A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC




A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, December 4, 2018, ♦ Decision, Per Curiam ♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Per Curiam, ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J] Manila EN BANC [ A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC. December 04, 2018 ] IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, A.M. NO. P-16-3450 (FORMERLY A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, RESPONDENT. DECISION PER CURIAM: No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The image of the court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat. The conduct of a person serving the Judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the Judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.1 (Emphasis ours) No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the Judiciary. The Court is mindful that any act of impropriety on the part of judicial officers and personnel, be they the highest or the lowest members of the work force, can greatly erode the people's confidence in our justice system. Hence, it is the sacred duty of every worker in the Judiciary to maintain the good name and standing of the courts. Every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities.2 (Emphasis ours) Before this Court are two consolidated administrative matters against Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. (respondent), Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Factual Antecedents These administrative matters stemmed from criminal cases filed against respondent for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002". Specifically, Criminal Case No. 63-15 was filed for violation of Section 11 (Illegal Possession) in relation to Section 28 of RA 9165; while Criminal Case No. 62-15 was filed for violation of Section 15 (Prohibited Use) in relation to Section 28 of the same Act.3 Also, I.S. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 was filed against respondent for violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale) and 15 of the said Act but was, however, dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor and now the subject of an automatic review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).4 The factual backdrop of the said cases are as follows: On March 7, 2015, pursuant to Search Warrant No. 5043, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and Philippine National Police (PNP) searched respondent's property, which resulted in the confiscation of seven plastic sachets, later on found to be containing a total of 9.4993 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". Consequently, respondent was arrested and detained. The confirmatory test conducted on respondent's urine sample likewise yielded positive of shabu. The Provincial Prosecutor also noted that respondent admitted the use of dangerous drugs.5 On April 21, 2015, Criminal Case Nos. 63-15 and 62-15 were filed. No bail was recommended for the respondent's release.6 Meanwhile, as a result of an alleged buy-bust operation, I.S. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 was also filed.7 Documents relative to Criminal Case No. 63-15 were then forwarded to the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Pursuant to the Court En Banc Resolution dated March 12, 1981, which authorized the OCA to initiate motu proprio the filing of administrative proceedings against judges and/or employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts, the OCA charged respondent with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which case was then docketed as A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC.8 In a Report9 dated November 6, 2015 in the said administrative matter, the OCA found respondent's acts to constitute grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Hence, it recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that respondent be ordered suspended from service pending the outcome of the criminal case or until further order from the Court; and, that respondent be ordered to comment on the administrative charge. The Court, in its April 11, 2016 Resolution,10 adopted and approved the OCA's findings and recommendation. Pursuant to the said April 11, 2016 Resolution, the case was re-docketed as A.M. No. P-16-3450. Meanwhile, P/Supt. Lorenzo Junio Holanday, Jr., Provincial Director, Marinduque Police Provincial Office, informed the Court, through a letter11 dated March 25, 2015, of the Special Report on respondent's arrest and the criminal cases filed against the latter for violations of RA 9615. This brought about A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC. In a Report12 dated January 28, 2016 in A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, the OCA likewise found respondent's acts to be constitutive of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In the main, respondent's separate Comments13 in the instant administrative matters constitute denial of the charges against him in the criminal cases and allegations of evidence-planting and frame-up. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its April 11, 2016 Resolution,14 suspended respondent from service pending the final outcome of the criminal case filed against him or until further order of this Court considering that the evidence of guilt is prima facie strong. In a letter15 dated August 11, 2016, respondent requested that the instant administrative cases be consolidated and that the cases be submitted for resolution based on the pleadings filed. On April 7, 2017, the OCA issued a Memorandum16 regarding A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, with the following recommendations: 1. A.M. No. P-16-3450 xxx and A.M. No.15-05-136-RTC be CONSOLIDATED; 2. Respondent Roge1io M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque be found GUILTY in both A.M. No. P-16-3450 and A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service pursuant to Sections 46(A)(3) and (B)(8), respectively, under Rule 10 of Revised Rules for Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; and 3. Respondent Salazar, Jr. be meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. In its Memorandum, the OCA emphasized that only substantial evidence is needed in administrative proceedings; that administrative liability is separate and distinct from criminal liability; and that in administrative proceedings, the Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. The OCA also noted that the instant administrative cases are not intended to preempt the DOJ's review of the dismissal of I.S. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 nor to determine respondent's guilt in Criminal Case Nos. 62-15 and 63-15.17 The OCA found that the evidence on record, which include, the undisputed fact that respondent was found to be positive for shabu in the drug test following his arrest, and that the finding of probable cause in the criminal charges against him constitute more than substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. The OCA grounded its conclusion on Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 13, series of 2010, which provides that any official or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a penalty of dismissal from the service for the first offense pursuant to Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Section 22(c) of its Omnibus Rules.18 On even date, the OCA also issued a Memorandum19 as regards A.M. No. P-16-3450, with the same findings and recommendation as in A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC above-stated. In a letter20 dated August 25, 2017, respondent manifested to this Court that on May 4, 2017, Judge-Designate Dennis R. Pastrana (Judge Pastrana) of the RTC of Boac, Marinduque, granted his Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence for lack of probable cause and non-conformity with established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines in the implementation of such search warrant.21 In the said May 4, 2017 Order, Judge Pastrana found that the officers who applied for the search warrant committed deliberate falsehoods to obtain the same. Thus Judge Pastrana ruled that due to the nullity of the search warrant, the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void and with the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from respondent's home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Respondent further manifested that his motion to dismiss the criminal cases against him was also granted by the RTC on August 18, 2017. In the said August 18, 2017 Order,22 Judge Pastrana added that even the urine test conducted on the respondent, having been done as a result of an arrest occasioned by the search is also inadmissible like the seized drugs for being fruits of the poisonous tree. Thus, in his August 25, 2017 letter,23 respondent requested for the dismissal of the instant administrative cases against him in view of the dismissal of the criminal cases, revocation of his suspension order, and payment of his back salaries and other benefits withheld during his suspension and detention. The Issue The pivotal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable despite dismissal of the related criminal cases against him. This Court's Ruling Respondent was charged with illegal sale, possession, and use of illegal drugs. Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that the criminal cases against him from which these administrative cases rooted, had already been dismissed by virtue of the quashal of the search warrant and the suppression of the evidence taken by virtue of the said warrant. It is the respondent's position that since the evidence obtained through such search warrant were declared illegal and inadmissible by the RTC, the same cannot likewise be used in the instant administrative cases. Hence, respondent argued that the administrative cases against him has no leg to stand on and must be dismissed. We do not agree. At the outset, We find it necessary to first place the instant case in its proper context. This is an administrative case against a Sheriff of the court charged with the administrative offenses of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as an offshoot of a prior arrest and criminal charges for violations of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 against said officer. Owing to the administrative nature of the instant case, several important considerations must be taken into serious account: first, the finding of administrative guilt is independent of the results of the criminal charges against the Sheriff; second, the Sheriff stands scrutiny and treated not as an accused in a criminal case, but as a respondent court officer; third, the Supreme Court, in taking cognizance of this administrative case, acts not as a prosecutor, but as the administrative superior specifically tasked to discipline its Members and personnel; fourth, the quantum of proof required for a finding of administrative guilt remains to be substantial evidence; and fifth, the paramount interest sought to be protected in an administrative case is the preservation of the Constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust. Well settled is the rule that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice-versa.24 Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. It bears stressing that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.25 Thus, the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 62-15 and 63-15 does not automatically entail the dismissal of the instant administrative actions. The fact that the pieces of evidence obtained from the voided search were declared inadmissible for being fruits of the poisonous tree will not result to the outright dismissal of the administrative cases at bar. It is necessary to emphasize that to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is required, that is, more than a mere scintilla of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,26 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.27 In the case of Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung and CA,28 this Court explained: xxx The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. xxx (citations omitted and emphasis ours) The question now is, taking into consideration the inadmissibility in the criminal cases of the drugs obtained by virtue of the search warrant and the positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the respondent upon arrest, is there substantial evidence to hold the respondent administratively liable in this case? We answer in the affirmative.ᇈWᑭHIL Respondent's admission of drug use, albeit with an allegation that he had stopped doing it as a promise to his mother on her deathbed in December 2014,29 coupled with the confirmatory test that yielded a positive result, are more than substantial evidence to support the conclusion that respondent is a drug-user, which would warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplinary power over court personnel. First. Respondent's admission of drugs use during the inquest cannot be considered as a fruit of the poisonous tree and as such, may legally and validly be admitted as evidence in the instant administrative case. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the trial court's order quashing the search warrant and dismissing the criminal cases did the trial court exclude the respondent's admission of drug use. This must necessarily be so for two reasons: (1) The admission partakes of a testimonial evidence, and not a "personal property" that can be the subject of a search and seizure. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court enumerates the personal property that may be seized for which a search warrant may be issued: (a) the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. In Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People30, We explained that "personal property" as used under the Rules pertain to the thing's mobility. Referencing Article 416 of the Civil Code, We expounded that in general, all things which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Testimonial evidence, therefore, cannot be treated as a "fruit" of the quashed search warrant. People v. Uy31 was emphatic in saying that the "inadmissible evidence termed as the fruit of the poisonous tree" refers to "object, not testimonial, evidence" and even more constricting when it held that "it refers to an object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure." (2) The admission was already far removed from the illegal search warrant that it cannot be regarded as a fruit of the poisonous tree. The lapse of time from the illegal search and the admission itself sufficiently "attenuate[s] the link."32 It should be stressed that the adjudged irregularity in the application and implementation of the search warrant does not have any clear causal relation between the evidence which was illegally obtained by virtue of such quashed warrant and respondent's admission before a separate and distinct proceeding and authority. Stating it in a different manner, the admission cannot be considered as a logical consequence of the latter. As eloquently put by one Justice's opinion, "[t]he admission was a voluntary act of respondent; it was not as if he was put into such an inescapable situation wherein he would be forced to admit to his guilt, since nothing precluded him from contesting the admissibility - as he did, in fact, contest the admissibility - of the evidence illegally obtained from him. Thus, as respondent had valid claims and defenses, it would be a stretch to conclude that the admission made during the preliminary investigation was a direct result of the evidence illegally seized from him. That being said, the admission is a distinct and separate piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal search conducted and hence, cannot be deemed as a fruit of poisonous tree." In the same vein, it would also be not logical nor legal to find nexus between the arrest which resulted from the illegal search and seizure and the admission during the preliminary investigation. The admission was made by respondent during the preliminary investigation stage which is a source independent from the illegal search, seizure, and arrest, and is presumed to have been regularly performed. While the search, seizure, arrest and preliminary investigation may be sequential, the admission made during the preliminary investigation was not a necessary, logical, and automatic consequence of the search, seizure and resulting arrest. We must consider that respondent may, or may not have made such admission despite the search and the arrest. Notably, respondent never questioned the voluntariness of such admission as well as the regularity of the preliminary investigation. In Wong Sun v. United States,33 the U.S. Supreme Court, under the "independent source exception" - admits evidence that was discovered through an independent source sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. If the evidence is not obtained directly from the violation, it is freed from the initial taint of the violation.34 In addition, the admission was made before the Prosecutor (and not before the erring police agents) who, concededly, had no participation in the illegal search and arrest. The Prosecutor, during the preliminary investigation, was regularly performing his duty, relying upon the validity of the search warrant and respondent's arrest. Hence, respondent's drug use was discovered by the Prosecutor independently and in good faith. Verily, the admissibility of respondent's admission in the instant administrative case cannot be questioned. Said admission is a separate and distinct piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal search and thus, cannot be regarded as a fruit of the poisonous tree. Further, it must be stressed that there is no allegation, much less proof, that any of respondent's basic rights in giving such admission were violated. Lastly, respondent's admission of his drug use is relevant for purposes of the present administrative case and as such, it may properly be considered by this Court in this administrative proceeding as substantial evidence. Second. The legal basis of the admissibility of the result of the confirmatory drug test cannot, likewise, be denied. The procedure for laboratory examination or test is outlined in Section 3835 of RA 9165. Section 38 provides that when there is reasonable ground to believe that an apprehended or arrested offender is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such offender shall be subjected to a screening laboratory examination or test. The positive results of a screening test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the results. The positive screening test result is not valid in a court of law unless confirmed. Following the prescribed procedure, the confirmatory urine test is therefore not the direct or indirect result of the illegal search; rather, it comes into play not only upon the apprehension or arrest of the offender, but also, (1) when the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the offender is under the influence of dangerous drugs; and (2) only after a screening laboratory test yields a positive result. The basis for the confirmatory drug test was, in fact, a reasonable belief of drug use and a positive screening test, both of which are neither a necessary nor automatic consequence of an illegal search. Parenthetically, Section 36, Article III of RA 9165 provides for the mandatory drug testing of: xxxx (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; xxxx (f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and xxxx In addition to the above-stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 1536 of this Act. Further, in A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC dated January 17, 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines for a program to prevent drug use and eliminate the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, specifically in the first and second level courts. Its objectives are as follows: 1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among lower court employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and provide administrative remedies in cases where an employee is found positive for dangerous drug use. 2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs among first and second level court employees and enhance awareness of their adverse effects by information dissemination and periodic random drug testing. 3. To institute other measures that address the menace of drug abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary. There is thus no reason to turn a blind eye, for purposes of this administrative proceeding, on the results of the confirmatory urine test when RA 9165 itself, as well as this Court's guidelines, sanction the conduct of a mandatory random drug testing of officers and employees of public and private offices.37 The character of the drug test being made at random actually dispenses with the usual requirement of probable cause. In the case of Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al.,38 We upheld the validity and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both public and private offices. This is allowed "for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace." This legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace is upheld because an employee's privacy interest is "circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace."39 Specifically, as regards public officers, this Court pronounced in SJS that: Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.40 Thus, despite the absence of probable cause, and the basis being only a positive drug test result, an employer is allowed by law to pursue an administrative case against the public or private officer or employee and thereafter, to suspend or terminate them. Notably, in the instant administrative matter, respondent never questioned the authenticity, validity, and regularity of Chemistry Report No. CRIMDT-005-1541 of the Marinduque Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. No objection or question was raised as to the regularity of the conduct of the confirmatory test. The finding of respondent's positive use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu remains unrebutted. Certainly, such compelling evidence cannot merely be ignored. The foregoing pieces of evidence thus constitute more than substantial evidence that respondent was found positive for illegal drugs use. The confirmatory drug test which yielded a positive result confirms respondent's admission of drug use and also, reflects respondent's propensity to lie as it negates his statement in his admission that he already stopped using illegal drugs. With the admissibility, relevance, and probative value of the subject evidence being established, We now proceed to rule on respondent's infraction and the proper sanction therefor. Misconduct has been defined as: xxx a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge grave misconduct.42 There is no doubt that the use of prohibited drugs constitute grave misconduct. It is a flagrant violation of the law, in fact a crime in itself, thus considered as grave misconduct. In Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services,43 the Court ruled that under Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Also, under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 13, series of 2010,44 any official or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a penalty of dismissal from the service at first offense pursuant to Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) 292 and Section 22(c) of its Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws.45 Further, undeniably, respondent's conduct tarnished the very image and integrity of the Judiciary,46 constitutive of a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense under Section 22(c) of the Omnibus Rules, with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. Section 50 of the RRACCS provides: Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Finding respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, We find the penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct, the most serious offense in this case, proper, pursuant to the aforecited provision.47 Besides, respondent's propensity to lie as above-mentioned, which bolsters a finding of moral turpitude, thus aggravating the offense, cannot go unnoticed. In all, the absurd consequences of excluding the seized evidence in this administrative case, constrain Us to hold respondent Sheriff administratively liable. Here is an officer of the court and an agent of law who is an admitted drug-user as evidenced by his admission during the preliminary investigation and the positive result of his confirmatory drug test, who will walk scot-free and whose claimed right to hold his public office will be sustained by this Court if We will heed to the dissent and dismiss these administrative cases merely because the related criminal cases were dismissed due to the quashal of the search warrant. We have, in the past, meted severe penalties against erring Court employees on the basis of mere affidavits or on mere allegations spelled in the pleadings filed. There is no reason for the Court to treat the instant administrative case differently, when the evidence is far more compelling. We always have to keep in mind the primordial consideration in resolving disciplinary actions. The paramount interest sought to be protected in an administrative case is the preservation of the Constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust. It must be remembered that no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. In the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes, et al.,48 where We dismissed an RTC clerk mainly for yielding a positive result in a drug test, We ruled: This Court is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs. The Court has adhered to the policy of safeguarding the welfare, efficiency, and well-being not only of all the court personnel, but also that of the general public whom it serves. The Court will not allow its frontline representatives xxx to put at risk the integrity of the whole judiciary. xxx.49 This Court's mandate to preserve and maintain the public's faith in the Judiciary, as well as its honor, dignity, integrity, can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of Justices, judges, and court employees. Thus, it is only by weeding out the likes of respondent from the ranks that We would be able to achieve such objective. WHEREFORE, finding Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court - Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service due to his drug use, the Court orders his DISMISSAL from service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur. Leonen, J., see separate opinion. Carandang, J., on leave. NOTICE OF JUDGMENT Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that on December 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matters, the original of which was received by this Office on February 14, 2019 at 4:00 p.m. Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court Footnotes 1 Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services, 719 Phil. 96, 101-102 (2017). 2 Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan v. Ronald Allan Gale R. Cruz, A.M. No. SB-17-24-P, July 11, 2017. 3 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 67. 4 Id. at 69. 5 Id. at 68-69. 6 Id. at 69. 7 Id. 8 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 148. 9 Id. at 1-2. 10 Id. at 8-9. 11 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 2-3. 12 Id. at 54-57. 13 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 7-9 and rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 10-32. 14 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 8. 15 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 61-63. 16 Id. at 67-75. 17 Id. at 69-71. 18 Id. at 73. 19 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 148-154. 20 Id. at 163-164. 21 Id. at 168-177. 22 Id. at 178-179. 23 Id. at 163-164. 24 Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 291-A Phil. 1 (1993). 25 Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011). 26 Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., 575 Phil. 538, 557 (2008). 27 Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, 549 Phil. 872, 877 (2007). 28 Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., supra note 26, id. at 557-558. 29 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 49. 30 747 Phil. 503, 524 (2014). 31 508 Phil. 637, 655 (2005). 32 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 592 (2006). 33 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 34 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection by Heather A. Jackson. 35 Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. - Subject to Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, if confirmed, the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law. 36 Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section II of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. 37 Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - xxx The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xxxx (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; xxxx 38 591 Phil. 393 (2008). 39 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., supra note 38 at 414. 40 Id. at 417. 41 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 51. 42 Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug of Castor, supra note 1, id at 100-101. 43 Id at 101. 44 Guidelines for a Drug-Free Workplace in the Bureaucracy. 45 Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services, supra note 1. 46 Id. at 101. 47 Laspiñas, et al. v. Judge Banzon, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2488, February 21, 2017. 48 635 Phil. 490 (2010). 49 Id. at 498-499. 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