G.R. No. 246580




G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020 ♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J] [ G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. RONILEE CASABUENA Y FRANCISCO AND KEVIN FORMARAN Y GILERA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. DISSENTING OPINION CAGUIOA, J.: Accused-appellants here were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) under an Information1 which alleged that they, in conspiracy with one Jimmy Arizala (Arizala), armed with a gun and bladed weapons, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence and intimidation, robbed and divested some of the passengers inside a jeepney of their personal belongings, and on the occasion of said robbery, Arizala was killed while struggling with the possession of his gun with the responding police officer, PO2 Ramilo De Pedro (PO2 De Pedro).2 During trial, PO2 De Pedro testified that after announcing the arrest of herein accused-appellants, Arizala took a pistol from his backpack, which prompted PO2 De Pedro to let go of his M16 rifle and wrestle for the possession of the pistol. PO2 De Pedro was able to grab possession of the pistol and fired twice - the second shot hitting Arizala in his chest, as a result of which, he died.3 Thus, the trial court was faced with the issue of whether accused appellants can be held guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, when the person killed was one of the robbers and committed by a third person, that is, PO2 De Pedro. The Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, on appeal, convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged on the ground that the "homicide takes place x x x on [the] occasion of the robbery."4 The ponencia, in turn, affirms accused-appellants' conviction ruling that all the elements of Robbery were established beyond reasonable doubt and that on the occasion of the robbery, a person did die, i.e., Arizala, one of the robbers. The ponencia explains that it is irrelevant if the victim of the homicide is one of the robbers; once homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is Robbery with Homicide. According to the ponencia, this is the clear import of Article 294 because the word "any" is all inclusive, including anyone of the robbers themselves.5 The ponencia also cites the cases of People v. Ebet6 and People v. De Jesus7 in support of its finding that the crime committed is Robbery with Homicide. I agree with the ponencia that in the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, the victim of the homicide (i.e., the person killed) may be any person, including the robbers themselves, as long as the killing was committed by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. However, I submit that this is the rule only if the homicide is committed by any of the persons guilty of robbery. In other words, this ruling does not apply when the robber is killed by a third person, a responding police officer. This is the clear and logical import of the language of Article 294 of the RPC, which reads: ARTICLE 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. 2. The penalty of reclusión temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted, or the person robbed shall have been held for ransom or deprived of his liberty for more than one day. 3. The penalty of reclusión temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted. 4. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period to reclusión temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263. 5. The penalty of prisión correccional to prisión mayor in its medium period in other cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Paragraphs 1 to 5 of the foregoing provision modify the overarching statement of "Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person,"8 by providing specific penalties for other acts that have been committed in relation to the robbery. Consequently, the overt acts mentioned in each of the enumerated acts, which include the commission of the incidental crimes of homicide, rape, mutilation, kidnapping and physical injuries, refer to the "agent" or "actor" in the general overarching statement, i.e., the person guilty of robbery. In People v. Madsali,9 the Court held that in a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.10 Thus, to be convicted under paragraph 1 of Article 294, it must be alleged in the Information and proven during trial that the perpetrator of the robbery is the same person who did the killing, committed on occasion or by reason of the robbery. It is completely illogical for the law to hold a person liable for a crime he did not commit or accede to. Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, however, opines that the use of different modifying phrases in each of the enumeration means that the accessory crimes committed in relation to robbery must be treated differently. According to him, the phrase "by reason or on occasion of”' in paragraph 1 does not qualify as to who committed the homicide, while the phrase "accompanied by" in paragraph 2 suggests that the robbers must have committed the accessory crimes of rape and intentional mutilation.11 I disagree. The phrases "by reason or on occasion of” and "accompanied by" are descriptive only of the time when the accessory crimes have been committed in relation to robbery, and not of the person who committed the said acts. It is settled in jurisprudence that the phrase " by reason or on occasion of" covers accessory crimes committed before, during or after the robbery;12 while the phrase "accompanied by" means that the accessory crimes of rape and mutilation must be committed in the course of the robbery. Nonetheless, in both instances, these accessory crimes should have been committed or inflicted by the person or persons guilty of robbery. To be sure, the words of paragraph 1 are very clear when they state: "The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed."13 In simple terms, it is not a question of whether or not someone died "by reason or on occasion of the robbery" — rather, the question is whether or not a "crime of homicide" was committed "by reason or on occasion of the robbery." Here, there can be no gainsaying that when PO2 De Pedro shot and killed one of the robbers, he did not, by that act, commit a "crime of homicide." And since the accused also did not shoot and kill their co-accused, they too cannot also be said to have committed a "crime of homicide." Accordingly, the applicable rule of statutory construction is not that relied upon by Justice Lopez,14 but rather, that if the statute is plain and clear, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation,15 and when there is doubt in the interpretation of criminal laws, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.16 Furthermore, robbery with homicide, as a special complex crime, falls under the category of plurality of crimes, where a single penalty is imposed by law,17 even if the actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind.18 Plurality of crimes also include (l) compound crimes, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; and (2) complex crime proper, where one offense is a necessary means for committing another offense.19 Similar to complex crime proper, the actor in special complex crimes commits two offenses but the accessory offense (i.e., rape, homicide, mutilation, kidnapping or physical injury) is not necessary for the accomplishment of the other (i.e., robbery).20 The law treats special complex crimes as one single indivisible crime under a definition of its own and provided for by a special penalty in the RPC even if in reality they are composed of two distinct crimes.21 In People v. Escote, Jr.,22 earned former Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug opined that in special complex crimes, like robbery with homicide, "the law effectively treats the offense as an individual felony in itself and then prescribes a specific penalty therefor."23 The law prescribes a distinct penalty in recognition of the primacy given to criminal intent over the overt acts that are done to achieve that intent."24 Hence, as a singular crime with one criminal intent, the overt acts constituting its elements, which include the crime of homicide or the other accessory crimes, incidental thereto, must be committed by the person or persons guilty of robbery. Moreover, jurisprudence has established that homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of robbery when the killing was done for the following purposes: (a) to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition; (b) to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property;25 (c) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (d) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; and (e) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery.26 In this case, it cannot therefore be said that the killing of a co-accused in the robbery by a responding police officer was committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery because none of the foregoing motives is attendant to the killing of one of the robbers by a responding police officer. During trial, PO2 De Pedro narrated that he "was able to grab possession of the pistol and fire twice — the second shot hit [Arizala] in the chest, as a result of which he died."27 In fact, it was not even shown in this case that accused-appellants fired any gun during the incident. Thus, affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, when the killing was committed not by any of them but by a responding police officer, goes beyond the letter and logic of the law. Indeed, in People v. Salazar,28 this Court held: Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. The penalty for robbery with homicide is more severe because the law sees, in this crime, that men placed lucre above the value of human life, thus, justifying the imposition of a more severe penalty than that for simple homicide or robbery. In view of said graver penalty, jurisprudence exacts a stricter requirement before convicting the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The ponencia's interpretation of paragraph 1, Article 294 — that the crime is Robbery with Homicide even if the killing was not committed by the person guilty of the robbery — also violates the fundamental rules on the construction of penal statutes. In People v. Sullano,30 the Court explained that criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law specifically calls for its punishment. Thus, courts must not bring cases within the provision of law that are not clearly embraced by it. The terms of the statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the latter to be held liable under the provision. Any ambiguity in the law will always be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.31 Intimately related to this rule is the principle of lenity. This applies when the court is faced with two interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. Rule of lenity dictates that the court should adopt the interpretation more favorable to the accused.32 In Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos,33 the Court held: x x x [I]t is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused muter its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. x x x34 (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied) As to the cases cited by the ponencia, a close reading thereof reveals that they do not support the finding that the crime committed in this case is Robbery with Homicide. To the contrary, Ebet and De Jesus affirm that, to be convicted of Robbery with Homicide, the robbery and the killing must be perpetrated by the same person, whether the victim of the homicide is other than the victim of the robbery or one of the robbers themselves. In Ebet, the victim of the homicide was one of the victims of the robbery, while in De Jesus, the person killed was a roving security guard who witnessed the robbery. In both cases, and in other cases decided by the Court35 where conviction for Robbery with Homicide was affirmed, the killing was committed by the person who committed the robbery. In contrast to the aforementioned cases cited in the ponencia, I find the Court's ruling in People v. Manalili36 instructive and applicable to this case. In Manalili, the accused was charged, among others, with the special complex crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide. He was convicted only of Robbery because the killing was committed by a third person, viz.: It is true that the Information for attempted robbery contained the allegation that one of the robbers was killed during such attempt. This, however, does not warrant a conviction for the special complex crime. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the attempted robbery and the killing be perpetrated by the same person. Said article speaks of the same person. "being guilty of such offenses"; that is, robbery and homicide. In this case, it is clear that the dead robber was killed not by his cohorts but by one of the passengers.37 That the crime in Manalili was only attempted robbery covered by Article 297 of the RPC does not make Manalili inapplicable. There is no basis in logic to make a distinction because the law punishes the same criminal acts of robbery and homicide. To be sure, the difference in the stage of execution only affects the penalty prescribed by law.38 Thus, in consummated Robbery with Homicide, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, while for attempted and frustrated Robbery with Homicide, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua. Moreover, the different languages used in Articles 297 and 294 paragraph 1 of the RPC - that the phrase "person guilty of such offenses" does not appear in Article 294 paragraph 1 — is more imagined than real, as this difference in language cannot trump the logic of applying the same reasoning for both provisions. As already discussed, the accessory crimes mentioned in paragraph 1 and in the other enumerations in Article 294 refer to the overarching statement of "any person guilty of robbery." Thus, it would only be redundant and superfluous to put in each paragraph in Article 294 the phrase "person guilty of such offenses." Again, it bears emphasis that in interpreting and applying criminal law, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.39 Based on the foregoing, I submit that accused-appellants should be held guilty only of Robbery and not the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide because it was proven during trial that the dead robber, Arizala, was killed not by accused-appellants but by the police officer who responded to the incident. 1 Ponencia, pp. 1 -2. 2 Id. 3 Id. at 3. 4 Id. at 4. 5 Id. at 6. 6 649 Phil. 181 (2010). 7 473 Phil. 405 (2004). 8 Italics supplied. 9 625 Phil. 431 (2010). 10 Id. at 455. 11 Ponencia, p. 7. 12 People v. Torres, 412 Phil. 375, 385 (2001). 13 Emphasis and italics supplied. 14 Ponencia, pp. 7-8. 15 Padua v. People, 581 Phil. 489, 500-501 (2008). 16 People v. Valdez, 774 Phil. 723, 747 (2015). 17 See Leonor D. Boado, NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 266 (2012 ed.) 18 Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 962, 969 (1975). 19 See RPC, Art. 48. 20 See People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 766 (1997). 21 United States v. Perez, 32 Phil. 163 (1915). 22 448 Phil. 748 (2003). 23 Id. at 801. 24 Id. at 802; emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics omitted. 25 People v. Matic, 427 Phil. 564, 573-574 (2002). 26 People v. Al Madrelejos, 828 Phil. 732, 738-739 (2018) 27 Ponencia, p. 3. 28 342 Phil. 745 (1997). 29 Id. at 766. 30 G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018, 858 SCRA 274. 31 Id. at 288. 32 Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, 626 Phil. 177, 200 (2010). 33 306 Phil. 219 (1994). 34 Id. at 230-231, citing Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 229 Phil. 139, 148 (1986). 35 See People v. Pedroso, 391 Phil. 43 (2000); People v. Boquirin, 432 Phil. 722 (2002); People v. Escote, Jr., supra note 22; People v. Comiling, 468 Phil. 869 (2004); People v. Borra, 713 Phil. 698 (2013); People v. Layug, 81 8 Phil. 1021 (2017); People v. Al Madrelejos, supra note 26; People v. Bacyaan, G.R. No. 238457, September 18, 2019, accessed at . 36 355 Phil. 652 (1998). 37 Id. at 685-686. 38 See RPC, Chapter Four, Sec. One. 39 Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, supra note 32. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation