EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004 ]
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
With due respect, I dissent from the majority decision that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over the present petition to annul the results of the plebiscite held on April 25, 1998 on the proposed conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a highly urbanized city.
Petitioners and petitioners-intervenors invoke the following provision of Section 2(1), Article XI-C of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(I) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
xxx
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
They claim that the above-quoted provision clearly bestows jurisdiction in the COMELEC to order the recount of plebiscite results.1
In Baytan v. COMELEC,2 this Court classified the constitutionally-vested powers of the COMELEC, in this wise:
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. x x x
On the other hand, the COMELEC'S quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
Section 2.1aшphi1 The'Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable."
xxx
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
Given the above classification of the COMELEC's constitutionally vested powers, petitioners and petitioner-intervenors thus invoke an administrative power of the COMELEC to order the revision and recount of ballots.
The grounds petitioners and petitioner-intervenors are raising, however — fraud, anomalies and irregularities that attended the balloting and canvassing alleged to have seriously affected the results of the plebiscite — are similar to the grounds raised in an election contest. Petitioners and petitioner-intervenors are thus asking the COMELEC to exercise a function similar to what it exercises in election protests.
The Constitution provides, however, that election protests are governed by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C — a quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC. Ergo, petitioners and petitioner-intervenors call on the COMELEC to exercise a function quasi-judicial in nature but invoke a constitutionally-vested administrative power as legal basis thereof. This is impermissible.
It bears emphasis that Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution can neither be applied to the petition for revision and recount of plebiscite votes, for the Constitution expressly enunciates the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC as covering the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal official decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. To extend by implication the jurisdiction to plebiscite results violates the clear provision of the Constitution.
In Lopez v. Roxas,3 this Court held that the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in the judicial branch "except only so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency' in which case said agency would be exercising quasi-judicial power. Consequently, where the power has not been expressly delegated by either the law or the Constitution to "some other agency," the same remains lodged with the judicial branch.
Since neither the Constitution nor any law confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to order the revision and recount of ballots in plebiscites or any contests arising from plebiscite results, it is the judicial branch that can take cognizance thereof.
Not only by analogy with election contests can it be concluded that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over controversies involving plebiscites. The case at bar does not simply involve "the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city" as seen by the majority. For petitioners are alleging that there have been fraud, anomalies and irregularities in the balloting and counting. Whether there was fraud or there were anomalies or irregularities is a legal question which is determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body calling for the exercise of judicial power or quasi-judicial power as the case may be.
The majority also view the case as not calling for the exercise of judicial power as it does not involve violation of any legally demandable and enforceable right nor the protection of the private interest of any individual and does not contemplate the clash of contending private parties. I beg to differ. The Taguig electorate, being directly affected by the proposed conversion into cityhood, has the constitutionally vested right to vote in said plebiscite.4 The exercise of such right would be futile if it does not come with the concurrent right to a canvass free from fraud, anomalies and irregularities. As said right is alleged to have been impaired, as in the case at bar, then there exists a controversy which calls for the exercise of judicial power.
Just as I beg to disagree with the conclusion that the exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial powers of courts and administrative tribunals is limited only to contests relating to elected officials and not to plebiscites. The question is not whether the case involves a plebiscite or an elected official.
To determine whether a case calls for the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative tribunals is to determine whether it involves a justiciable controversy or only involves a purely administrative function.
As previously pointed out, the case at bar calls for determination as to whether the balloting and canvassing was attended with fraud, anomalies and irregularities, a legal question which is clearly justiciable and thus requires the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Being justiciable, B.P. Big. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, specifically Section 19, which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
xxx
(Italics supplied)
applies.
The above-quoted provision is not limited to traditional civil cases, i.e., involving the violation of a right of specific person, as the majority seems to point out.1aшphi1 The Rules of Court provides for special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for questioning the legality of any law, act, order or ordinance. The special civil action of quo warranto may also be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic or the Philippines. Such civil actions do not necessarily involve a violation of a specific right of a particular person.
As to the apparent fear of "jumbled justice" that may result in giving the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results in the event that they involve a nationwide plebiscite, it should be stressed that the present petition accentuates the present gap in the law as neither the Constitution nor legislation provides which court or body has jurisdiction over said controversy. Recognizing such gap in the law, however, does not empower the judiciary to fill it in without committing judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, I vote that the petition be DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action with the proper court.
Footnotes
1 Rollo at 326.
2 G.R. No. 153945. February 4. 2003.
3 17 SCRA 756 (1966).
4 Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by majority of the votes cast in a Plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
