JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ v. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014
Decision, Brion [J]
Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601               November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48

In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later.56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1wphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice


Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam; rollo, pp. 36-46.

2 Id. at 48.

3 According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records, attached to the CA records, p. 72.

4 Id. at 5.

5 Affidavit of Arrest, id. at 6.

6 As shown by the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; id. at 72.

7 Rollo, p. 37.

8 RTC records, p. 6.

9 Rollo, p. 75.

10 Id. at 37.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 37-38.

14 The pertinent matters state:

Considering the opposition and issues raised by the prosecution, the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation filed by the accused is DENIED.

15 Rollo, p. 38.

16 Id.

17 Supra note I.

18 Supra note 2.

19 Section 5 of The Philippine Bill of 1902. That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

20 Section 1(3), Article III -The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

21 Section 3, Article IV - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

22 Section 2, Article III - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

23 Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.

24 Entitled THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, cited generally by Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process, University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April 23, 2008.

25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna Carta, last accessed October 10, 2014.

26 Id.

27 homas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process, University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April 23, 2008.

28 Id at 45.

29 Wrongfully dispossessed.

30 Supra note 27.

31 278 Fed. 650.

32 The People of the Philippine Islands v. Malasugui, G.R. No. L-44335, 63 Phil. 221, 226 (1936).

33 Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.

34 The United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853, 856 (1917).

35 The United States v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472, 474-480 (1909).

36 4 Phil. 317, 323-324 (1905).

37 In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court cited Section 37 ctf Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila), which designates certain officials, including police officers, as "peace officers" expressly provides that within the territory defined in the Act they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view."

38 11 Phil. 193, 197 (1908).

39 Supra note 34, at 856.

40 Id. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals and the officer should not wait the commission of the crime.

This rule is supported by the necessities of life.

41 Sec. 2204, 1916 ed.; Sec. 2258, 1917 ed.

42 Supra note 35, at 477-479.

43 Section 37 (a) If the number of barrios in a municipality is less than or equal to the number of councilors the council shall put each of its members in immediate charge of a barrio or part of a barrio, so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more councilors.

(b) If the number of barrios exceeds the number of councilors, including the vice-president, the council shall group the barrios into as many districts as there are councilors, and shall place each councilor in charge of one such district. Each councilor shall be empowered to appoint one lieutenant in each barrio or part of barrio which comes under his immediate supervision. A lieutenant of barrio shall serve without compensation and shall report directly to the councilor appointing him.

Sec. 38. (a) Each councilor shall keep the people of his barrio or barrios informed as to the acts of the council, or other governmental measures which directly concern them, by means of suitable notices posted in a public and conspicuous place in each barrio. He shall serve in the council as the representative of the people of his barrio or barrios and shall bring their special needs to the attention of that body.

(b) He shall further promptly inform the president of any unusual or untoward event occurring within the barrios assigned to him.

(c) He is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cane with silver head, plated ferule and black cord and tassels.

44 Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 479 (1997).

45 Supra note 35, at 477-478.

46 Supra note 34, at 856.

47 60 Ill. 361 (1871].

48 Supra note 34, at 854-855.

49 G.R. No. L-6909, 21 Phil. 514-516 (1912).

50 Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration in Sayo v. The Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 875 (1948).

51 Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Book IV, 2007 Edition, citing Feria, Philippine Legal Studies, Series No. 2, p. 375.

52 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S Ct. 1371.

53 111SC174,97, SE 62, 3 ALR 1500, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 689.

54 361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80 S Ct. 168, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688.

55 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 690, citing United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937) and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

56 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 691-692, citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F. 2d 1336; Be Vier v. Hucal, (CA? Ill) 806 F. 2d 123; Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560; Martin v. Eaton, 140 Vt 134, 436 A. 2d 751; Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F. 2d 70; State v. Kendall, 794 P. 2d 114; People v. Villiard, 679 P. 2d 593; State v. Tarica, 59 Wash App 368, 798 P. 2d 296; Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797; United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d 700.

57 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L Ed 2d 484, 91 S Ct 1106;

United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; People v. Exum, 382 Ill 204, 47 N. E. 2d 56; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W. 2d 705; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d 700.

58 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Thompson v. State (Del Sup) 539 A. 2d 1052; Ricks v State, 82 Md. App. 369, 571 A. 2d 887, cert gr 320 Md 3505, 578 A. 2d 778 and affd 322 Md 183, 586 A. 2d 740; People v. Tracy, 186 Mich App 171, 46. N.W. 2d 457; State v. Leonard (Utah App) 825 P. 2d 664, 177 Utah Adv Rep 49, cert den (Utah) 843 P. 2d 1042.

59 G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 227.

60 Paderanga v. Drilon et al., 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991).

61 32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915).

62 Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

63 People v. CA, 361Phil.401, 413 (1999).

64 People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 642.

65 Supra note 59.

66 Supra note 34.

67 Id.

68 G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 388.

69 G.R. L-68995, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.

70 365 Phil. 292, 312 (1999).

71 268 Phil. 571, 576 (1990).

72 G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 150.

73 G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772, 775, 778.

74 G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993, 219 SCRA 756, 761.

75 341 Phil. 526, 534, 543 (1997).

76 346 Phil. 847, 853-854 (1997).

77 232 Phil. 406 (1994).

78 G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, 232 SCRA 412-413.

79 Supra note 59.

80 Fifth Edition, p. 220.

81 New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005).

82 According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records, p. 72.

83 Rollo, pp. 73-74.

84 Issued by the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Charlton S. Sibal, M.D.; RTC records, p. 7.

85 Joey Pestilos then resided at Block 1, Lot 6, Don Primitivo Extension, Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Dwight Macapanas then resided at No. 24 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Miguel Gaces then resided at No. 13, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Jerry Fernandez resided at No. 16, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Ronald Mufioz then resided at No. 15, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; RTC records, p. 4.

86 Atty. Generoso then resided at No. 16 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City per the referral letter of the Police Inspector to the City Prosecutor, dated February 20, 2005; id.

87 Rollo, p. 75.

88 Supra note 76.

89 G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139.

90 Rollo, p. 40.

91 Rule 113, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.

92 Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627, 637-638; see also People v. Mi/ado, 462 Phil. 411, 417 (2003).

93 The pertinent portion of the Affidavit of Arrest states:

That, immediately we proceeded at the said place and upon arrival complainant appeared complained and pointed to the undersigned to suspects [Joey] Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces[,] Jerry Fernandez and Ronald Munoz at (sic) those who mauled him.

That, I informed all the suspects of the charges imputed [against] them by complainant Atty. Generoso then invited them to Batasan Police Station for Investigation x x x" (Emphasis ours)

94 Rollo, p. 41.

95 Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

96 SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.


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