Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34709 June 15, 1973
CONSUELO B. SISON, petitioner,
vs.
MARINO GATCHALIAN, NATIVIDAD GATCHALIAN, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Romeo R. Bringas, Fortunato Gupit, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Sison for petitioner.
Ricafort & Galang for private respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
Respondent Court of Appeals, in this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, is taken to task for its failure to dismiss an appeal notwithstanding the undeniable fact that the record on appeal does not show on its face that the required steps to elevate it to such court was perfected on time. This is hardly a new question, and it ought not to have added to the workload of this Tribunal. The petition would have been unnecessary for, on the face of the resolution complained of, the motion to dismiss the appeal on the part of petitioner Consuelo B. Sison was denied only because it did appear from the printed record on appeal that it was filed within the reglementary period of thirty days,1after its attention precisely had been called in such motion to the fact that on the face of the typewritten record on appeal, it was undisputed that the filing thereof was five days beyond the last day allowed by law. The challenged motion for reconsideration was denied on January 18, 1972. As far back as March 31, 1971, in Reyes v. Carrasco2 Chief Justice Concepcion made clear: "Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, obviously refers to the record on appeal filed with the trial court, not to the record on appeal printed in the appellate court. At any rate, the Court of Appeals is in a position to determine the date aforementioned, by examining the original record on appeal thereto, forwarded, and, hence, forming part of its own records."3 Petitioner, therefore, must prevail.
As stated in the petition: "The record on appeal filed by the Gatchalians [private respondents] in said case does not show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time; on the contrary, the record on appeal shows that it was filed out of time, because whereas it is alleged therein that copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance was received on March 29, 1971 ... the record on appeal was filed with the Court of First Instance on May 3, 1971 as shown by the stamped receipt on the cover page of the typewritten record on appeal, .... There is no showing in the record on appeal that extension was granted to file the same. It is therefore clear that the record on appeal shows that the appeal was perfected out of time because it appears therein that the record on appeal was not filed within the reglementary period; ...."4 The next paragraph reads: "In view of the said failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time, petitioner filed with the respondent Court a motion to dismiss the appeal, ... Notwithstanding the clear showing that the record on appeal was in fact deficient and that therefore the respondent Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, respondent Court nevertheless denied the motion to dismiss appeal, ..."5With the denial of the motion to dismiss appeal as well as the motion for reconsideration, petitioner had no choice but to bring the matter to us.
Her case thus stands on solid ground. The reason given by respondent Court for not granting the motion to dismiss appeal finds no support in law. The outcome, therefore, is certainly predictable. Petitioner is entitled to the remedy sought.
1. In Marsman v. Syquia,6a 1972 decision, this Court is sustaining a motion to dismiss the appeal7on the ground precisely that the record on appeal does not show on its face that such a step was perfected within the period required by law, and after noting that it was so indeed, referred to Government v. Antonio,8decided in 1965, as supplying the controlling doctrine, which requires literal adherence to Section 6 of Rule 41. The interpretation thus made has been uninterruptedly adhered to up to now. In Marsman, fifteen other decisions were cited applying the above principle.9As pointed out by Justice Castro, who spoke for the Court "These decisions, notable of their number and unanimity, affirm that the requirement of Section 6 of Rule 41 show that the record on appeal must contain 'such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time,' is mandatory and jurisdictional, non compliance with which justifies dismissal of the appeal. The principles underlying the rule have been extensively discussed in the decisions adverted to, so that it would be supererogation to restate them here."10After Marsman came Palanca v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.11Here, in one on the latest opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes before his retirement,, it was 'Stressed: "Since the record on appeal doe not show when the order denying the motion for reconsideration/clarification was received by appellant administrator bank, it cannot be determined, on the face of the record, if the appeal was timely perfected or not."12
This case is particularly worth emphasizing because the only defense, if defense it can be called, of private respondents, shown, in their answer, is that "it is true that on the last day of the original period (April 28, 1971), the typewritten record on appeal was not yet filed. But one day before the deadline, in lieu thereof, were filed (1) the notice of appeal (2) the appeal bond and (3) the motion for extension of time to complete Record on Appeal. Which motion was granted on this same day (April 27, 1971) it was filed. So, the last day to perfect appeal was then, May 12, 1971. As the typewritten record on appeal (the only one remaining of the three requirements of an appeal was filed on May 3, 1971, same was perfected nine (9) days earlier than the last day granted under the extension."13As was emphasized, however, by petitioner in her memorandum in lieu of oral arguments: "In their answer, private respondent have taken great pams to show that their appeal was perfected on time. But this Honorable Court has already held that the actual perfection of the appeal is not material to the question. (See: Government vs. Antonio, Araneta vs. Madrigal, ... Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, ... Marsman vs. Syquia, ...). This is obviously so because the purpose of the requirement is to avoid additional work and unnecessary waste of time in having to examine the evidence that may be submitted by the parties, which would contribute to delay and would consume time badly needed by the appellate courts for more meritorious cases."14
Private respondents thus ignored what was said in Palanca that for such an allegation to merit any consideration, it should be so stated in the record on appeal.ℒαwρhi৷ This was not done by private respondents. They cannot deny that their typewritten record on appeal lack such data. Thus is made clear beyond doubt how formidable is the case for petitioner and why she should prevail.
2. Nor should there be any misgivings that to view the matter thus in accordance with what has been constantly held by this Court is, as alleged by private respondents, to put a premium on technicality. What is readily apparent is that we are not justified in treating his appeal any differently. This is not to deny what was noted by Justice Teehankee in Workmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Augusto.15"For [a party] to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the Rules."16There are no such " strong compelling reasons" that would call for a relaxation of the iron-clad doctrine. The only issue on the merits as was made clear in the reply memorandum of petitioner "is whether or not the private respondents are purchasers in good faith to a square meter portion of a piece of land. [It is petitioner submission that] the overwhelming evidence below is the private respondents knew beforehand about petitioner interest in the 36-square meter portion of the property the private respondents bought. All that private respondents lean on is a bare denial on their part of any knowledge of petitioner's interest."17Then from such reply memorandum came this portion: "Petitioner and private respondents own adjoining back-to-back lots in Kamuning, Quezon City. The private respondents, the Gatchalians purchased their lot from the Bugayongs. When the Gatchalians inspected the property prior to their purchase, they already saw that petitioner's lot, fenced, protruded into the lot that they were going to buy. In fact, the two back to back lots were partitioned by a formidable adobe wall constructed by the petitioner. The protrusion was very evident because the adobe wall was peculiarly not aligned with the other lots to the left and to the right, as it should have been, considering that they were PHHC lots which were a identical in area on the protruding area of 36 square meters, petitioner already had her septic tank, toilet and bath, and part of the kitchen of her residence at the time of the sale to the Gatchalians. The lot of the Bugayongs, consisting of 240 square meters, was originally owned by PHHC. The awardee there was Fortunata Bernabe way back in 1954. Subsequently, in 1958, title to the lot was issued in the name of her daughter Adoracion Bugayong, married to Ricardo Bugayong. But sometime in 1953, Fortunata Bernabe sold a portion of her rights to the petitioner, consisting of 36 square meters of the back portion of her lot. This sale was not registered because the property at that time was still in the name of PHHC."18It turned out that the Bugayongs later sold their property to the private respondents, the Gatchalians "who had full knowledge of the petitioner's interest as to a 36-square meter portion thereof."19Petitioner now referred to the evidence on this point which for her was "more than clear and convincing."20As noted by her: "Adoracion Bugayong, now a school teacher in Mangatarem, Pangasinan, came all the way to Manila to testify for the petitioner. She declared in court that, before the sale to the Gatchalians, she called their attention to the fact that petitioner already owned 36 square meters of their original property, as separated and partitioned by the adobe wall, and that what the Gatchalians were buying was only 204 square meters in area; that the deed of sale in favor of the Gatchalians, covering 240 square meters, was prepared by the latter's lawyer; that she signed emphasizing to the Gatchalians that they should not overlook the interest of the petitioner; and that the Gatchalians agreed to respect petitioner's interest. Even the real estate agent, one Purificacion Mendoza, testified for the petitioner. She narrated at the trial that she was the one who sold the Bugayong property to the Gatchalians, and that she showed to them the adobe partition and the extent of the lot sold, as appearing in a sketch drawn by her ...21
Both petitioner and her mother did declare on the stand that upon such disputed part of the lot being acquired, the same was filled with sand and gravel and the adobe wall was erected. When private respondents acquired by sale the adjoining lot, she specifically inquired if the latter knew that such portion had previously been bought by petitioner, whose reply memorandum continues: "The adobe wall was even repaired later on with the supervisory assistance of the Gatchalians because the petitioner and her mother had to tend to their store. One time, the petitioner requested her mother to go to the Gatchalian residence to arrange for the transfer of the 36-square meter area. She talked with the Gatchalians, who were amenable. She even obtained from them on a piece of paper their complete names, residence certificate numbers, places and dates of issue, their places of birth, the title number of the property and the document number of the deed of sale. Thereafter, petitioner's brother, Atty. Reynaldo B. Sison, prepared a Ratification of the Deed of Sale ..., which petitioner's mother brought back to the Gatchalians for their signatures. The latter, however. requested that the document be left with them first so that they can show it to their relatives. When petitioner's mother returned, the Gatchalian said that they were no longer going to sign. Thus, petitioner's brother sent a letter of demand, which was heeded petitioner filed an adverse claim with the Register Deeds and the suit below."22From private respondent according to such pleading of petitioner, there was nothing but merely and incredible bare denial of knowledge by respondent, Marino Gatchalian, who, however, admitted that he observed that the adobe wall was not along the same line as other lots."23
Petitioner's reply memorandum was filed with this Court October 6, 1972. It was the turn then of private respondent come up with their reply memorandum. They did so on October 24, 1972. What is immediately noticeable, even after such lapse of 18 days, is that there was no rebuttal, much less a denial the above recital of facts as set forth by petitioner. There is no occasion then for the invocation of the exception mentioned the Workmen's Insurance Company decision as to service to ends of justice and prevention of a grave miscarriage there sufficing to take a case out of the operation of the general rule. No wonder, private respondents were not even minded to do so.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals of December 2, 1971, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal well as its resolution of January 18, 1972, denying a motion reconsideration are nullified, set aside and, declared of no force and effect. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of Appeals is restrained from taking a further action on the appeal interposed in CA-G.R. No. 48883-R, entitled Consuelo B. Sizon v. Marino Gatchalian Natividad Gatchalian, which is hereby dismissed. With costs against private respondents.
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex D.
2 L-28783, 38 SCRA 296.
3 Ibid, 318.
4 Petition, par. 5, Emphasis supplied by petitioner.
5 Ibid, par. 6.
6 L-28027, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 113.
7 The appeal here was taken at a time when such competence was lodged with this Tribunal when such a remedy was available to the losing party if a question of law were raised.
8 L-23736, October 19, 1965, 15 SCRA 119.
9 Cf. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, L-26387, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 113; Araneta v. Madrigal & Co., L-26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966, 18 SCRA 446; Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. Progressive Labor Assn., L-27125, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 110; Jocson v. Robles, L-23433, Feb. 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 521; Anota v. Bermudo, L-29417, Sept. 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 53; Cadiz v. Secretary of National Defense, L-25150, Sept. 30, 1968, 25 SCRA 419; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals, L-27746, July 31, 1970 34 SCRA 73; Industrial Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 423; Valeta v. Court of Appeals, L-29416, Jan. 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 80; Reyes v. Carrasco, L-28783, March 31, 1971, SCRA 296; Workmen's Insurance Co. v. Augusto L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123; De Guia v. Court of Appeals, L-33101, July 30, 1971,'40 SCRA 332; Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, L-26938, Oct. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 79; Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, L-28722, Oct. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 97.
10 L-28027, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 113, 117.
11 L-28713, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 331.
12 Ibid, 335.
13 Answer of Private Respondents, 4.
14 Memorandum in Lieu of Oral Argument for the Petitioner, 8.
15 L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123.
16 Ibid, 127.
17 Reply Memorandum for the Petitioner, 4.
18 Ibid, 4 and 5.
19 Ibid, 6.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 6 and 7.
22 Ibid, 7 and 8.
23 Ibid, 8.
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