EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015 ]
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, PETITIONERS, VS. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that the designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special Commercial Courts does not work to confer jurisdiction over the branches designated as such. It was an error for the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, to dismiss the Complaint filed by petitioners. As the ponencia underscores, Branch 276 should have instead transferred the case to the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly designated to perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court's functions as a Special Commercial Court. The present Petition must, thus, be granted.
Jurisdiction over what the ponencia collectively refers to as SEC Cases was vested by Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, in Regional Trial Courts and is not limited to the Regional Trial Court branches designated by this court as Special Commercial Courts. It is only the legislature that has the power "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courtsf.]"1 As Congress does not share this power with this court, in relation with these issues, this court's competence is limited to "administrative supervision over all courts[,]"2 as well as the "[p]romulgat[ion of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]"3 It was purely in the exercise of these powers, and not for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction where previously there was none, that this court designated certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special Commercial Courts.
The text of Section 5.24 of the Securities Regulation Code, the statutory provision that transferred jurisdiction over SEC Cases from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Regional Trial Courts, bears this out. It refers to Regional Trial Courts in general and in their capacity as courts of general jurisdiction. It delimits the capacity of this court to designate Regional Trial Court branches as Special Commercial Courts to only be "in the exercise of its authority[,]"5 i.e., administrative supervision and promulgation of procedural rules. It specifies that the effect of this court's designation is to enable the branches so specified to "exercise jurisdiction"6 and not to vest jurisdiction.
I
Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 57 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which were previously under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, was vested in Regional Trial Courts by Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code. Section 5.2 reads:
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - . . .
5.2. The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
This statutory provision was adopted pursuant to the legislature's power under Article VIII, Section 28 of the 1987 Constitution "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]" In contrast, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, through this court's November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, was pursuant to this court's power under Article VIII, Section 69 of the 1987 Constitution to exercise "administrative supervision over all courts." A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not work to confer jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC itself declares that it was adopted merely "[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799[.]"10
Congress' power "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts" is constitutionally established. While it may be true that the allocation of competencies among courts may be incidental and necessary to the power to adjudicate cases, the sovereign, through the Constitution, deemed it fit for the legislature to exercise this power to balance and temper judicial power. We cannot, in the guise of judicial interpretation, disregard a clear command of the Constitution.
The power vested solely and exclusively in Congress has clear limitations: First, Congress cannot diminish the jurisdiction of this court, which jurisdiction is spelled out in Article VIII, Section 511 of the 1987 Constitution; and second, Congress cannot increase the "appellate jurisdiction of [this court] without its advice and concurrence."12
The exclusivity and non-delegability of Congress' power "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts" is long settled.
In University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals,13 this court was confronted with an issuance by the President of the Philippines, i.e., Executive Order No. 401-A, that was purportedly enacted pursuant to an enabling statute, Republic Act No. 422.14 Executive Order No. 401-A created the Board of Tax Appeals and defined its jurisdiction, as follows:
SEC. 8. The Board of Tax Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide administratively as hereinafter provided —
(1) All appeals from decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue[.]15
This court declared Executive Order No. 401-A null and void to the extent where it interfered with the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, but sustained its validity in all other respects.16 This court emphasized that, in the first place, Republic Act No. 422's purpose was limited only to "effect[ing] a reorganization of the different bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government."17 Republic Act No. 422 did not go so far as to enable the President to create a body or to promulgate an issuance which, "in effect deprives the courts of first instance of their jurisdiction in actions for recovery of taxes which is granted to them by section 30618 of the National Internal Revenue Code."19
For that matter, even though Republic Act No. 422 actually enabled the President to do so, this statutory grant (i.e., delegation) of power would have been invalid. This court categorically stated that under the Constitution, "Congress alone has 'the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courtsf,]'"20 and that this is a power that cannot be delegated by Congress.21 Pursuant to this power, jurisdiction vested in Courts of First Instance was conferred on them by statute, i.e., an act of the legislature, and the President, the existence of a supposed enabling statute notwithstanding, cannot himself define their jurisdiction:
But Executive Order No. 401-A does not merely create the Board of Tax Appeals, which, as an instrumentality of the Department of Finance, may properly come within the purview of Republic Act No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the courts of first instance of their jurisdiction to act on internal revenue cases a matter which is foreign to it and which comes within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by Congress, for under our Constitution, Congress alone has "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. "22 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The same conclusions were reached by this court in Corominas, Jr., and Corominas & Co. v. Labor Standard Commission, et al.23 Here, this court found the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to have exceeded its authority when, through its Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,24 it vested jurisdiction over money claims arising from labor standards violations in the regional offices of the (then) Department of Labor.25 Reorganization Plan No. 20-A ran counter to Republic Act No. 602, the then Minimum Wage Law, Sections 15(d),26 15(e),27 and 16(a)28 of which vested jurisdiction over money claims cases in a "competent court."
In Corominas, this court noted that Republic Act No. 997,29 the statute creating the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, did not enable the Commission to create a body exercising judicial power and intruding into the jurisdiction of courts.30 So, too, this court emphasized that Congress could not have done so "as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice to any other agency of the Government."31
Bereft of the power "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[,]" this court's competence is limited to "administrative supervision over all courts[,]"32 as well as the "[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]"33
II
Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code's investiture of jurisdiction over erstwhile SEC Cases in Regional Trial Courts is clear: "The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court[.]"
Concededly, the use of the disjunctive conjunction "or" leads to some degree of confusion. Customarily, the use of "or" denotes that the items mentioned are alternative to each other. Thus, Section 5.2 appears to mean that "Courts of general jurisdiction" are distinct from Regional Trial Courts and that one can stand in place of the other. However, it is settled that, in our judicial system, it is the Regional Trial Courts which themselves stand as courts of general jurisdiction. They are one and the same. As this court stated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:34
The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.35
The consideration of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction proceeds from Section 19(6) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
. . . .
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.1aшphi1]
The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction is no bar to designating certain Regional Trial Court branches to focus on certain types of cases. To the contrary, it is this identity which permits it. Designating branches to focus on certain types of cases, in order to facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice, is well within their nature as courts competent to take cognizance of cases not falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal, person, or body. Designating branches as such balances two considerations: on the one hand, their nature as courts, which because they have general jurisdiction, can exercise jurisdiction over the specific matter to which they were assigned; and, on the other, their duty to speedily administer justice.
Accordingly, this designation does not work to confer jurisdiction over these branches when previously there was none. It merely exhorts them to proceed with dispatch and deftness. This is evident from Section 23 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980:
SEC. 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. — The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 23 is not a blanket license for this court to create new courts of limited jurisdiction. It is an enabling mechanism, empowering this court to fulfill its function as the authority having "administrative supervision over all courts[.]"36
When the legislature (at that time, it was the interim Batasang Pambansa) adopted the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, it created all Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction, equally competent to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by the same statute. So, too, when the Securities Regulation Code transferred jurisdiction over SEC Cases, it did so to all of our courts which were recognized as courts of general jurisdiction, that is, to Regional Trial Courts.
Section 5.2's investiture of jurisdiction over Regional Trial Courts notwithstanding, it also contains a proviso enabling this court to "in the exercise of its authority . . . designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over [the] cases."
Section 5.2's qualification that this court's power to designate is necessarily only "in the exercise of its authority" is illuminating. It is to say that, in going about its task of designating, this court cannot act in excess of its constitutional authority. This affirms the Constitution's segregation of the competencies of Congress from those of this court. It affirms the exclusivity of Congress' power "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]" This affirms the reality that, bereft of this power, this court's competence is limited to "administrative supervision over all courts[,]"37 as well as the "[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]"38
Accordingly, it was exclusively in the performance of these competencies that this court adopted its November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and specified the Regional Trial Court branches which are to perform functions as Special Commercial Courts.
Equally illuminating is Section 5.2's specification that this court's competence is in designating which branches shall "exercise jurisdiction[.]" As deftly emphasized by the ponencia, conferment of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a matter of substantive law.39 In contrast, incidents pertaining to the exercise of jurisdiction are a matter of procedure.40
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not create a new class of courts. Its purpose is operational efficiency. In its own words, it was adopted to serve "the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice[.]"41 It is, thus, but a procedural and administrative mechanism aimed (to echo the words of the ponencia) "to promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the [Regional Trial Courts'] jurisdiction[.]"42
Also in its own words, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC was adopted only "[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 [or the Securities Regulation Code]."43 Thus, in adopting A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, this court was fully cognizant of how Section 5.2 limited its authority to designate only "in the exercise of its authority[.]" Indeed, this court could not have intended to overstep the constitutional limits of its authority.
III
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC is not the only administrative issuance of this court specifying Regional Trial Court branches which are to focus on certain types of cases, not because this court created or transformed them into special types of courts in lieu of their being courts of general jurisdiction, but solely in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
In this court's August 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC,44 this court designated certain Regional Trial Court branches as "Special Courts for drugs cases, which shall hear and decide all criminal cases in their respective jurisdictions involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act [of] 1972 (R.A. No. 6425) as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved."45
This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC made no pretenses that it was creating new courts of limited jurisdiction or transforming Regional Trial Courts into courts of limited jurisdiction. Instead, it repeatedly referred to its operational and administrative purpose: efficiency. Its preambular clauses emphasized that the designation of Special Courts was being made because "public policy and public interest demand that [drug] cases ... be expeditiously resolved[,]"46 and in view of "the consensus of many that the designation of certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Special Courts to try and decide drug cases . . . may immediately address the problem of delay in the resolution of drugs cases."47 Moreover, its dispositive portion provides that it was being adopted "pursuant to Section 23 of [the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, [and] in the interest of speedy and efficient administration of justice[.]"48
Consistent with these operational and administrative aims, this court's October 11, 2005 Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC,49 which addressed the question of whether "special courts for dr[u]g cases [may] be included in the raffle of civil and criminal cases other than drug related cases[,]"50 stated:
The rationale behind the exclusion of dr[u]g courts from the raffle of cases other than drug cases is to expeditiously resolve criminal cases involving violations of [R.A. No.] 9165 (previously, of [R.A. No.] 6435). Otherwise, these courts may be sidelined from hearing drug cases by the assignment of non-drug cases to them and the purpose of their designation as special courts would be negated. The faithful observance of the stringent time frame imposed on drug courts for deciding dr[u]g related cases and terminating proceedings calls for the continued implementation of the policy enunciated in A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC.51
To reiterate, at no point did this court declare the Regional Trial Court branches identified in these administrative issuances as being transformed or converted into something other than Regional Trial Courts. They retain their status as such and, along with it, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980's characterization of them as courts of general jurisdiction. However, this court, in the interest of facilitating operational efficiency and promoting the timely dispensation of justice, has opted to make these Regional Trial Court branches focus on a certain class of the many types of cases falling under their jurisdiction.
Having mentioned this court's Resolutions, which designated Regional Trial Court branches as so-called Drugs Courts, it is crucial to draw the distinction between, on the one hand, this court's designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as such Drugs Courts, or (as is the subject of this case) Commercial Courts, and, on the other, this court's designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as so-called Family Courts.
Similarly through a Resolution in an Administrative Matter, this . court's February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC52 designated certain Regional Trial Court branches as Family Courts. As with Drugs Courts, this court declared this designation of Family Courts to be "in the interest of the expeditious, effective and efficient administration of justice[.]"53 This court further specified that this designation was in order "[t]o implement the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the 'Family Courts Act of 1997[.]'"54
This court's February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC is, thus, an offshoot of the Family Courts Act of 1997. Section 3 of this statute did not add to, clarify, or make specific mention of the types of cases cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Rather, it created independent Family Courts that are distinct from Regional Trial Courts. Section 5 spelled out the exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Courts, that is, subject matter jurisdiction that, henceforth, was no longer within the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts. Parenthetically, it is well to emphasize that the Family Courts Act of 1997 is a legislative enactment. Accordingly, it was well within its bounds to create courts and define their jurisdiction.
Sections 3 and 5 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 provide:
SEC. 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the highest population.
SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code";
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
This court's designation of Family Courts through its February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC was pursuant to a transitory provision: Section 17 of the Family Courts Act of 1997. Section 17 required this court to, in the meantime, designate Regional Trial Court branches to act as Family Courts. This designation was of a temporary nature, effective only in the intervening period pending the establishment of Family Courts:
SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the branches of the Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary.
Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned to the Family Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are heard.
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Section 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.
This court's designation of Family Courts, insofar as there was a need to tentatively provide for specialized courts, proceeded from the same mandate which animated its designation of Drugs Courts, as well as Special Commercial Courts. It was pursuant to the power of this court to administratively supervise lower courts.
The status quo engendered by A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC persists to the present day, more than 15 years after its adoption and almost 18 years after the adoption of the Family Courts Act of 1997.1aшphi1 However, the delineation of the exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Courts as against the subject matter jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts remains. It is just that, from the time of its enactment, the Family Courts Act of 1997 has not been fully implemented. This state of affairs is a fact acknowledged by this court, as, on August 13, 2014, this court issued Memorandum Order No. 20-14 establishing a Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns, the mandate of which includes the drafting of a plan for effecting the organization of Family Courts.
I have no doubt that this Committee, under the present and able leadership of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, will do all it can to provide a workable and comprehensive plan that will convince Congress to create and fund the statutorily mandated Family Courts. However, this temporary state of affairs can only be remedied by an act of Congress. Hopefully, in due time, Congress can proceed to complete what is mandated by the Family Courts Act of 1997.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Orders dated April 17, 2012 and July 9, 2012 of the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 11-077 must be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead of being dismissed, Civil Case No. 11-077, must be REFFERRED to the Executive Judge of the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, in order that it may be ASSIGNED to the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly designated to perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court's functions as a Special Commercial Court.
Footnotes
1 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 2.
2 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6.
3 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5).
4 Securities Code, sec. 5.2 provides:
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. . . .
5.2. The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
5 SECURITIES CODE, sec. 5.2.
6 SECURITIES CODE, sec. 5.2.
7 Pres. Decree No. 902-A (1976), sec. 5 provides:
SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.
a. Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;
b. Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
c. Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
8 Const., art. VIII, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
9 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6 provides:
SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
10 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000), first par. provides:
To implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code), and in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following branches of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) are hereby designated to try and decide Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A (Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange Commission), arising within their respective territorial jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region, and within the respective provinces in the First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions[.]
11 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
12 CONST., art. VI, sec. 30 provides:
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
13 93 Phil. 376 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
14 Id. at 379; Rep. Act No. 422 (1950), otherwise known as An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Reorganize within One Year the Different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Other Instrumentalities of the Government, including the Corporations Owned or Controlled by it. Sec. 2 provides:
SEC. 2. For the purpose of carrying out the policy set forth in section one of this Act, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the total current appropriation, such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the government including the corporations owned or controlled by the government as he may deem necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; to eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the government service.
15 University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 379 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Bane].
16 Id. at 382.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 380. University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals cites Sec. 306: SEC. 306. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. — No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal-revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty.
19 Id. at 381.
20 Id. at 382.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 112 Phil. 551 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Bane].
24 Id. at 557. Corominas, Jr., and Corominas & Co. v. Labor Standard Commission, et al. cites Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, sec. 25:
25. Each Regional Office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay, and maternity leave of employees/laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay, and payment for medical services of domestic help.
25 Id. at 562.
26 Rep. Act No. 602 (1951), sec. 15(d) provides:
SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act.-
d. The Secretary may bring an action in any competent court to recover the wages owing to an employee under this Act, with legal interest. Any sum thus recovered by the Secretary on behalf of an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary, directly to the employee or employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because he cannot be located within a period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
27 Rep. Act No. 602(1951), sec. 15(e) provides:
SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act-
e. Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the unpaid wages with legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by anyone or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee which shall not exceed ten per cent of the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in which event the fee may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount. Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly to the plaintiffs, in the presence of a representative of the Secretary of the Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court of its representative, the Secretary shall be notified within ten days of payment that the payment has been made.
28 Rep. Act No. 602(1951), sec. 16 provides: SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the courts.-
a. The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this act; action by the Secretary or by the employees affected to recover underpayment may be brought in any competent Court, which shall render its decision on such cases within fifteen days from the time the case has been submitted for decision; in appropriate instances, appeal from the decisions of these courts on any action under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.
29 An Act Creating the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
30 Corominas, Jr., and Corominas & Co. v. Labor Standard Commission, et al., 112 Phil. 551, 561 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
31 Id.
32 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6.
33 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5).
34 427 Phil. 604 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
35 Id. at 612.
36 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6.
37 Const, art. VIII, sec. 6.
38 Const, art. VIII, sec. 5(5). j9 Ponencia, p. 4.
40 See Lozada v. Bracewell, G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 371, 381 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
41 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000).
42 Ponencia, p. 8.
43 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000).
44 Resolution Designating Certain Branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Special Courts for Drugs Cases Regardless of the Quantity of the Drugs Involved.
45 A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC (2000).
46 A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC (2000).
47 A.M. No. 00-8-01 -SC (2000).
48 A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC (2000).
49 Re: Request for Clarification on Whether Drug Court[s] should be Included in the Regular Raffle.
50 A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC (2005).
51 A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC (2005).
52 Designation of Certain Branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts.
53 A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC (2000).
54 A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC (2000).
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