EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004 ]
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.,
I dissent from the majority opinion penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno that the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") has jurisdiction over the instant petition to annul the results of the plebiscite held on 25 April 1998 on the proposed conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city.
The Constitution expressly confers on the COMELEC only a limited quasi-judicial jurisdiction. Thus, Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable. (Italics supplied)
A plain reading of the text of this constitutional provision clearly shows that the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC applies only to election contests involving elective officials. The wording of this provision is not susceptible to any other interpretation.
Thus, this Court has ruled that the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC is found only in Section 2(2) of Article IX-C and nowhere else. In Baytan v. COMELEC,1 the Court held:
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, return's, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
The Court reiterated this ruling in the more recent case of Bautista v. COMELEC. 2
The COMELEC can exercise its quasi-judicial jurisdiction only if there is an election contest involving an elective official. A plebiscite on whether a municipality should become a city does not involve the election into public office of any official. Such a plebiscite does not involve any election contest as no one is running for any public office. Thus, the COMELEC has no quasi-judicial jurisdiction over any dispute involving the results of such plebiscite. In Garces v. Court of Appeals,3 this Court ruled:
The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado contending that this is a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7, Art. 1X-A of the I 987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac. he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the R fC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMEL resolution contrary to Sec. 7. Art. 1X-A.
The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
"Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or "matter" referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicator}- or quasi-judicial powers involving "elective regional, provincial and city officials." In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." (Italics supplied)
The distinction between the administrative powers and quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC extends to the conduct of plebiscites. The COMELEC's power to "enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct's x x of x x x plebiscite" does not include any quasi-judicial po.vver. Any question on the validity of the plebiscite, or any dispute on the results of the plebiscite, falls within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts. Thus, in Salva v. Makalintal,4 this Court ruled:
xxx We agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary, authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws." (Citation omitted.) Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the Constitution has not vested in the COMELEC any quasi-judicial jurisdiction over disputes involving the results of plebiscites. The question then arises whether such disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. This leads us to Section 19 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,5 which states:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; x x x.1aшphi1 (Italics supplied)
An action to annul the results of a plebiscite is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, just like an action to declare the unconstitutionality of a law.6 Moreover, an action to annul the results of a plebiscite does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, under Section 19(1) and (6) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, such action expressly falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts.
The argument that Regional Trial Courts have no experience in the revision of ballots does not hold water. Regional Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials.7 Regional Trial Courts also exercise appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials.8 Besides, it is the law that confers jurisdiction, not experience, practice or tradition.
The suggestion that the administrative power of the COMELEC to "[Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall"9 should be liberally construed to include quasi-judicial jurisdiction over the instant petition would lead to constitutional anomalies. To do so would also mean granting to the COMELEC quasi-judicial jurisdiction over disputes arising from the validity of an initiative, or the recall of local officials. Under the same logic, the COMELEC would also have quasi-judicial jurisdiction over cases involving violations of election laws. If Congress subsequently confers on regular trial courts exclusive jurisdiction over these cases, then such legislative act would have to be invalidated as unconstitutional. This would wreak havoc on the constitutional concept of judicial power as being lodged in the judiciary.10
In summary, neither the Constitution nor any existing law grants the COMELEC jurisdiction over a petition to annul the results of a plebiscite. However, the Judiciary Reorganization Act expressly confers on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such a petition. The ineluctable conclusion is that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the instant petition to annul the results of the plebiscite held on 25 April 1998 on the proposed conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city. Such jurisdiction clearly belongs to the proper Regional Trial Court.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the instant petition, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action with the proper Regional Trial Court.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 153945. 4 February 2003.
2 G.R. Nos. 154796-97. 21 October 2003.
3 G.R. No. I 14795. 17 JuK 1996. 259 SCRA 99.
4 G.R. No. 132603. 18 September 2000. 340 SCRA 506.
5 Republic Act No. 7691.
6 Mirasol v. Cowl of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448. 1 February 2001. 351 SCRA 44; Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497. 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 135.
7 Section 251, Batas Pambansa Big. 881. otherwise known as "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines."
8 Section 252. ibid.
9 Section 2(1). Article 1X-C of the Constitution.
10 Section 1. Article VIII of the Constitution.
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