G.R. No. 182601 - Separate Opinion

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ v. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014
♦ Decision, Brion [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

I regret that I cannot bring myself to agree that the warrantless arrest was valid.

Both petitioners and respondent are residents of Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City.1

On February 20, 2005, at around 3:00 to 3:15 a.m., petitioners Joey M. Pestilo.s (Pestilos ), Dwight Macapanas (Macapanas ), Miguel Gaces (Gaces), Jerry Hernandez (Hernandez), and Ronald Mufioz (Mufioz), and respondent Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) were waiting for the water supply on Kasiyahan Street. Pestilos and Macapanas got into an altercation with Atty. Generoso that involved physical violence. Immediately after the incident, Pestilos and Macapanas went to the barangay hall to seek help from the local barangay officials.2

At the barangay hall, Pestilos reported the incident and wanted to have it inscribed in the barangay blotter. The barangay tanod advised them to secure a medical certificate first before Pestilos and Macapanas could register their complaint in the barangay blotter.3 Pestilos and Macapanas requested the barangay tanod to accompany them on their way back to their residences on Kasiyahan Street, "to avoid further trouble."4

At around 5:30 a.m., Pestilos and Macapanas arrived with the barangay tanod on Kasiyahan Street. Bythen, officers from Batasan Hills Police Station were present. Atty. Generoso pointed to Pestilos and Macapanas as perpetratorsof his alleged mauling.5 The two began complaining about Atty. Generoso’s attack against them. The police officers, led by SPO2 Dominador Javier (SPO2 Javier), brought Pestilos, Macapanas, and Atty. Generoso to the police station. The other petitioners, Gaces, Hernandez, and Muñoz, were brought by Pestilos and Macapanas to act as their witnesses.

Macapanas left the police station for a while to get a medical certificate from the East Avenue Medical Center, as advised by the barangay tanod earlier.6 Meanwhile, at the police station, Atty. Generoso filed charges against all petitioners (Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Hernandez, and Muñoz) for frustrated murder.7

Macapanas also filed charges against Atty. Generoso for slight physical injuries.8 The police officers in the Batasan Hills Police Station rendered reports for both charges. Inaddition to the reports, SPO2 Javier executed an affidavit of arrestwith respect to petitioners.9

At the Office of the Prosecutor,the prosecutor subjected all the petitioners to inquest, while the complaint against Atty. Generoso was treated as a case subject topreliminary investigation.10 Two days after the incident, the prosecutor filed an information against petitioners for attempted murder.11

Before arraignment, petitioners filed an urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation. However, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, denied the motion.12 They filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.13

On appeal via Rule 65, the Court ofAppeals sustained the order of the Regional Trial Court: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated April 17, 2008.15 They came to this court via a petition for review on certiorari. They argue that they are entitled to preliminary investigation. Subjecting them to inquest proceedings was irregular because they were not properly arrested. Assuming that their decision to go to the police station was an "arrest," the arrest was invalid because it was not made in compliance with the ruleon warrantless arrests.

I vote that the petition be granted. Petitioners are entitled to a preliminary investigation because the warrantless arrest was not valid.

The right of a person to his or her liberties in the form of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures enjoys a high degree of protection.16 The Constitution only allows for reasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, courts decide whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest. In People v. Burgos,17 this court stated that:

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.18 (Emphasis supplied).

The limited circumstances for the conduct of reasonable warrantless arrests are enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 12, Section 7.

This case does not fall under the first and third exceptions. The question is whether this falls under the special circumstances of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule113, Section 5(b) are the following: (1) the offense has just been committed; (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts orcircumstances; and (3) these facts and circumstances give riseto probable cause that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

The first element requires that there are facts leading to a conclusion that an offense has been committed. Being based on objectivity, the first element requires the occurrence of facts that, when taken together, constitutes the commission of an offense.

If we accepted the version of Atty. Generoso, it appears that he was a victim of an attack from petitioners. The facts that he narrated may, thus, constitute the possible offenses of physical injuries or even attempted or frustrated homicide or murder. The offense should be evaluated from the facts and circumstances as it appearedto the person making the warrantless arrest. The element that the offense had "just been committed" was introduced in the 1985 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. This element must be read in relation to the general requirement that a warrant of arrest must be procured to ensure a more impartial determination of the existence of facts and circumstances. This element, however, acknowledges the necessities of law enforcement. At times, the police officer arrives at the scene of the crime after the crime just happened and there are facts and circumstances — such as the sudden flight of a person or the wielding of a weapon by a person near the incident — that reasonably lead the police officer to believe that the person is the perpetrator. In such cases, to ensure that the right person can be put withinthe jurisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid warrantless arrest.

This necessity is wanting in this case. Petitioners themselves, together with a barangay tanod, voluntarily went to the police station. They did so after they had gone to the barangay hall to report the incident and had their own complaints entered into the barangay blotter.

There was no urgency to arrest petitioners. Theywere not planning to flee. They voluntarily presented themselves as complainants against private respondent. For reasons not clear in the record, they were subjected to a warrantless arrest and thento inquest. Private respondent, on the other hand, was allowed to be a respondent in a preliminary investigation. He was not arrested.

Several cases qualified the time element of "just been committed" to range from three (3) hours19 to 14 days.20 This is not the correct approach.

In Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Laurente C. Ilagan21 and Umil v. Ramos,22 cited by the majority, were decided under the dark days of Martial Law. The dissents in those cases were clarion calls for the protection of our liberties.

Former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his dissent in In Re Ilagan, was of the opinion that "just been committed" "connotes immediacy in point of time."23 Former Associate Justice Florenz Regalado24 emphasized the requirement of immediacy:

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge.25

In the same case, Associate Justice Florentino Feliciano illustrated how a hot pursuit warrantless arrest should be made:

Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the scene; and 2)the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first requirement imports that the effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of a gunshot wound; or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds.The arresting officer may not have seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and therefore the offense can not be said to have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception by the arresting officer.That requirement would exclude information conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for truth and reliability might be. Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the streetand sees a person running awaywith a knife from where the victim is sprawled on the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts which rendered it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed."26 (Emphasis supplied)

The second element under Rule 113, Section 5(b) is that the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts and circumstances. Personal knowledge is "derived from the [person’s] own perception."27

On the other hand, information not of personal knowledge is hearsay. Hearsay is "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."28

The arresting officers must obtain personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an offense has just been committed. They must also perceivefacts and circumstances that would substantiate the probable liability of the person. The accused is usually identified when he or she is seen fleeing the scene because the act of fleeing suggests the attempt to evade authority. A person in possession of a weapon could also be perceived as the one liable for an offense.

There must be a reasonable amount offacts short of seeing the entire offense being committed. A collection offacts, on the other hand, is a set of circumstances. If the arresting officer saw facts and circumstances indicating that an offense has just been committed and the person is probably liable for that offense, a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b). If the arresting officer saw the offense being committed, then the warrantless arrest will be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a), not under subsection (b).

Facts or circumstances relating tothe nature of the offense cannot substitute for personal knowledge of facts or circumstances relating to the liability of the person who probably committed the offense. One pertains to the object and the other the method of perception. SPO2 Javier had personal knowledgeof the injuries of private respondent. This is only personal knowledge with respect to the offense, not yet as to the identity of the perpetrators.

On the other hand, the information obtained by the police officers when private respondent pointed to petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime was hearsay. Private respondent’s act of pointing to petitioners communicated that petitioners committed the mauling. It becomes hearsay on the part of the police officers who did not see petitioners mauling private respondent. The only personal knowledge obtained by the police officers was that private respondent pointed to petitioners.

According to petitioners, they returned to the crime scene and saw the police officers. They also informed the police officers that private respondent attacked them. That is another hearsay received by the police officers at the crime scene.

The police officers perceived limited facts while investigating at the crime scene. These limited facts do not provide sufficient bases for the liability of anyone at the scene. No one was reported holding a weapon allegedly used against private respondent. None of the petitioners fled at the sight of the police officers.

There were only facts relating to the offense, such as the sight of an injured private respondent. This fact cannot substitute for the personal knowledge of facts and circumstances relating to the liability of petitioners.

Parenthetically, the police officers also had hearsay knowledge that private respondent was the perpetrator against petitioners. For reasons not clear in the records, however, the police officers preferred not to arrest him.

The third element requires that these facts and circumstances must lead to the conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed the offense. Rule 113, Section 5(b) requires that "probable cause" or "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion" must be supported by personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that, when taken together, builds the suspicion thatan individual committed the offense.

The plurality in the phrasing suggests that there should be more than one fact or circumstance. In People v. Cogaed,29 we ruled that for there to be a "genuine reason" to execute a warrantless arrest or search, there should be more than one suspicious circumstance to infer that there was criminal activity.30

In most cases that found the validity of the warrantless arrest, there was the presence of more than one circumstance that formed part of the personal knowledge of the police officers.

In People v. Jayson,31 police officers were summoned immediately to the crime scene. They found the victim, and saw the accused fleeing. These are two facts that show that the offense was committed and that the person arrested was probably responsible because he attempted to escape.

In People v. Tonog,32 there was a murder. Police officers at the crime scene saw the following: the body of the victim and a motorcab that was driven by Tonog that day. Tonog voluntarily went to the police station, and one of the police officers noticed that he had blood splatters on his jeans. All three facts and circumstances were observed by the police officers during the arrest, thereby building the probable cause that Tonog committed the murder.33 On the other hand, this court ruled that there are instances when there is no personal knowledge of the police officers; hence, there is no valid warrantless arrest.

In People v. Burgos,34 a source informed the police officers that Ruben Burgos was engaged in subversive activities. This court held that the report was not enough to enact a warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b), especially since there were no facts personally known to the police officers that a crime was committed.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,35 the National Bureau of Investigation officers arrested two students identified bywitnesses as the perpetrators of a killing during a fraternity rumble. The arrest was made without a warrant, and this court declared the warrantless arrest invalid.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) did not apply in People v. Briones36 where the accused was arrested after one eyewitness had identified him as the murderer. This court declared that the warrantless arrest was invalid "because the police officer who effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. It is [the] eyewitness . . . who had such personal knowledge."37

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.39 (Citations omitted)

The confusion with this treatment is that it qualifies personal knowledge with probable cause, not the other way around. The rule states that "probable cause . . . [is] based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances."40 It does not state personal knowledge of facts based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.The import of the text is that reasonable suspicion and probable cause is built by personal knowledge of facts and circumstances. Personal knowledge is the method of perceiving facts. Probable cause is the conclusion of all the facts so perceived. Flight of the accused is often a sign that there is probable cause that he or she committed the offense. When he or she attempts to escape from authorities, the authorities must act immediately because not doing so might compromise the investigation.

If there is no personal knowledge offacts and circumstances on the part of the police officers, a warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) will be unreasonable because there is nothing to base probable cause on that the accused committed the offense.

Here, there was no flight of the accused. On the contrary, petitioners returned to the crime scene41 because they felt that they were the victims, not the perpetrators.

The police officers were still investigating the matter when petitioners were brought to the police station. The circumstances of the situation did not call for an exception to the rulerequiring a warrant of arrest. The statement made by private respondent on the identity of his perpetrators, as communicated to the police, could have been reduced to an affidavit used to support an application for a warrant of arrest. The statements made by petitioners were other pieces of evidence to be considered for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The police officers were not threatened by the immediate flight of the alleged perpetrators who believed that they also have a right to vindicate since they were cooperating with the police. All facts point to the reasonability of obtaining a warrant ofarrest. There was no exigency to cause the warrantless arrest of petitioners.

It bears stressing that petitioners went with the police officers in their capacity as complainants against private respondent. They did not know that they were already being arrested. Totheir mind, the police officers just wanted to continue the investigation at the police station. This is shown by the police report dated February 20,2005 regarding the complaint of petitioner Macapanas against private respondent Atty. Generoso. In this report, petitioner Macapanas was the complainant, and private respondent Atty. Generoso was the accused. To wit:

It is worthy to mentioned [sic] that complainant voluntarily [sic] appeared to this Station wherein he was identified by complainant at [sic] the one who punched him(,) which also causing [sic] him to be bitten (by) a dog thereat.42

The existence of two police reportsfor two separate crimes committed during one incident — one with petitioners as accused43 and the other with private respondent as accused44 — proves that at the time that petitioners were taken into custody, the police officers were still uncertain about what happened. This negates the presenceof probable cause, required by Rule 113, Section 5(b).

Probable cause must exist at the time of the warrantless arrest. Otherwise, any form of uncertainty should be resolved through the exercise of judicial caution.

When the police officers becamemore convinced that private respondent’s version was more believable than petitioners’, the police officers should have applied for a warrant of arrest. SPO2 Javier expedited procedure when he executed an affidavit of arrest. He made it appear that there was a valid warrantless arrest, instead of applying for a warrant of arrest. This is unacceptable in our Constitution.

Strict standards should be imposed on law enforcement. It is said that "the prosecution can bring the full resources of the state to bear on winning. Imposing a heavy burden of proof on the prosecution diminishes this advantage."45

Relaxing our standards in taking individuals under custody enhances the advantage of the prosecution, tothe detriment of the individual. Compared to the state, the accused does not have the resources to question the legitimacy of an arrest. Some of them do not even know that they are already being arrested. Many arrested individuals may not even be able to afford lawyers until the public attorney steps in during custodial investigation or, worse, during arraignment. By then, the accused would have already been deprived of his or her liberty.

The circumstances of this case requirethe vigilance of this court in protecting the neglected rights of petitioners. Petitioners were just in their 20s when the altercation occurred. Pestilos was a student, Macapanas and Muñoz were unemployed, Gaces was a driver, and Fernandez was a printing press operator. Petitioners havebeen certified as indigents.46 They are of limited means. At the time that they were trying to vindicate their rights at the police station, they did not have counsel.

On the other hand, it is easier for the police officers to be persuaded by private respondent, a member of the bar who is fully aware of his constitutional rights. The police officers became more inclined to believe his story because he is a lawyer, while petitioners were all non-lawyers. Petitioners were not expected to know that a detention was an arrest. The affidavit of arrest stated that SPO2 Javier "informed all the suspects of the charges imputed against themby complainant Atty. Generoso."47 To an ordinary citizen, they were just complaints. An invitation is really just an invitation for petitioners. They did not go to the police station because they were being arrested.

With the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners are entitled to preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or a proceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."48 The right to preliminary investigation is statutory in character.49 Being mandated by statute, a preliminary investigation becomes part of the constitutional due process rights accorded to the accused.50

Under Rule 112, a preliminary investigation is required if an offense has a penalty of at least four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day. However, under Section 6 of the same rules, a preliminary investigation is no longer necessary if the person accused was arrested lawfully without a warrant. If there was a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5, inquest proceedings are required.

Based on the Manual for Prosecutors, inquests are conducted by a public prosecutor assigned as an Inquest Officer. An inquest is conducted only at the police stations or headquarters of the Philippine National Police, unless otherwise directed.51

Here, petitioners alleged that theywere brought from Batasan Hills Police Station to the Office of the Prosecutor. At the Office of the Prosecutor, it was decided that petitioners would be subjected to inquest, while respondent would undergo preliminary investigation. This irregularly conducted inquest aggravates the fact that petitioners were subjected to an inquest despite lack of a valid warrantless arrest.

Considering that petitioners were not arrested in accordance with the strict guidelines of our Constitution and the Rules of Court, petitioners' statutory right to preliminary investigation is mandatory.