quite notably, the Investigating Commissioner based his findings on the other charges leveled by complainant, contrary to his Order dated April 8, 2016.
In a Resolution5 dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,6 arguing that the Investigating Commissioner went beyond the matters agreed upon, thereby violating his right to due process.
The IBP-BOG agreed with respondent and proceeded to determine his liability vis-à-vis the stipulated issue. Finding that complainant and her co-heirs received their due share under the compromise agreement, the IBP-BOG ordered the dismissal of the complaint.7
I
Atty. Sabban, as the respondent in the present disbarment proceedings, is entitled to due process.8 No less than the Constitution vouchsafes this right.9 Thus, no deprivation of life, liberty, and property can take place without due process of law.10
Since lawyers earn a living through the practice of their profession, their license is deemed a property right which may not be arbitrarily taken away without due process of law. In PSP Development Corp. v. Arma,11 we said:
Keeping in mind the above-discussed requirement of due process as well as the fact that the power to disbar (including the power to suspend) must be exercised with great caution, we hold that there is no sufficient basis for a disciplinary action against respondent. The Court cannot simply deprive respondent of the right to practice his legal profession without any sufficient factual and legal justifications. After all, such legal practice involves respondent's rights to work and to make a living, which are his property rights, and "the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong." (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, before a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law, the rudimentary requirements of due process must be observed. As Rule 138, Section 30 of the Rules of Court affirms:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
As an administrative proceeding, due process requirements in disciplinary cases are less stringent. Indeed, the right to due process is satisfied when there is notice, and a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend oneself. In addition, technical rules of procedure are not strictly observed. In Besaga v. Acosta,12 we elaborated on the concept of administrative due process as follows:
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
Nevertheless, the non-observance of technicalities in administrative cases does not give us the carte blanche to disregard fundamental considerations of fairness.13 We are still "bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process."14
II
In the proceedings before the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP, the parties agreed that the issues will be limited to whether complainant lost properties due to the actuations of respondent. In his Order15 dated April 8, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner directed the parties to submit their respective position papers on this very issue, to wit:
At today's session, the counsel for the complainant and her representative appeared. The respondent himself and his counsel also appeared.
After lengthy discussions, it was decided that the parties themselves will submit within a period of thirty (30) days from today their respective verified position papers, etc. The agreement being that: on the part of the complainant she has to show that the respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the complainant under a compromise agreement. On the part of the respondent, it is his burden to show that the property subject of the compromise agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered loss of prejudice inn the implementation of the said compromise agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
I agree with the ponencia that the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP-BOG erred in limiting the issues to be dealt with during the investigation. As the ponencia cogently discussed, disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Unlike in criminal or civil suits, no rights are prosecuted in disciplinary cases. Rather, they inquire into the fitness of a lawyer to remain a member of the bar. They are conducted to protect public interest and not to vindicate private rights. As we explained in Bernal, Jr. v. Prias:16
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. It is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.
The IBP's error, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It has consequences that reverberate throughout the entire proceedings. If left to fester, their odious effects will certainly taint the resolution of this case with due process defects.
One such consequence is the way respondent was constrained to address one and only one issue—whether his conduct resulted in complainant's loss of property. A review of his submissions shows that respondent complied with this directive.
As the ponencia observed, respondent was silent regarding the other charges raised by complainant. I find respondent's silence understandable. He merely followed the order of the Investigating Commissioner to limit his discussion to the stipulated issue. After all, it is his duty to abide by the lawful orders of the IBP, with which non-compliance is considered a contemptuous act and a misconduct.17
Evidently, the opportunity to be heard granted respondent was illusory. Although he was able to file his position paper, he was prevented from arguing the other issues and presenting evidence that may exculpate him or, at the very least, mitigate his liability.
To reiterate, due process is not satisfied by the mere perfunctory existence of the opportunity to be heard. Such opportunity must be fair and reasonable to enable the respondent to mount an intelligent defense. Of course, what is fair and reasonable depends on the circumstances of each case.
For instance, in Jardeleza v. Sereno,18 we ruled that physical presence in a meeting without a reasonable chance to defend oneself does not satisfy due process requirements:
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Fontanilla v. Commission on Audit,19 we carved an exception from the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration precludes a violation of the right to due process. In particular, we insisted that the root cause of the due process defect must actually be remedied:
While we have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due process because the process of reconsideration is itself an opportunity to be heard, this ruling does not embody an absolute rule that applies in all circumstances. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the due process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits remained.
In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or she stands charged, then a due process problem exists. This problem worsens and the denial of his most basic right continues if, in the first place, he is found liable without having been charged and this finding is confirmed in the appeal or reconsideration process without allowing him to rebut or explain his side on the finding against him.
Time and again, we have ruled that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, one is heard when he is accorded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his case or is given the chance to have the ruling complained of reconsidered. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Gradiola v. Deles,20 we remanded the case to the CBD for further investigation, report, and recommendation upon a finding that the respondent lawyer suffered a stroke, which may have impaired his cognitive abilities. That an answer was filed and the respondent lawyer was ably represented by counsel who was retained by his son did not deter us from ruling that there is a due process defect that must first be addressed.
In Baldomar v. Paras,21 a disbarment complaint was filed before us against a lawyer, who denied the charges in his answer. After the complainant filed his reply, we referred the case to the IBP for further investigation. The investigating commissioner, however, failed to conduct hearings on the case. The report and recommendation endorsed to us was based on the same documents that we sent to the IBP. Despite the fact that the parties were able to file pleadings, we still ruled that they were denied the opportunity to be heard. As such, we remanded the case to the IBP for further proceedings.
In sum, due process is satisfied when there is an "opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings."22
In this case, it is true that respondent was informed that there were other allegations against him. It is equally true that he was able to file an answer to the complaint. However, for his position paper, the "proper pleading" so to speak, where he could have fully responded to the accusations against him, he was directed to confine his discussion and evidence to the issue agreed upon. At the very least, this case should have been remanded to the IBP to give respondent a full and reasonable opportunity to refute the charges against him.
With that said, this case should also not be dismissed as recommended by the IBP-BOG. I agree with the majority that respondent's misconduct was substantially proven. The records do show that respondent admitted to representing conflicting interests, violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, and failed to disclose his interest in the property subject of the litigation.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result insofar as Atty. Placido M. Sabban is found guilty of misconduct and in the penalty imposed.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, unpaginated.
2 Id. at 168-172.
3 Id. at 246.
4 Id. at 569-573.
5 Id. at 568.
6 Id. at 574-606.
7 Id. at 886-893.
8 See Natanauan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016.
9 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.
10 Id.
11 A.C. No. 12220, November 13, 2018.
12 G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015.
13 See Dimson v. Chua, G.R. No. 192318, December 5, 2016, 801 Phil. 778.
14 Id.
15 Rollo, p. 246.
16 A.C. No. 11217, October 7, 2020.
17 RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Section 8. See, e.g., Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009, 611 Phil. 179 and Sibulo v. Ilagan, A.C. No. 4711, November 25, 2004, 486 Phil. 197.
18 G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.
19 G.R. No. 209714, June 21, 2016.
20 A.C. No. 10267, June 18, 2018.
21 A.C. No. 4980, December 15, 2000.
22 Philippine Mining Development Corp. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 245273, July 27, 2021. Emphasis supplied.
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