EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34709 June 15, 1973
CONSUELO B. SISON, petitioner,
vs.
MARINO GATCHALIAN, NATIVIDAD GATCHALIAN, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Romeo R. Bringas, Fortunato Gupit, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Sison for petitioner.
Ricafort & Galang for private respondents.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando and note with gratification that the same takes special pains to show, by a discussion of the lack of merit of respondents' appeal pending before the appellate court, that the dismissal of the appeal herein ordered for failure to comply with the rule that the record on appeal show on its face "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time"1is fully justified and thereby squarely disposes of the "premium on technicality" argument generally pleaded by the party-appellant in such cases.
The main opinion thus expressly reiterates the Court's pronouncement in Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto,2that a party may "seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal (by showing) strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof...." and stresses that "no such 'strong compelling reasons'" have been established by respondents.
This is merely to uphold the fundamental principles often expounded by the Court of not "sacrificing justice to technicality" and of not construing its rules in such manner as to "amount to a denial of justice and/or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance" and that in meritorious cases "a liberal (not literal) interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the interest and purpose of the rules — the proper and just determination of a litigation. There is no vested right in technicalities."4
Where warranted, "it is always in the power of the Court suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case fro operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it."4 Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Fernando in Carillo vs. Allied Workers' Ass'n.5"an element of rigidity (should not) be affixed procedural precepts and made to cover the matter." The Dequito vs. Lopez6a late motion to dismiss the appeal on ground of non-compliance with the rule filed on January 1968 after the filing of appellant's brief on December 8, 1967, was summarily brushed aside by the Court as "being much too late."
In the most recent case, Sarmiento vs. Satud,7the Court likewise rejected a belated motion for dismissal of the appeal after the rendition of an adverse decision against the appellee who invoked the jurisdiction of defect of the failure to comply with the rule, "(C)onsidering ... that appellees' laches allowing six (6) years after the filing of their brief to elapse without moving for dismissal is a case unprecedented in the annals of the Court; that no justification is offered explanation given for such neglect and procrastination that in effect nullify the purposes for which Rule 41, section 6, was enacted, which is the speedy settlement of appeals; and that, upon the other hand, the case of appellants is meritorious shown by the decision."8
The avowed objective of the rule (Rule 41, section 6 ) requiring the statement in the record on appeal of "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time" is to enable the appellate courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether or not an appeal was timely made.
This was expressly made of record of the Court in Araneta vs. Madrigal & Co. Inc.9wherein after noting that prior to the 1964 amendment of the rule, "issues were often raised in appellate courts on whether the appeal had been perfected on time or not, owing to the fact that the data pertinent thereto were not set forth in the record on appeal. Inasmuch as the records of trial courts, in cases appealed by record on appeal, are not forwarded to appellate courts, the latter had no means of checking or verifying the conflicting allegations of fact made, either in the briefs, or in the motion to dismiss the appeal and the opposition thereto, filed by the parties. As a consequence, appellate courts had to examine such evidence as the parties may have submitted thereto, in support of their respective contentions. This entailed additional work and unnecessary waste of time, that contributed to the delay in the final determination of appealed cases. To eliminate such obstacles to the speedy administration of justice, this Court deemed it best, not only to rephrase the first sentence of said Section 6 .... but, also, to add, at the end thereof, the clause:
'together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.'
The Court has time and again stressed since then "the injurious consequences of a failure to grasp (the rule's) import" and the need of strict compliance with the rule's requirements. In de Guia vs. Court of Appeals,10the Court through Justice J.B.L. Reyes again stated that "(T)his Court notes with regret that although these requirements on the contents of a record on appeal have been in effect since 1964, there are still lawyers and litigants who do not comply with the same: either they have not perused the Revised Rules, or choose not to comply therewith. Liberality in this regard is by now unwarranted, and would be unjust to numerous litigants or counsel who exercise diligence in observing the Rules of Court."
Still the main objective of the rule to make of record that the appeal has in fact been timely perfected and to avoid protracted inquiry, additional work and unnecessary waste of time in the appellate courts, as stated in Araneta, supra, should not be lost sight of..
Otherwise, the effects of the rule would be pushed to the absurb extreme, as in Ozaeta vs. Court of Appeals 11wherein the trial court sustained the therein prevailing party's (respondents) proposed appeal for failure to state in the record on appeal a statement of the material date of receipt by the latter of the trial court's order of denial of their motion to set aside decision, notwithstanding the availability of the original record from the which such date and timeliness of appeal could readily be verified. The trial court therein dismissed the proposed appeal stating in effect the failure per se to state the material dates in the original record on appeal was fatal and precluded amendment and correction, as contemplated in section 7 of the same rule.12
The Court therein disvowed of course the trial court's application of the rule by rote and sustained the Court of Appeals' decision that it was "precipitate and hasty on the part of the (trial) judge to have dismissed the appeal without giving (appellants) an opportunity to amend the record on appeal by incorporating (the omitted) statement as to when the order (denying motion to set aside) was received by them"13within such period fixed by him in the absence thereof, within the ten-day period from receipt of the order to amend, as provided in section 7 of the rule.
The Court through Mr. Justice Barredo, emphasized that it is the trial judge's duty precisely to determine whether or not the appeal has been actually perfected on time and to "allow the amendment of a record on appeal in order to include therein any relevant omitted data, "thus: "... in the case at bar the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed with the trial court when the records were still there and by an examination of the same, His Honor could have very well ascertained the said date for purposes of determining — after his attention was called by petitioners to the alleged defect of respondents' record on appeal — whether or not said appeal had been actually perfected on time. As We see it, this is precisely what the trial judge should have done, relying therefor on Section 7 of Rule 41, which allows the amendment of a record on appeal in order to include therein any relevant omitted data."14
Thus, in De Luna vs. Palacio 15the Court, speaking again thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, pointed out that a would be appellant who failed to timely perfect an appeal may properly seek relief under Rule 38, section 2 for reasons of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, thus, "(I)t is indisputable and elementary that to perfect an appeal the notice and record of appeal, as well as the appeal bond, must be filed with the period prescribed by the Rules; and that the failure to do so renders the decision final and unappealable because the period for appeal is fatal (See, inter alia, Alvero vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 433; Salva vs. Palacio [1952], 90 Phil. 731; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals [1943], 74 Phil. 235; Mallare vs. Panahon [1955], 98 Phil. 154). But the would be appellant is not thereby precluded from seeking relief under Revised Rule 38, section 2, whenever the entering of a judgment or order against said party was made through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. ...
"Now, if a party may seek relief under Rule 38, and within the period prescribed therein, after an order for dismissal of the appeal has been entered, there is no reason for denying him that right before the order of dismissal is entered. Respondent Ferrer's' objection to the motion to dismiss his appeal in this case was virtually a motion for relief under Rule 38; it was predicated on accident or excusable neglect, and was accompanied by an apposite affidavit of merit. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant him relief, provided of course the ground for doing so appeared indubitable."
It should be noted that since the enactment on September 1968 of Republic Act 5440 limiting appeals to this Court petitions for review by certiorari, the application of the rule question (Rule 41, section 6) is now invariably limited to the Court of Appeals wherein regular appeals thereto are still perfected by means of records on appeal.
Under section 3 of the Act in relation to Rule 45, section 2, is required of the petitioner seeking review in this Court make "a verified statement of the date when notice judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any were received." As the said rule's (Rule 45, section 2) requirement has the same objective of assuring this Court the petition has in fact been filed within, the reglementary period the Court has "considered as not filed" a defective or incomplete petition that initially failed to state the material date(s) showing timeliness of the filing thereof but has invariably given such the would-be petitioner an opportunity furnish such omitted dates through an amendment of the petition.
When the main objective of determining timeliness of the appeal by the inclusion of all relevant data in the record of appeal is thus placed in focus, I feel that an element of estoppel, if not bad faith that offends a sense of justice and equity, must be taken strongly against a party-appellee, who instead of abiding by the letter and intent of the rule to determining timeliness of the proposed appeal in the proceedings before the trial court below, deliberately desists from objecting to appellant's failure to state a material date (e.g. the date of receipt of an extension order, date or fact of filing of an appeal bond) and presents no objection to the approval of such incomplete record on appeal — which, he knows and the original record shows, has been in fact timely perfected — and practically springs from ambush "with a rapier's throat" in the Court of Appeals upon the printing of the record on appeal to demand the prize of dismissal of the appeal by the appellate court for failure of appellant's record to state such material date.
Justice Moreland's observations for the Court in the early case of Alonso vs. Villamor,16are still as relevant and applicable: "Defect in mere form can not possibly prejudice so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows plainly through, no harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the substance.
x x x x x x x x x
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice.ℒαwρhi৷ Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. ... There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
Hence, it should be stated that the blanket assertion of respondents "that the actual (timely) perfection of the appeal is not material to the question"17cannot be taken at face value, but on the contrary is subject to various qualifications hereinabove discussed and to the paramount considerations of substantial justice. More specifically, the party seeking exception from the rule for valid reasons must show a strong prima facie case of merit in the appeal itself that would warrant giving it due course instead of dismissing it as a futile or forfeited appeal..
It should finally be stated that in most, if not all, wherein the Court applied the rule and sustained dismiss the appeal for failure to show on the face of the record appeal the timeliness of the appeal, the Court invariably did so after satisfying itself of the existence of "a rational basis the result reached by the trial court"18in the decision sought to be reviewed by the lost appeal. Applying the same paramount considerations of substantial justice, the Court proceed the balancing principle that "mandamus to compel approval and certification of an appeal, even if otherwise well group procedurally speaking, has to be denied where it is evident there is no merit in the appeal itself and 'it would serve no useful purpose to reinstate the same.'"19
Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rule 41, section 6.
2 40 SCRA 123 (July 29,1971); note in emphasis supplied.
3 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304, 312 (May 31, 1962); note in parenthesis and emphasis added.
4 Idem, at pp. 312-313, citing Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275; emphasis supplied.
5 24 SCRA 566, 573 (July 31, 1968).
6 22 SCRA 1352, 1355 (March 28, 1968).
7 46 SCRA 365, (Aug. 18, 1972).
8 Idem, at p. 366.
9 18 SCRA 446, 449-450 (Oct. 25, 1966); emphasis supplied.
10 40 SCRA 332, 334-335.
11 42 SCRA 79 (Oct. 29, 1971). See also Guerra Enterprises Co. vs. CFI of Lanao del Sur, 32 SCRA 314 (April 17 1970); Torre vs. Ericta, L-29753, 38 SCRA 296 (Mar. 31, 1971).
12 SEC. 7. Hearing and approval of record. — Upon the submission for approval of the record on appeal, if no objection is filed within five (5) days, the trial judge may approve it as presented or, upon his own motion or at the instance of the appellee, may direct its amendment by the inclusion of any matters omitted which are' deemed essential to the determination of the issue of law or fact involved in the appeal. ..." (Rule 41, Rules of Court)
13 Idem, at pp. 82-83; notes in emphasis supplied.
14 42 SCRA at pp. 84-85; emphasis supplied.
15 30 SCRA 912, 914-915 (Dec. 27, 1969); emphasis supplied.
16 16 Phil, 315, 321-322 (July 26, 1910); emphasis supplied.
17 Quoted on pp. 4-5 of main opinion.
18 Paz vs. Guzman, 43 SCRA 384 (Feb. 29, 1972) citing Corliss vs. Mla. RR. Co., 27 SCRA 674, 678, (March 28, 1969).
19 Espiritu vs. CFI of Cavite, 47 SCRA 354 (Oct. 31, 1972) emphasis supplied; citing Razalan vs. Concepcion, 31 SCRA 611, 61 MRR Co. vs. Ballesteros, 16 SCRA 641; and Paner vs. Yatco, 87 Phil. 271.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment granting the remedy prayed for the petitioner, fully agreeing as I do that the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing private respondents' appeal in question notwithstanding their failure to state in their record on appeal "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time as required by Section 6 of Rule 41 since January 1, 1964, which omission ineluctably resulted in the appellate court losing jurisdiction to entertain said appeal, pursuant to Section 1 (a) of Rule 50, making said omission a ground for dismissal, witch by the construction given by this Court to said provision, in a long line of decisions, as stressed in the main opinion of Justice Fernando, is mandatory and jurisdictional.
While such is my vote, I consider unnecessary and uncalled for Justice Fernando's reference to the supposed lack of merit of private respondents' appeal. An appellate court is not supposed to make any finding regarding the merits of an Appeal unless the corresponding and appropriate procedure guaranteeing full opportunity to all the parties to be duly heard is observed. I cannot but declare myself legally incompetent to render my judgment on a matter not properly before the Court.
This has been my consistent view whenever the Court has been called upon to decide whether or not an appeal should be dismissed on the ground herein involved. I feel it is highly improper for the Court to make any reference to the merits of an appeal when the same has not been made in the manner prescribed by the rules, particularly when, as in this case, the specific procedure laid down by the rules has been definitely characterized by this Court as mandatory and jurisdictional, inasmuch as for the Court to do so would necessarily imply that we can still inquire into the merits of a case even if We have no jurisdiction over the same, which to me is an absurd proposition.
It is too obvious for any extensive elucidation that the Supreme Court had good reasons, well grounded in experience and the principles of equity and justice and consistent with the objective of administering justice justly, speedily and inexpensively, (Section 2, Rule 1) to formulate and promulgate Section 6 of Rule 41 and Section 1 (a) of Rule 50 as they are. Otherwise, the said provisions should not have been acted at all. I am certain that the members of the Court must have studied, discussed and taken into account the noble principles and sentiments articulated by Justice Moreland, in Alonso vs. Villamor, now being cited by Justice Teehankee, as well as similar views, albeit expressed differently, in many other opinions rendered by other eminent justices of the long history of this Court but, as may be gathered from Our decisions applying these provisions, it was the objective of trying to avoid protracted discussions and debates not only between the parties but even among the members of the Court on whether or not an appeal has been made on time that won the day. To entertain now the view that consideration should be given to the merits of an appeal before the Court may dismiss it due to the defect referred to is beyond my comprehension, considering that deliberation on and resolution of such matter is properly require more time than the simple question of timeliness of the appeal. In other words, what I can see is that to indulge in a fair and conscientious determination of merits of the appeal before deciding on whether or not it shows be dismissed would defeat the very purpose for which the rule has been conceived.
Withal, I cannot grasp the point of the contention that dismiss an appeal which might probably be meritorious merely because the record on appeal is faulty in the sense under discussion is to give more importance to form that substance, for the simple reason that, to my mind, such pose an argument against the rule itself rather than its application to the situations contemplated thereby. It is to me beyond cavil that the Court knew when it made the rule that this rather undesirable result would arise, and we must perforce conclude that when it adopted the rule, it found more paramount ends attain by disregarding such contingency, I perceive ponderous season to review such election.
What seems to me to be more compelling to consider, however, is that in apparently endeavoring to do justice certain appellants, We are actually committing injustice or least would be creating occasions that might result unfairness. How are We going to restore the appeals of those parties whom We have told categorically, in dismissing the appeals, that it is immaterial whether their appeals has actually been made on time or not or whether they could meritorious or not? I have lost track of the number of such parties. And are We not dealing unequal protection to appellees who now have to be prepared to prove the correction of the decisions of the respective trial courts in their favor, they expect their motions to dismiss appeals therefrom to acted on favorably, whereas former appellees had to merely point out the deficiency of the record on appeal of failing appear on its face to have been made on time to win their cases irrespective of their merits?
Again, I ask, how can We fairly pass upon the plausibility an appeal before the briefs are filed? And if the arguments on the motion to dismiss the appeal are to be as comprehensive and extensive as those that would be presented in the brief, why don't We make the resolution of an appeal more expeditious by allowing motions to dismiss the same on the ground that it is without sufficient merit? In this regard, note that Section 1 of Rule 50 does not include as ground for the dismissal of an appeal that it is untenable. And the reason is simple — that is precisely the matter to be resolved in the appeal after due hearing.
I realize that by the operation of the rule under discussion, We are practically penalizing parties for the mistake of their lawyers. But is this not true in many other instances resulting from the actual working out of the rules? Truth to tell, however, in appropriate cases, the courts have not been entirely deaf to entreaties on behalf of clients misled or prejudiced by the error of their counsel but in said instances, it was hardly the merits of the client's cause that was the justification for the relieving measures allowed or adopted by the courts; rather it was, As it should be, the setting of circumstances in which the mistake or error of the lawyer came about. Indeed, it is always possible to avoid the fatal consequences of the application of any of the rules of procedure by properly invoking the formula of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. In other words, even the omission of the data required by Section 6 of Rule 41 in the record on appeal could be attributable to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, but surely, no one should expect relief when these circumstances do not obtain.
In the last analysis, the application of the rule, here in question is not technicality in the odious sense of being itself the hindrance to justice. Rather it is one of the expedient means by which the courts may be enabled to have the needed time and opportunity to do justice to everyone coming to them, by not tarrying in the consideration of details which, if the lawyers concerned only took ordinary care to attend to, should not give rise to any problem. The rule in question has been in the books for more than eight years already. There is absolutely no excuse for practicing lawyers to overlook it. And judges of trial courts can help immeasurably in the accomplishment of the sound objectives of said rule were they careful enough to see to it that it is complied with before they approve the record on appeal.
I, therefore, vote to reverse the impugned resolution of the Court of Appeals, without looking into the merits of private respondents' appeal, for, after all, are my brethren ready to give due course to their appeal, if it should really appear to meritorious, in clear violation of Section 1 (a) of Rule 50 and rosary of decisions of this Court construing the same mandatory and jurisdictional? And not to forget a point I has always refused to agree to, if as repeatedly held by this Court the matter is jurisdictional, may appellate jurisdiction conferred by estoppel or laches? Certainly not. Power authority, that is supposed to emanate only from law cannot any alchemy of reasoning be derived from the acts of any party litigant, not even from any act of the court. The want authority being a matter of public policy, no party however situated may be barred from raising it.
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