A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, December 4, 2018,
♦ Decision,
Per Curiam
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion,
Per Curiam,
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Caguioa, [J]
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC. December 04, 2018 ]
IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
A.M. NO. P-16-3450 (FORMERLY A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, RESPONDENT.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PER CURIAM:
I.
I concur. Respondent Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. (respondent) should be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of his admitted drug use, and thus, ought to be dismissed from service. I do, however, find it fitting to expound on the parameters of the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution in order to address respondent's averments in his August 25, 2017 letter1 to this Court.
To recount, in said letter, respondent requested for the dismissal of the instant administrative cases due to the prior dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 62-15 (for violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. [RA] 9165) and 63-15 (for violation of Section 11 in relation to Section 28 of RA 9165) after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the drugs seized under the void search warrant, as well as the fruits thereof (i.e., the results of the confirmatory drug test), were inadmissible in evidence by operation of the exclusionary rule.2 Notably, the documents relative to the foregoing criminal cases were forwarded to the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator and hence, spurred these administrative cases against respondent.3 Thus, as presented in the ponencia, "[i]t is respondent's position that since the evidence obtained through such search warrant were declared illegal and inadmissible by the RTC, the same cannot likewise be used in the instant administrative cases [which hence] have no leg to stand on and must be dismissed."4
II.
It is well settled that "an administrative case is independent from the criminal action, although both arose from the same act or omission xxx. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence required, the procedure observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as in the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Thus, as a rule, exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa."5
Nevertheless, the demarcations between administrative and criminal cases do not negate the general application of the exclusionary rule to both of these cases under the Constitution's present formulation.
The exclusionary rule is found under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The "preceding section" referred to in Section 3 (2) pertains to the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures found under Section 2, Article III:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
According to case law, the exclusionary rule is the "practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."6 In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.7
In simple terms, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement in engaging in fishing expeditions,8 and ultimately, protect the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Our constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is an almost faithful reproduction of the Fourth Amendment to the United States of America (US) Constitution, viz.:
ARTICLE [IV] (Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
However, it should be highlighted that under the Fourth Amendment, the phrase "of whatever nature and for any purpose" does not appear as a qualifier to the above-stated right.
Furthermore, the US Constitution does not contain a corresponding exclusionary rule. Tracing its origins from the cases of Boyd v. United States (Boyd)9 and Weeks v. United States,10 the exclusionary rule in the US has been regarded as a "prophylactic doctrine"11 created by the Judiciary in relation to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.12 As there was no standard exclusionary rule codified in the US Constitution, it therefore appears that its application - particularly, in administrative disciplinary cases - remains nuanced by the attending circumstances.
To illustrate, in Department of Transportation v. State Personnel Board,13 the Court of Appeal of the Second District of California refused to apply the exclusionary rule since the social consequences of applying the same did not outweigh the effect thereof on the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, the court did not favor its application to shield an erring government employee from administrative sanction.
On the other hand, in Dyson v. State Personnel Board,14 the Court of Appeal of the Third Appellate District of California applied the exclusionary rule, holding that "because of the particular nature of the investigation of this case and the extent of agency involvement, xxx the exclusionary rule applies to remedy the agency invasion of its employee's constitutional rights."
Meanwhile, in City of Omaha v. Savard-Henson,15 the Court of Appeals of Nebraska opined that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to administrative proceedings where its purpose of deterring police conduct would not be served. Nevertheless, if the balancing test finds that the social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence outweighs the likely costs, it may apply.
In the Philippines, the exclusionary rule was similarly brought to light through jurisprudential pronouncements. The rule first appeared in Kheytin v.Villareal (Kheytin),16 wherein Boyd was cited as basis. While the exclusionary rule had been utilized in cases succeeding Kheytin,17 the Court halted its application in the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court.18 Moncado's abandonment of the exclusionary rule echoed in subsequent jurisprudence until the case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),19 wherein its application was reinstated. In Stonehill, the Court rationalized that:
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually - but, understandably - finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.20
In contrast to the US experience, our evolving jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule culminated in its express incorporation in Section 4 (2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Significantly, this ensured the firm application of the exclusionary rule in our jurisdiction.21 As one constitutionalist pointed out, "by making such evidence inadmissible, the Constitution has closed the door to any judicial temptation to erode the rule by distinguishing and splitting hairs."22 Therefore, the very act of expressly incorporating the exclusionary rule in our fundamental law begs a different treatment of the same from that in the US.
To bolster this point, not only has the exclusionary rule been codified in our Constitution, it is further couched in general and comprehensive language, which is hence, expressive of its overarching force. As previously stated, the exclusionary rule applies to any evidence obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III, i.e., the guarantee against the right to unreasonable searches and seizures, and has the effect of rendering such evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" in Section 3 (2), Article III correspondingly reflects - as it is made to implement - the equally expansive "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose" under Section 2 as above-said.
Indeed, the phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" in Section 3 (2), Article III means that the exclusionary rule should apply in all kinds of cases, whether criminal, civil, or administrative. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.23 Likewise, if "the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission."24 In fact, while there is yet no definitive ruling which traverses head-on the exclusionary rule's comprehensiveness, it deserves mentioning that this Court has already applied the same in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Morales,25 an administrative case, and Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,26 a civil case.
III.
As for the present matter, it is my humble view that the exclusionary rule finds application in both the criminal and the administrative cases against respondent. As mentioned, the primary evidence against respondent is the subject drugs seized from him. However, these drugs were obtained by virtue of a void search warrant and hence, fall within the ambit of the exclusionary rule, rendering them inadmissible in evidence.
Likewise, the exclusionary rule applies to render inadmissible the results of the confirmatory drug test because it is the direct fruit of the unlawful search and seizure. In People v. Alicando,27 the Court explained that "once the primary source (the 'tree') is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the 'fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible. xxx The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained."28
Section 38 of RA 9165 states that "[a]ny person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs."29
In this case, respondent's apprehension was based on the drugs illegally seized from him. Without said evidence, there would be no reasonable basis for the apprehending officers to subject respondent to a confirmatory drug test. Thus, the results thereof should be deemed as fruits of the poisonous tree and perforce, should be excluded.
These notwithstanding, records disclose that respondent voluntarily admitted before the public prosecutor during the preliminary investigation that he was a drug user. As aptly pointed out by the ponencia, "[t]he admission was made by respondent during the preliminary investigation stage which is a source independent from the illegal search, seizure, and arrest, and is presumed to have been regularly performed. xxx Notably, respondent never questioned the voluntariness of such admission[,] as well as the regularity of the preliminary investigation."30 As I see it, there is no clear causal relation between the evidence which were illegally obtained and the admission made by respondent. The latter is not a logical consequence of the former. As earlier stated, the admission was a voluntary act of respondent; he was not put into such an inescapable situation wherein he would be forced to admit to his guilt, since nothing precluded him from contesting the admissibility - as he did, in fact, contest the admissibility - of the evidence illegally obtained from him. Thus, as respondent had valid claims and defenses, it would be a stretch to conclude that the admission made during the preliminary investigation was a direct result of the evidence illegally seized from him. That being said, the admission is a distinct and separate piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal search conducted and hence, cannot be deemed as a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Without a doubt, the admission of respondent constitutes substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. "Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant."31
An admitted drug user has no place in the ranks of the Judiciary. As the Court held in Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes,32 "all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is [RA 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs. xxx [T]he conduct of a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary."33
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court - Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, is GUILTY of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and thus DISMISSED from service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Footnotes
1 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 163-164.
2 Ponencia, pp. 5-6.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 6.
5 Jaca v. People of the Philippines, 702 Phil. 210, 250 (2013).
6 Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 750 (1967).
7 Id.
8 People v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212 (2014).
9 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1806, 3 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2488.
10 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1368.
11 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 71.
12 United States v. Herrera, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9830, 444 F.3d 1238.
13 178 Cal. App. 4th 568, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 2009 Cal. App. LEX IS 1690, 158 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P60,883.
14 213 Cal. App. 3d 711, 262 Cal. Rptr. 112, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 886.
15 9 Neb. App. 561 , 615 N.W.2d 497, 2000 Neb. App. LEXIS 243.
16 42 Phil. 886, 899 (1920).
17 See Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 47 (1937).
18 See 80 Phil. 1, 3-4 (1948).
19 Supra note 6.
20 Id. at 753-754.
21 See People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51 (1991); Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 229.
22 Id.
23 See National Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 250-251 (2005); and Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289, 295 (2002).
24 Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 201 (2012).
25 592 Phil. 102 (2008).
26 324 Phil. 63 (1996).
27 321 Phil. 656 (1995).
28 Id. at 690.
29 Emphasis supplied.
30 Ponencia, p. 9.
31 Menor v. Guillermo, 595 Phil. 10, 15 (2008).
32 635 Phil. 490 (2010).
33 Id. at 498-499.
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