G.R. No. 234448 - Concurring Opinion




G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018, ♦ Decision, Tijam, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J] ♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J] [ G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018 ] PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RESPONDENTS. CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I concur with the ponencia and add the following observations. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PHAPi), represented by its President, Dr. Rustico Jimenez, seeks to question the constitutionality of particular provisions of Republic Act No. 10932, otherwise known as the Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law by Increasing Penalties for Refusal of Hospitals and Clinics to Administer Medical Treatment in Emergency or Serious Cases. Petitioner asserts that the case is ripe for adjudication considering that there is an imminent threat that unconstitutional obligations and sanctions will be imposed on its members because of the impending approval of the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 10932.1 It also claims that it has the required locus standi because it stands to be directly injured by the implementation of Republic Act No. 10932, considering that its members' management and staff are placed at the risk of administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities.2 It further argues that in any case, the absence of a direct injury should not bar this Court from taking cognizance of this case as it raises issues that are of transcendental importance, particularly on denial of due process, equal protection of laws, and presumption of innocence.3 The ponencia notes that the requisites for this Court's exercise of the power of judicial review is not present in this case.4 It found that there is no actual case or controversy, and that petitioner does not have the required locus standi to file the petition. It discusses that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied upon a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the governmental act. Likewise, a case is ripe for adjudication if there is an act of the government and an immediate or threatened injury to petitioner as a result of the act.5 The ponencia found that petitioner failed to meet the requirement. It notes that there is no allegation that petitioner or its members have suffered an actual or direct injury from any grave abuse of discretion. It found that the absence of the injury will render this Court's opinion as merely advisory.6 The ponencia further points out that the law is presumed constitutional and this cannot be overturned in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any infraction of the Constitution.7 It posits that it would be delving into questions of policy and wisdom of the executive and legislative departments if it invalidated the law based on conjectures and suppositions.8 As to locus standi, the ponencia notes that Republic Act No. 10932 covers hospitals, medical facilities, medical practitioners, and employees, but not associations.9 Thus, in this case, the association is not the one who will be held liable for any violation of Republic Act No. 10932.10 Furthermore, while an association has the capacity to sue or be sued, it must still show a substantial interest such that it has sustained or will sustain a direct injury.11 While third-party standing may be invoked as an exception to the rule, the ponencia notes that petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had been authorized by its members to file the instant case.12 Thus, it did not take cognizance of the present petition. I concur. This case is indeed not ripe for judicial review. Canonical for the exercise of judicial review when the constitutionality of a law is being questioned are these requirements: first, there must be an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have locus standi; third, the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the issue on constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.13 I There is no actual case or controversy in the case at bar. The requirement for an actual case or controversy is fundamental. This is based on Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandabie and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) An actual case or controversy means that there are conflicting legal rights, such that the legal claim of one party is opposed to the legal claim of another, and it is capable of being resolved by the courts.14 It is necessary that the conflicting legal rights must be real and concrete, not merely hypothetical or conjectural.15 It is well-established in this jurisdiction that . . . for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; . . . In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.16 (Citations omitted) Thus, there must first be a real and material act affecting another, which one party asserts is done within the bounds allowed by law, but which another contends is injurious to his or her right. If there is yet no such act, or when such acts are merely conjecture, there is no actual case or controversy.Ꮮαwρhi৷ In case of a governmental act, the party asserting its unconstitutionality must allege the actual act performed by the government that caused it the injury. In Lozano v. Nograles,17 this Court explained: An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness". In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) The requirement of an actual case or controversy is rooted on the respect for the separation of powers of the three branches of the government. Courts cannot supplant the discretionary acts of the legislative or the executive branch on the premise that they know of a wiser, more just, or expedient policy or course of action.19 They may only act in case the other branches acted outside the bounds of their powers or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The other reason for requiring an actual case or controversy is to maintain the significance of this Court's role in making "final and binding construction[s] of law."20 Courts do not render mere advisory opinions. Judicial decisions are part of the legal system,21 and thus, have binding effects on actual persons, places, and things. Ruling on hypothetical situations with no bearing on any matter will weaken the import of this Court's issuances. In Belgica, et al. v. Ochoa:22 Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy.Ꮮαwρhi৷ This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately represent. The requirement of an "actual case," thus, means that the case before this Court "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice." Furthermore, "the controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests." Thus, the adverse position of the parties must be sufficient enough for the case to be pleaded and for this Court to be able to provide the parties the proper relief/s prayed for. The requirement of an 'actual case' will ensure that this Court will not issue advisory opinions. It prevents us from using the immense power of judicial review absent a party that can sufficiently argue from a standpoint with real and substantial interests.23 (Citations omitted) Moreover, hypothetical or conjectural situations illicitly widen the courts' discretion such that future parties who present claims on the law being interpreted may be unduly affected by the limitations set, without affording them the opportunity to be heard, thus:24 An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text.25 (Emphasis in the original) Thus, in cases where the constitutionality of a law is being questioned, it is not enough that the law or the regulation has been passed or is in effect. To rule on the constitutionality of provisions in the law without an actual case is to decide only the basis of the mere enactment of the statute. This amounts to a ruling on the wisdom of the policy imposed by the Congress on the subject matter of the law. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,26 this Court ruled that it is not enough that there is & possibility of abuse of the questioned enactment. There must first be an actual act of abuse. In Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio Harry Roque, et al.,27 this Court said that the parties presented no actual case or controversy because they did not show any government action implementing the questioned statute against them. In Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment,28 this Court ruled that it is not enough that the issuances may result in a diminution of the bus drivers and conductors' income, considering that the allegations are based on speculation. In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,29 the petitioner in that case did not assert a specific act committed against it by the Commission on Elections in enforcing or implementing the questioned law. This Court found that there was no actual case or controversy. An allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is insufficient.30 If there is no exercise of discretion, it could not have been gravely abused. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that any violation of its rights was committed as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 10932. The law itself has not been enforced against petitioner or its members. In fact, petitioner's allegation is that there is a risk or a threat that its members will be obligated and sanctioned by the enactment of the law. Thus, there is yet no act committed by petitioner showing any breach of the statute, and there is yet no act of enforcement or sanction against it. There is no injury yet suffered by petitioner. The sanctions they alleged are still in the realm of imagination. II I also agree that petitioner failed to show that it has the required locus standi to file the petition. As an association which represents private hospitals, petitioner is a third party to the instant case. Thus, before it may file the petition, it must show that it is compliant with the requisites for third-party standing. Another requisite for this Court's exercise of judicial review is that the party filing must have locus standi or legal standing to file the suit, thus: Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." . . . . Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought.31 (Citations omitted) The party filing must show that it has a substantial interest in the case such that it was or will be directly affected or injured by the challenged governmental act. However, this Court has given leeway to petitions filed by parties who have no personal or substantial interest in the challenged governmental act but nonetheless raise "constitutional issue[s] of critical significance."32 The substantiality and directness of the injury is reckoned from the point of view of petitioner. Thus, this Court has allowed suits to be filed by taxpayers in cases where there is a claim of an unconstitutional tax measure or illegal disbursement of public funds. Cases filed by voters who show an obvious interest in the validity of the questioned election law have been allowed. Courts have likewise taken cognizance of cases filed by legislators in petitions where they claim that their prerogative as legislators have been infringed upon.33 In a very limited subset of cases, this Court has allowed a party to bring a suit on behalf of another. However, for this Court to accept that the third party has the standing to file the case, the following requisites must be present: first, the party filing the suit "must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus [has] a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; [second, he or she] must have a close relation to the third party; and [third, the third party is prevented by] some hindrance . . . to protect his or her own interest."34 Associations have been able to file petitions on behalf of its members on the basis of third-party standing. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,35 this Court found that an association "has the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests,"36 thus: This [modern] view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. . . . . . . . We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized . . . to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical . . . The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.37 (Citation omitted) However, associations must sufficiently establish who their members are, that their members authorized them to sue on their behalf, and that they would be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts.38 In Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines vs. Department of Labor and Employment,39 this Court did not allow the association to represent its members because it failed to establish the presence of these requirements. There was no evidence of board resolutions or articles of incorporation showing that it was authorized to file the petition. It noted that some of the associations even had their certificates of incorporation revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This Court ruled that it was not enough that they alleged that they were an association that represented members who would be directly injured by the implementation of a law, thus: The associations in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., and The Executive Secretary were allowed to sue on behalf of their members because they sufficiently established who their members were, that their members authorized the associations to sue on their behalf, and that the members would be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts. The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose members are those who suffer direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors. In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear and convincing demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue. Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the representation of the association is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more efficient for this Court to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the association should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to which they belong. In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by the petitioner would have special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to bring the action themselves—i.e., the amount they would pay for the lease of the motels—will be too small compared with the cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever among the patrons files the case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial number of interested parties without recovering their costs. This is the free rider problem in economics. It is a negative externality which operates as a disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right.40 In Executive Secretary v. The Hon. Court of Appeals,41 the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. was found to have standing to file the petition for declaratory relief on behalf of its member recruitment agencies because it proved through board resolutions that it was authorized to sue on the behalf of its members. It was able to show that it was the medium used by the members to effectively communicate their grievances. Allegations of transcendental importance are not enough to allow exceptions to locus standi. In Francisco v. House of Representatives,42 this Court enumerated factors that determine if an issue is of transcendental importance. There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.43 (Citations omitted) Moreover, there must also be a showing of a "clear or imminent threat to fundamental rights" and of "proper parties suffering real, actual or more imminent injury,"44 thus: In addition to an actual controversy, special reasons to represent, and disincentives for the injured party to bring the suit themselves, there must be a showing of the transcendent nature of the right involved. Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a grounded level of urgency can be transcendent. For instance, in The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the association was allowed to file on behalf of its members considering the importance of the issue involved, i.e., the constitutionality of agrarian reform measures, specifically, of then newly enacted Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive, Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes its role in a democracy if it is asked to substitute its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable and representative bodies where there is no unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot lose this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction and the justiciability of their claims must be presented with rigor. Transcendental interest is not a talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law. . . . . Again, the reasons cited—the "far-reaching consequences" and "wide area of coverage and extent of effect" of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001—are reasons not transcendent considering that most administrative issuances of the national government are of wide coverage. These reasons are not special reasons for this Court to brush aside the requirement of legal standing.45 (Citations omitted) The petitioner was unable to prove that it was authorized by its members to file the instant case through board resolutions or through its articles of incorporation; I find, thus, that petitioner does not have the required standing to file the petition. ACCORDINGLY, I VOTE to DISMISS the Petition. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, p. 7. 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. at 14. 5 Id. at 15. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. at 16. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 17. 11 Id. at 16-17. 12 Id. at 17. 13 Levy Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 63-64 (1993) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En Banc]. 14 Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 499 Phil. 281, 304 (2005) [Per C.J. Panganiban, En Banc]. 15 Id. See also Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 479 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc]. 16 Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 499 Phil. 281, 304 (2005) [Per C.J. Panganiban, En Banc]. 17 607 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc]. 18 Id. at 341. 19 See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]; Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 20 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 661 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 21 CIVIL CODE, art. 8. 22 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 23 Id. at 661-662. 24 Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 25 Id. at 25. 26 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales]. 27 718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 28 G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 29 Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 314 Phil. 131 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc]. 30 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 554-666 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 31 Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 27-28 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 32 Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]. 33 See Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]. 34 White Light Corp., et al. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 456 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. 35 561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]. 36 Id. at 396. 37 Id. at 395-396. 38 Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 32 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 39 G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 40 Id. at 32-33. 41 473 Phil. 27 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]. 42 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc]. 43 Id. at 899. 44 In Re Supreme Court Judicial Independence v. Judiciary Development Fund, 751 Phil. 30, 44 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 45 Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 33-34 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation