G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998,
♦ Decision,
Romero, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Puno, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Vitug, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Panganiban, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Romero, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998
EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
I share the opinion of those who continue to uphold the decision in the National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections case that has sustained the validity of Section 11(b) of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6646, otherwise also known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Petitioners, in seeking a re-examination of the decision of this Court in the National Press Club case, no more than invoke anew Section 4, Article III, of the Constitution to the effect that —
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of press, on the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.ᇈWᑭHIL
It is their submission that Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 18(e) of Comelec Resolution No. 2974 should be declared unconstitutional. These contested provisions state:
Sec. 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
x x x x x x x x x
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
Sec. 18. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful
x x x x x x x x x
e. For any radio broadcasting or television station or any person making use of broadcast media to sell or give, free of charge, any air time for campaign and other political purposes, except thru "COMELEC Time," allotted to the Commission pursuant to Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code.
I see, however, in the above provisions a faithful compliance and due observance of the language, intent and spirit of the Constitution itself, Article IX(C)(4) of which reads:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied.)
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in the hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates' right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be the best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Melo and Purisima, JJ., concur.
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