G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018,
♦ Decision,
Tijam, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion,
Caguioa, [J]
[ G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018 ]
PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RESPONDENTS.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari (Petition) filed by Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PHAPi) assails the constitutionality of select provisions of Republic Act No. 109321 (RA 10932), or the Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law, i.e., Sections 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the said law.
I concur with the ponencia that the instant Petition should be dismissed at the first instance because it does not present an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power, and the petitioner has no personal and substantial interest in the case such that it has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
In asking the Court to declare certain provisions of RA 10932 as unconstitutional for supposedly contravening the Constitution, the petitioner invokes the Court's power of judicial review under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution.2 The power of judicial review refers to the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution.3 Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.4 For the Court to exercise this power, it is indispensable that certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.5
The Petition here fails the first two (2) requisites.
There is no actual case or controversy calling for the Court's exercise of judicial power.
An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.6 There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.7
Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite of "ripeness," which means that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.8
Otherwise stated, an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.9
The Petition here does not allege that any medical institution or practitioner has actually been held liable under RA 10932. Nor is there even an assertion that an existing action has been filed against any medical institution or practitioner who violated RA 10932. As well, there is likewise no assertion that any medical institution or practitioner has actually committed any act violative of RA 10932 that makes such institution or person susceptible to the liabilities imposed under the said law.
In short, it is apparent that the instant Petition was filed merely in anticipation of a possible breach or infraction of the law.ℒαwρhi৷ To emphasize, an actual case or controversy which justifies the Court's exercise of its judicial review power necessitates an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not merely an anticipatory controversy.
The petitioner has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA 10932.
That is not all. Again, in order for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the person or entity challenging the act must have standing to challenge — he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.10 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.11
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, it is crystal clear that petitioner PHAPi has no legal standing to question the constitutionality of RA 10932 — as it does not stand to sustain any damage or injury of a direct and personal nature in the implementation of RA 10932.
Under RA 10932, only officials, medical practitioners, and/or medical institutions that actually demand/accept any form of advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement/medical treatment of a patient in emergency situations or refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death/permanent disability are subjected to potential liability under the law.
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that petitioner PHAPi is not a medical institution that administers medical treatment, being an association with a completely separate juridical personality from its members. With petitioner PHAPi being a juridical person endowed with a distinct personality of its own, it is clear that any potential liability that may be imposed upon any of the petitioner's member hospitals, clinics, and facilities will NOT be a liability of petitioner PHAPi.
Restating the obvious, petitioner PHAPi will sustain no direct and personal injury from the implementation of RA 10932; it has no personal stake in the issues raised in the Petition. Hence, the requisite of locus standi is completely lacking, warranting the outright dismissal of the instant Petition.
Section 1 of RA 10932 is not violative of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, even if the abovementioned matters were to be swept aside for the sake of liberality, the instant Petition should nonetheless be dismissed as it is bereft of substantive merit.
The petitioner argues that Section 112 of RA 10932 transgresses the Constitution because it purportedly imposes upon medical institutions and medical practitioners the untenable and impossible duty of actually preventing the death or permanent disability of a patient, or, in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or non-institutional delivery. The petitioner posits the view that the aforementioned provision of the law is violative of due process as it goes against the jurisprudential doctrine that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of treatment.13
The petitioner's interpretation of RA 10932 is mistaken.
The essence of RA 10932 is to prohibit medical institutions/practitioners from requesting or accepting any deposit or any other form of payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care, confinement, or medical treatment of a patient, or to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or, in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or non-institutional delivery, only in emergency or serious cases and only if the medical institution or practitioner has adequate medical capabilities to administer treatment.
By reason of inadequacy of the medical capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the attending physician may transfer the patient to a facility where the appropriate care can be given, after the patient or his next of kin consents to said transfer and after the receiving hospital or medical clinic agrees to the transfer.14
Hence, contrary to the specious interpretation of the petitioner, Section 1 of RA 10932 does not mandate whatsoever that physicians be insurers of the good result of treatment. The law merely imposes on medical institutions/practitioners the strict duty to administer basic emergency care, as defined under the law, only with respect to persons in emergency or serious situations, and when the medical institutions/practitioners have the capability to administer such treatment.
Further, Section 4 of RA 10932 is also not violative of the Constitution.
The petitioner likewise argues that the fines and penalties imposed under Section 415 of RA 10932 are constitutionally infirm becafuse they are supposedly unjust, excessive, and oppressive; the penalties set by the law are allegedly not commensurate to the act or omission being penalized.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
The penalties as prescribed by statute are essentially and exclusively legislative; the courts should not encroach on the prerogative of the lawmaking body.16 As pronounced by the Court early on in United States v. Borromeo,17 the fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as to shock the sense of mankind.
In any case, the stern fines and penalties provided by Section 4 of RA 10932 are not at all unjust, excessive, and oppressive, considering that the violation of the law does not entail mere damage to property. The observance of RA 10932 may very well determine whether a patient experiencing an emergency health situation will survive or perish. The grave consequences involved cannot be overstated; a patient's life hangs in the balance. Further, the legislature's desire to impose strict penalties upon violators of RA 10932 is in fealty to the constitutional mandate that the State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people.18
Hence, the petitioner's attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 10932 must also fall.
Furthermore, Section 5 of RA 10932 likewise does not violate the Constitution.
Section 5 of RA 10932 (Presumption of Liability Clause) states:
SEC. 5. Presumption of Liability. — In the event of death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, or in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, proceeding from the denial of his or her admission to a health facility pursuant to a policy or practice of demanding deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment, a presumption of liability shall arise against the hospital, medical clinic, and the official, medical practitioner, or employee involved.
The petitioner finds Section 5, which makes the erring medical institution and/or practitioner prima facie liable for medical malpractice, unconstitutional on the notion that, in medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the medical practitioner failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done. The petitioner adds that medical malpractice must be proven with reasonable medical probability based on competent expert testimony and that proximate cause of injury/death must be established.
These arguments are mistaken.
Under Section 5 of RA 10932, the presumption of liability on the part of the medical practitioner/institution arises only when death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, or, in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, occurs after the denial by the medical institution/practitioner of the emergency patient's admission to the health facility during an emergency/serious situation, pursuant to an established policy/practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment.
In the context of medical malpractice, Section 5 creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the medical institution/practitioner when the latter commits a violation of law, i.e., the act of denying the emergency patient's admission to the health facility during an emergency/serious situation pursuant to an established policy/practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment, which RA 10932 considers a violation of law.
The presumption of negligence when a statutory duty has been violated.
While the petitioner posits the view that this is unconstitutional because the plaintiff, in medical malpractice cases, must first prove that negligence was indeed committed, it should be noted that under Philippine law, the violation of a statutory duty may be treated either as a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence, negligence per se, or a circumstance which should be considered together with other circumstances as evidence of negligence.19
The Court held in F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals20 that the failure of the therein petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with certain city ordinances in itself sufficed to support a finding of negligence.
In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals,21 finding that the failure of the therein petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1572 constituted negligence per se, the Court held that "[t]here is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent."22
Hence, creating a presumption of negligence based on the violation of a statutory duty is not legally infirm.
The violation of a statutory duty as the proximate cause of an injury
The petitioner also faults Section 5 of RA 10932 for supposedly presuming that the illegal act of the medical institution/practitioner, i.e., denying the emergency patient's admission to the health facility during an emergency/serious situation pursuant to an established policy/practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment, is the proximate cause of the injury or death of the patient. The petitioner argues that in medical malpractice cases, the act or omission complained of must be established as the proximate cause of the injury or death.
In this respect, the pronouncement of the Court in Teague v. Fernandez,23 is instructive:
"x x x [I]f the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury." x x x
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. x x x"24 (Italics in the original omitted; emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, when a statute is created in order to prevent a certain injury, and such injury occurs when the statute is violated, then the violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Section 5 of RA 10932 contemplates a situation wherein death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, etc. occurs, which are the very injuries intended to be prevented by the introduction of RA 10932, then the acts violative of RA 10932 will be presumed to be the proximate cause of the death or serious injury.
In any case, the Presumption of Liability Clause does not create a conclusive presumption that the defendant is automatically guilty of medical malpractice. What the provision merely does is to shift the burden to the defendant to prove that there was another act or event that was the proximate cause of the death/injury.
The presumption of liability recognized under Philippine Law
Under various legal provisions and established legal doctrines, it is well recognized that liability may, at certain times, be disputably presumed when certain acts have been committed or when a certain set of conditions is present which has a reasonable or rational connection with the fact presumed.
For instance, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is well-recognized in this jurisdiction, wherein in a situation in which the thing causing the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it is presumed, in the absence of sufficient explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care of the latter.25
As another example, Article 1387 of the Civil Code provides that alienation of property for valuable consideration made by a person against whom an unsatisfied judgment is outstanding raises a presumption of fraud.26
Similarly, under Article 1265 of the Civil Code, whenever a thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1165.
With respect to common carriers, Article 1735 of the Civil Code states that if goods under the care of common carriers are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, then the common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. In relation to the foregoing, Article 1752 of the Civil Code even dictates that despite the presence of an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the vigilance over the goods, the common carrier is nevertheless disputably presumed to have been negligent in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
In the same way, according to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
With respect to motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he/she was violating any traffic regulation.
Moreover, under Article 2188 of the Civil Code, there is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.
In addition, and as already explained above, it is a settled rule that when a statute is created in order to prevent a certain injury, and such injury occurred when the statute was violated, the violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.27 Jurisprudence has also recognized that the violation of a statutory duty may be treated either as a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence, negligence per se, or a circumstance which should be considered together with other circumstances as evidence of negligence.28
In fact, under Section 3(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the disputable presumption that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent is sufficient, unless satisfactorily contradicted.
Hence, considering the foregoing provisions of law and established doctrines in jurisprudence providing for the presumption of liability, the Presumption of Liability Clause under Section 5 of RA 10932 is not at all a novel provision of law.
Similar to the abovementioned provisions and doctrines on the presumption of liability, Section 5 merely creates a disputable presumption of liability over the death or injury of a patient on the part of the medical practitioner and/or institution in a situation wherein a violation of a statutory duty is committed, in which such violation has, at the very least, a reasonable and rational connection to the death or injury that occurred.
The Presumption of Liability Clause does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The notion of presuming liability has been so accepted in Philippine law that it has even found application with respect to the more stringent and rigid concept of criminal liability.
The Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of penal statutes that provide for a prima facie evidence of guilt, shifting the burden of proof to the accused, despite the elementary rule that the prosecution has the burden of establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, neither can the argument be made that the Presumption of Liability Clause infringes on the constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
To illustrate, under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Also, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 4885, the drawer of a check is given three (3) days to make good the said check by depositing the necessary funds to cover the amount thereof; otherwise, a, prima facie presumption will arise as to the existence of fraud, which is an element of the crime of estafa.
In Bañares v. Court of Appeals,29 citing People v. Mingoa,30 the Court held that, contrary to petitioner PHAPi's theory on the supposed infringement of the constitutional presumption of innocence, there is no constitutional objection to a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct:
There is, of course, no constitutional objection to a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence. The legislature may provide for prima facie evidence of guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Applying the foregoing to the Presumption of Liability Clause, considering that it envisions a situation wherein a person who is in extremely urgent need of medical attention is denied treatment by a medical institution/practitioner due to an illegal policy or practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment, and such person dies or is seriously injured immediately thereafter, there is undoubtedly a reasonable connection between the illegal act committed and the ultimate fact presumed, i.e., liability for the death or injury of the emergency patient.
Such connection is not unreasonable and arbitrary, considering that death or serious injury would be the rational and logical outcome/consequence when a person experiencing an extremely urgent medical situation was not given timely medical attention due to a policy or practice expressly prohibited by law.
Finally, Sections 7 and 8 of RA 10932 do not violate the Constitution.
Lastly, the petitioner seeks to declare Sections 7 and 832 of RA 10932 unconstitutional because the said provisions, which provide that PhilHealth reimbursement, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office assistance, and tax deductions shall only cover basic emergency care provided to poor, indigent, or marginalized patients, supposedly violate the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause does not call for absolute equality. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.33
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.34
First, a belabored discussion is not needed to explain that there are substantial distinctions as to the medical treatment of poor, indigent, and marginalized patients and that of patients who can very well afford medical treatment. It is self-explanatory that poor, indigent, and marginalized patients are differently situated as compared to affluent and well-off patients who have the means to avail themselves of medical treatment. Further, the special treatment of poor, indigent, and marginalized patients under RA 10932 is very much germane to the purpose of the law. In fact, the 1987 Constitution itself mandates that the State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, wherein there shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.35 Lastly, it is not limited to existing conditions only and that the questioned proviso .is equally apply to all members of the same class.
Given the foregoing reasons, I concur with the ponencia and vote to DISMISS the instant Petition.
Footnotes
1 AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-HOSPITAL DEPOSIT LAW BY INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLLANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES", AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
2 See Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009).
3 Id. at 73.
4 Id.
5 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003).
6 Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 288 (2016).
7 Id. at 288.
8 Id.
9 Board ofOptometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1206 (1996).
10 Ocampo v. Enriquez, supra note 6, at 289-290.
11 Id. at 290.
12 SECTION 1. In emergency or serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any proprietor, president, director, manager or any other officer, and/or medical practitioner or employee of a hospital or medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or accept any deposit or any other form of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care to any patient, confinement or medical treatment of a patient in such hospital or medical clinic or to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or noninstitutional delivery: Provided, That by reason of inadequacy of the medical capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the attending physician may transfer the patient to a facility where the appropriate care can be given, after the patient or his next of kin consents to said transfer and after the receiving hospital or medical clinic agrees to the transfer: Provided, however, That when the patient is unconscious, incapable of giving consent and/or unaccompanied, the physician can transfer the patient even without his consent: Provided, further, That such transfer shall be done only after necessary emergency treatment and support have been administered to stabilize the patient and after it has been established that such transfer entails less risks than the patient's continued confinement: Provided, furthermore, That no hospital or clinic, after being informed of the medical indications for such transfer, shall refuse to receive the patient nor demand from the patient or his next of kin any deposit or advance payment: Provided, finally, That strict compliance with the foregoing procedure on transfer shall not be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act.
13 See Lucas v. Tuaño, 604 Phil. 98, 125 (2009).
14 RA 10932, Sec. 1.
15 SEC. 4. Any official, medical practitioner or employee of the hospital or medical clinic who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction by final judgment, be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but not more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if such violation was committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital or clinic or upon instruction of its management, the director or officer of such hospital or clinic responsible for the formulation and implementation of such policy shall, upon conviction by final judgment, suffer imprisonment of four (4) to six (6) years, or a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court, without prejudice to damages that may be awarded to the patient-complainant: Provided, further, That upon three (3) repeated violations committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital or clinic or upon the instruction of its management, the health facility's license to operate shall be revoked by the DOH. The president, chairman, board of directors, or trustees, and other officers of the health facility shall be solidarily liable for damages that may be awarded by the court to the patient-complainant.
16 People v. Millora, 252 Phil. 105, 122 (1989).
17 23 Phil. 279, 289 (1912).
18 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 15.
19 See Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 756, 766-767 (2004).
20 247-A Phil. 51, 56 (1988).
21 331 Phil. 1019 (1996).
22 Id. at 1027.
23 151-A Phil. 648 (1973).
24 Id. at 652.
25 Spouses Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 123 Phil. 272, 281-282 (1966).
26 See Ramos v. Cho Chun Chac, 54 Phil. 713, 715 (1930).
27 Teague v. Fernandez, supra note 23, at 652.
28 Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.
29 271 Phil. 886 (1991).
30 92 Phil. 856, 858-859 (1953).
31 Bañares v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 897.
32 SEC. 7. PhilHealth Reimbursement of Basic Emergency Care. — PhilHealth shall reimburse the cost of basic emergency care and transportation services incurred by the hospital or medical clinic for the emergency medical services given to poor and indigent patients. Furthermore, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) shall provide medical assistance for the basic emergency care needs of the poor and marginalized groups.
SEC. 8. Tax Deductions. — Other expenses incurred by the hospital or medical clinic in providing basic emergency care to poor and indigent patients not reimbursed by PhilHealth shall be tax deductible.
33 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 459 (2010).
34 Id. at 459.
35 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 11.
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