Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26112 April 11, 1972
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN CAUNCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR, FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA and BLAS BASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JAIME DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas; AYALA Y CIA AND/OR HACIENDA CALATAGAN and ALFONSO ZOBEL, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
VILLAMOR, J.:
Before us for resolution are the motions for reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. thru Counsellors Bautista, Angelo, Tolentino, Antonio, Lopez and Assosociates, and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration filed by said petitioner thru Counsellors Paredes, Poblador, Nazareno, Azada and Tomacruz.
At the outset, it must be stressed that this proceeding constitutes a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus involving the issue of whether or not the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch III, of February 2, 1966, quashing the writ of execution issued on December 27, 1965, on the ground that nowhere in the decision of the Court a quo of June 2, 1962, in Civil Case No. 373 or in the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950 is there any pronouncement that defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan, and/or Alfonso Zobel have been found to be possessors in bad faith and, therefore, liable for the payment of compensatory damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., is correct. It is the considered opinion of this Court that any issue which is not within the sphere or scope of a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, i.e., any issue which seeks to delve into the merits of the aforesaid Civil Case No. 373 or the correctness of the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the Court a quo in the said case, may no longer be entertained by this Court, the judgment therein having become final after the expiration of the reglementary period from the promulgation of our decision in case G.R. No. L-20950.
It is the contention of the petitioners that our resolution of October 4, 1971, has set aside a judgment of the Court a quo in the said Civil Case No. 373 as modified by our decision in G.R. No. L-20950, which had long become final and executory. This is not true. If ever the petitioners have impressed upon themselves the notion that such is the case, it must have been due to the fact that they, particularly petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., have sought to inject so many extraneous matters into this special civil action. Of course, our having taken extra effort in our resolution of October 4, 1971, to refer back to the jurisprudence squarely applicable, and the factual background of the case, source of this special civil action, in order that the process whereby the consensus of opinion in the said resolution was arrived at can be better understood, may have helped in having this special civil action become apparently open to the injection of issues which are not proper in this proceeding. We, therefore, stress the fact that our resolution of October 4, 1971, does not in any way set aside or reopen the already final judgment of the Court a quo in the said Civil Case No. 373, as modified by our decision in G.R. No. L-20950. The resolution of October 4, 1971, merely clarifies the ambiguity and settles the question once and for all of whether or not the private respondents in this special civil action may be considered as included in the award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., as contained in subparagraph (c) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court a quo in the said Civil Case No. 373. And as stated on page 4 of said resolution of October 4, 1971, it has all along been the impression of the parties in the said Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo that the private respondents in this special civil action were not so included. This observation finds particular application to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., when he filed a motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. L-20950 on May 31, 1965, wherein he insisted, after our decision therein absolved the Dizons from liability for compensatory damages to him, that all the defendants be declared possessors in bad faith and liable for such compensatory damages. The said motion for reconsideration having been denied by this Court in the same case, it is obvious that the private respondents herein, co-defendants in the said case, G.R. No. L-20950, were considered by us as not liable for compensatory damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.
We have studied meticulously the said motions for reconsideration of the petitioners, including that filed by the Solicitor General which, properly speaking, has no place in this special civil action since it is only the interest (for damages) of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., which is in issue in this case. While it is not far-fetched to say that the said motion for reconsideration is merely a reproduction, with recastings here and there, of the dissenting opinions to the majority resolution of October 4, 1971, suffice it to say that in all the four (4) years from the date of the decision in this case, or June 30, 1967, up to the time of the promulgation of our resolution of October 4, 1971, this Court has been studying and deliberating upon the issues involved in this special civil action; it can be safely said that we have made a very thorough and painstaking study of all the issues of this case, as well as the aspects and legal implications of our resolution of October 4, 1971. We find untenable the arguments of the petitioners that there is nothing ambiguous in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 373. We have construed the phrase "all the defendants" in sub-paragraph (c) of the judgment of the Court a quo to refer merely to the Dizons who were the only ones mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraph (b) of the same judgment of the Court a quo. In brief, our resolution of October 4, 1971, does not in any manner disturb the decision or judgment of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 373. What was in issue in this special civil action was merely the interpretation or construction of the dispositive portion thereof which was explained in our resolution of October 4, 1971. The alleged erroneous conclusions of fact and of law which did not and do not impress us, are likewise fully discussed in the same resolution.
With respect to the contention of the petitioners that our resolution of October 4, 1971, controverts the findings, as to the private respondents herein, in Civil Case No. 373 and G.R. No. L-20950, and reverses the clear and explicit pronouncement against them for damages, suffice it to say that a minute examination of the Record on Appeal in G.R. No. L-20950, particularly the decision of the Court a quo contained therein, does not support the contention that there were such findings. Neither is there any such finding in our decision in G.R. No. L-20950. We, therefore find the contention that our resolution of October 4, 1971 reversed the clear and explicit pronouncement against the private respondents herein for compensatory damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., as absolutely devoid of merit. Further, it is error to say that our resolution of October 4, 1971, "leaves in shambles the said basic decision which has long been final and executory since entry of this Court's judgment in SC-G.R. No. L-20950 on December 11, 1965". This is so for the simple reason, as aforestated, that our resolution of October 4, 1971, does not disturb the said decision in G.R. No. L-20950 but merely clarifies the judgment of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 as modified by our decision in the same case G.R. No. L-20950.
Petitioners would now have us reconsider our resolution of October 4, 1971, "in order to serve as a lesson against usurpations of the public domain as well as simulation of sales thereof by the original usurper by not exempting the latter from responsibility for damages which would not have been sustained if it were not for the irregularities committed by him ... ." Petitioners' contention is not within the sphere or scope of the instant special civil action.
With respect to the alleged ground of fraud, this has been adequately discussed in our resolution of October 4, 1971. Suffice it to say, however, that even if the act of the private respondents herein of preparing a composite plan which included part of the navigable portions of the public domain and causing these areas to be titled in their names may be considered a tortious act, nevertheless, there is still lacking the juridical tie or vinculum juris between them and petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. In other words, for one to obtain damages against another, he must show that he is clearly and unequivocably entitled to them as against the latter. This, petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., had failed to prove before the Court a quo as shown in the discussion in our resolution of October 4, 1971, with respect to the elements of a cause of action. In fact, the records of Civil Case No. 373 showed that he did not even testify. The case of Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 7, basis of the decision of the Court a quo in its award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. from the date of the filing of his fishpond lease application on March 11, 1954 (page 254, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950), is, in fact, applicable against the latter. In that case, we rule that for an applicant of public land to be entitled to damages as against an adverse occupant, the former must have had prior possession and prior bona-fide occupancy, and that the latter was the one who ousted him from such prior possession. In Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo, however, petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. was never in possession.
Moreover, we take judicial cognizance of the fact that in all fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, there is the condition that such permit does not authorized the permittee to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or occupancy within the areas granted to him until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had and obligation contained or until such claim shall have been legally extinguished. It was, therefore, error to consider Miguel Tolentino Sr. entitled to compensatory damages from the date of the filing of his fishpond application on March 11, 1954, since the claim and occupancy of the Dizons of Lot 360, Psd-40891, had not been legally extinguished. But this is already going to the merits of Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo, which, as previously pointed out, are improper to touch upon in this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
In brief, nothing said here and in Our resolution of October 4, 1971, is meant to modify, much less overrule, the time-honored doctrine that a final and executory judgment may not be substantially amended or altered,ℒαwρhi৷ save and except as permitted in unquestioned jurisprudence already existing before Our resolution, such as, Locsin v. Paredes, 63 Phil. 87, and other cases cited in Our resolution. Likewise, it should be evident that whatever We have said about the possible claims of Petitioner Tolentino against the Republic for damages for its failure to place him in possession of lands leased to him are intended to be mere academic discussions, simply because with the finality of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, all such claims are now foreclosed, hence the improbability of the Republic being liable to any of the parties under any conceivable situation.
At this juncture, it seems necessary to clarify a point, which surprisingly is not raised in the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor General, limited as it is to invoking or reiterating the arguments advanced in the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Teehankee justifying the award, not to the government but to petitioner Tolentino, namely, the effect of the resolution of October 4, 1971, upon the refusal of the court a quo to issue, per its order of February 8, 1966, the writ of execution prayed for by the Republic for the implementation of paragraph (a) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision of June 2, 1962 in Civil Case No. 373, the said resolution having denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus unqualifiedly. It is suggested in the motions for reconsideration of petitioner Tolentino that such denial leaves the government practically with an empty victory, since it looks as if respondent judge is determined not to give full effect to the annulment of the titles referred to in the aforementioned paragraph (a) of Judge Tengco's judgment. In fact, the same apprehensive suggestion may be gleaned from the "Reply to Opposition" dated January 31, 1972 of petitioner Tolentino wherein the attention of this Court is invited to a subsequent order of respondent Judge of October 27, 1970 denying the motion filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas praying for authority to conduct a resurvey of the lands herein in question preparatory to implementing the same paragraph of Judge Tengco's judgment already referred to.
We do not believe there is real ground for such fear, no matter how apparent it does appear that private respondents are very cautious in seeing to it that the implementation of Judge Tengco's judgment does not go beyond what they feel it warrants or contemplates. Examined objectively and overlooking their infelicitous phraseology, We cannot discern from the orders in question any repudiation by Judge de los Angeles of the declaration of nullity not only of TCT 9550, covering lots 360, 362, 363, and 182, but also of "other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722 ... which are hereby reverted to public dominion" per Judge Tengco's decision. Surely, no one can deduce such a repudiation from the positive holding in the order of February 8, 1966 that "there is no need of issuing a writ of execution because the declaration of nullity in itself is already executory." One might perhaps question the legal correctness of such proposition, but it is clear to Us that there is here a reaffirmation rather than a denial of the rights of the Government in the premises, albeit His Honor could be mistaken in his view that it would be only after private respondents and Dizon have refused or failed to surrender their titles for cancellation that "resort" to the court would be proper. And with respect to the holding in said order that "it is clear that the Dizons being purchasers in good faith have the right to retain possession of all the lots covered by TCT No. 9550 ...", it is obvious that such was the judgment of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, and it would have been a manifest error of His Honor had he ruled otherwise. It is thus clear that even after the issuance of the order of February 8, 1966, nothing adverse to the government or the Republic was being done by anyone that was not expressly authorized by the final and executory decision of this Court.
Coming now to the order of October 27, 1970, which, incidentally, was never brought to the attention of this Court before October 4, 1971, We cannot see how the same can be cause for apprehension on the part of the Republic because as We read the same, it does not actually deny the right of the government to a resurvey; rather, it simply held basically that "it is only wise, prudent and proper not to give due course to the instant motion (to resurvey) which ... is tantamount to giving due course to a motion for execution even before the Supreme Court had ruled on the matter" of whether or not to grant the mandamus ordering the court "to execute the final decision in Civil Case 373." And having declared itself without authority to act in the meanwhile, it stands to reason that anything else it might have said in the order which could be interpreted as adversely affecting the government's position in any respect would be of no consequence, the same being pure obiter dictum.
Upon these premises, We hold that even if the prayer for certiorari and mandamus in the basic petition herein is denied, still it is clear that what this Court is disposing of in the present case does not affect at all the interests of the Republic but only those of Intervenor Tolentino in relation to the lower court's orders of January 18, 1966, February 2, 1966 and April 13, 1966. As already explained, the order of February 8, 1966 does not constitute a denial of the right of the Republic to the cancellation of the titles nullified by the decision of Judge Tengco affirmed by this Court. Indeed, the respondent Judge expressly made the reservation for the Republic to "resort" to the court should private respondents refuse or fail to have their titles cancelled. Incidentally, even the order of October 27, 1970 about the resurvey merely held the remedy to be premature until the decision in this case has become final. Of course, it is understood that in such eventuality, the resurvey requested by the Provincial Fiscal would be in order and as soon as the same is completed the proper writ of execution for the delivery of possession of the portions found to be public land should issue.
WHEREFORE, and with the clarification aforemade of the rights of the Republic, the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of petitioner Tolentino are denied for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor General, which is no more than a duplication of Petitioner Tolentino's motions in support of his private claim for damages, is likewise denied.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
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