EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015 ]
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, PETITIONERS, VS. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, RESPONDENTS.
DISSENTING OPINION
PEREZ, J.:
I am constrained to register my dissent to the ponencia that the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to all Regional Trial Courts, unaffected by the proviso in the same Section that the Supreme Court may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise the transferred jurisdiction. I base my dissent on the plain wording of Section 5.2 of Republic Act. No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code."
Briefly, the undisputed facts.
Petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales filed a Complaint against respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which petitioners purportedly already bought from, and fully paid to, S.J. Global, Inc. on 1 February 2010. Petitioners, the Gonzales', designated their Complaint as a Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages.1
Essentially, the allegations in the Complaint state that petitioners subscribed to a total of 295,116 shares fully paid in the books of S.J. Land Inc., acquiring 40% and 10% of the outstanding capital stock thereof. The bone of contention in the Complaint is the status of the shares, i.e., whether fully paid or unpaid by petitioners and the consequent issue of ownership and its incidences.
Upon filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, it was raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. On 9 and 24 August 2011, the RTC, Branch 276, in two separate Orders, issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After filing their respective answers to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.
In an Order dated 17 April 2011, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts, Branch 256 in this instance. Since Branch 276 was not specifically designated by the Supreme Court as a commercial court, it had no jurisdiction over the intra-corporate dispute, and accordingly, the case should be dismissed.
On motion for reconsideration, petitioners argued that: (1) they had no control over raffle of cases; (2) the RTCs have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799, with only the Supreme Court designating specific branches as special commercial courts, thus, at most, the case should be transferred or raffled to the proper branch; and (3) in all, as a matter of justice and equity, they cannot be prejudiced by the incorrect raffling of their case since they complied with the rules for the filing of cases.
Branch 276 stood pat on its ruling that it was without jurisdiction to hear, decide and act on the case, not designated as a special commercial court pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC/l 1-21-00. Ratiocinating further that without any kind of authority to act thereon, Branch 276 can only dismiss the case and cannot order the transfer of the case to the proper RTC following our ruling in Calleja v. Panday.2 The reversal of the rulings is the object of this Petition before us.
In granting the petition, the ponencia starts with the basic premise that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, distinct from the exercise of jurisdiction which, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. The ponencia points to R.A. No. 8799, specifically Section 5.2, as the law conferring (transferring) original and exclusive jurisdiction to the appropriate RTCs (from the Securities and Exchange Commission) over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A (SEC Cases). The ponencia clarifies, however, that the Supreme Court's designation of specific Special Commercial Courts, made subject of various Supreme Court Administrative Matters,3 was not a conferment of jurisdiction, but a "procedural tool to promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the RTCs jurisdiction over such cases." In this instance, pursuant to our Rules directing the manner by which jurisdiction shall be exercised, commercial cases were required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Courts.
The ponencia emphasizes that, petitioners having "correctly filed an intra-corporate case with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with [the Rules]," the RTC, "from the time of such filing[,] acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action."
Specifically, the ponencia holds:
Unfortunately, the case was raffled to Branch 276 instead of being assigned to the single Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. As the Court sees it, this erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the RTC's exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. As such, Branch 276 should have merely ordered the transfer of the case to Branch 256, and not its dismissal, x x x
In sum, the ponencia, discussing and citing the cases of Calleja, on which the court a quo based the herein assailed Order, Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,4 and Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc.,5 draws a distinction between subject matter jurisdiction conferred by law, in this instance falling with the RTCs, and the exercise of jurisdiction, in accordance with the designation of appropriate RTCs by the Supreme Court. Thus, according to the ponencia, the RTC of Muntinlupa City regardless of the Supreme Court designated branch, acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11-077 upon the filing of the complaint in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Courts. Thus, too, Branch 276, an RTC, albeit not designated as a Special Commercial Court, should simply order the transfer of the case to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court, contemplating merely a procedural matter, incidental to the RTC's exercise of jurisdiction. In all, as per the ponencia, the general investiture of jurisdiction to all RTCs is absolute, and once acquired, any of the RTCs may, in the exercise of vested jurisdiction, order the transfer of cases to the specific branch designated by the Supreme Court as a Special Commercial Court.
With all due respect, the ponencia proceeds from the wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over transferred SEC cases on all the Regional Trial Courts and that the designation by the Supreme Court of Special Commercial Courts concern only an "exercise of jurisdiction."
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 reads:
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — x x x
x x x x
5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
Thus, I am constrained to differ based on the statements in, and exact wording of, the law
It is first axiom in legal hermeneutics that a statutory provision is read as a whole and not in disjointed parts. The rule is as respected as it is ancient. Its sum and substance has not been diluted no matter how frequent the free paraphrases have been. The textbook says:
Subject always to the cardinal rule of statutory construction, the courts should give every reasonable interpretation to a statute which will give effect and meaning to every part or word thereof.
A statute should be construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous, meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably avoided.
The rule has its basis in the presumption that the legislature could not have intended to use words in vain or to leave part of its enactment devoid of sense or meaning. It cannot be presumed that the legislature introduced into a statute, words, clauses, provisions which would annul or mutually destroy each other. Rather, it is to be presumed that it is the purpose of the legislature that the entire statute and every part thereof should be significant and effective.
The maxim "ut res tnagis quam per eat" requires not merely that a statute should be given effect as a whole but that effect should be given to each of its express provisions.
Under this rule, that construction is favored which will render every word operative rather than one which makes some words idle and nugatory.
However, the court may not, in order to give effect to particular words, virtually destroy the meaning of the entire context, e.g., give them a significance which would be clearly repugnant to the statute looked upon as a whole and destructive of its obvious intent.7
Included in the Philippine applications of the tenet are the cases of: (1) Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation;8 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello;9 and Smart Communications, Inc. v. The City of Danao,10 as cited in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit11 where the Court's ruling was:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Because the law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.
I must here repeat the application of the rule. Thus must the following conclusions be reached.
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 did not transfer the cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to all the RTCs. If that was the legislative intention, then the provision should have simply stated that such cases are "hereby transferred to the Regional Trial Courts." The complete investiture is, however, on "the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases." If the law is a general conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the phrase "or the appropriate Regional Trial Court" is an inutile surplusage and the proviso that "the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases" is a purposeless appendage and wasted words. A general grant to all RTCs renders irrelevant the "Supreme Court's exercise of authority" on the matter. Such a general grant renders meaningless the designation by the Supreme Court of the RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.
Each word in the law was purposely written; and all such words make up the phrased idea. This is a basic presumption: To repeat -
[T]he legislature could not have intended to use words in vain or to leave part of its enactment devoid of sense or meaning. It cannot be presumed that the legislature introduced into a statute, words, clauses, provisions which would annul or mutually destroy each other. Rather, it is to be presumed that it is the purpose of the legislature that the entire statute and every part thereof should be significant and effective.12
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 should therefore be read to mean that SEC's jurisdiction over all cases under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is transferred to the specific RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority.
This is the reading of the Supreme Court as expressed with precision in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC dated 21 November 2000 which is aptly titled "Resolution Designating Certain Branches of Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission" "arising within their respective territorial jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions." This En Banc Resolution opened with a purpose clause reading "to implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code). This is an unequivocal statement that the Court interprets the provision to mean that only the RTC Branches that it shall designate to hear and decide Special Commercial Court cases can exercise jurisdiction over such cases. The issued guideline reinforces the exclusivity of the designation:
1. In multiple sala courts where one (1) or more branches of the RTC are herein designated as special courts, there will be no unloading of cases already pending in the branches designated. They shall continue to try and decide the said cases in addition to the SEC cases. In the meantime, in view of the temporary imbalance of caseload as a result of the transfer of SEC cases, the Executive Judge concerned shall exclude them in the raffle of newly filed cases in their station until their workload equals to that of the other branches, in which event they shall be included in the raffle of other civil and criminal cases.
x x x x
5. In provinces (for the First to the Twelth Judicial Regions) where there are no designated special courts, the Executive Judge of the station where new SEC cases will be filed shall consult the Supreme Court thru the Office of the Court Administrator.
There have been subsequent designations of RTC Branches as SEC courts, namely: RTC Branch 142, Makati City through A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; RTC Branch 34, Calamba, Laguna through amendment A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; RTC Branch 40, in Daet, Camarines Norte; RTC Branch 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; RTC Branch 74, Malabon; RTC Branch 36, Masbate again through an amendment of A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; and RTC Branch 23 of Naga City through A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC.
There has been, as just enumerated, as many iterations by the court itself of its reading of Section 5, Item 5.2 of P. D. 8799 i.e., that the law transferred the SEC jurisdiction over the cases listed in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the particular branches of the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable, therefore, is the conclusion that all other Branches of the RTCs without the Supreme Court designation are without jurisdiction over SEC cases. And, following unreversed rulings13 the other Branches of the RTC before whom a SEC case is filed must dismiss such case for want of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent such jurisdiction, the non-SEC RTC cannot direct the case to the "proper" court.14
The unavoidable, because statutorily mandated, allocation to RTC branches of the authority to decide SEC cases had, just as unavoidably, resulted in caseload imbalance in affected areas. Parenthetically, there was a resulting caseload imbalance since R.A. No. 8799 did not create Commercial Courts. The law merely unloaded SEC cases to the branches designated by the Supreme Court as Commercial Courts. The consequent caseload problem urged the exercise by the Court, as administrator, to effect an equitable distribution of cases among the RTC branches in areas where RTC branches have been given jurisdiction over the additional case types. Thus did the Court issue the Resolutions on the exclusion of the SEC designated courts from the raffle of cases.
Such arrangement continued until the weight of the unloaded jurisdiction eased such that the Court in 1 July 2003 issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It states:
1. The Regional Trial Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission;
2. The designation of Intellectual Property Courts under Administrative Order No. 113-95 dated 2 October 1995, as amended by Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated 21 October 1996 and Resolution dated 19 February 2002 in A.M. No. 02-1-11- SC, is hereby revoked. However, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby designated as an additional Special Commercial Court in the City of Manila;
3. Upon the effectivity of this Resolution, all IP cases shall be transferred to the designated Special Commercial Courts except those which have undergone the pre-trial state in civil cases or those where any of the accused has been arraigned in criminal cases which shall be retained by the court previously assigned to try them;
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;
5. In the event of inhibition of the judge of a designated Special Commercial Court, the following guidelines shall be observed: (a) where there is only one (1) Special Commercial Court, the case shall be raffled among the other judges in the station; (b) where there are two (2) Special Commercial Courts in the station, the Executive Judge shall immediately assign the case to the other Special Commercial Court; and (c) in case of inhibition of both judges of the Special Commercial Court, the Executive Judge shall raffle the case among the judges in the station; and
6. In order to ensure a just and equitable distribution of cases, the designated Special Commercial Courts shall continue to participate in the raffles of other cases. Provided, however, that the Executive Judge concerned shall adopt a procedure whereby every IP and SEC case assigned to a Special Commercial Court should be considered a case raffled to it and duly credited to such court.
What must be noted is the fact that the chosen RTC branch, now called Commercial Court, became such, as distinguished from the other RTC branches because of a special bestowal of jurisdiction by the Court in implementation of the statutorily granted authority. Without such grant mandated by the law, the undesignated RTC branch is without SEC case jurisdiction.
Upon the other hand, the RTC branch, or the Commercial Court, maintain jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section 19, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.15
But the exercise of such jurisdiction is subject to the regulation of the Court in the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all lower courts:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
x x x x
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
This is evident from A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC.
Palpably, RTC caseloads and the need to equalize the caseloads among all branches determine the need for the Court to issue regulations regarding the Commercial Courts' exercise of jurisdiction over noncommercial cases.
In all, the RTC Commercial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over commercial cases and can still exercise jurisdiction over regular cases if, as determined by the Supreme Court, the caseloads necessitate such exercise.
While there may be arguments in favor of a simpler arrangement whereby all the RTCs in all the Judicial Districts are made Commercial Courts, such arguments cannot be submitted for resolution by the Court. The settlement is in the legislature.
Further on the issue, the proviso that "the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases" is a definition of the conferred jurisdiction. The designation of specific Regional Trial Court branches that will exercise jurisdiction over cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is pursuant to statute and not solely the consequence of the Court's rule-making power and administrative supervisory power of the Court over lower courts under Article VIII, Sections 5 (paragraph 5) and 6, respectively. In fact, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC on which the ponencia relies heavily for its position that the designation of specific RTC branches as a simple procedural rule incidental to the exercise of jurisdiction, primarily traces its authority for designation of Special Commercial Courts to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, gleaned from the 1st recital clause, to wit:
WHEREAS, to implement the provisions of Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities and Regulation Code), and in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice, the Supreme Court en banc, in the (a) Resolutions dated 21 November 2000 (Annex 1), 4 July 2001 (Annex 1-a), 12 November 2002 (Annex 1-b), and 9 July 2002 (Annex 1-c), all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC (Annex 2); and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC (Annex 3), resolved to designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases formerly recognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission;
Plainly, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, as implemented by the Supreme Court through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred jurisdiction and not merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The ponencia fails to address an equally important precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction is determined by the averments and allegations of the complaint which in this instance is inarguably a commercial case concerning subscription of shares in a corporation.
From the onset, petitioners, by the filing of their Complaint, supplied the occasion for the exercise of jurisdiction vested by law in a particular court. In short, petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC (not as a court of general jurisdiction), and with the allegations in their Complaint, specifically invoked the RTC designated as a Special Commercial Court under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, implemented under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. Petitioners cannot just simply file their Complaint before the RTC without any specificity, given the allegations contained therein and the reliefs they prayed for.
I cannot give credence to petitioners' stance that they cannot be faulted for the incorrect raffling of their Complaint to a regular court, having filed the same before the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City. Petitioners obviously argue that their only responsibility as plaintiffs in this case is to file the case with the RTC despite Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 confining exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the appropriate RTC.
I invite attention to the statement in the ponencia that "petitioners correctly filed an intra-corporate case with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC." The ponencia then concludes that the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action from the time of such filing.
Quite notably, petitioners did not intend to file an intra-corporate case: they labeled their Complaint though incorrectly as a Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages. At that time they filed their Complaint in 2011, petitioners were with the aid of counsel, a full service law firm and R.A. No. 8799 and the implementing rules of the Supreme Court for the designation of Special Commercial Courts, have long been effective. Subject matter jurisdiction over their Complaint, the nature determined by the allegations therein, has been settled and delineated to be with not just any RTC, but the appropriate RTC specially designated by the Supreme Court as a Special Commercial Court pursuant to law.
Petitioners, as plaintiffs, by the filing of their Complaint, are charged with responsibility to properly and correctly invoke the jurisdiction of the RTC whether in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or as a Special Commercial Court. Palpably, petitioners' incorrect labeling of their Complaint precipitated the incorrect raffling thereof to a regular court, Branch 276, which, by specific provision of law, is without subject matter jurisdiction to act thereon given that it had not been designated as a Special Commercial Court.
Second, with the incorrect labeling of their Complaint and the wrong invocation of the RTC's regular jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint by the mere filing thereof with the multi sala RTC. Since petitioners had filed what they labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it pursuant to the general jurisdiction of the RTC under Sec. 19 of B.P. Big. 129.
The mere filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court as what occurred herein, is not equivalent to the correct and proper filing of the Complaint before the appropriate Regional Trial Court specially designated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Branch 276 of the RTC, to which the Complaint was consequently raffled, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot order the transfer of the Complaint to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do so on the basis of authority over the case which it did not have. Neither does it have authority over a co-equal court.
Note that in this case, petitioners, given the labeling of their Complaint as a Civil Case, should suffer the consequences of its own act. The Office of the Clerk of Court, cannot be faulted for raffling it to the RTC of general jurisdiction as petitioners themselves invoked such general jurisdiction.
In Calleja v. Panday,16 we likewise took note of the fact that therein plaintiffs petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005, by that time A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been in effect for four years, and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC effective for almost two years, where there appears no cogent reason why plaintiffs were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should be filed.
Such can also be said in this case, albeit there is only one designated Special Commercial Court. With more reason should it be noted in this case since petitioners herein has even incorrectly labeled their Complaint as a Civil Case. They cannot claim that it should not be prejudiced by the incorrect raffling of their Complaint, laying fault solely on the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Indeed, We should, as warranted, require from counsels disciplined knowledge of procedure. Courts should not themselves correct the procedural mistakes of pleaders. I cannot overemphasize, and ultimately revert to the fact, that subject matter jurisdiction was conferred by law (Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate RTC as determined thru the designation by the Supreme Court.
Consistent with the observable conformity with, nay affirmance by the existing administrative issuances relative to the foregoing opinion, the following directives are reiterated for continuing validity and, therefore, compliance.
1. A.M. No. 00-11 -03-SC, August 27, 2001
2. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, July 1, 2003, and
3. All related issuances
Thus, I vote to DENY the petition. The Orders dated 17 April 2012 and 9 July 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are AFFIRMED. The Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its re-filing in the proper court.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 42; Complaint.
2 518 Phil. 801(2006).
3 A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC; AM No. 00-11-03-SC; Administrative Circular No. 08-2001; A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC; OCA Circular No. 82-2003.
4 514 Phil. 307(2005)
5 660 Phil. 517 (2011), later deleted as citation in the revised ponencias.
6 SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
7 Martin, Statutory Construction, 6th Ed., p. 141 citing Martin v. Shippard, 102 S. Co. 2nd, p. 1036; Adamowski v. Bard, A.C., Pa. 193 F. 2d., p. 578; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 322-323; Denvis v. Roses, 52 P. 333; Shimonek v. Tillanan, 1 P. 2d., 154; and Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., 15Ld2d. 1273.
8 G.R. No. 174971, 15 October 2008, 569 SCRA 154, 183.
9 G.R. No. 162288, 4 April 2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535.
10 G.R. No. 155491, 16 September 2008, 565 SCRA 237, 247-248.
11 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010).
12 Martin, Statutory Construction 1984 Ed. p. 141 citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 322-323.
13 Calleja v. Panday, supra note 2; Home Guaranty Corporation, supra note 5; and Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 11 September 2002, 388 SCRA 574.
14 Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, supra note 5.
15 Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (PI00,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
16 Supra note 2.
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