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G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971,
♦ Decision, Villamor, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Barredo, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Concepcion, [CJ]

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26112 October 4, 1971

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN CAUNCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR, FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA and BLAS BASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JAIME DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas; AYALA Y CIA. AND/OR HACIENDA CALATAGAN and ALFONSO ZOBEL, respondents.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I fully concur in the mastery and comprehensive dissent of the Chief Justice. I fear that the majority resolution, which in effect reviews and overturns the long, final and executory judgment of this Court in Case L-20950, May 31, 1965, has so far departed from the well nigh universal doctrines and principles of finality of judgments and law of the case extensively discussed in the Chief Justice's dissent — without specifically defining the factors and elements that would exempt the case at bar therefrom or at least synthesizing why it is an exception — that I must unburden myself of the following observations:

1. To begin with, there is no question that the lower Court's decision affirmed by the Court in Case L-20950, May 31, 1965, and sought to be executed in this proceeding has long become final and executory, judgment having been entered since December 11, 1965. Upon petition filed in this case on May 27, 1966, the Court issued on June 30, 1967 its decision herein, directing respondent judge to order the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision affirmed in Case L-20950. The Court in its Resolution of September 13, 1967 denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of August 3, 1967 "because the points stressed therein are dependent upon a question settled by a former judgment that is admittedly final and executory."

Upon consideration of respondents' second motion for reconsideration of September 19, 1967 and supplemental second motion for reconsideration of September 22, 1967 and other pertinent pleadings subsequently filed by the parties, the majority resolution would now set aside the decision of June 30, 1967 rendered in this case and dismiss the herein petition, by the simple expedient of holding belatedly and tenuously that "since the torrens titles of the Dizons served to shield them against any stigma of bad faith (in Case L-20950), the same legal rule must obtain as respects any imputation of bad faith against the private respondents herein. ln other words, there is no reason why the reliance of the Dizons upon the indefeasibility of their torrens titles should vary in its effect from the reliance of Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonzo Zobel, or, for that matter, of any other person upon theirs."1

The Court's decision in said Case L-20950 is bereft of anything that would warrant this imputation or conclusion of the majority resolution. On the contrary, said respondents' titling of an estimated 2,500 hectares of the public domain, including over 400 hectares of the beach, foreshore and territorial sea, which was declared null and void in the decision, negates any such imputation and conclusion. Specifically, the Court, citing the antecedent 1956 case of Dizon vs. Bayona,2 found in said Case L-20950 that "In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued inthe names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshare or the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion."3

If we were to go by the expressly cited case of Dizon vs. Bayona involving exactly the same Dizons purchasers from Ayala y Cia and/or Alfonso Zobel and occupants up to now of the illegally titled lots of the public domain duly leased by the Government to, but wrongfully withheld from, petitioner Tolentino) the Dizons could not be deemed as "purchasers in good faith." As far back as 1956 when the Dizons were contesting the Government's grant of the fishpond permits over the same lots to Tolentino on the ground that they had purchased the same from Ayala Cia. which had wrongfully titled the same, the committee named by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the purpose had after due investigation with notice found that "the land where these fishponds were located was ... part of the public domain."4

This Court had then already put on notice the Dizons and herein respondents that their titles derived from Ayala y Cia. were null and void, since they covered non-alienable and non-registrable land of the public domain, thus: "But even if they should succeed in showing that their Torrens certificates of title describe parcels of land which are comprised within the area of the tract of land known as Hacienda Calatagan, owned by and registered in the name of Ayala y Cia., as evidenced by Torrens transfer certificate of title No. 722, still if said lots Nos. 1 and 49 of subdivision plan Psd-27941 are really part of the sea, beach, or foreshore, the same can not be registered under the Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) in the name of anyone, for they are not registrable are non-alienable and belong to the public domain to be administered and managedby the State for the benefit of the people."5

In the April 1965 cases of Dizon vs. Rodriguez, Nos L-20300-01 and 20355-56, April 30, 1965, likewise expressly cited by the Court in Case L-20950, which involved exactly similar circumstances as the present case except that the Dizons were the ones who initiated the judicial action (and failed) to confirm their possession of the lands therein in question (derived from the illegally secured, titles of herein respondents covering navigable waters of Pagaspas Bay) 5a the Court emphasized to the Dizons and herein respondents that "It is an elementary principle that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land thus covered is not capable Of registration."

But since the Court had found in Case L-20950, however erroneously and contrary to the cited notice of the nullity of their titles given since 1956 to the Dizons and herein respondents in Dizon vs. Bayona, that "there (was) no showing that defendants Dizon are not purchasers in good faith and "that assuch possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties account of their possession of the property," such final finding in favor of the Dizons is already beyond revision, modification or correction even by this Court.

By the same token, and a fortiori, it is respectfully submitted that the corollary imputation and finding of bad faith correctly made in the same Case L-20950 against herein respondents as the source of the Dizons' void titles — which then sentenced herein respondents exclusively to pay Tolentino the awarded compensatory damages of P3,000.00 yearly per hectare wrongfully withheld from him — is beyond revision or modification even by this Court. This Court expressly confirmed the lower court's factual finding that "certain areas original portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company (herein respondent Ayala y Cia.) to third persons (the Dizons, among them)"6 when it wrongfully expanded by magnetic survey the boundaries of its original title to Hacienda Calatagan to include the non-alienable and non-registrable portions of the foreshore of the territorial waters."7

It defies logic for respondents to now claim that as the very source of the void and illegal titles of the Dizons to non-registrable lands of the public domain and portions of the teritorial waters, they should be shielded from the liability for damages attributible to their wrongful act of selling without right such property to the Dizons, simply because the Dizons were held to be shielded from such liability precisely because they (the Dizons) depended allegedly in good faith on on the conveyance to them by respondents. No one, such as respondents, who wrongfully secures title to patently non-registrable and non-alienable and clearly visible portions of the public domain, such as the sea, beach and foreshore, notwithstanding due notice and admonition given by the government authorities, (supra, Dizon vs. Bayona) can possibly claim to have obtained such illegal title, or to have disposed of it, in good faith.

2. The majority resolution would thus overturn the final and executory decision affirmed in Case L-20950, notwithstanding the clear and categorical judgment, as set forth in its dispositive part, expressly sentencing the respondents herein to jointly and severally pay petitioner Miguel Tolentino the compensatory damages therein awarded. Yet, it is acknowledged that it is not "legally permissible" at this late stage to "attempt in any way to alter or modify the basic decision in Case L-20950 and that "reopening the main case. . . cannot be legally done anymore."8 I submit that if the basic decision in Case L-20950 concededly cannot be altered or modified directly in the same case, neither may such alteration or modification be done indirectly in the case at bar, as, the majority resolution would do, by reading into the said decision something that is not there, i.e. its holding now "that the modification of the lower court's decision has the effect to absolving not only the Dizons but also that other defendants, Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel,"9 from the joint and solidary liability for damages to Tolentino imposed upon them by the trial court.

3. Even respondents themselves did not read it this way. In fact, they expressly discarded such contention. In their motion of January 8, 1966 to quash the execution writ originally issued by respondent judge, as well as in their answer to the petition at bar, respondents contended that "the extinction of the Dizons' liability carried with it the extinction of the liability of Ayala and Zobel, because of their joint and several nature." And when this was rejected in the decision at bar as "absolutely devoid of merit," respondents, in their first Motion for Reconsideration of August 3, 1967 expressly abided by the Court's rejection of such a reading of the basic decision in Case L-20950 and manifested that "we do not now insist upon (it)."

4. All the other arguments of respondents as to the unfairness, ambiguity, injustice and inequity of the basic decision in Case L-20950 expressly ordering all of them, the Dizons excepted, to jointly and severally pay Tolentino the awarded damages were rejected in the Court's Resolution of September 13, 1967 as already barred by said decision, which had admittedly become final and executory since entry thereof on December 11, 1965. Indeed, if there were such ambiguity or unfairness in the judgment, notwithstanding its express terms, respondents' plight, to paraphrase Edwards vs. Arce, 10 can only be attributed to themselves or their counsel, for they should have filed the corresponding motion to have the Court remove such alleged ambiguity or unfairness but failed to take such action and allowed the judgment to become final and executory. Said judgment is now res adjudicata and it is too late now to seek classification of the alleged ambiguity or relief from the alleged unfairness, much less in an ancillary proceeding of mandamus such as the case at bar to enforce execution of the judgment, long final and executory since 1965. This is equally true of the alleged lack of definite bases in fact and in law as to the conclusion and controlling part of the decision, affirming the trial court's judgment sentencing all the defendants to pay Tolentino the awarded damages, but modifying it by excluding the Dizons from liability. The time to raise such question of alleged failure of the trial judge's decision to comply with the Constitutional mandate was when the main case was still before the Court and before it became res adjudicata.

5. What is worse is that all these arguments of respondents to the effect that "neither the judgment of the trial court nor that of this Court (in case L-20950) ... adjudged them liable for the damages claimed by Tolentino" would now at this late stage be accepted by the majority, which would now hold that "taking all pertinent circumstances into account and giving due regard to all considerations, both legal and equitable, the decision of this Court of May 31, 1965 in G.R. No. L-20950 may not be construed or understood as holding respondents Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel liable for the damages claimed by petitioner Miguel Tolentino." To do this, the simple phrase "all the defendants" in paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of said judgment, sentencing all the defendants to pay Tolentino the awarded damages, is dissected and by means of analyzing the phraseology and punctuations used, the conclusions are reached that it is "untenable" that the phrase necessarily includes the defendants Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel; that "there is looseness in Judge Tengco's language that creates room for uncertainty as to the exact import of the judgment"; that the phrase "suffers from latent ambiguity literally," and this Court's decision, affirming Judge Tengco's decision and excluding the Dizons from liability would appear to be vague and even incomplete.11 I submit that there is no valid warrant for discarding the clear, inequivocal and express import of the simple phrase "all the defendants."

The most incontrovertible proof that thejudgment affirmed by this Court in said Case L-20950 expressly adjudged the respondents liable for the damages claimed by Tolentino and that respondents themselves so understood it is found in the very brief of the respondents Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel as defendants-appellants therein. 12 In their said appellants' brief, respondents expressly made the following Fourth Assignment of Error and representations against Judge Tengco's decision.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ALL THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY COMPENSATORY DAMAGES TO INTERVENOR MIGUEL TOLENTINO, AS WELL AS THE COSTS OF SUIT.

In its decision subject of this appeal, the lower court ordered all of the herein defendants jointly and severally to pay Miguel Tolentino `compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area. (p. 260, R. on A.) The lower court stated in this connection:

... To the mind of the Court, insofar as this Lot 360 is concerned, the Dizons began possessing in bad faith from the time that they became aware of a defect in their title or mode of acquisition (Art. 526 of the Civil Code, Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). This was on March 11, 1954, when the Director of Fisheries dismissed their protest to the fishpond application of Tolentino on the ground that the fishpond was outside the boundaries of Hacienda de Calatagan and a part of the territorial sea. As such possessor, they are liable for the fruits received as well as those which the lawful possessors would have received pursuant to Article 54 (should be 549) of the Civil Code. From the time this complaint has been filed up to the present, it has been admitted that the defendants Dizons are in possession of the portion of the sea denominated as Lot 360 of Psd-40891. Evidence shows that the fruits that could be received were P1,000.00 per hectare of milkfish or bañgos and P2,000.00 per hectare for shrimps, crabs and other fishes. Intervenor Tolentino should therefore be awarded damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession of the fishpond in Lot 360' (pp. 258-359, R. on A.)" 13

Respondents in their said appellants' brief then proceeded to give five reasons and arguments "why the ruling of the lower court on this point is erroneous," to wit: —

(1) The finding of damages at the rate of P3,000.00 per hectare was based on Mercado's testimony, as against Tolentino's testimony who claimed damages at P4,000.00 per hectare, and Mercado's, testimony cannot be used as a safe basis for measuring Tolentino's damages;

(2) Tolentino's testimony on the matter of investment was incredible;

(3) The damages are being awarded to Tolentino and not to the Republic of the Philippines;

(4) "The incontrovertible evidence is to the effect that the Hacienda de Calatagan was brought under the operation of the Torrens system since 1909. When defendants Dizons leased lots 360, 362, 363 and 192 from Alfonso Zobel in February, 1949, said Hacienda was already the subject of a resurvey under the true azimuth system, and plan Psd-27458 was approved by the Bureau of Lands. Since them said defendants proceeded to convert these lands, into fishponds at no small expense until it was finished in 1953. (t.s.n., p. 43, Sept. 21, 1961). When the defendants Dizons purchased those lots on September 3, 1954, they were already the subject of a subdivision survey. Considering these circumstances, the defendants had every right to believe that they hold an indefeasible title to the lots in question." 14

(5) "It Will be noted from the decision of the lower court that the alleged damages are awarded to Miguel Tolentino as lessee but not to the government as lessor of the fishponds instructed by defendants Dizons. This is a plain error.

... It is clear from this that the lessee's (Tolentino's) right of action for damages, if any, arising from the failure to occupy the premises, should be directed against the lessor (government) but not against third persons. 15

And taking up the cudgels for the Dizons, since they were liable as the source and vendor of the Dizons' titles declared to be null and void, respondents submitted the following alternative prayer in favor of the Dizons in their brief:

WHEREFORE, defendants-appellants respectfully pray that the lower court's Decision dated June 2, 1962 in the above-entitled case be reversed in toto with costs against Miguel Tolentino. In the remote event that the lands in question will be held as parts of the public domain, it is respectfully prayed that defendants Dizons be declared entitled to reimbursement by Miguel Tolentino for all their necessary expenses, plus 6% per annum as interests thereon from the time the judgment herein becomes final until full payment thereof, and that they be allowed to retain the lots in question until they have been finally reimbursed therefor.

Manila, October 2, 1963.16

Be it noted that in their alternative prayer in the event of affirmance or non-reversal of the lower court's decision adjudging them liable for damages, respondents merely prayed for modification of the decision in favor only of the Dizons, viz. that the Dizons be declared entitled to reimbursement for all necessary expensesfrom Tolentino with right of retention until such reimbursement. Such modification was precisely granted by this Court, which further excluded from liability for the awarded damages the Dizons as alleged purchasers in good faith from respondents of the foreshore lots illegally titled by respondents.

It is patent that respondents acknowledged thereby thatif the award of damages against all the defendants in the decision was to be affirmed, as in fact this Court so affirmed it, exempting the Dizons, respondents, as the vendors and source of the lot illegally titled, were in law liable and answerable for such damages.

There is no basis for holding, as the majority resolution does, that the final and executory decision in Case L-20950 suffers from "obvious injustice and inequity," for "so long as reimbursement is not made to them, they (the Dizons will retain their right of possession. On the other hand, the private respondents in this special civil action will continue to be liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. for about P90,000.00 a year."17 As the records of the case at bar plainly show, petitioners, particularly Tolentino, immediately after the rendition of the judgment in Case L-20950, affirming that of the lower court but granting the modification in favor of the Dizons of allowing them the right of retention until reimbursement as prayed for by herein respondents themselves, had sought execution of the judgment as thus modified, to the extent of instituting the present mandamus proceedings, where judgment was promulgated in their favor over four years ago on June 30, 1967. All the delay in the execution of the judgment had been caused solely by respondents resistance to and refusal to abide by the express terms of the final judgment, even as affirmed by this court with the very modification alternatively sought and obtained by themselves.

6. When Case L-20950 was heard on appeal, therefore, respondents made then none of their present claims Judge Tengco's decision, did not adjudge them liable for damages to Tolentino or that the decision was vague or ambiguous or that it was unjust and inequitable, for "there is nothing in the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the decision of the lower court in the said Civil Case No. 373 which could form the basis for an award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against the private respondents in this special civil action." 18 They expressly assigned as error such judgment for damages against them and disputed Tolentino's factual and legal right thereto.

But as stated in the preceding paragraph respondents acknowledged, for they never questioned in their fourth assignment of error or prayer in their brief above quoted that in the event of affirmance of Judge Tengco's judgment against them for damages, there was factual and legal basis therefore in that they were the vendors and source of the illegally titled foreshore lots. More, respondents expressly pinpointed in their brief the actual factual and legal bases stated in Judge Tengco's decision for so holding them liable for damages, specifically, "the fishpond (sold by them to the Dizons) was outsideboundaries of Hacienda de Calatagan and a part of the teritorial sea." (supra, paragraph 5).

How can respondents then now come before this same Court and present the sham argument that they were not adjudged liable for the damages awarded to Tolentino in Judge Tengco's judgment, affirmed by this Court in Case L-20950, which is now res adjudicata? Or pretend that such judgment is susceptible of two connicting interpretations? And how can respondents claim now that "the modification of the lower court's decision has the effect of absolving not only the Dizons but also the other defendants, Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel,"19 when, as pointed out in paragraph 3 of this opinion, they had in their first motion for reconsideration expressly accepted and abided by the ruling in this Court's decision that their argument of extinguishment of their liability with the extinction of the Dizon's liability was "absolutely devoid of merit?"

All these arguments of respondents, in the face of the incontrovertible fact of record that respondents clearly and unqualifiedly understood that Judge Tengco's judgment held them liable for the damages awarded to Tolentino cannot but be denounced to be just as sham and captious as their manifestations and prayer in their motion is for reconsideration (first and second) "that the judgment at bar be set aside insofar as it orders respondents Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel, jointly and severally, to pay Miguel Tolentino the sum of P3,000.00 per hectare per year for 29.8639 hectares of Lot No. 360 from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession thereof." This is a transparent attempt to go around the barrier of the former judgment against them, for residents well know that it is not the judgment at bar but the former judgment in Case L-20950 affirming Judge Tengco's decision that so holds them liable to Tolentino for said damages, and that said former judgment long became res adjudicata since 1965 and is concededly beyond setting aside or reopening in this or any other proceeding. (Supra par. 2 hereof).

It is therefore regretfully stated, with due respect, that it fails comprehension how the resolution of the majority (only one of whom took part in the promulgation of the Court's decision of May 31, 1965 in Case L-20950) can, in the light of the foregoing and assuming that this Court had the power, now speculate that "it was never in the mind nor in the contemplation of this Court that the private respondents in this case were also considered by the court a quo as liable for the compensatory damage in question to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., for the simple reason that it was only the Dizons, as previously stated above, who were in possession and were the regained owners of Lot 360, Psd-40891 of the Batangas Cadastre, at the time petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. filed his fishpond lease application on March 11, 1954, the date when his cause of action accrued." 20

]7. Respondents in their second and supplemental second motions for reconsideration raised no new grounds or special circumstances arising after the finality of the basic decision in L-20950 and not available at the time of the filing of their first motion for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 37, section 4 and Rule 15, section 8 ofthe Rules of Court. These self-name arguments had already been advanced in their answer and their first motion for reconsideration and rejected by the Court in its decision in the case at bar and its Resolution of September 13, 1967. The pending motions reiterating the same rejected contentions were correctly assailed by Tolentino in his pleading of September 5, 1968 as pro forma motions which deserved no further consideration, in accordance with the Court's hitherto consistent stand against multiplicity of motions.

8. The respondent judge refused to execute any portion of the final decision affirmed in Case L-20950, particularly paragraph (a) of the dispositive part or judgment declaring as null and void Ayala's T.C.T. No. T-9550 and other subdivision titles, which were reverted to public dominion. This part of the judgment was affirmed without any modification and not even the respondents raise any question of ambiguity about it. As a matter of fact, respondents first and second motions for reconsideration seek only the reconsideration of the decision at bar insofar as the awarded damages of Tolentino are concerned. As stated by the State on pp. 12-13 of the petition. "Indeed, it seems that the trial judge is bent on making things difficult for the plaintiff and intervenor. ... All that (he) has to do is to issue an order addressed to the Register of Deeds of Batangas directing him to cancel the title in question pursuant to said paragraph of the final and executory decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas." Yet, the majority resolution would sustain even this unjustified refusal of respondent judge and without any given reason, entirely set aside the decision at bar and deny the petition, notwithstanding the clear ministerial duty on the part of respondent judge to execute this undisputed of the judgment.

9. The majority resolution totally setting aside the Court's decision at bar of June 30, 1967 which merely granted the original and ancillary petition for mandamus filed with us the issuance of a writ of execution of respondent court's basic decision of June 2, 1962, as affirmed with modification in the Court's decision of May 11, 1965 in Case L-20950, leaves in shambles the said basic decision which has been long final and executory since entry of our judgment in said Case L-20950 on December 11, 1965.

As shown above, (supra, paragraph 5) the Court's modification of respondent court's basic decision of June 2, 1962 reserved the Dizons' right to retention of the property (Lot 360) until they are reimmbursed of their necessary expenses thereon and excluded them from the award of damages to Tolentino. Such modification was made precisely at respondents' instance and insistence in their appellants' brief in Case L-20950, where they submitted the alternative prayer, not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the Dizons, that should the lands be held, as actually they were held, to be parts of the inalienable public domain "that defendants Dizons be declared entitled to reimbursement by Miguel Tolentino for all their necessary expenses . . . and that they be allowed to retain the lots in question until they have been fully reimbursed therefore." Clearly, in such event, since respondents, as vendors and source of the lots illegally titled, remained as the parties liable to pay the damages awarded to Tolentino, the latter in turn would out of such damages reimburse the Dizons' necessary expenses and effect thier saurrender of the property.

But now with the majority resolution setting aside the foregoing antecedents of record and exempting respondents Ayala, et al., from their final judgment liability for such damages, there is no longer any one bound to reimburse the Dizons for their expenses. The Dizons to all intents and purposes may now retain for all time the property, notwithstanding that in the Court's very decision in said Case L-20950, it expressly found that the subject lots were "portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters" and affirmed respondent court's judgment "ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion."

10. The decision at bar expressly reminded the respondent judge that it was his ministerial duty to order the issuance of the writ of execution, even if he entertained the doubts pointed out in his questioned orders. It is indisputable doctrine, grounded on public policy and sound practice that there must be a point of finality to judicial controversies, so that not even this Court can revise much less reverse, its final decisions. In pursuance thereof, the equally indisputable doctrine has been evolved that the judgment or decree, as distinguished from the body of the opinion, is set out in the dispositive part of the decision and prevails over the opinion. So once final judgment is rendered, the lover court is called upon to execute the judgment or decree as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision, as affirmed or modified on appeal by this Court, regardless of any inconsistency between the decree and the body of the opinion or of any deficiency, be they real or imagined. Thus, this Court has always ruled that the lower courts cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the final judgment of the higher court. Yet, the respondent judge did just this in his Order of February 2, 1966, stating "that the interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision cannot be made by a mere mathematical process of substraction (of the Dizons) but rather by understanding its rulings which will control in the interpretation of the decision." The majority resolution's sanctioning of this action of respondent judge and upholding of his interpretation of this Court's decision as correct instead of enforcing the cardinal principle that his is the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution of the judgment as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision and any alleged doubts as to the correct interpretation of this Court's judgment in the case must be obtained from this Court exclusively by the party adversely affected thereby — opens the floodgates to endless litigations and judicial chaos, with the litigants exploiting every little gap in the decision on appeal, and each judge making his own subjective interpretation of the same in accordance with his understanding of the rulings, and reviewing, as respondent judge did, even the motions for reconsideration filed with this Court in the appealed case and the pronouncements, or lack thereof, of this Court on the litigants' respective contentions.

I vote, therefore, to maintain the decision at bar and to deny respondents' second and supplemental second motions for reconsideration.

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Footnotes

1 At page 24; note in parentheses supplied; see also Justice Barredo's concurring opinion, at page 18.

2 98 Phil. 942 (April 28, 1956).

3 Republic vs. Ayala y Cia L-20950, 14 SCRA 259, 263.

4 Dizon vs. Bayona. 98 Phil. 942, 944.

5 Idem, at pp. 948-949.

5a Justice Barredo's concurring op. at p. 15, notes in parentheses supplied.

6 Republic vs. Ayala vs. Cia., L-20950 14 SCRA 259, 262.

7 Idem. at page 263.

8 Justice Barredo's concurring op., at page 20.

9 Idem, at page 18.

10 98 Phil. 688.

11 Justice Barredo's concurring op., pp. 9, 11, 12 and 15; See also majority resolution, pp. 15-17.

12 Rollo, Case L-20950, p. 246.

13 Respondent's Brief in L-20950, pp. 88-89; emphasis supplied.

14 Emphasis copied from brief, pp. 95-96.

15 Emphasis copied from brief, pp. 98-99.

16 At page 105, emphasis supplied.

17 Main resolution, at page 20.

18 Majority Resolution, at page 5.

19 Justice Barredo's concurring opinion, at page 18.

20 Majority resolution, at page 24.

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