G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998,
♦ Decision,
Romero, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Puno, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Vitug, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Panganiban, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Romero, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998
EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting;
The Court, by a majority vote, decided to uphold the ban on political advertising, as provided, under Section 11(b)1 of RA 6646, and to reiterate the 1992 ruling in National Press Club vs. Comelec2 for two main reasons:
1. To equalize "as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign 'war chests.'" In other words, the intention of the prohibition is to equalize the "political playing field" for rich and poor candidates.
2. While conceding that Section 11(b) of RA 6646 "limit[s] the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves," the Court justifies the ad ban by alleging that: (a) it is limited, first, in its "duration," (i.e. the ban applies only during the "election period") and, second, in its "scope" (i.e. the prohibition on the sale and the donation of print space and air time covers only those for "campaign and other political purposes", time does not restrict the legitimate reporting of news and opinions by media practitioners who are not candidates); and (b) the Comelec is authorized to procure, by purchase or donation, media time and space which are to be fairly, freely and equally distributed among the candidates. Otherwise stated, the grant of Comelec time and space, free of charge, to said candidates makes up for the admitted infringement of the constitutional right to free speech and access to mass media during the campaign period.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority's view and join the stirring Dissenting Opinions of Justices Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,3 Isagani A.
Cruz4 and Edgardo L. Paras5 in NPC vs. Comelec, and of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in the present case. I will no longer repeat their cogent legal arguments.ℒαwρhi৷ Let me just add my own.
1. Ad Ban Not Pro-Poor
but Anti-Poor
The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it prevents the rich from buying media time and space which the poor cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that media advertising is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor.
I respectfully submit that such argument is bereft of factual basis. True, a full-page ad in a major broadsheet6 may be priced at about P100,000; a 30-second commercial in a major television channel,7 anywhere from P15,000 to P90,000 depending on the time and the program; while air time of an equal duration in a leading radio station, anywhere from P300 to P4,500.8 But even with such price tags, media ads are not necessarily expensive, considering their nationwide reach, audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value.
Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a national office like the presidency, the vice presidency, and the senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited campaign expenditures to ten pesos (P10) for every voter in the case of candidates for president and vice president, and three pesos (P3) per voter in their constituencies, for other candidates.9 Anyone whether rich or poor who aspires for such national elective office must expect to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable donations, to make himself and his platform or program of government known to the voting public.
Media Ads
Comparatively Cheaper
While a one-page black-and-white ad in a major daily costs about P100,000, it is replicated, however, in about 250,000 copies 10 circulated to an equal number of offices and households nationwide on the very same day of its publication. Each newspaper copy has an average readership of six. Hence, the ad is exposed to about 1.5 million (250,000 x 6) people all over the country. Consider, too, that people discuss what they read while they congregate in barber shops, corner stores, and other places where people gather. Sometimes, radio and TV broadcasters pick up and comment on what they read in newspapers. So, the reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and effectivity of a broadsheet ad are practically immeasurable.
On the other hand, let us consider the alternative of printing and distributing a poster or handbill of similar size. The actual printing cost of such handbill on newsprint is twenty centavos (P.20) per copy.11 The cost of P250,000 copies (the circulation of a major daily) would thus be P50,000 (250,000 x P.20). But that is only the printing cost. To disseminate these handbills nationwide on the same day of printing without the distribution network of a major newspaper is almost impossible. Besides, the cost would be horrendous. To approximate the circulation of a major newspaper, the most practical substitute would be the mails. Ordinary mail is now P4.00 per posting. Hence, the distribution cost through the mails would be P1 million (250,000 copies x P4.00). And this does not include the manual work and cost of sorting, folding and individually addressing these 250,000 pieces of mail matter. (This alternative assumes the availability of a mailing list equivalent to the reach of a newspaper.) Even if third-class mail is used, the distribution cost alone will still be P3.00 per individual mailing, or P750,000 for all 250,000 copies.12
This alternative is not only much more expensive but much less effective as well, because it has no guarantee of same-day delivery, has a diminished readership multiplier effect and is tremendously cumbersome in terms of sorting and distribution.
Furthermore, a candidate need not buy one-page ads. He can use quarter-page ads at one fourth the cost or about P25,000 only per issue.ℒαwρhi৷ To be effective in his ad campaign, he may need to come out once every three days (to be spread out among the different dailies) or 30 times during the 90-day campaign period13 for national candidates. Hence, he will spend, for the entire duration of the campaign, about P750,000 (P25,000 x 30). I repeat, to advertise a one-fourth page ad at least 30 times in various major dailies, a candidate needs to spend only P750,000 an amount less than the alternative of printing and distributing nationwide ONLY ONCE a less timely and less effective equivalent leaflet or poster.
A similar detailed comparison of cost-benefit could be written for radio and television. While, at initial glance, the rates for these electronic media may appear high, still they could be proven more beneficial and cheaper in the long term because of their "value-for-money" appeal.14
Candidates Should Not Be Denied
Option to Use Media Ads
From the foregoing, it is clear that mass media truly offers an economical, practical, and effective means by which a relatively unknown but well-qualified political candidate who has limited resources, particularly one running for a national office, may make known to the general public during the short campaign period15 his qualifications, platform of government, stand on vital issues, as well as his responses to questions or doubts about his capabilities, his character or any other matter raised against him. Deprived of media ads, the rich candidate, unlike his poor opponent, resorts to expensive propaganda the holding of public meetings and rallies before large but oftentimes "paid" crowds, helicopter stops and motorcades spanning several towns and cities, the production of ingenious materials, giveaways and other products, and the incessant printing and distribution of various campaign paraphernalia. These forms of electoral promotion ineluctably require a large political machinery and gargantuan funds (organization + people/supporters + communication gadgets + vehicles + logistics). To combat this formidable and expensive election behemoth, the poor candidate's most viable alternative may be media advertising.
In NPC vs. Comelec, it was feared that the "unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time . . .ℒαwρhi৷ by the financially affluent [was] likely to make a crucial difference." But I say such fear is unfounded. First, because campaign expenses are limited by law. Second, the possibility of the abuse and misuse of media ads by the "financially affluent" is not an argument in favor of their total withdrawal, for to use the very words of the majority in NPC "there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused."16 Third, the absence of access to media advertising totally deprives the poor candidate of his most formidable weapon in combating the "huge campaign war chests" of rich contenders.
THE POINT IS: IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT MEDIA ADVERTISING SHOULD BE BANNED BECAUSE ONLY THE RICH CAN AFFORD IT OR, FOR THAT MATTER, THEY MAY ABUSE OR MISUSE IT. Quite the contrary, in terms of reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and cost-benefit advantage, media advertising may be the cheapest and most effective campaign mechanism available. I am not suggesting that every candidate should use media ads. In the final analysis, it is really up to the candidates and their campaign handlers to adopt such mode and means of campaigning as their budgets and political strategies may require.16a What I am stressing is that candidates, whether rich or poor, should be given the option of campaigning through media, instead of being forced to use other forms of propaganda that could turn out to be less effective and more expensive.
2. Ad Ban Not Limited;
Comelec Time and Space Inutile
I now come to the second major point. The majority rationalizes the ad ban by saying that it has a very limited duration and scope and that, in any event, the Comelec's grant of free media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the violation of their constitutional right. I disagree.
Ad Ban Not
Limited in Duration
The ad ban is constitutional because, according to the majority, it is limited in duration for the reason that it is enforced only during the election period. In my humble view and with all due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political advertisement is relevant only during the campaign period not before and not after. As petitioners put it, a ban on mountain-skiing during the winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in only when the mountains slopes are covered with snow. To add a further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice during the rainy season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After all, nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In the same manner, campaign ads are not resorted to except during the campaign period. And their prohibition does not become any less odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies only during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to advertise their qualifications and platforms only during such period. Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not limited in duration but is in fact and in truth total, complete and exhaustive.
Ad Ban Neither
Limited in Scope
The majority also claims that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in scope; that is, it refers only to the purchase, sale or donation of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes," and does not restrict news reporting or commentaries by editors, columnists, reporters, and broadcasters. But the issue here is not the freedom of media professionals.17 The issue is the freedom of expression of candidates. That the freedom of the press is respected by the law and by the Comelec is not a reason to trample upon the candidates' constitutional right to free speech and the people's right to information. In this light, the majority's contention is a clear case of non sequitur. Media ads do not partake of the "real substantive evil" that the state has a right to prevent18 and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information.
Besides, what constitutes "campaign or other political purposes"? Neither RA 6646 nor the majority provides an explanation. If candidates buy 30 column-inches of newspaper space or one hour of prime radio/TV, time everyday, and if they retrain professional journalists to use such space/time to defend them from attacks and to promote their platforms of government, should such purchase be covered by the ad ban, or should it be allowed as an exercise of the freedom of journalists to express their views? Even more insidiously, should regular columnists' daily defense of their chosen candidates and daily promotion of their platforms of government constitute donated space for "campaign and other political purposes"?19
Ad Ban Not Compensated for or
Justified by Free "Comelec Time"
Finally, the majority opines that the grant of free Comelec media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the abridgment of the latter's right to buy political ads.20 With due respect, I believe this is hollow and shallow.
In its Compliance dated March 13, 1998, Comelec tell us that under its Resolution No. 3015, it gave due course to eleven candidates for president,21 nine for vice president,22 and forty for senator.23 It is claimed however that, all in all, there are really about 100,000 candidates running for about 17,000 national and local positions in the coming elections, from whom a voter is expected to choose at least 3024 to vote for. With so many candidates, how can the ordinary, sometimes nonchalant, voter ever get to know each of the political hopefuls from whom he will make an intelligent selection? In the crucial choice for president alone, how can ordinary citizens intelligently and sufficiently assess each of the 11 candidates in order to make a sensible choice for a leader upon whom to entrust the momentous responsibility of carving the country's path in the next millennium?
The Comelec answers these questions with Resolution No. 2983-A, promulgated on March 3, 1998, in which it asks "every radio broadcasting and television station operating under franchise [to] grant the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be known as 'Comelec time' effective February 10, 1998 for candidates for President, Vice President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998 for candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998," to be allocated "by lottery" among candidates requesting its use. But Comelec, in the same Compliance, informed the Court that "it is not procuring 'Comelec space' (in any newspaper) by virtue of the effects of the decision of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272."25
class="j">In sum, the Comelec intends to secure 30 minutes of "Comelec time" from every radio and broadcasting station to be allocated equally to all candidates. The Comelec does not state exactly how it intends to allocate except "by lottery" these 30 minutes per station to the 17,000 candidates, considering that these stations do not have the same reach, audience and penetration. The poll body does not say exactly how many stations are involved, what budget allocation, if any, it has for the purpose,26 when each candidate will be allowed to speak and for how long, how the Comelec intends to cover the 77 provinces, 68 cities and 42,000 barangays nationwide, and many other details. Moreover, while the Comelec smugly speaks of free Comelec time being effective on "February 10, 1998" for national candidates, Resolution 2983-A itself was promulgated only on March 3, 1998.
Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major candidate using this so-called free Comelec broadcast time. In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998, Comelec Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no candidate had applied for an allocation of Comelec time. Not even petitioners. This is the best testament to the utter inutility and ineffectivity of Comelec time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute, much less a viable alternative, to freely chosen but paid for media ads. It cannot compensate for the violation of the candidates' right to free speech and media access, or for the electorate's right to information.
If the real objective is to level the playing field for rich and poor candidates, there must be, as there already are, a cap on election expenses and a shortening of the campaign period. The incapability of the Comelec to effectively monitor and strictly implement such expense and time limitations should not take its toll upon constitutionally enshrined liberties of the people, including the candidates. To prohibit access to mass media, except only through Comelec time which has been indubitably shorn to be sorely insubstantial, insignificant and inutile is not, and is far from being, a solution to the problems faced by poor candidates. The simple remedy is to lift the media ban.
Epilogue
The ad ban is a blatant violation of the candidates' constitutional right to free speech 27 and the people's right to information.28 Being the last refuge of the people and the guardian of the Constitution, this Court should then, with alacrity, view the ban with suspicion, if not with outright rejection.29 To repeat, the alleged limitations are in reality nonexistent; and the "pro-poor" justification, without logic.
To say that the prohibition levels the playing field for the rich and the poor is to indulge in a theoretical assumption totally devoid of factual basis. On the contrary, media advertising may be depending on a contender's propaganda strategy the cheapest, most practical and most effective campaign medium, especially for national candidates. By completely denying this medium to both the rich and the poor, this Court has not leveled the playing field. It has effectively abolished it! Far from equalizing campaign opportunities, the ban on media advertising actually favors the rich (and the popular) who can afford the more expensive and burdensome forms of propaganda, against the poor (and the unknown) who cannot.
The allegation that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in duration and scope is itself most unreasonable, bereft as it is of logic and basis. Even more shallow is the argument that the Comelec-given media time and space compensate for such abridgment. In fact, the Comelec is not even procuring any newspaper space. In any event, the fact that not even the poorest candidates have applied for available opportunities is the best testament to its dubiousness. That petitioners who are seasoned political leaders prefer to pay for their own media ads rather than to avail themselves of the Comelec freebies refutes the majority's thesis of compensation. Indeed, the free things in life are not always the best.30 They mat just be a bureaucratic waste of resources.
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases,31 has deviated from stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions. It should do no less in the present case.
Elections can he free, honest and credible not only because of the absence of the three execrable "G's" or "guns, goons and gold." Beyond this, the integrity and effectivity of electoral democracy depend upon the availability of information and education touching on three good "P's" principles, platforms and programs of the candidates. Indeed, an intelligent vote presupposes a well-informed voter. If elections must be rid of patronage, personalities and popularity as the main criteria of the people's choice, we must allow candidates every opportunity to educate the voters. And corollarily, the people must be accorded every access to such information without much effort and expense on their part.
With all due respect, I submit that the ad ban is regressive, repressive and deceptive. It has no place in our constitutional democracy.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to CONDEMN Section 11(b) of RA 6646 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID.
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., dissent.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x
b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
2 207 SCRA 1, March 5, 1992, per Feliciano, J.
3 Ibid., pp. 28-30, The following are excerpts:
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will certainly achieve one result keep the voters ignorant of who the candidates are and what they stand for.
The implementation of Section 11(b) will result in gross inequality. A cabinet member, an incumbent official, a movie star, a basketball player, or a conspicuous clown enjoys an unfair advantage over a candidate many times better qualified but lesser known.
. . . We owe it to the masses to open all forms of communication to them during this limited campaign period. A candidate to whom columnists and radio-television commentators owe past favors or who share their personal biases and convictions will get an undue amount of publicity. Those who incur the ire of opinion makers cannot counteract negative reporting by buying his own newspapers space or airtime for the airing of his refutations.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is censorship pure and simple. It is particularly reprehensible because it is imposed during the limited period of the election campaign when information is most needed. . . .
4 Ibid., pp. 31-43. I quote significant, enlightening portions as follows:
The citizens can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the many methods by which ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he may speak or write or sing or dance, for all these are forms of expression protected by the Constitution. So is silence, which "persuades when speaking fails." . . . The individual can convey his message in a poem or a novel or a tract or in a public speech or through a moving picture or a stage play. In such diverse ways may he be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for acceptability will depend on the quality of his thoughts and of his person, as well as the mood and motivation of his audience. But whatever form he employs, he is entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his thoughts.
It is for the purpose of properly informing the electorate of the credentials and platforms of the candidates that they are allowed to campaign during the election period. . . .
It is curious, however, that such allowable campaign activities do not include the use of the mass media because of the prohibition in Section 11(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. . . .
The lawful objective of Section 11(b) may be readily conceded. The announced purpose of the law is to prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates by denying both of them access to the mass media and thus preventing the former from enjoying and undue advantage over the latter. There is no question that this is a laudable goal. Equality among the candidates in this regard should be assiduously pursued by the government if the aspirant with limited resources is to have any chance at all against an opulent opponent who will not hesitate to use his wealth to make up for his lack of competence.
To pursue a lawful objective, only a lawful method may be employed even if it may not be the best among the suggested options. In my own view, the method here applied falls far short of the constitutional criterion. I believe that the necessary reasonable link between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved has not been proved and that the method employed is unduly oppressive.
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less that what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that "any system of prior restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity." That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evidence fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution.
I submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest dissemination of information learning on the forthcoming elections. An uniformed electorate is not likely to be circumspect in the choice of the officials who will represent them in the councils of government. That they may exercise their suffrages wisely, it is important that they be apprised of the election issues, including the credentials, if any, of the various aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of the dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego, are relying on their money, or their tinsel popularity, or their private armies, to give them the plume of victory.
For violating the "liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties," the challenged law must be struck down. For blandly sustaining it instead, the majority has inflicted a deep cut on the Constitution that will ruthlessly bleed it white, and with it this most cherished of our freedoms.
5 Ibid., pp. 43-44, where he said in part:
The freedom to advertise one's political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression and of our right of access to information. Freedom of expression in turn includes among other things, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms without rhyme or reason, and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
The majority says that the purpose of the political advertisement provision is to prevent those who have much money from completely overwhelming those who have little. This is gross error because should the campaign for votes be carried out in other fora (for example, rallies and meetings) the rich candidate can always be at a great advantage over his less fortunate opponent. And so the disparity feared will likewise appear in campaigns other than through media. . . .
6 Like the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Manila Bulletin and the Philippine Star.
7 Like ABS-CBN Channel 2 or GMA Channel 7.
8 Petition in Intervention, p. 28.
9 Sec. 100, BP Blg. 881, as amended by Sec. 13, RA 7166, which provides:
Sec 100 Limitations upon expenses of candidates. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President, and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy Provided, That a candidate without any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidates or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
10 This is the claimed circulation of the three major broadsheets Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star.
11 This is the present cost actually paid by a major broadsheet for every page of printing, including the paper and the ink used. Commercial printing presses actually charge 3 to 4 times this amount for posters smaller than a one page newspaper ad.
12 The cost is P3 for the first 50 grams in bulk mailing, method which would entail add-on costs for the materials to reach the individual voters. Hence, to factor out these adds-on costs while approximating the reach of a newspaper, the cost of mailing by piece was computed instead.
13 Sec. 3, BP. Blg. 881, as amended by Sec. 5, RA 7166.
14 The Court, in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans Jr., 137 SCRA 628, 635-636, July 19, 1985, through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., described the pervasive effect of broadcast media in this wise:
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. 7!ᕼdMᗄ7Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within the reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every of every age persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate . . .
15 90 days for candidates for president, vice president and senator; and 45 days for the other elective positions (Sec. 3, BP Blg. 881, as amended by Sec. 5, RA 7166).
16 In National Press Club, supra, at 12-13, the Court gives the argument:
It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil 139, 177 (1936)] that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused.
16a In his column in the Manila Standard on March 30, 1998 entitled "A survey about political ads," Mahar Mangahas, president of the Social Weather Stations, explains why "it pays of advertise" political candidacies, "judging from the results of the Social Weather Stations survey of Feb. 21-27, 1998." Interestingly, the SWS survey showed that the 1998 political ads best recalled by the public were those of the two leading candidates Joseph Estrada (55%) and Alfredo Lim (54%) followed by Jose de Venecia (37%), Lito Osmeña (35%), Renato de Villa (19%), Raul Roco (11%), Miriam Defensor Santiago (9%), Imelda Marcos (3%), and Juan Ponce Enrile (2%). Interestingly also, the topnotchers in the ad survey cannot be termed "rich" nor the bottom dwellers, "poor," thereby reinforcing my thesis that the effectiveness of political ads is not dependent on financial fortunes. Rather, political ads are complementary to the overall political strategy of each candidate.
17 This specific issue has been resolved in Sanidad v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529, January 29, 1990, per Medialdea, J., where the Court ruled:
However neither Article IX-C of the Constitution [Comelecs power to supervise and regulate the operation of public utilities and the mass media during the election period] nor Sec 11 (b) and par of R A 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during the plebiscite periods. Media practitioners are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. . . . Therefore Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 [prohibiting columnists commentators or announcers to use their column radio or TV time to campaign for or against plebiscite issues] has no statutory basis.
x x x x x x x x x
Anent respondent Comelecs argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgment. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. [Emphasis in the original]
18 Using the "clear and present danger test" as enunciated in Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835, 877, April 18, 1969, per Fernando, J., citing Sohenk v. United States, 249 US 47, 52, 63 L.ed. 470, 473-474 (1919); Whitney v. California, 247 US 357, 373, 71 L.ed. 192, 202-203 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494, 510, 95 L. ed., 1137, 1153 (1950); and several other cases. See also, Ponencias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71, 87-88, January 27, 1948, per Feria, J.; Adiong vs. Comelec, 207 SCRA 712, 715, March 31, 1992, per Gutierrez Jr., J.; Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans Jr., supra.
19 "PPI appeals to media companies not to sell space, air time to pols," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 5, 1998. The following are excerpts:
The appeal was made as the PPI expressed "grave concern and alarm over the overnight proliferation of "fly-by-night" newspapers who take advantage of the political campaign season for racketeering.
"The institutes is dismayed by the reported abdication by a number of media owners and editors of their journalistic responsibilities by selling their editorial pages and air time to political candidates." PPI executive director Ermin Garcia said in a statement.
See also, "Ad ban worsens corruption in media," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 1998, which reads in part:
A media officer of a candidate revealed that in one national daily the going price for a page one photo is P5,000. The reporter who acts as broker gets P1,000, the editor who puts it out gets P4,000. That is cheaper than the price of an equivalent column space for advertisement in the inside pages.
A presidential candidates photo on the front page fetches P15,000 while for a senatorial candidate it is P10,000.
A banner story costs P25,000. A front page above the fold costs P20,000. A small press release costs P5,000.
20 In contrast, this was what the Court said in unanimity in Sanidad, supra:
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. (Emphasis ours)
21 1. Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. LAKAS-NUCD UDMP
2. Renato S. De Villa Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma/Lapiang Manggagawa Coalition
3. Santiago F. Dumlao, Jr. Kilusan para sa Pambansang Pagpapanibago
4. Juan Ponce Enrile Independent (LP)
5. Joseph E. Estrada Partido ng Masang Pilipino LAMMP
6. Alfredo S. Lim Liberal Party
7. Imelda R. Marcos Kilusan Bagong Lipunan
8. Manuel L. Morato Partido Bansang Marangal
9. Emilio R. Osmeña Progressive Movement for Devolution of Initiative Political Party of Central Visayas
10. Raul S. Roco Aksyon Demokratiko
11. Miriam Defensor Santiago People's Reform Party
22 1. Edgardo J. Angara LDP/LAMMP Coalition
2. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
3. Oscar M. Orbos PDR LM
4. Sergio Osmeña III Liberal Party
5. Reynaldo R. Pacheco KPP
6. Camilo L. Sabio Partido Bansang Marangal
7. Irene M. Santiago Aksyong Demokratiko
8. Ismael D. Sueño PROMDI
9. Francisco S. Tatad People's Reform Party
23 1. Lisandro C. Abadia LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
2. Rolando R. Andaya LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
3. Teresa Aquino-Oreta LDP/LAMMP Coalition
4. Luduvico D. Badoy KPP
5. Ramon S. Bagatsing, Jr. LDP/LAMMP Coalition
6. Robert Z. Barbers LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
7. Rodolfo G. Biazon LDP/LAMMP Coalition
8. Eduardo D. Bondoc KPP
9. David M. Castro KPP
10. Renato L. Cayetano LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
11. Raul A. Daza LIBERAL PARTY
12. Roberto F. De Ocampo LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
13. Renato B. Garcia KPP
14. Adolfo R. Geronimo PDR-LM Coalition
15. Ricardo T. Gloria LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
16. Teofisto M. Guingona LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
17. Abraham S. Iribani PDR/LM Coalition
18. Robert S. Jaworski LAMMP
19. Edcel C. Lagman LAMMP
20. Reynante M. Langit PDR/LM Coalition
21. Loren B. Legarda-Leviste LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
22. Oliver O. Lozano INDEPENDENT
23. Fred Henry V. Marallag KPP
24. Blas F. Ople PMP-LAMMP Coalition
25. John Reinner Osmeña NPC/LAMMP
26. Roberto M. Pagdanganan LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
27. Charito B. Plaza LIBERAL PARTY
28. Hernando B. Perez LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
29. Aquilino Q. Pimentel LAMMP (PDP/LABAN)
30. Santanina C.T. Rasul LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
31. Ramon B. Revilla LAKAS-NUCD UMDP
32. Miguel Luis R. Romero LAMMP
33. Roberto S. Sebastian PDR-LM Coalition
34. Roy B. Señeres PDR-LM Coalition
35. Vicente C. Sotto III LDP/LAMMP Coalition
36. Hadja Putri Zorayda PDR/LM Coalition
A. Tamano
37. Rube D. Torres LAMMP
38. Jose M. Villegas, Jr. LM (Workers Party)/PDR
39. Freddie N. Webb LDP/LAMMP
40. Haydee B. Yorac Independent
24 1 each for president, vice-president, congressman, governor, vice-governor, mayor and vice-mayor; 12 for senator; at least 5 for Sangguniang Panlalawigan members; also at least 5 for Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod members; and 1 for party list representative.
25 Compliance dated March 13, 1998, p. 4.
26 The Comelec has not even paid the per diem and allowances of the public school teachers who served during the last barangay elections. How can it expect to pay for the Comelec TV and radio time? (Memorandum of Petitioners-in-Intervention, p. 33).
27 Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
28 Article III of the Constitution also provides:
Sec 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
29 The time-honored doctrine against prior restraint is stated in New York Times v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971), which has been invariably applied in our jurisdiction, in this wise: "'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.'" (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987 ed., Vol. I., p. 142.)
30 With apologies to Lew Brown and Buddy (George Gard) De Sylva, "The Best Things in Life Are Free," Good News, 1927, as quoted by John Barlett in Barlett's Familiar Quotations, 1980 ed., p. 825.
31 For instance, Ebralonag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed the Court's 34-years-old doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses "to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly, Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the 12-years-old ruling in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians for offense allegedly committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on the validity of certain presidential decrees regarding the determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with the then Code of Civil Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation