EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10511. January 04, 2022 ]
MILAGROS MELAD-ONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PLACIDO M. SABBAN, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The administrative case stemmed from a complaint filed by Milagros Melad-Ong (complainant) against Atty. Placido M. Sabban (respondent) for committing unlawful and illicit acts by taking interest in a property subject of a litigation, acting as counsel for opposing parties, and executing falsities in the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the complainant and her co-heirs in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Facts of the Case
The controversy began on November 22, 1984, when complainant's father, Jose Melad (Jose), filed a civil suit1 against Concepcion Tuyuan (Concepcion) for Reconveyance, Reivindication and Annulment of Instrument with Damages for the illegal transfer of title of a 272,045-square meter property originally owned by Fe Tuyuan, which was now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-52533. In the complaint, Jose alleged that he is the sole legal heir of Fe Tuyuan for being the first cousin by blood of the former, while Concepcion was not related by blood to the deceased.2 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3413 before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 2 (RTC). Jose was represented by Atty. Simeon Agustin (Atty. Agustin), while Concepcion was represented by Atty. Hilarion L. Aquino (Atty. Aquino).3
On May 31, 1985, respondent, on behalf of his clients Rita Maguigad-Baquiran, Teodorico Maguigad, Estelita Maguigad Dalupang, Alberto Maguigad, Rogelio Maguigad, Edna Maguigad Managelot, and Totoy Maguigad (collectively, Maguigads), filed a Complaint in Intervention4 on Civil Case No. 3413. The Maguigads alleged that they are the true and rightful sole heirs of Fe Tuyuan to the exclusion of Concepcion and Jose. They averred that the property was the paraphernal property of Pelia Maguigad (Pelia), who was the mother of Fe Tuyuan. They claim that Severino Maguigad, who was their father, Pelia's brother and the deceased's uncle, is entitled to the property by right of succession, thereby making them the rightful heirs of Fe Tuyuan. Respondent was assisted by his father, Atty. Benito Sabban (Atty. Benito), in handling the case.
On January 26, 1995, Jose passed away while the case was still pending. He was substituted by his surviving heirs (Heirs of Jose) as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3413, which included herein complainant.
On May 1995, Concepcion executed a Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees5 (Deed) in favor of Atty. Benito and transferred to him 10 hectares (100,000 square meters [sq. m]) of the 27 hectares (270,000 sq. m.) land owned by the deceased Fe Tuyuan. The land was received as compensation for the legal services rendered by Atty. Benito during the lifetime of Fe Tuyuan. The deed was made without the knowledge of the court where the case was pending nor the consent of the parties involved in the suit.
By virtue of the abovementioned deed, Atty. Benito, for himself and on behalf of his son, respondent, applied for retention of the 10 hectares of the subject property before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Likewise, Concepcion filed an application for retention of seven hectares against the subject property before the DAR, despite the fact that there was an ongoing litigation on the said land and a 'lis pendens' attached to the title. As a consequence of the application for retention, on November 3, 1995, the DAR granted seven hectares (70,000 sq. m.) to Concepcion, five hectares (50,000 sq. m.) to Atty. Benito and 2.0507 hectares (20,507 sq. m.) to respondent, Atty. Benito's son, despite the subject property still being under litigation. The subject land, being under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27,6 Concepcion, Atty. Benito, and respondent were ordered to maintain the peaceful possession and cultivation of the tenants in the farm lots and authorized them to withdraw the amortization payments made by the tenants which were considered as lease rentals.7
On the other hand, the civil suit continued for years until Atty. Agustin, the counsel for plaintiffs Heirs of Jose, initiated a compromise deal among the parties. However, the deal did not materialize because Atty. Agustin died on December 2007.
Thereafter, the parties resumed the compromise discussions and on February 2008, the respondent drafted a Compromise Agreement8 and filed it before the court with the following partition: 80,000 sq. m. located in the southeast portion will be allotted to the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose, 80,000 sq. m. located in the middle south portion will be allotted to the intervenors Maguigads, and the remaining 112,045 sq. m. will be for defendant Concepcion. The Compromise Agreement was granted by RTC Branch 2 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan on April 1, 2008.9 Under the Compromise Agreement, a certain Atty. Luis Donato acted as the counsel for the plaintiffs (Heirs of Jose), while respondent acted as the counsel for both the intervenors (Maguigads) and the defendant (Concepcion).
On the same date, Concepcion executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale, first, on the sale of 20,000 sq. m. of the subject property in favor of respondent and second, on the sale of 50,000 sq. m. of the subject property in favor of respondent, his mother and siblings. The sale consisted of the 7 hectares of the subject property retained by Concepcion in 1995 as granted by the DAR. By virtue of the deeds of sale, TCT Nos. T-165677 (20,000 sq. m.), T-165678 (45,687 sq. m.) and T-165679 (4,135 sq. m.) were issued in favor of respondent, his mother and siblings.
In 2009, the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose filed an application for retention of the portion awarded to them by virtue of the Compromise Agreement before the DAR. However, their application was not immediately acted upon and they re-submitted their application in 2011. Thereafter, the DAR informed the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose that the portion of the property awarded to them has already been awarded to various tenants in 1995. When they got hold of the documents pertaining to the inappropriate retentions to their property, they discovered the illegal retentions made by Concepcion, Atty. Benito and respondent in 1995.
Complainant reached out to respondent to seek his help with respect to the tenants in their awarded portion of the property since the respondent and his father were recognized by the tenants as the landowners. However, respondent did not reply to her despite her numerous emails. Hence, complainant was again constrained to file a case against the illegal tenants before the DAR in order to get back their share of the subject property.
In an Order10 dated February 14, 2011, the DAR granted the application for retention filed by the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose and ordered the retention area of not more than five hectares in the subject property. The DAR also authorized the cancellation of the emancipation patents issued to the tenants who were awarded the lots in 1995, when Concepcion transferred it to them via the Operation Land Transfer through Direct Payment Scheme program under PD 27. DAR ruled that the tenants lost their right over the properties when the Compromise Agreement was judicially approved and the farm lots were no longer covered by the provisions of PD 27.11
Sometime in 2012, respondent negotiated a sale and was able to sell about 130,000 sq. m. of the subject land in favor of Camella Homes. Respondent sold about 74,000 sq. m. under his name while Concepcion sold 36,184 sq. m. and two of the farmer-beneficiaries sold 10,000 sq. m. each of the land they acquired through the Operation Land Transfer under PD 27.12
On March 19, 2013, the intervenors Maguigads filed a Motion for Execution13 of the April 1, 2008 Order granting the Compromise Agreement. They averred that up to that date, they have not received the portion of the lot allocated to them. Likewise, they filed a Manifestation14 informing the lower court that they have rescinded the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 3413 and they are now represented by Evangelista and Maguigad Law Office.
On August 8, 2013, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution of the intervenors Maguigads.15 On August 31, 2013, respondent, on behalf of Concepcion, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the said Order and prayed for the stay of execution, which was denied by the RTC. On August 27, 2014, a Writ of Execution17 was issued and a survey was made over the subject land. Under the Survey Verification Report,18 it was found that the area occupied and developed by Camella Homes encroached upon the area being claimed by the intervenors and plaintiffs, approximately 44,619 sq. m. and 14,417 sq. m., respectively.
Despite obtaining a positive ruling from the DAR and the RTC, the plaintiffs Heirs of Jose and intervenors Maguigads still failed to get the whole portion of their share in the subject property.
Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On July 17, 2014, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondent before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) alleging that respondent committed unlawful conduct, together with his father, in acquiring a portion of the subject property being litigated in Civil Case No. 3413, which case they were handling. In her complaint, she alleges that respondent allowed his father, Atty. Benito, to apply for retention of a portion of the subject property and eventually became a beneficiary of such retention, as awarded by the DAR. Likewise, they deceived the DAR by making it believe that the subject property was free from any liens or encumbrances and hid the fact that the property was under litigation. Further, respondent disregarded the conflict-of-interest rule when he acted as counsels for both the intervenors Maguigads and defendant Concepcion in the Compromise Agreement and later on, he became the counsel of Concepcion and filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Order dated August 8, 2013 of the RTC granting the Motion for Execution filed by the intervenors, who were his initial clients. Respondent also failed to disclose to the parties and to the RTC Branch 2 of Tuguegarao that he, Atty. Benito and Concepcion applied for retention of the subject property before the DAR in 1995. Lastly, he enticed the parties to enter into a Compromise Agreement despite knowing that the subject property has already been retained and allocated to several people making the division of the property unfair and disadvantageous on the part of the Heirs of Jose and the Maguigads.19
In a Resolution dated February 23, 2015, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. In an Order dated August 18, 2015, the IBP directed the respondent to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the order.
On October 12, 2015, the respondent, thru his counsel, filed his Answer.20 Respondent admits that he filed the Complaint in Intervention on behalf of the Maguigads, however he claims that it was not him, but his father, who handled the case until Atty. Benito's death in 2006. It was only then that he resumed his appearance in Civil Case No. 3413. In 2007, Atty. Agustin, counsel of the complainant and Heirs of Jose, approached respondent and requested that he arrange a conference with Concepcion for early settlement of the case. However, Atty. Agustin died thus, there was no settlement reached. Respondent avers that the Compromise Agreement was approved with the consent of all parties and that the Heirs of Jose were assisted by their counsel, a certain Atty. Luis Donato, in signing and approving the same. Lastly, he argues that the portion designated to the Heirs of Jose in the Compromise Agreement is the same portion of the land awarded to them by the DAR in a Resolution dated July 14, 2011 when the Heirs of Jose applied for retention. Respondent did not answer the other allegations in the Complaint.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing21 dated October 15, 2015 was issued by the IBP setting the hearing on December 3, 2015 to discuss the admissions, stipulation of facts and definition of issues and directing the parties to submit their mandatory conference briefs 10 days prior to the hearing. Respondent filed his mandatory conference brief on October 28, 2015.22 Respondent reiterated the arguments raised in his Answer. On the other hand, complainant filed her mandatory conference brief23 on November 26, 2015. Aside from the averments raised in her complaint, she alleges that respondent committed delay of justice, deceit, dishonesty, forgery, falsification of public document and malicious intent for personal gain.
In an Order dated December 3, 2015, the IBP conducted the mandatory conference and directed the IBP-Cagayan Chapter to assist in the conduct of deposition by oral interrogatories of the witnesses to be presented by the respondent. He will be presenting Atty. Luis Donato and Concepcion Tuyuan as his witnesses, who are both living in Cagayan.
On January 25, 2016, the IBP-Cagayan Chapter President Caesar Segundo R. Catral (Atty. Catral) facilitated the conduct of deposition by written interrogatories of the respondent's witness, Atty. Luis Donato. The complainant's representatives manifested that they will hire a counsel for the next hearing to conduct their cross-interrogatories. On February 26, 2016, Atty. Jovencio Evangelista (Atty. Evangelista) appeared for the complainant. He conducted the cross-examination of the deponent witness. On March 1, 2016, the respondent manifested that he will be dispensing with the testimony of his witness Concepcion.
In an Order dated April 8, 2016, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner Robles) conducted a clarificatory hearing and directed the parties to submit their verified position papers, the agreement being that the complainant has to show that respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the complainant under the Compromise Agreement and that the respondent has the burden to show that the property subject of the Compromise Agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered loss or prejudice in the implementation of the said Compromise Agreement.24
The parties submitted their respective position papers. Complainant reiterated the arguments she raised in her complaint and conference brief. On the other hand, respondent limited his discussion on the issue agreed upon during the April 8, 2016 clarificatory hearing. He argued in his position paper that the complainant did not suffer any loss of the property awarded to them under the compromise agreement and it was the complainant's fault that they failed to enjoy their share in the property.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
After hearing and investigation, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Report and Recommendation25 dated December 12, 2016 penned by Investigating Commissioner Robles recommending the suspension of respondent, to wit:
UPON THE FOREGOING, it is recommended that Respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban be suspended from the legal profession for one (1) year. There is no doubt at all that he breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Canons 3 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, showed ignorance of Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and defied conflict-of-interest rules.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.26
In a Resolution dated June 17, 2017, the IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law against the respondent. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.27
Upon reconsideration, the IBP-BOG reversed its earlier Resolution and issued an Extended Resolution dated October 4, 2018 granting the respondent's motion for reconsideration and dismissing the case against him, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, it is resolved that the respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the Notice of Resolution of the Board of Governors dated June 17, 2017, in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1214, with an attached Report and Recommendation dated December 12, 2016, by Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles be set aside and the case against respondent Atty. Placido Sabban be DISMISSED.28
The IBP-BOG ruled that according to the Order dated April 8, 2016 of Commissioner Robles, the basic issue agreed upon was the complainant has to show that respondent is responsible for the alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the Heirs of Jose by virtue of the Compromise Agreement. Upon review of the records, the IBP-BOG found that the complainant failed to prove respondent's fault and participation in the loss of the property and thereby dismissed the complaint against respondent.
Issue
The main issue in the complaint is whether respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the Complaint.
Ruling of the Court
The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG and finds respondent administratively liable for violating Canons 1, 15 and 17, and Rules 1.01, 10.01 and 15.03 of the CPR and Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the complaint, the Court must discuss the procedural issue raised by the complainant. The IBP-BOG limited its resolution on the issue of whether the complainant was able to prove that respondent is responsible for the loss of the property awarded to them in the Compromise Agreement. The IBP-BOG finds basis in the Order dated April 8, 2016 of Investigating Commissioner Robles, which the Court quotes:
After lengthy discussions, it was decided that the parties themselves will submit within a period of thirty (30) days from today their respective verified position papers, etc. The agreement being that: on the part of the complainant she has to show that the respondent is responsible for an alleged loss of a property that was awarded to the complainant under a compromise agreement. On the part of the respondent, it is his burden to show that the property subject of the compromise agreement meant for the complainant is intact and that the complainant has not suffered loss or prejudice in the implementation of the said compromise agreement.29
However, this Court rules that the IBP-BOG erred in disregarding the other substantive issues raised in the complaint and pleadings submitted by the complainant.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. The procedural requirements observed in ordinary civil proceedings do not strictly apply in disbarment cases.30 Disciplinary proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. In Re Almacen,31 the Court held:
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. x x x Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.32 (Citations omitted)
Thus, unlike in civil proceedings, issues in disbarment cases are not limited by the issues agreed or stipulated by the parties or ordered by the trial court. Further, a disbarment case is not instituted for the restitution of the complainant but rather for the determination of the fitness of the lawyer to remain as an officer of the Court. Hence, limiting the issue to respondent's participation in the loss of the property of the complainant is not proper in a disciplinary proceeding.
It is worthy to note that complainant has raised repeatedly in her complaint, mandatory conference brief, and position paper the unlawful and reprehensible acts committed by respondent in violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the ethical conduct mandated by the legal profession. Hence, the Court shall discuss each of the acts complained of by the complainant in her pleadings against respondent.
Violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 17 in relation to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR
Complainant raised the several instances that respondent committed violations of the conflict-of-interest rule, to wit:
a. Respondent acted as the counsel of the intervenors Maguigads and of Concepcion (Defendant) in the Compromise Agreement;
b. Respondent was initially the counsel of the Maguigads and filed the complaint in intervention against Concepcion but later on, he acted as counsel of Concepcion and filed a motion for reconsideration to order granting the motion for execution filed by the Maguigads;
c. Respondent notarized the motion for intervention filed by his father, Atty. Benito, in Civil Case No. 3413 on August 22, 1997.
Complainant's allegations are well-taken. Respondent's acts of representing opposing clients violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 in relation to Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which provide:
Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law of and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As culled from the records, respondent was the counsel of the Maguigads when they filed the complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 3413. There was no record that respondent withdrew as counsel or terminated his services with the Maguigads. It was only on March 19, 2013 that the Maguigads manifested before the RTC that they were terminating the services of respondent. It was admitted by respondent in his answer that he filed the complaint in Intervention of the Maguigads but he argues that it was not him who was handling the case, but his father, Atty. Benito. Respondent's defense fails to convince this Court.
A lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause upon acceptance of the case. A relationship imbued with trust and confidence, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs, especially in representing them in a case before the court. Until there is termination of services by the client or a withdrawal approved by the court, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. The attorney-client relationship does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. Case law provides:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.33
In this case, there was no termination of services made by the Maguigads until they filed their Manifestation dated March 19, 2013 informing the RTC that they were severing the services of respondent. Thus, respondent remained to be their counsel of record until his services were severed by the client. Likewise, there is nothing in the records that shows that respondent applied to withdraw as counsel of the Maguigads.
While remaining to be the counsel of the Maguigads, respondent also acted as counsel of Concepcion in the Compromise Agreement filed before the RTC, thereby acting as representatives of opposing parties. Respondent did not provide any explanation as to why he was acting as counsel for both the Maguigads and Concepcion. Neither did he present a written consent of the parties involved authorizing him to act as counsel for both of them, as required by the law.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon 17 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR for his lack of commitment to the cause of his client, the Maguigads, and for betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by representing as well the opposing party, Concepcion, without the consent of the former.
Further, complainant was able to prove that respondent acted as counsel for Concepcion when he filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 8, 2013 of the RTC granting the Maguigads' motion for execution of the Compromise Agreement. This is a definite violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to situations where opposing parties are represented by the same lawyer in the same, or an unrelated action. It also applies even if a lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one client to the other's disadvantage. The determining factor is whether acceptance of the new relation will prevent a lawyer from fulfilling his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client, or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.34
In the case of Aniñon v. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.,35 the Court identified three tests developed by jurisprudence to determine the existence of conflict of interest. First, whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue, or claim on behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Second, whether acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client, or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Third, whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.36
Based from these tests, there exists a conflict of interest in the representations made by respondent. As the counsel on record of the Maguigads, respondent is duty-bound to advocate for his client's rights and interests in the subject property, and at the same time, oppose that claim for Concepcion when he became the latter's counsel, thereby establishing representation of conflicting interests. Further, respondent's act of representing Concepcion after his services were terminated by the Maguigads likewise violate the conflict-of-interest rules. Respondent has confidential information acquired through his previous employment with the Maguigads with respect to the contested property which he may use in favor of his new client, Concepcion. He cannot simply represent a client especially when that person was the opposing party in the case he previously handled.
The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.37 Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client.38 Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.39
However, on the issue of notarizing the Motion for Intervention filed by his father, the Court cannot fault respondent for the same. At the time of notarization in 1998, the prevailing law governing notarization was the Notarial Law.40 Under the said law, there is no disqualification among notaries public in notarizing documents executed by their immediate family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Such disqualification was only adopted in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice41 which was promulgated by this Court on July 6, 2004. Hence, respondent was permitted by law to notarize the document at that time.
Violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code
Further, complainant avers that respondent acquired a portion of the subject land in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
x x x x
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." (Emphasis supplied)
For lawyers, the prohibition applies to all properties of their clients which were subject of a litigation that they took part in. The prohibition, which rests on considerations of public policy and interests, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him.42
In this case, respondent acquired by purchase from Concepcion a portion of the contested property as evidenced by the Deeds of Absolute Sale43 executed on April 1, 2008, the same day that the Compromise Agreement was judicially approved. It can be gleaned from this that respondent has had interest over the property even while the case was pending and immediately grabbed the opportunity to buy it upon approval of the Compromise Agreement so as to avoid the prohibition under Article 1491. The fact that the property was bought at the same date as the approval of the Compromise Agreement shows the propensity of respondent to circumvent the mandate of the law which is that respondent, as a lawyer, is prohibited from acquiring, either by purchase or assignment, the property and rights of his client that were involved in a litigation in which he took part in.
Further, respondent violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code when he and his father, Atty. Benito, illegally retained about 7 hectares of the land subject of the litigation while the case was still pending. It is evidenced by the Order44 of the DAR dated November 3, 1995, granting Atty. Benito's application for retention of the land for himself and for respondent. Likewise, it is bolstered by the Motion for Intervention with Consolidated Petition for Intervention and for Partial Lifting of Lis Pendens45 filed by Atty. Benito and notarized by respondent in Civil Case No. 3413 before RTC Branch 2 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In the said Motion, Atty. Benito sought to exclude the 10 hectares of the subject property ceded and transferred to him by Concepcion by virtue of the Deed of Confirmation of Attorney's Fees.46 These pieces of evidence prove that respondent has known and consented to the acts of his father taking interest in the property in Civil Case No. 3413. Respondent was even granted the retention of two hectares of the subject land in contravention of the prohibition under Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Public policy prohibits these transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved between the lawyer and his client. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice and is a ground for suspension.47
All these acts were done with the knowledge and consent of respondent, despite the clear prohibitions embodied in the law. Such reprehensible conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Violation of Rule 10.01 of the CPR
Likewise, we rule that respondent violated Rule 10.01 of the CPR which provides:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent knew that his father, Atty. Benito, applied for illegal retention over the subject land before the DAR. As a matter of fact, Atty. Benito applied not just for himself but also on behalf of his son, respondent. Thus, respondent cannot claim that he has no knowledge of the illegal retentions made by his father and Concepcion on the contested property. As counsel of the intervenors Maguigads and as an officer of the Court, respondent had the duty to disclose the fact of illegal retention to his clients and the RTC Branch 2 where the subject property was being litigated upon.
Further, respondent, in drafting the Compromise Agreement which was later on approved by the RTC, failed to inform the parties that they had existing rights over the subject land. Respondent concealed to his clients, the Maguigads, and to the Heirs of Jose that Atty. Benito and Concepcion had been granted retention over a portion of the contested land and that they have transferred some of these lots to the current tenants via the Operation Land Transfer under PD 27. The Compromise Agreement was drafted by respondent and approved by the parties thinking that the subject land was free from any liens, encumbrances or issues. All these facts affect the partition of the property under the Compromise Agreement, which complainant would not have accepted had she known of the illegal retentions made by Atty. Benito, Concepcion and respondent. Thus, respondent's failure to disclose the illegal retentions misled the Maguigads and the Heirs of Jose into approving the Compromise Agreement, which resulted to the latter's damage and prejudice.
Imposable Penalty
Parenthetically, it is this Court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.48 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.49 The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.50 Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.51 The final decision lies with the Supreme Court as the constitutional institution empowered to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, including the discipline and disbarment of erring lawyers.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating the lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.52
Considering the gravity and multiplicity of the misconducts committed by respondent and in view of the settled penalties in jurisprudence on the matter, the Court deems it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of two years.
In the cases of Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting,53 Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,54 and Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte,55 the Court imposed the penalty of six months suspension to the erring lawyers who all violated the prohibition under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code for acquiring a property subject of a litigation in a case that they handled or were handling.
Meanwhile, in similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension ranging from one to three years. In Samson v. Atty. Era,56 the erring lawyer violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR by representing the opposing party of his previous client and the Court suspended him for two years. Similarly in the case of Paces Industrial Corp. v. Atty. Salandanan,57 the respondent therein handled cases of Paces Industrial against E.E. Black Ltd. but later on, he was engaged as the counsel of the latter in cases against Paces Industrial. The Court suspended him for three years and found that he has acquired knowledge from his previous employment that could be utilized for his own personal interest or for the advantage of the new client to the detriment of Paces Industrial.58
Lastly, in cases where the lawyers committed falsehood in violation of Rule 10.01 of the CPR, the Court has imposed a penalty of six months to two years suspension depending on the circumstances of each case.
In Heirs of Torrices v. Atty. Galano,59 the lawyer notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale despite the fact that two of the parties in the sale were dead at the time of notarization. The Court found that Atty. Galano notarized the document even without the presence of the executing parties in violation of the CPR and 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Atty. Galano was suspended from the practice of law for two years due to his misconduct. In Petelo v. Atty. Rivera60, the lawyer who committed falsehood and misled the Court by authorizing or delegating to his secretary the signing of the pleadings filed before the courts was imposed the penalty of suspension for one year.
In view of these Court pronouncements and in consideration of the nature of the acts committed by respondent, the penalty of two years suspension is warranted. Lawyers as officers of the Court must always conduct themselves in a proper, honest and decent manner. They must always possess good moral character worthy of the public confidence. They must endeavor to conduct themselves at all times in such a way as to give credit to the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect and trust of their clients and the community. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's responsibility in our society that he stands "as a shield" in the defense of rights and to ward off wrong. From the profession charged with these responsibilities there must be expected those qualities of truth speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have throughout the centuries been compendiously described as "moral character."61
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Rule 10.01, Rule 15.03, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective from the date of his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that his commission of similar offenses will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the personal record of respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban. Copies shall likewise be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., no part.
Footnotes
Rosario, J., Please see separate opinion.
1 Rollo, pp. 56-61.
2 Id. at 58.
3 Id. at 63.
4 Rollo, pp. 65-69.
5 Id. at 74.
6 Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, transferring to them the Ownership of the Land they till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.
7 Rollo, pp. 71-73, 80-82.
8 Id. at 86-90.
9 Id. at 93-96.
10 Id. at 269-275.
11 Id. at 140-142.
12 Id. at 8-9.
13 Id. at 99-101.
14 Id. at 97-98.
15 Id. at 148.
16 Id. at 148-152.
17 Id. at 300-301.
18 Id. at 302-303.
19 Id. at 4-10.
20 Id. at 168-172.
21 Id. at 181.
22 Id. at 177-180.
23 Id. at 183-187.
24 Id. at 246.
25 Id. at 896-900.
26 Id. at 899-900.
27 Id. at 883.
28 Id. at 893.
29 Id. at 246.
30 Mejares v. Atty. Romana, 469 Phil. 619, 632 (2004).
31 142 Phil. 353 (1970).
32 Id.
33 Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 797-798 (1997).
34 Pilar v. Atty. Ballicud, A.C. No. 12792, November 16, 2020.
35 685 Phil. 322 (2012).
36 Id. at 327.
37 Samson v. Atty. Era, 714 Phil. 101, 112 (2013).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Sections 231-259, Chapter 11, Revised Administrative Code.
41 A.M. No. 02-08-13-SC.
42 Zalamea v. De Guzman, Jr., 798 Phil. 1, 7 (2016).
43 Rollo, pp. 124-127.
44 Id. at 80-82.
45 Id. at 117-121.
46 Id. at 74.
47 Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248, 280 (1940).
48 Ramirez v. Atty. Buhayang-Margallo, 752 Phil. 473, 484 (2015).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Constantino v. Aransazo, Jr., A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021.
53 273 Phil. 534 (1991).
54 261 Phil. 266 (1990).
55 283 Phil. 1064 (1992).
56 714 Phil. 101, 112 (2013).
57 814 Phil. 93 (2017).
58 Id. at 98-102.
59 A.C. No. 11870, July 7, 2020.
60 A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019.
61 Collantes v. Renomeron, 277 Phil. 668, 674 (1991).
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